MARK ANTHONY PRICE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 30, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000652-MR
MARK ANTHONY PRICE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE FRED A. STINE V, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00095
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: HOWARD AND STUMBO, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HOWARD, JUDGE: Mark Anthony Price (hereinafter Price) appeals from the order of
the Campbell Circuit Court denying his motion, pursuant to RCr 11.42, to set aside his
criminal conviction for theft by unlawful taking over $300 and for being a persistent
felony offender in the first degree. Finding no error, we affirm.
Price was indicted by the Campbell County Grand Jury on March 23, 2001,
charging him with theft by unlawful taking over $300 and with being a persistent felony
1
Senior Judge David Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
offender in the first degree. He was convicted by a jury after a trial which commenced on
November 29, 2001, and was sentenced by the Campbell Circuit Court on February 12,
2002, to serve seventeen years' imprisonment. On direct appeal, we affirmed that
judgment and sentence, by an unpublished opinion,2 rendered July 11, 2003. The
Kentucky Supreme Court denied discretionary review.3 In our opinion, we summarized
the pertinent facts of the case as follows:
On January 22, 2001, Michael Roberts was performing
construction work outside the Mansion Hill Tavern in
Newport, Kentucky. He owned a 1992 Chevrolet Silvarado
pickup truck which he had parked leaving the keys inside.
After an employee of the tavern arrived, Roberts stepped
inside to get warm. Price entered the bar, used the restroom,
and exited. Shortly thereafter, the employee told Roberts that
someone had entered his truck. After Roberts looked out the
window and saw someone sitting in his truck, he walked
outside and approached the passenger side of the truck. He
saw Price sitting in the driver's seat. Price then backed up the
truck and hit an older light blue Cadillac. He sped off and the
Cadillac, driven by a woman, followed. Roberts notified
police of the theft.
On January 23, 2001, Cincinnati Police Officer David Ivey
received a tip regarding a stolen vehicle and went to 2585
Eastern Avenue, Apartment B, and knocked on the door.
Loretta Fischer answered, and after obtaining consent, the
officer went to the garage area where he found Roberts' truck.
Detective Flowers of the Newport Police Department and
Roberts went to the Cincinnati address where the truck was
found and observed a light blue Cadillac with a Kentucky
license plate registered in Kenton County. Based on the
registration information, Detective Flowers obtained a copy
2
Price v. Commonwealth, 2002-CA-000428-MR.
3
Price v. Commonwealth, 2003-SC-0571-D.
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of Price's driver's license photograph. Upon Roberts being
able to pick Price from a photo lineup, Price was arrested.
At Price's trial the Commonwealth introduced, through
Debbie Lynn, Deputy Clerk of the Kenton County Clerk's
Office, that a proof of insurance document is a document
regularly kept and maintained by the clerk's office and is
required to be presented when a person registers a vehicle in
Kentucky. Price's proof of insurance for a 1988 Cadillac,
license number 217-BEB, listed Price's address as 2585
Eastern Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio, and the insurance
company was Buyers Choice Insurance. She further testified
that Price, the owner of the vehicle, supplied her office with
this information.
On August 26, 2004, after his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal,
Price filed a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42, alleging that his trial counsel was
constitutionally deficient and provided ineffective assistance. The trial court appointed
counsel to assist Price on the motion and conducted an evidentiary hearing. The court
heard testimony from two witnesses; Price's trial counsel, Patrick Walsh, Esq., and Kim
McVey, the employee of the bar who was present at the time of the offense. After the
hearing, the motion was overruled. This appeal followed.
The Department of Public Advocacy was initially ordered to represent Price
for purposes of this appeal. After a review of the record, the Department of Public
Advocacy moved to be relieved from the case, indicating that the appeal was “not a
proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his
own expense.” KRS 31.110(2)(c). The request to withdraw was granted by this Court
and Price has proceeded with this appeal pro se.
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On appeal, Price raises three issues: first, whether counsel provided
ineffective assistance when he failed to interview or call the bar employee as a witness at
trial; second, whether counsel provided ineffective assistance in response to evidence
relating to Price's ownership of the Cadillac and a proof of insurance record disclosing an
address in Cincinnati; and third, whether counsel failed to effectively challenge the
persistent felony offender charge. We have reviewed each argument and the record, in
detail, and find no error.
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Price
must show that counsel's performance was deficient to such an extent that the integrity of
the trial was impaired. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The standard which must be met to show ineffective assistance of
counsel in Kentucky, under RCr 11.42, was discussed at length by the Kentucky Supreme
Court in Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436 (Ky. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
998, 122 S.Ct. 471, 151 L.Ed.2d. 386 (2001):
The standards which measure ineffective assistance of
counsel are set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); . . . In order to be
ineffective, performance of counsel must be below the
objective standard of reasonableness and so prejudicial as to
deprive a defendant of a fair trial and a reasonable result. . . .
“Counsel is constitutionally ineffective only if performance
below professional standards caused the defendant to lose
what he otherwise would probably have won.” United States
v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992). The critical
issue is not whether counsel made errors but whether counsel
was so thoroughly ineffective that defeat was snatched from
the hands of probable victory.
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Haight, 41 S.W.3d at 441.
Mr. Walsh, Price's trial counsel, testified at the evidentiary hearing that
although the name of the bar employee, Ms. McVey, was listed in his file, he did not
remember talking to her. She testified that she had never been interviewed by counsel
prior to the trial. However, the record does not support Price's assertion that Ms.
McVey's testimony would have created an alibi or exonerated him. She testified at the
hearing that although she remembered a man entering the bar to use the restroom she
could not say whether or not it was Price. She did not see the person who stole the truck.
She did, however, see Mr. Roberts, the owner of the truck, go outside and approach the
passenger side of the truck before it drove off. We agree with the finding of the trial
court that her testimony would have been equivocal at best, and may have tended to
support Roberts' testimony, rather than refute it as Price claims. It would have been well
within the realm of legitimate trial strategy to have chosen not to call her as a witness.
See Dorton v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117 (Ky. 1968). Counsel was not ineffective
in this regard.
Price next claims that counsel was ineffective because he failed to challenge
evidence relating to the location where police found the stolen truck, along with a light
blue Cadillac registered in his name. Records were introduced, through the testimony of
a Kenton County Deputy Clerk, that Price's proof of insurance, filed with that office,
listed the address in Cincinnati where the vehicles were found as his address. Price
contends that this proof of insurance record should not have been admitted because it was
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not provided through discovery prior to trial and was thrust upon counsel by surprise, but
that counsel failed to object to its introduction. He also argues that the proof of insurance
contained hearsay. This second argument was raised and rejected, both at trial and on his
first appeal. RCr 11.42 is not available to raise issues that either were or could have been
raised on direct appeal. Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1983).
The record refutes the claim that trial counsel was surprised, or that there
was any basis for objection to the introduction of the proof of insurance record. Mr.
Walsh testified that he requested discovery through the proper mechanisms and that the
Campbell County Commonwealth's Attorney had an “open file policy” regarding
discovery. See RCr 7.24; RCr 7.26. He testified that his file contained information from
the prosecutor listing witnesses, and that among them was the Kenton County Clerk who
was “to bring registration information as of January 2, 2001, on Cadillac auto 217-BEB.”
The fact that the actual document was not provided either to the prosecutor or to defense
counsel until the day of trial, when it was brought from a neighboring county by the
deputy clerk, is of no consequence. The record reflects that counsel's actions in
conducting discovery were not lacking and that he was not surprised in this regard. It is
not ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to object to admissible evidence. Bowling v.
Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405 (Ky. 2002). The contention that counsel provided
ineffective assistance in this regard is without merit.
Price's final argument is that the indictment, as it related to the persistent
felony offender charge, was deficient and that counsel failed to object or move to dismiss
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this charge. An indictment is sufficient if it “informs the accused of the specific offense
which is charged and does not mislead the accused.” Parrish v. Commonwealth, 121
S.W.3d 198, 202 (Ky. 2003). The indictment was in narrative form and, as Price points
out, did not list each specific prior offense used to justify the charge of being a persistent
felony offender. But there is no requirement as to how specific an indictment must be, so
long as it is sufficient to provide notice of the charges. This indictment meets that
criteria.
Counsel testified that he was provided and reviewed, before trial, the
certified records of all of Price's prior felony convictions. The record discloses the
specifics of six prior felony convictions which were presented during the penalty phase of
the trial. Price does not collaterally attack any of those prior convictions. There was no
error in the indictment. Counsel provided effective assistance as it relates to the
persistent felony offender charge.
We will not disturb the trial court's ruling regarding a RCr 11.42 motion
absent a showing that it was clearly erroneous. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 180 S.W.3d
494 (Ky.App. 2005). We find nothing in the record to indicate there was any error in the
ruling denying Price's motion in this case.
The Order of the Campbell Circuit Court denying Price's RCr 11.42 motion
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Mark Anthony Price, pro se
Eddyville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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