R & J DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, TRANSPORTATION CABINET, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS and FAST LANE DISCOUNT TOBACCO OUTLET, INC. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, TRANSPORTATION CABINET, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
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RENDERED: JUNE 29, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000480-MR
R & J DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC
v.
APPEAL FROM ROWAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00068
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
TRANSPORTATION CABINET,
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
AND:
APPELLEE
NO. 2006-CA-000508-MR
FAST LANE DISCOUNT
TOBACCO OUTLET, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ROWAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00068
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
TRANSPORTATION CABINET,
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ABRAMSON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: R & J Development Company, LLC (R & J) brings Appeal No.
2006-CA-000480-MR and Fast Lane Discount Tobacco Outlet, Inc. (Fast Lane) brings
Appeal No. 2006-CA-000508-MR from a January 20, 2006, judgment upon a jury trial
adjudicating the fair market value and the fair market lease value of property taken by the
Commonwealth through condemnation. We affirm in both appeals.
The Commonwealth instituted a condemnation proceeding by filing a
petition in the Rowan Circuit Court for the purposes of acquiring a .837 acre tract of land
in fee simple from R & J. The record reveals that a building was situated upon the land
where a tobacco outlet store was being operated by Fast Lane. R & J had leased the
property to Fast Lane for this purpose.
Commissioners were appointed and eventually fixed the fair market value
of the property at $250,000.00. Being dissatisfied with the commissioners' valuation, R
& J filed an answer to the condemnation complaint. Therein, R & J specifically
“excepted” to the commissioners' valuation and requested a jury trial. R & J also filed a
motion to join Fast Lane as an additional real party in interest alleging that Fast Lane held
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
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a long-term lease upon the subject property. The court eventually granted the motion to
join Fast Lane as a defendant. A trial by jury was held, and the jury returned a verdict
finding the fair market value of the property without the lease to be $265,000.00 and the
fair market value subject to the lease to be $245,000.00. In accordance with the jury
verdict, R & J was awarded $245,000.00 representing the fair market value of its fee
simple interest in the land and Fast Lane received $20,000.00 representing the fair market
value of the lease. Being dissatisfied with the award, both R & J and Fast Lane have filed
appeals, which have been consolidated for our review.
Standard of Review
The primary errors asserted in both appeals look to various evidentiary
rulings made by the trial court. The proper standard of review of a trial court's
evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11
S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2000). This same standard applies under the Kentucky Rules of
Evidence, including the testimony of expert witnesses under Ky. R. Evid. (KRE) 702.
Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1995)(overruled on other grounds).
In performing our review, the decision below must be affirmed unless the
jury verdict rendered is “palpably or flagrantly against the weight of the evidence so as to
indicate it was reached as a result of passion or prejudice.” Lewis v. Bledsoe Surface
Mining Co., 798 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Ky. 1990). This standard will be applied accordingly
to both appeals.
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Appeal No. 2006-CA-000480-MR
R & J contends that the circuit court committed reversible error by both
admitting and excluding certain items of evidence at trial. R & J names three specific
contentions of error: (1) the court erred by admitting evidence of the initial purchase price
($175,000.00) paid by R & J when it acquired the property in 1995; (2) the court erred in
admitting evidence concerning the tax assessed value of the property; and (3) the court
erred in excluding evidence by R & J concerning the cost of improvements upon the
property after its purchase in 1995. We shall address these issues seriatim.
In Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Whitledge, 406 S.W.2d 833
(Ky. 1966), the Court was faced with the question of whether evidence of the purchase
price of property paid some five years and two months prior to its condemnation was
admissible to measure the fair market value of the property at the time of condemnation.
The Court ultimately concluded that the purchase price was admissible. In so
concluding, the Court held:
In Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain (3rd Ed.), Vol. 5,
sec. 21.2, pp. 411 through 414, it is pointed out that the price
paid for property which is the subject of condemnation is
admissible, if these conditions are satisfied: The sale was
bona fide; the sale was voluntary, not forced; the sale
occurred relatively in point of time; and the sale covered
substantially the same property involved in the condemnation
proceeding. In the case of Taylor, etc. v. State Roads
Commission of Maryland, 224 Md. 92, 167 A.2d 127, the fact
that a sale of similar property was made five years, one and
one-half months prior to the commencement of the action to
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condemn did not render evidence of that sale inadmissible in
such condemnation proceeding.
Commonwealth v. Whitledge, 406 S.W.2d at 836. Under the holding of Whitledge, the
purchase price of condemned property is admissible if (1) the sale is bona fide; (2) the
sale is voluntary; (3) the sale occurred relative in time to the condemnation; and (4) the
sale involved substantially the same property. Id.
In the case at hand, R & J argues that the sale of the property was neither
relative in time because it took place in 1995, some six years prior to condemnation, nor
was substantially the same property because of extensive remodeling. We disagree.
In Whitledge, the Court admitted into evidence the purchase price of
property some five years and two months before condemnation. Here, we do not believe
that the passage of six years rendered the sale too remote in time to be admissible.
Moreover, we cannot say that the mere remodeling of property affects whether it is
“substantially” the same property under the factors set forth in Whitledge. Most
importantly, we are guided by the following statement in Whitledge:
We think it the better policy, where there are any reasonable
elements of comparability, to admit testimony as to the sales,
and leave the weight of the comparison for the consideration
of the jury, along with such distinguishing features as may be
brought out on cross-examination or otherwise.
Id. at 836 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err by
admitting into evidence the purchase price or sale price paid by R & J for the property in
1995.
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R & J also contends that it was reversible error to admit into evidence the
tax valuation of the property. The Commonwealth introduced into evidence the taxable
value of the property as fixed by the Rowan County Property Valuation Administrator.
The property's tax assessed value was $175,000.00.
As a general rule, the tax assessed value of property is generally
inadmissible in a condemnation proceeding to prove the fair market value of the property.
Mengel Properties v. City of Louisville, 400 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. 1966); Milby v. Louisville
Gas & Electric Company, 375 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1964). However, an exception to this
rule is recognized in Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Rankin, 346 S.W.2d
714 (Ky. 1960). Therein, the Court held that the tax assessed value of land is admissible
in a condemnation action where the owner fixed or assented to the valuation. The Court
in Rankin stated:
Evidence as to assessed valuation of land when fixed by the
owner is competent in a condemnation action for the purpose
of acquiring state highway right of way. Commonwealth, by
State Highway Comm. v. Combs, 229 Ky. 627, 17 S.W.2d
748; Davidson v. Commonwealth, 249 Ky. 568, 61 S.W.2d
34; Commonwealth v. Salyers, 258 Ky. 837, 81 S.W.2d 859.
In determining the value of land taken for highway purposes,
such assessed value, though not conclusive, can be considered
in connection with other evidence of value of the property.
Crittenden County v. Towery, 264 Ky. 606, 95 S.W.2d 233.
Such evidence is admissible on the theory that it is an
admission against interest when the value shown is fixed by
the landowner. Commonwealth v. Gilbert, Ky., 253 S.W.2d
264. When a landowner signs an assessment list of his
property which contains an evaluation of such property, as the
landowner did here, he will not be heard to say that he has not
fixed the value of his property.
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Id. at 716-717. As the landowner signed an assessment list that contained a valuation of
his property, the Rankin Court held that such tax valuation was properly admissible.
In this case, the Commonwealth notes that R & J signed the consideration
certificate contained in the 1995 deed of conveyance.2 Pursuant to this certificate, R & J
made a sworn statement that the property was worth $175,000.00 in 1995. The Rowan
County PVA placed this value on the property for taxation purposes. Given these facts,
we agree with the Commonwealth and believe that the tax assessed value of the property
was properly admissible. See Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Rankin, 346
S.W.2d 714.
R & J's final argument is that the circuit court committed reversible error by
excluding evidence outlining the cost of improvements made upon the property after its
purchase in 1995. In its reply brief, R & J comments:
The [Commonwealth] states that by not putting the
itemized cost into evidence by avowal amounts to a waiver.
This confuses the point. The court ruled that the parties were
not allowed to place this into evidence before the jury and it
would have made no difference that it was not placed in by
avowal, as that would not have any bearing on what the jury's
verdict would have been.
R & J's Reply Brief at 3. We believe R & J has misinterpreted the law.
The proper procedure for preserving a claim of error relating to the
exclusion of evidence is found in KRE 103(a)(2).3 To preserve an allegation of error
2
A consideration certificate in a deed is required by KRS 382.135. The certificate is a sworn,
notarized statement by the grantor and grantee that the consideration reflected in the deed is the
full consideration paid for the property.
3
Ky. R. Evid. 103(a)(2) reads:
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regarding the exclusion of evidence, it is incumbent upon the party to request the circuit
court to enter the evidence excluded into the record by avowal or by counsel offering a
proffer of the evidence. KRE 103(a)(2); Hart v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 481 (Ky.
2003). In Hart, the Kentucky Supreme Court noted that “[a]ppellate courts review
records; they do not have crystal balls.” Id. at 484 (quoting Commonwealth v. Ferrell, 17
S.W.3d 520, 525 (Ky. 2000)). Without having this evidence before us, we have no way
to determine whether exclusion of the evidence was prejudicial to R & J. Moreover, R &
J admits that it did not request the excluded evidence to be entered into the record by
avowal or by proffer. Thus, the issue concerning the exclusion of such evidence was not
properly preserved for our review. See id., 116 S.W.3d 481.
In sum, we affirm in Appeal No. 2006-CA-000480-MR.
Appeal No. 2006-CA-000508-MR
Fast Lane contends the circuit court committed reversible error by
admitting into evidence the testimony of two appraisal witnesses for the Commonwealth,
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right
of the party is affected; and
....
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence,
upon request of the examining attorney, the witness may make
a specific offer of his answer to the question.
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William Berkley and Joe Robinson. Specifically, Fast Lane alleges that Berkley and
Robinson failed to follow Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Sherrod, 367
S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1963) in rendering their opinions concerning the fair market value of
Fast Lane's lease with R & J. Neither Robinson nor Berkley appraised any value for the
lease because, in their opinion, the lease was not the result of an arm's-length transaction.
Under Sherrod, Fast Lane argues that the fair market value of a lease should be based
upon whether the rental price paid by the lessee is equal to or above the fair market rental
value of the subject property. As Robinson and Berkley assigned no value to the lease
due to the lack of an arm's-length transaction, Fast Lane maintains that their appraisal
testimony should have been excluded by the circuit court. We disagree.
In Sherrod, the Court held:
[T]he market value of the lease can easily be ascertained by
determining what the whole property would sell for free of
the lease, and what it would sell for subject to the lease-the
difference is the value of the lease. (Of course, if the lease
were disadvantageous to the lessee it would have no value,
because the land would not sell for less subject to the lease,
but for more.)
Id. at 849. According to Sherrod, the fair market value of a lease is determined by
comparing the rental rate paid under the lease to the fair market rental rate in the
community. If the lease is advantageous to the lessee and the lessee is paying less than
the fair market rental rate, the lease would have value upon condemnation. On the other
hand, if the lease is disadvantageous to the lessee and the lessee is paying a higher rental
rate, the lease would have no value upon condemnation.
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In this case, Robinson and Berkley testified that the lease was not the result
of an arm's-length transaction between Fast Lane and R & J. In support thereof, they
testified that Fast Lane was paying a rental rate far higher than the fair market rental rate
in the area. Robinson specifically testified that Fast Lane was paying $1,600.00 per
month according to the lease terms and that the fair market rental value was $900.00 per
month in his opinion. Berkley also testified that the lease rate was higher than the fair
market lease rate in the area and was favorable to R & J. Thus, Robinson and Berkley
opined that the lease was disadvantageous to Fast Lane. The above testimony is
sufficient to support Robinson and Berkley's opinion that the lease had no value under the
principles announced in Sherrod. Based upon the testimony of Robinson and Berkley,
we are of the opinion that the appraisal testimony was properly admitted.
Next, Fast Lane contends:
The verdict of the trial court below should be reversed
because of the blatant appeal by representatives of the State
Highway Department to the passion and prejudice of the jury
which so permeated the trial that it prevented this appellant
from receiving a fair and impartial verdict.
Fast Lane's Brief at 8. Fast Lane argues that the Commonwealth repeatedly made
derogatory remarks concerning Jim Booth, who held an ownership interest in both R & J
and Fast Lane. Fast Lane contends that the Commonwealth referred to Booth as a
wealthy man who resided in the second largest mansion in the county. We observe that
some of those comments were made at a prehearing conference outside the hearing of the
jury. Fast Lane also maintains that the Commonwealth's closing argument was improper
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for stating that R & J and Fast Lane were trying to raid the coffers of the Commonwealth,
that R & J and Fast Lane were really on the same side, and the lease between them was
basically a sham created for tax purposes.
The Kentucky Supreme Court recently reemphasized the position that our
Courts give broad latitude in allowing counsel to present a case to the jury. Morgan v.
Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 99 (Ky. 2006). A trial will not be reversed based upon
closing arguments unless the statements made render the entire trial fundamentally unfair.
Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787 (Ky. 2001). Given the totality of the evidence
presented to the jury in this case, we do not believe that the admission of these statements
constituted reversible error. See also KRE 103(a). Stated differently, we cannot say that
absent their admission the jury's verdict would have been different. See Crane v.
Commonwealth, 726 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1987). To the extent these statements were
improper, we conclude the error to be harmless.4 Accordingly, we hold that the circuit
court did not commit reversible error regarding the alleged error below.
4
We note that Fast Lane Discount Tobacco Outlet, Inc's counsel did not make a
contemporaneous objection to the statements made by opposing counsel in closing argument.
Rather, counsel waited until the jury had been dismissed to move for a mistrial, based upon the
prejudicial statements made during closing argument. In this instance, the trial court was not
given the opportunity to rule on any objectionable statements or admonish the jury, if deemed
necessary. However, the Court does acknowledge that the Commonwealth did attempt to place
the jury in the position of being the protector of the “state coffers,” implying that the jury
effectively controlled disbursements from the state treasury. We note that this is the function of
the executive and legislative branches of state government, not juries, and such an argument may
be analogous to the “golden rule” argument in criminal cases where prosecutors ask jurors to
place themselves in the victim's position and rule accordingly. We strongly caution the
Commonwealth against this practice in future cases.
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Fast Lane further argues that the circuit court committed reversible error by
admitting Robinson's testimony concerning a comparable sale involving Viking Food
Mart, Inc. The Viking Food Mart sale was used by other appraisers at trial as a
comparable sale in reaching the fair market value of the condemned property. It was
Robinson's opinion that the Viking Food Mart sale should not be used as a comparable
sale. He testified that the sale involved a tax free exchange among three properties. Fast
Lane argues that Robinson had no “first-hand knowledge” as to whether the Viking Food
Mart sale was a tax free exchange involving three separate properties. As such, Fast
Lane contends that the circuit court committed reversible error by admitting this
testimony.
It is well-established that a primary responsibility of a jury is to determine
the weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses. Tuttle v. Perry, 82 S.W.3d 920 (Ky.
2002). The jury heard Robinson's testimony, and based upon Fast Lane's argument
above, Robinson should have been easily impeached. The credibility of this witness was
clearly placed before the jury, which we will not second guess on appeal. Even if we
were to agree that this testimony was erroneously admitted, we are unable to conclude
that absent its admission the jury's verdict would have been different. See Crane v.
Commonwealth, 726 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1987). Thus, we hold that the circuit court did not
commit reversible error in admitting Robinson's testimony. See KRE 103(a).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Rowan Circuit Court in
Appeal Nos. 2006-CA-000480-MR and 2006-CA-000508-MR is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT R & J DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, LLC:
COMBINED BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Phillip K. Wicker
Jon H. Johnson
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
John R. McGinnis
Greenup, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT FAST LANE DISCOUNT
TOBACCO OUTLET, INC.:
Jon H. Johnson
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
Roger R. Cantrell
Greenup, Kentucky
- 13 -
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