SHERRI SMITH (NOW WILSON) v. CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 2, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000443-MR
SHERRI SMITH (NOW WILSON)
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-00160
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON AND WINE, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
WINE, JUDGE: Sherri L. Smith Wilson (“Wilson”) appeals from an order of the Fayette
Circuit Court dismissing her complaint alleging racial discrimination and granting a
summary judgment on February 10, 2006, in favor of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Cabinet for Health and Family Services (“CHFS”). After reviewing the parties’ briefs,
including the pleadings filed with the circuit court, and having considered the deposition
of the appellant, we affirm the judgment below.
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
The underlying facts are not in dispute. Wilson graduated from the
University of Louisville in August 1986 with a Bachelor of Science Degree in
Correctional Administration. At the time of her deposition in March 2005, she had been
accepted into a graduate program at Kentucky State University, seeking a Master’s
Degree in Public Administration. Although she attended some post-graduate courses
while working for the Commonwealth of Kentucky (“Commonwealth”), she never
received any additional degrees. Beginning in 1986, Wilson worked as a probation and
parole officer with the Department of Corrections in the Justice Cabinet. She wrote presentence investigation reports, worked with a program designed to help inmates transition
back into the community and served as a juvenile counselor.
In June 2000, Wilson began work with CHFS as a Social Services Clinician
I. She was a member of a foster care team where her responsibilities included
interviewing foster parents and monitoring the status of children placed in foster care in
Fayette County. In January 2001, she transferred back to the Department of Corrections,
only to return to CHFS on April 15, 2001, where she was assigned to Franklin County.
In July 2002, Wilson applied for a position with CHFS’s Central Intake, a
department assigned the responsibility of receiving complaints concerning child abuse.
When informed the position would result in a reduction in pay, Wilson withdrew her
application. In December 2002, Wilson applied and interviewed for the position of Field
Office Supervisor of a foster care team, also a position with CHFS. The minimum
requirements for the position included: (1) a Master’s Degree in Social Work, Sociology,
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Psychology or related field; and (2) four years of social work experience. Although a
Bachelor’s Degree and two years of professional social work could be substituted for the
Master’s Degree, the position announcement stressed the clear preference for a Master’s
Degree in Social Work. Wilson was not hired and instead a Caucasian female with a
Master’s Degree in Social Work, whom Wilson insists was less qualified than she, was
hired. In her deposition, Wilson admitted she was not familiar with the other applicant’s
work history except that she had not worked in foster care. Wilson also complained that
the interviewing panel was entirely Caucasian and the individual hired actually helped
conduct the interview. Wilson further alleges that a CHFS supervisor told her she would
never be hired in a position within foster care because she had developed a reputation
“for being confrontational.”
Wilson also applied for a position on a Permanency Team with CHFS in
December 2002. The vacancy was filled by an Arab-American whom Wilson claimed
not only was not as qualified as herself but, contrary to CHFS policy, was hired from
outside of the agency. Once again in her deposition, Wilson admitted she was not
familiar with the other candidate’s education or employment history.
Subsequently in June 2003, Wilson applied for a position in CHFS as a
Field Office Supervisor of the Central Intake Team. The requirements for this position
were the same as those for the foster care team supervisor position. Again, a Caucasian
female, whom Wilson asserts was less qualified but who had more years of experience
with CHFS and also had Master’s Degree in Social Work, was hired instead of her.
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In January 2005, Wilson filed her complaint in the Fayette Circuit Court
alleging she had been a victim of intentional and illegal racial discrimination. On August
10, 2006, the trial court granted summary judgment, finding Wilson had failed to
establish a prima facie case of race discrimination because she was not as qualified as the
other applicants who were hired.
The standard of review on appeal when a trial court grants a motion for
summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found there were no genuine issues
as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Palmer v. International Ass’n of Machinists, 882 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Ky. 1994);
Stewart v. University of Louisville, 65 S.W.3d 536, 540 (Ky.App. 2001); CR 56.03. The
movant bears the initial burden of convincing the court by evidence of record that no
genuine issue of fact is in dispute, and then the burden shifts to the party opposing
summary judgment to present “at least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a
genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.,
807 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Ky. 1991); see also City of Florence, Kentucky v. Chipman, 38
S.W.3d 387, 390 (Ky. 2001). The court must view the record in the light most favorable
to the nonmovant and resolve all doubts in her favor. Commonwealth v. Whitworth, 74
S.W.3d 695, 698 (Ky. 2002); Lipsteuer v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 732, 736
(Ky. 2000). “The inquiry should be whether, from the evidence of record, facts exist
which would make it possible for the non-moving party to prevail. In the analysis, the
focus should be on what is of record rather than what might be presented at trial.” Welch
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v. American Publishing Co. of Kentucky, 3 S.W.3d 724, 730 (Ky. 1999); see also Murphy
v. Second Street Corp., 48 S.W.3d 571, 573 (Ky.App. 2001). As an appellate court, we
need not defer to the trial court’s decision on summary judgment and will review the
issue de novo as only legal questions are involved. Hallahan v. The Courier Journal, 138
S.W.3d 699, 704-05 (Ky.App. 2004).
Discrimination in the terms, conditions, compensation, and privileges of
employment on the basis of race is illegal pursuant to the Kentucky Civil Rights Act,
KRS 344.010 et seq. Because Kentucky’s Civil Rights Act was modeled after and
mirrors the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, Kentucky state courts often rely on federal
case law in deciding these cases. Howard Baer, Inc. v. Schave, 127 S.W.3d 589, 592
( Ky. 2003); Jefferson County v. Zaring, 91 S.W.3d 583, 590 (Ky. 2002).
The United States Supreme Court has established that an employee
claiming racial discrimination in hiring or promotion must demonstrate, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the following:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications,
he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant’s
qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824, 36
L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).
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In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
358 n. 44, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1866, 52 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1977), the Court explained that, under
McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must show that his rejection is not attributable to “the two
most common legitimate reasons on which an employer might rely to reject a job
applicant: an absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in the
job sought.”
The issues then are: (1) was Wilson qualified for the various positions she
sought; and (2) if qualified was the failure to promote or hire the result of racial
discrimination.
An employer does not illegally discriminate when it chooses, for nonracial
reasons, one equally qualified candidate over another, much less when one lacks the
necessary announced qualifications as did Wilson. As the Federal Court held in Wrenn v.
Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 1987):
It may be worthwhile to note here that Title VII does
not diminish lawful traditional management prerogatives in
choosing among qualified candidates, United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 207, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 2729,
61 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979). So long as its reasons are not
discriminatory, an employer is free to choose among qualified
candidates, Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259, 101 S.Ct. at 1096;
Canham, 666 F.2d at 1061; Leiberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60,
67 (2d Cir. 1980). An employer has even greater flexibility in
choosing a management-level employee, as is the case here,
because of the nature of such a position. Ackerman v.
Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 70 (6th Cir.1982).
See also Manson v. Continental Illinois National Bank, 704
F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1983); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d
1003 (1st Cir. 1979); Frausto v. Legal Aid Society of San
Diego, Inc., 563 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Wilson concedes she did not have a Master’s Degree in any field, including
social work. However, she argues that because she has a Bachelor of Science Degree in
Correctional Administration, she could substitute that with two years of social work
experience for a Master’s Degree. Even with her two years of experience, an additional
four years would have been required. Although she was never hired as a social worker,
Wilson argues her work experience qualified as social work. She points to her
experience as director of Volunteers in Corrections (“VIC”), a program designed to help
felons assimilate back into society. From her deposition, it appears this position lasted
approximately one year. She also actively supervised felons on probation or parole for
approximately three to four months. Wilson also worked as a counselor with juveniles at
the Cisco Road Juvenile Detention Facility for three years. However, this was a part-time
position usually only working on Saturdays. Wilson argues that all of her work as a
probation and parole officer should satisfy the social work requirement. CHFS
challenges this assertion. However, even assuming she qualified for the position utilizing
the work experience as a substitution for the education component, the two applicants
hired both had a Master’s Degree in Social Work, the stated preference for both the
Central Intake and Service Office Supervisor positions.
The trial court found Wilson was not qualified and stopped any further
inquiry. However, even assuming Wilson was qualified for any of the positions she
sought, the next question is whether CHFS discriminated against Wilson based on her
race.
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A plaintiff has two means of proving intentional racial discrimination,
either by direct evidence of discrimination or by circumstantial evidence from which
discrimination can be inferred. Kline v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 128 F.3d 337, 348
(6th Cir. 1997). Further, once a member of a protected class has made a prima facie
showing of racial discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decisions. Then, the minority employee is
given an opportunity to show that the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason is only a
pretext.
Wilson argues there is direct evidence of racial discrimination because her
supervisor said she had a confrontational attitude, citing Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F.3d
636 (8th Cir. 2002). However, Mohr can be easily distinguished. In Mohr, the
supervisor had direct involvement in the decision not to hire Mohr. Here, there is no
proof that Wilson’s supervisor was involved in the decision-making process. Wilson
further argues concerns of other African-Americans—that minorities are treated unfairly,2
hiring minorities inter-agency rather than intra-agency, and irregularities in one interview
process—are all indirect evidence of racial discrimination. Thus, she argues that while
she lacked the stated and preferred qualification of a Master’s Degree in Social Work,
circumstantial or indirect evidence of discrimination creates a question of “mixed
motives”as to CHFS’s refusal to promote or laterally transfer her. In First Property
2
Based on a page from a 2003 Employee Satisfaction Survey included as exhibit 8 to CHFS’s
motion for summary judgment, which was provided by Wilson in discovery.
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Management Corp. v. Zarebidaki, 867 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Ky. 1993), the Kentucky
Supreme Court held:
We recognize that in 1991 the Federal Civil Rights Act
was amended to make it clear, if it wasn’t already, that the
plaintiff need only show that one of the grounds for discharge
declared unlawful by the Federal Civil Rights Act was “a
motivating factor,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), which may (or
may not) mean something different than the standard stated
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse and by our
Court in Meyers. Thus, in cases under the Federal Civil
Rights Act, if so-called “mixed motives” are involved, the
plaintiff has only the burden of showing an “unlawful
employment practice . . . was a motivating factor,” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(m), whereupon the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to avoid liability by showing that the same
employment decision would have been made “in the absence
of the impermissible motivating factor.”
An obvious disparity in qualifications which favored Wilson would be
evidence that the nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual. Odom v. Frank, 3 F.3d 839
(5th Cir. 1993). No such disparity is evident, and Wilson failed to offer any evidence that
CHFS’s reasons for promoting any of the other women instead of her were a pretext for
racial discrimination. Wilson does not dispute that the other women had the necessary
Master’s Degree in Social Work. Rather she tries to substitute her Bachelor of Science
Degree and work experience for the Master’s Degree requirement. However she offered
no evidence other than her own beliefs that her personal work experience could be
substituted for the stated requirement of six years of social work. Absent four years of
social work experience and a Bachelor’s Degree, Wilson would not have had the
prerequisite education equivalent for a Master’s Degree.
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While Wilson questioned the qualifications of the other women who were
hired or promoted instead of her, she produced no evidence other than her own
speculation that they did not possess the necessary qualifications. While she challenged
the racial composition of the panel that interviewed her, again, she presented no evidence
that such a panel must be racially diverse. Finally, while CHFS may have a stated policy
of preferring to promote inter-agency as opposed to hiring from outside the Cabinet,
Wilson cites no statute, regulation or case law that mandates such a practice. To defeat a
motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce at least some
affirmative evidence showing there is some material issue of fact for trial. Lewis v.
B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky.App. 2001).
Accordingly, because Wilson offered no evidence of any unlawful or
discriminatory employment practices and because she lacked the necessary qualifications,
both preferred and mandatory for the positions she sought, the opinion and order of the
Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Edward E. Dove
Lexington, Kentucky
Ronald W. Crawford
Cabinet for Health and Family Services
Office of Legal Services
Frankfort, Kentucky
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