SUNNYSIDE HOMES OF ROCKLEDGE, INC. AND MICHAEL MORLEY v. JOE A. OWEN AND KAREN OWEN
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RENDERED: AUGUST 24, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000432-MR
SUNNYSIDE HOMES OF
ROCKLEDGE, INC. AND
MICHAEL MORLEY
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MARSHALL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENNIS R. FOUST, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00037
JOE A. OWEN AND
KAREN OWEN
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND VANMETER, JUDGES; GRAVES,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE: Sunnyside Homes of Rockledge, Inc. and Michael Morley appeal
from an order of Marshall Circuit Court granting a default judgment pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 37.02 in favor of Joe Owen and Karen Owen
(“the Owens”). We affirm.
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Senior Judge J. William Graves, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to
Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
The Owens, who are Kentucky residents, were two of the original investors
in the Sunnyside Homes corporation which develops assisted living communities in
Florida. In 2001, the Owens sold their interest in Sunnyside Homes to Avonlea Cottages,
LLC, a company owned by Morley and his business partners, who are all residents of
Utah. This appeal arises from a cross-claim filed by the Owens against Morley and his
partners in an underlying cause of action. In the original action, the Owens and the
principals of Avonlea Cottages, LLC were found liable as guarantors on a promissory
note executed by Sunnyside Homes. Marshall Circuit Court granted partial summary
judgment in favor of the creditor, and Sunnyside Homes, Morley, and his partners
appealed. A panel of this Court affirmed the partial summary judgment in an
unpublished opinion. Gordon v. Sunnyside Homes of Rockledge, 2004-CA-001719-MR
(March 10, 2006).
Other than Morley and the Owens, the principal defendants in the original
action became judgment proof due to bankruptcy. As such, the Owens prosecuted their
cross-claim against Sunnyside Homes and Morley, seeking indemnity for the Owens'
obligation on the promissory note. In March 2004, the Owens served interrogatories and
requests for production of documents upon Morley. Morley, who was represented by
attorneys in both Kentucky and Utah, failed to respond to the interrogatories.
In July 2004, the Owens filed a motion to compel discovery. On August
17, 2004, the court held a hearing on the motion to compel. Morley's Kentucky counsel
appeared. Counsel opined that communication with his client was difficult because
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Morley lived in Utah. The court issued an order compelling Morley to comply with the
Owens' discovery requests. The order specifically required:
full and complete responses to the outstanding discovery
requests propounded by Joe and Karen Owen not later than
August 23, 2004. Failure to do so will result in sanctions
including, but not limited to, prejudicial dismissal of all
claims filed herein by the defendants . . . .
Morley filed his answers to the interrogatories on August 26, 2004. However, none of
the requested documents were produced. Instead, Morley answered:
Given the volume of the requested documents, they are
available, upon reasonable notice for copying and inspection
at the offices of Kemp, Ison, Harton, Tilley & Holland, LLP.
The Owens made several attempts to set up a time to inspect the
documents, but received no response from Morley's attorney. More than a year later, the
documents still had not been made available for inspection. In December 2005, the
Owens moved the trial court to enter default judgment against Morley pursuant to CR
37.02 for failure to comply with the court's discovery order. Morley did not file a
response prior to the hearing, nor did he or his attorney attend the hearing.
On December 27, 2005, the court rendered a default judgment against
Morley. Soon thereafter, Morley moved the court to vacate the default judgment and
tendered a belated response to the Owens' motion. In January 2006, the court held a
hearing on Morley's motion and considered Morley's argument. In a written order, the
court denied Morley relief, and this appeal followed.
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CR 37.02 addresses a party's failure to comply with a court order. It states
in pertinent part:
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending.
If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit
discovery, including an order made under Rule 37.01 or Rule
35, the court in which the action is pending may make such
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others
the following:
***
(c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or
staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or
dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or
rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;
CR 37.02(2) (emphasis added).
Our standard of review is whether the Marshall Circuit Court abused its
discretion by entering a default judgment against Morley and Sunnyside Homes.
Greathouse v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 796 S.W.2d 868, 870 (Ky.App. 1990). As
such, we will not disturb the findings of the trial court unless the “decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v.
English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
Morley first argues the court erred in granting a default judgment because
his conduct was not willful or in bad faith. See Greathouse, 769 S.W.2d at 870. We
disagree.
In Greathouse, a panel of this Court emphasized that the trial court must
take care to “articulat[e] on the record . . . the court's resolution of the factual, legal, and
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discretionary issues presented.” Id., quoting Quality Prefabrication, Inc. v. Daniel J.
Keating Co., 675 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir. 1982). The Court also advised:
Among the factors to be considered in reviewing the
imposition of sanctions for an abuse of discretion, the
appellate court should consider: (1) whether the adversary
was prejudiced by the dismissed party's failure to cooperate in
discovery, (2) whether the dismissed party was warned that
failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal, and (3) whether
less drastic sanctions were imposed or considered before
dismissal was ordered.
Id.
In this case, the trial court rendered detailed findings in support of its grant
of default judgment. Furthermore, the court's order clearly took into consideration the
mandates of Greathouse. The court noted that Morley's conduct displayed a willful
failure to cooperate with the discovery order and prejudiced the Owens by impeding
resolution of the case while other parties declared bankruptcy and interest accrued on the
promissory note. After reviewing the record on appeal, we find the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by granting a default judgment against Morley.
In his second assignment of error, Morley contends the court should have
considered alternative sanctions rather than granting a default judgment. However, the
court's order states in part:
The Court finds that while other remedies might be available,
none would be effective to address the conduct and resulting
prejudice which is apparent in this case. The Court reiterates
the longstanding default in Morley's obligations and this
Court's explicit warning that failure to comply in good faith
with its previous order would be subject to severe sanction.
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Morley also opines that, in the interest of justice, courts should avoid dismissing claims
for technical violations. However, in the case at bar, the trial court was within its power
to grant a default judgment because Morley failed to fully comply with the August 17,
2004, court order. CR 37.02(2)(c). See also Sublett v. Hall, 589 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Ky.
1979). This Court previously noted in Greathouse, “if a party has the ability to comply
with a discovery order and does not, dismissal is not an abuse of discretion.” 796 S.W.2d
at 870 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we find no error.
Finally, Morley argues his Kentucky counsel did not receive notice of the
Owens' motion for default judgment until five days prior to the December 19, 2005,
hearing. However, it is undisputed that counsel did not attempt to secure a continuance
on Morley's behalf, nor attempt to attend the hearing. We also note that the court
entertained Morley's belated response to the Owens' motion. The court heard from
Morley's counsel and considered his arguments, but still concluded default judgment was
warranted. Consequently, after reviewing the record on appeal, we find no error.
For the reasons stated herein, the order of the Marshall Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
John C. Tilley
Hopkinsville, Kentucky
Kerry B. Harvey
Benton, Kentucky
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