DANIEL BUGG v. AMERICAN LEGION, ANDERSON POST
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MAY 25, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED: JUNE 15, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000429-MR
DANIEL BUGG
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ANDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN ROBERT MORGAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00210
AMERICAN LEGION, ANDERSON POST
NO. 34
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT, MOORE, AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Daniel Bugg (hereinafter “Bugg”) has appealed the Anderson
Circuit Court's order entered on January 20, 2006, which granted a directed verdict in
favor of American Legion, Anderson Post No. 34 (hereinafter “American Legion”). For
the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Background
On July 6, 2001, Bugg was a participant in the Castleman Classic Horse
Show (hereinafter “Castleman Classic”) being held at the American Legion Fairgrounds
in Lawrenceburg, Anderson County, Kentucky. Bugg had rented a stall in the barn area
of the fairgrounds for his champion saddlebred horse which he intended to show at the
event. Bugg had shown horses for many years at this and other venues. As he prepared
his horse and stall for the show, Bugg, an innocent bystander, was injured by a bullet
fired from Charles Justice's (hereinafter “Justice”) pistol as Justice was being arrested.
Earlier that morning, Justice and his fiancée, Sarah White (“White”), had
departed their home in Pikeville, Kentucky, bound for the Castleman Classic. Along the
way, the pair engaged in the use of marijuana, cocaine, and alcohol. Justice had a
handgun in his possession for which he intended to get parts while on their journey.
Justice and White made their way to Louisville, Kentucky, where they picked up White's
mother to accompany them to the horse show. During their travels, Justice announced his
great displeasure with White's continued use of illegal substances while she was pregnant
with his child. The discussion became heated and continued to escalate as they made
their way to Lawrenceburg. Before their arrival, and prompted by White's threat to have
an abortion, Justice brandished his handgun and threatened to shoot himself, but
ultimately discharged the weapon out the vehicle's rear window.
When the trio arrived in Lawrenceburg, they parked their vehicle across the
street from the American Legion Fairgrounds. The two women began walking toward
-2-
the fairgrounds while Justice attended to his dog and slightly lowered the windows of the
vehicle for ventilation. Justice determined he should carry his handgun on his person
rather than leaving it unsecured in the vehicle. Justice then made his way into the
fairgrounds where he rejoined his party near the horse barns at the rear of the property,
close to the stall Bugg had rented and was currently occupying. Justice thereupon
resumed the earlier argument with White in a loud and boisterous manner, which
altercation attracted the attention of a Castleman Classic representative who sought out an
American Legion representative to summon police to the scene.
Lawrenceburg Police Officer Chad Cox (hereinafter “Officer Cox”) arrived
shortly thereafter and engaged Justice in conversation. Justice had his hands in his
pockets concealing the outline of the handgun and refused Officer Cox's repeated
demands to remove them. Justice became verbally combative with Officer Cox and
refused to submit to the officer's commands. Officer Cox then forcefully executed a
“take-down” of Justice in order to place him under arrest. As Justice hit the ground his
firearm discharged, and the bullet struck Bugg in the hand and upper thigh.
Bugg filed suit in the Anderson Circuit Court on July 1, 2002, against
Justice, White, Officer Cox, the City of Lawrenceburg,1 and American Legion,2
1
The City of Lawrenceburg has a partial ownership interest in the American Legion
Fairgrounds. Bugg alleged liability on the part of the City of Lawrenceburg for premises liability
as well as vicarious liability for the actions of its employee, Officer Cox.
2
Bugg did not name Castleman Classic as a defendant in his initial complaint. However,
American Legion filed a third-party complaint to have Castleman Classic brought into the action
for the purpose of apportionment of liability, if any.
-3-
advancing various theories of liability for his injuries. The Circuit Court entered agreed
orders dismissing the complaint against Justice on October 21, 2005, and against White
on October 25, 2005. The case proceeded to trial with the remaining parties on October
24, 25, and 26, 2005. At the close of Bugg's case-in-chief, the Circuit Court granted
American Legion's motion for directed verdict pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 50.01, and further, upon agreement of the parties, granted a partial
directed verdict for the City of Lawrenceburg.3 The jury returned a verdict in favor of
Bugg for $631,675.55, apportioning fault to Justice (75%) and White (25%), and
assigning no liability to Officer Cox or the City of Lawrenceburg. Judgment was entered
accordingly on November 21, 2005.
On December 8, 2005, Bugg filed motions for a new trial pursuant to CR
59.01; to alter, amend, or vacate judgment pursuant to CR 59.05; and alternatively for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to CR 50.02. The Circuit Court denied
these motions on January 5, 2006, and an amended final judgment was entered on
January 27, 2006.4 This appeal followed.
3
The premises liability claim against the City of Lawrenceburg was dismissed by agreement,
but the vicarious liability claim remained to be presented to the jury.
4
American Legion had previously filed a motion to amend the original judgment to remove
language that the third-party complaint against Castleman Classic was dismissed with prejudice.
The revised judgment reserved American Legion's right to re-file its complaint against
Castleman Classic in the event Bugg was successful on appeal or later filed a different action
against American Legion couched on the same facts as the instant complaint. As we are
affirming the Circuit Court's ruling on directed verdict, further discussion of this amendment
would be superfluous.
-4-
On appeal, Bugg's sole contention is that the Circuit Court erred in granting
a directed verdict in favor of American Legion. We disagree and affirm the Circuit
Court's decision.
II. Standard of Review
The standard of review for appeal of a directed verdict is well established in
the Commonwealth. A reviewing court is limited in its inquiry to determining whether
the trial court erred in its ruling on the directed verdict motion. Bierman v. Klapheke,
967 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Ky. 1998) (citing NCAA v. Hornung, 754 S.W.2d 855 (Ky. 1988)).
We are directed to review the evidence only to determine whether the ruling “is palpably
or flagrantly against the evidence so as to indicate that it was reached as the result of
passion or prejudice.” Id. at 18. Furthermore, “the reviewing court is not at liberty to
determine credibility or the weight which should be given to the evidence, these being
functions reserved to the trier of fact. The prevailing party is entitled to all reasonable
inferences which may be drawn from the evidence.” Id. See also Meyers v. Chapman
Printing Co., Inc., 840 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1992). Thus the ruling of the Circuit Court shall
not be overturned on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.
III. Directed Verdict
A motion for directed verdict raises a question of law as to whether any
evidence has been presented which would support a verdict. Harris v. Cozatt, Inc., 427
S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1968). In Gibbs v. Wickersham, 133 S.W.3d 494, 496 (Ky.App. 2004),
this Court noted “[w]hile it is the jury's province to weigh evidence, the [circuit] court
-5-
will direct a verdict where there is no evidence of probative value to support the opposite
result and the jury may not be permitted to reach a verdict based on mere speculation or
conjecture” [citations omitted]. A directed verdict admits the truth of all evidence which
is favorable to the party opposing the motion. Kentucky & Indiana Terminal R. Co. v.
Cantrell, 298 Ky. 743, 184 S.W.2d 111 (1944). Unless there is a complete absence of
proof on a material issue, or there are no disputed issues of fact upon which reasonable
minds could differ, a trial court is prohibited from entering a directed verdict. Gibbs, 133
S.W.3d at 494 (citing Bierman, supra). Therefore, if conflicting evidence is presented,
the matter must be submitted to the trier of fact for resolution of the issue and a directed
verdict is improper.
IV. Analysis
Bugg has couched his claims against American Legion in the common law
cause of action of premises liability. Bugg contends that American Legion failed to
protect him, its invitee, from a dangerous condition involving an unreasonable risk of
harm, to wit, Justice. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965). A premises
liability claim is generally regarded as a sub-category of general negligence law. Under
negligence law, in order to prevail the one so pleading must prove (1) the defendant owed
him a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) a causal connection between the
breach and the pleader's consequent injury. Lewis v. B & R Corporation, 56 S.W.3d 432,
436 (Ky.App. 2001). See also Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85 (Ky. 2003);
and Mullins v. Commonwealth Life Insurance Co., 839 S.W.2d 245 (Ky. 1992).
-6-
However, “[w]hile general negligence law requires the existence of a duty, premises
liability law supplies the nature and scope of that duty when dealing with tort injuries on
realty.” Lewis, 56 S.W.3d at 437-38. The nature and scope of such duty, if any, is
determined based upon the status of the one injured at the time of his injury, and is more
particularly determined by one's classification as an invitee, licensee, tenant, or
trespasser.
It is undisputed that Bugg was a business invitee on the premises owned by
American Legion.5 It is axiomatic that invitees are placed upon a higher footing than
other classes of persons with respect to the duty of care that is owed to them while they
enjoy the owner's premises. This Court held in Lewis, 56 S.W.3d at 438, under common
law premises liability principles the duty owed by a premises owner to an invitee is “a
general duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition
and warn invitees of dangers that are latent, unknown or not obvious” [citations omitted].
An owner is under a duty to discover dangerous conditions on the premises and either
correct them or warn its invitees of their existence. Johnson v. Lone Star Steakhouse &
Saloon of Kentucky, Inc., 997 S.W.2d 490 (Ky.App. 1999). However, “[t]he occupier is
not an insurer of the safety of invitees, and his duty is only to exercise reasonable care for
their protection.” Bartley v. Educational Training Systems, Inc., 134 S.W.3d 612, 615
(Ky. 2004) (citing William Prosser and W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, §
61 (5th ed. 1984)). “What constitutes ordinary care varies with the nature of the business
5
Black's Law Dictionary 832 (7th ed. 1999) defines an invitee as a “person who has an express
or implied invitation to enter or use another's premises, such as a business visitor or a member of
the public to whom the premises are held open.”
-7-
and the use to which the premises are put, but it is a care commensurate with the
particular circumstances involved in the given case [citations omitted].” Sidebottom v.
Aubrey, 267 Ky. 45, 101 S.W.2d 212, 213 (1937). This Court recently held in Murphy v.
Second Street Corp., 48 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Ky.App. 2001) that in order to prevail on a
claim similar to the one sub judice, a “plaintiff must show either: (1) that the proprietor
had knowledge that one of his patrons was about to injure the plaintiff and he failed to
exercise ordinary care to prevent such injury; or, (2) that the conduct of some of the
persons present was such as would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that they
might injure other guests” [footnote omitted].
Bugg contends Justice entered the premises through the main gate while
obviously intoxicated and loudly cursing and berating his female companions, a situation
which American Legion should have reasonably recognized as a risk to other patrons.
Bugg further contends that the heated debate continued as the party made their way
across the grounds, thus allowing American Legion greater opportunity to discover the
potential danger. Finally, Bugg contends Justice could have easily been identified and
kept away from other patrons, thus eliminating the danger of harm, if American Legion
had provided adequate security. However, a review of the record fails to support his
claims.
Justice testified that he had no recollection of how he came to enter the
fairgrounds and did not remember passing through a gate or paying admission, nor did he
recall whether he might have scaled the fence surrounding the fairgrounds. No other
-8-
evidence was presented regarding how he gained entry to the premises. Further, Justice
testified that his first memory after entering the premises was arguing with White near the
barn area, the location where Castleman Classic and American Legion representatives
became aware of the problem and immediately summoned assistance from police.
No evidence was presented to support Bugg's claim that Justice was loud,
profane, and “screaming” as he made his way across the fairgrounds. Bugg also failed to
present any testimony to support his argument that the presence of additional security
would have prevented his injury. Uncontroverted testimony revealed that the shooting
was accidental and not an intentional act, and that it occurred after Officer Cox had
arrived.
There was no evidence presented which would sustain a finding that
American Legion knew or reasonably should have known that anyone was in imminent
danger of being injured by Justice,6 nor that American Legion breached any duty of care
owed to its invitees. See Napper v. Kenwood Drive-In Theatre Co., 310 S.W.2d 270, 272
(Ky. 1958). As American Legion is not an insurer of the safety of its invitees, it would
be unreasonable to hold them accountable for the unforseeable and unfortunate result of
Justice's arrest. See Murphy, 48 S.W.3d at 574. We therefore find Bugg's contentions to
be based solely on conjecture and speculation.
6
Moreover, although a risk of immediate harm was not foreseeable, it is noteworthy that
American Legion took immediate steps to protect all of its patrons upon learning of the
altercation by summoning the local police who arrived on-scene only minutes later. Thus,
Bugg's contention on appeal that American Legion did nothing to protect him is thereby easily
refuted.
-9-
Finding nothing in the record which would support a judgment in favor of
Bugg against American Legion, we hold the trial court was correct in ruling Bugg had
failed to establish a cause sufficient to be presented to the jury on his premises liability
claim against American Legion and properly granted the directed verdict. As the
judgment of the Anderson Circuit Court was not clearly erroneous nor flagrantly against
the weight of the evidence, its judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Daniel A. Simons
Richmond, Kentucky
Terry Sellars
Lexington, Kentucky
- 10 -
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.