JUSTIN R. MORGAN v. PATRICE P. MORGAN
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 28, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000426-MR
JUSTIN R. MORGAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY NEIL PHILPOT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-05279
PATRICE P. MORGAN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART
AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: THOMPSON AND WINE, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
WINE, JUDGE: Justin Morgan appeals from a divorce decree entered by the Fayette
Circuit Court, Family Division, on January 31, 2006. The issues in this case are related
to the disposition of the property, assignment of debt, and custody of the children.
Specifically, Justin argues the trial court erred in finding that the 2004 tax debt was nonmarital and in failing to award Justin the bedroom furniture valued at $10,000.00. In
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Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
addition, Justin argues the trial court erred in giving sole custody of the parties’ children
to Patrice simply because Justin failed to pursue more visitation prior to this action and
because Patrice had maintained physical custody of the children. Finally, Justin contends
that the trial court’s award of $10,000.00 in attorney fees to Patrice was an abuse of
discretion because she received an equal award of financial resources, $6,900.00 in
monthly support, and her attorney fees were unreasonable.
Relevant Facts and Proceedings
Justin Morgan and Patrice Morgan were married on May 29, 1999. Justin
and Patrice had two children, Sarah Anne Morgan, born 11/20/99, and Jacob Ross
Morgan, born 9/1/02. In December 30, 2003, Patrice filed for divorce; the parties
reconciled for a very short time in 2004 and then separated again in June 2004.
Justin works as an attorney with a civil practice in Lexington, Kentucky.
Justin’s average income, prior to the parties’ separation, from 2000 to 2003, was
$238,991.50. Patrice was employed by Systems Design when she and Justin married.
She quit working but then returned after the parties’ first child was born. Patrice testified
that working outside the home did not work well after Sarah was born. Plus, Justin was
urging her to not work. Thus, she quit Systems Design in 2000. In 2001, Patrice began
working for Turf Town Real Estate as an agent. However, because she was unsuccessful,
Patrice placed her real estate license in escrow and remained unemployed from 2001 until
the parties separated.
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Justin testified that prior to the parties’ separation, Patrice operated on a
$10,000.00 monthly budget. As of the day of trial, Patrice worked at Lexington Furniture
Store a total of 24 hours a week, earning $250.00 per week. Patrice testified that due to
child care costs and the need to care for the children herself, she was only able to work
part-time.
The parties separated on December 14, 2003, but had a brief reconciliation
in January 2004, before separating permanently. In June 2004, the parties reached an
agreement as to child support and temporary maintenance. However, the parties had not
agreed on the issues of custody, visitation, or property distribution. The trial court
entered an Agreed Order on June 25, 2004, which required Justin to pay temporary
maintenance and child support in the combined amount of $6,900.00 per month. In
addition, Justin would pay the minimum credit card payments which, at the time of trial,
were approximately $1,600.00 per month.
For the months of January and February 2005, Justin was in arrears on his
obligation to pay temporary maintenance and child support as directed in the June 25
Agreed Order. As a result, Patrice filed a motion for contempt. The trial court heard the
motion on March 1, 2005, and ordered Justin to pay the arrearage of $20,818.69 by
March 31, 2005, or be subject to contempt sanctions.
On February 23, 2005, Justin filed a motion to modify the agreed temporary
order, arguing a change in circumstances. Specifically, Justin urged that the IRS had
issued a levy against the parties’ 2002 unpaid taxes in the amount of $111,245.33. In
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addition, Justin asserted that National City Bank had filed suit against him based on an
unpaid line of credit. The trial court heard arguments on the matter and on March 22,
2005, denied Justin’s motion to modify the Agreed Order.
The matter proceeded to trial on the contested issues regarding the extent
and division of the marital estate, child custody, support and visitation. Prior to trial, they
stipulated that the value of the marital residence was $380,000.00. In addition, the parties
agreed that a Florida time-share should be sold and the money applied to their 2002 tax
liability of $111,245.33.
While there was no visitation order in place for the parties’ children, Justin
and Patrice had worked out an alternating schedule where Justin would have the children
for a few hours on Mondays and Thursdays after school and then every other Saturday.
However, Justin has had no overnight visits with the children since the parties separated
on December 14, 2003. The trial court ruled that the parties’ existing custody
arrangement, with Patrice having sole custody of the children, should continue as it was
in the best interests of the children.
Standard of Review
In its findings of fact, the trial court held that Justin should be responsible
for the 2004 tax liability minus the amount Patrice paid on the maintenance she received
during the parties’ separation. Justin contends this ruling is in error because the debt was
incurred while the parties were still married and Justin did not start paying temporary
maintenance and child support until July 1, 2004. The court further held that Justin
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received $10,000.00 in furniture. However, Justin asserts that the court erred on this
issue because it failed to award him any of the furniture even though it increased the
value of the property awarded to him by $10,000.00. Justin further asserts that the court
improperly mischaracterized certain debts as being dissipated marital assets.
“The trial court has wide discretion in dividing marital property . . .” and we
may not disturb the trial court’s ruling on property division issues unless the trial court
has abused its discretion. Davis v. Davis, 777 S.W.2d 230, 233 (Ky. 1989), citing KRS
403.190(1). KRS 403.190(1)(b) directs the court to divide the marital property in just
proportions considering all relevant factors - - including the “[v]alue of property set apart
to each spouse[.]” This Court will not disturb the trial court’s findings of fact unless
clearly erroneous. “Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if supported by substantial
evidence.” Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843, 852 (Ky.App. 1999). “The
test for substantiality of evidence is whether when taken alone, or in the light of all the
evidence, it has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable
men.” Id., citing Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 308
(Ky. 1972). We now turn to the arguments raised by Justin and Patrice.
The 2004 Tax Liability
Justin takes issue with the trial court’s finding that the 2004 tax debt in the
amount of $132,644.00, which occurred when the parties were still married, was labeled
a non-marital debt and assigned to him. Both parties concede that the tax liability should
have been designated as marital debt. The trial court found that the 2004 tax debt was
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non-marital because, even though it was incurred during the marriage, it was incurred
after their separation while Justin was paying temporary maintenance and child support.
However, Justin contends that the 2004 tax debt was not solely incurred after separation
when he was paying temporary maintenance and child support to Patrice. He points out
that he was responsible for paying all of the parties’ expenses through June of 2004.
Justin further points out that he did not begin paying the temporary maintenance and
child support until July 1, 2004, pursuant to the June 25 Agreed Order.
Conversely, Patrice asserts that the trial court was correct as to the 2004 tax
debt because she and Justin filed separate tax returns for 2004. Even though Patrice
failed to introduce a 2004 tax return at trial, she testified that she paid taxes on the
maintenance she received from Justin for 2004. Patrice argues the trial court’s
assignment of the 2004 debt was thus appropriate because she was responsible for the
amount of the taxes on the portion of Justin’s 2004 income that benefited her during the
second half of the year.
While we find some merit to this argument, the evidence presented at trial
was insufficient to completely support this position. First, the June 25 Agreed Order
never specified what portion of the $6,900.00 was for maintenance only. So, while it was
appropriate for the trial court to assign the debt based on Patrice’s testimony that she filed
a separate tax form in 2004, she never testified or presented the trial court with evidence
indicating how much maintenance she declared on her tax return. Further, Justin’s
income was taxed in total for the year 2004. From the record, there is no way to
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determine what portion of the $132,644.00 was for the first half of the year or the second
half of the year. Further, it is not necessary, as Patrice suggests, that Justin offer evidence
indicating when during the year he generated the income being taxed in 2004. Justin was
responsible for paying all of the parties’ expenses through June 2004. Thus, Patrice
benefited to some degree from his entire income for the year. On the other hand, having
determined that the 2004 tax debt is a marital obligation, Patrice may be entitled to a
credit for the amount she has already paid for the maintenance she received from July to
December 2004. Since the trial court clearly erred in characterizing the debt as nonmarital, and since the court failed to make findings on other necessary issues, we must
remand the matter to the trial court for findings on how much in taxes Patrice paid for the
maintenance she received from July through December 2004 and, further, for a
determination of any marital share of taxes which accrued on Justin’s income for January
through June 2004.
The Household Furniture
The total value of all the parties’ household furniture was determined by
Justin’s expert, Calvin D. Cranfill, to be $10,000.00. Patrice agreed with this valuation.
The parties agreed that Justin would take the bedroom furniture while all other remaining
household furniture would go to Patrice. Justin testified that he attempted to pick up the
bedroom furniture prior to trial but Patrice would not allow him because she wanted to
wait for the court’s ruling on the matter. However, at trial, Patrice agreed that Justin
should receive the bedroom furniture.
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Justin asserts that the trial court erred because it failed to award him any
furniture but still concluded in its assignment of property that he had received furniture
valued at $10,000.00. He also points out that the trial court’s findings of fact omitted an
award of furniture to Patrice, yet testimony indicates that she retained all the marital
furniture. In response, Patrice argues that Justin did not properly preserve this issue for
review because he did not mention this error in his motion to alter, amend or vacate on
February 10, 2006. However, Patrice admits that the trial court’s calculation of the
marital estate incorrectly credited Justin as receiving the value of the furniture that
remained in her possession.
Yet, Patrice offers another explanation for the trial court’s findings. Patrice
suggests that the trial court may have omitted the furniture items agreed upon by the
parties due to the fact that Justin purchased some furniture during the parties’ separation.
She further suggests the trial court may or may not have inadvertently omitted the
furniture award to Justin in order to offset the value of the furniture he purchased with
marital funds during the separation.
As noted above, a trial court has wide discretion in dividing marital
property. “A trial court abuses its discretion when it renders a decision which is
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by legal principles.” Rigdon v.
Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Ky.App. 2004). In this case, the trial court’s
finding increasing the value of Justin’s property award by $10,000.00 for furniture, when
he did not receive any of the marital furniture, is wholly unfair based upon the evidence.
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Thus, this issue is reversed and remanded for additional findings as to which party is
entitled to what portion of the marital furniture.
Dissipation of Marital Property
Justin next argues that the trial court incorrectly characterized certain debts
which he had incurred as a dissipation of marital assets. Patrice submitted a chart in her
position statement to the trial court with a category titled “Debts Not Properly Paid From
Marital Estate and Other Dissipation” totaling $141,953.00. The trial court essentially
agreed with the two categories but incorrectly called the entire amount “dissipation” in its
own chart and referred to the amount as “non-marital expenses.” However, in the
findings of fact, the trial court specifically noted which of the payments it considered
dissipated marital assets. Those included Justin’s payments to the following: The
Lexington Forensic Institute; Bay Investigation; Oram’s Florist; Ross Taylor; Michael
Moloney; Kring, Ray, Farley & Riddle; Calvin Cranfill; John Baldwin; User Friendly
Phone Book; MBNA; Emily Taylor; Grove Park Inn; the Democratic National
Convention; campaign contributions; Strand Hotel; a chartered plane; and cosmetic
surgery. Justin argues this was error as most of these expenses were business related.
A court may find that a party dissipated marital assets when it is satisfied by
a preponderance of the evidence that marital property was expended during a period
when the parties were separated or dissolution was impending and there is a clear
showing of intent to deprive the other spouse of his or her proportionate share of marital
property. Brosick v. Brosick, 974 S.W.2d 498, 502 (Ky.App. 1998). As for the payments
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Justin made to Emily Taylor (“Emily”), Bay Investigation, MBNA, Grove Park Inn, the
Democratic National Convention, campaign contributions, Strand Hotel, a chartered
plane, and cosmetic surgery, we agree with the trial court that these were correctly
labeled dissipated funds. After the parties’ separation, Justin paid Emily a $33,750.00
salary to act as his office manager for nine months. Patrice points out that Justin did not
have an office manager prior to hiring Emily, nor did he hire a replacement when her
employment ended. Justin then claims to have paid Emily $35,000.00 the week before
trial to satisfy a loan she had made to him during his separation from Patrice. Justin
provided no evidence of the loan but testified that the actual loan amount was for less but
he wanted to pay her interest. Justin and Emily went on trips, staying in lavish hotels,
including the Ritz Carlton in Hawaii and a luxury hotel in London, England. In addition,
Justin attended the Democratic National Convention (“DNC”) at an expense of
$15,000.00 and even made contributions to the DNC of $5,000.00. Following the
parties’ separation, Justin also chartered a plane to Florida at a cost of $3,655.00 and
spent $3,000.00 on cosmetic surgery. Finally, Justin hired Bay Investigation to assign a
private investigator to follow Patrice during the parties’ separation. Justin claims it was
necessary to have Patrice followed as it was relevant to custody and maintenance.
However, there is no evidence to support this argument and the expense of Bay
Investigation was properly assigned as a dissipated expense.
Justin also argues that the $200,000.00 fee reduction to receive a
$300,000.00 advance in the Zyprexia case should not be his sole responsibility since he
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took the loan in order to pay taxes, current child support, and maintenance in accordance
with the trial court’s order. Justin argues, if anything, the loan reduced both of the
parties’ share of the estate. We disagree. Justin was frequently delinquent in the
payment of his child support and maintenance obligations following the parties’
separation even though it has been established that he spent thousands of dollars going on
trips with his girlfriend and making contributions to the DNC.
From our review of the evidence, Patrice made a sufficient showing that
Justin dissipated marital property during the parties’ separation in order to deprive her of
her share of the property. Therefore, the issue of distribution and assignment of debt as
non-marital or dissipated is remanded to the trial court for findings consistent with this
opinion.
On the other hand, Patrice concedes that the trial court improperly labeled
all the other debts as dissipated. Justin argues the following constituted business
expenses to which he offered canceled checks and invoices: Lexington Forensic
Institute; Oram’s Florist; Kring, Ray, Farley and Riddle; Ross Taylor; John Baldwin; and
User Friendly Phone Book. The expense from the Lexington Forensic Institute was
related to a particular case in Justin’s firm. However, Justin testified that the cost would
be recouped from the client’s portion of the recovery in the case. Justin testified the
flowers were sent to an injured client. Kring, Ray, Farley & Riddle were the accountants
who assisted Justin in the preparation of the affidavit in support of his motion to decrease
child support due to a tax levy. The User Friendly Phone Book expense was incurred for
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the purpose of advertising the firm. Ross Taylor was a runner at the firm. We agree with
Justin that the only evidence is that these debts were incurred for the benefit of Justin’s
law firm.
Nevertheless, Patrice contends that those debts were non-marital and thus
properly assigned to Justin. “Debts incurred during the marriage are traditionally
assigned on the basis of such factors as receipt of benefits and extent of participation, . . .
whether the debt was incurred to purchase assets designated as marital property, . . . and
whether the debt was necessary to provide for the maintenance and support of the family
. . . .” Neidlinger v. Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d 513, 522 (Ky. 2001) (internal citations
omitted). In this case, the debts were incurred for the benefit of Justin’s firm, which was
assigned to him. The trial court would have been well within its discretion to assign
these debts to Justin as his non-marital debt. Furthermore, Justin has not shown that the
trial court’s improper characterization of the debts compels a different division of the
marital property. Consequently, we can find no reversible error on this point.
But we agree with Justin that the trial court improperly characterized the
payment to Calvin Cranfill as dissipated funds. Justin hired Cranfill as an expert to
valuate the marital estate and Justin’s law practice. Cranfill’s fee was $3,750.00. The
trial court then adopted Cranfill’s anticipated fee collection and overhead figures even
though it disagreed with his valuation of the estate. Patrice offered no alternative expert
opinion on the issue. Since both parties relied on Cranfill’s testimony, it was error to
label his fee dissipated funds and the parties should share this expense.
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Sole custody of the Parties’ Two Children
Justin next argues the trial court erred in its decision to award Patrice sole
custody of the children because it failed to consider all of the factors in KRS 403.270.
The statute requires the trial court to “determine custody in accordance with the best
interests of the child” after considering all relevant factors including those specified in
the statute. KRS 403.270(2). Here, the trial court, after hearing the parties’ testimony
and reviewing their post-trial statements, determined that it was in the best interests of the
children to remain with their mother. The trial court noted that there had never been any
motions filed regarding the custody of the minor children in this action.
Justin points out that he did express his interest in exercising joint custody,
with the children primarily residing with Patrice, in his post-trial statement. However,
Justin put forth no evidence indicating that joint custody was in the best interests of the
children. In fact, Justin offered no response to Patrice’s testimony that Justin was an
excessive drinker and had been convicted of driving while under the influence, or that he
kept the conviction a secret but continued to drive the children while his license was
revoked. In addition, Patrice testified that Justin spent considerable amounts of money
on pornography and was concerned that the children would be subjected to pornographic
material. Justin offered no testimony refuting these allegations.
The trial court concluded that the arrangement of the parties whereby
Patrice had temporary custody and Justin had time-sharing with no overnight visits was
working well and the existing arrangement should remain in place. The trial court,
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having decided that Patrice would continue to have sole custody of the children, was
hopeful to revisit the matter in the future and anticipated an increase in Justin’s timesharing and overnight visits with the children.
The court’s determination of custody is subject to review under the abuse of
discretion standard. Cherry v. Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982). Having
reviewed the record, we must conclude that substantial evidence supported the trial
court’s findings of fact. It follows then that the court did not abuse its discretion by
concluding that it was in the children’s best interests to award sole custody to Patrice
with Justin continuing with time-sharing. See Polley v. Allen, 132 S.W.3d 223, 227-28
(Ky.App. 2004). The trial court’s order is affirmed on this issue.
Attorney Fees
Lastly, Justin argues that the trial court erred in apportioning him
$10,000.00 of Patrice’s attorney fees. In its determination of attorney fees, the trial court
recognized that Patrice had allegedly spent $28,096.44, much of which was for contempt
issues prior to the final hearing when Justin was delinquent in paying child support and
maintenance. The award of attorney fees is entirely within the discretion of the trial
court. Poe v. Poe, 711 S.W.2d 849 (Ky.App. 1986). Considering that the contempt
issues contributed to the amount of fees which Patrice incurred and the fact that there is a
disparity in the financial resources of the parties where Justin is in a much better position
to pay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Justin to pay $10,000.00 in
attorney fees.
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Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this matter to the
the trial court with directions to make findings in accordance with the above opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Barbara Anderson
Lexington, Kentucky
Elizabeth S. Hughes
Lexington, Kentucky
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