DAVID R. HARROD, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE WILLIAM R. HARROD IRREVOCABLE TRUST UNDER AGREEMENT DATED DECEMBER 28, 1992 AND AS GUARDIAN FOR JOHN WILLIAM HARROD; HARROD CONCRETE AND STONE COMPANY; STUART HARROD, INDIVIDUALLY AND TYLER STUART HARROD; MARGARET ELIZABETH BARRETT, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS GUARDIAN FOR EMILY BARRETT AND CATHERINE J. HARROD; AND EILEEN M. HARROD APPEAL AND v. JOAN M. HARROD, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE WILLIAM R. HARROD IRREVOCABLE TRUST UNDER AGREEMENT DATED DECEMBER 28, 1992 FOR THE BENEFIT OF JOAN M. HARROD
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RENDERED: AUGUST 17, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000263-MR
AND
NO. 2006-CA-000297-MR
DAVID R. HARROD, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
APPELLANTS/CROSSTRUSTEE OF THE WILLIAM R. HARROD
APPELLEES
IRREVOCABLE TRUST UNDER AGREEMENT DATED
DECEMBER 28, 1992 AND AS GUARDIAN FOR JOHN
WILLIAM HARROD; HARROD CONCRETE AND STONE
COMPANY; STUART HARROD, INDIVIDUALLY AND
AS GUARDIAN FOR DENVER REED HARROD AND
TYLER STUART HARROD; MARGARET ELIZABETH
BARRETT, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS GUARDIAN FOR
EMILY BARRETT AND CATHERINE J. HARROD; AND
EILEEN M. HARROD
v.
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-01500
JOAN M. HARROD, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
APPELLEE/CROSSTRUSTEE OF THE WILLIAM R. HARROD IRREVOCABLE
APPELLANT
TRUST UNDER AGREEMENT DATED DECEMBER 28, 1992
FOR THE BENEFIT OF JOAN M. HARROD
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART AND VACATING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT, MOORE, AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: David R. Harrod, individually and as trustee of the Harrod Family
Trust, Margaret Elizabeth H. Barrett, Stuart R. Harrod, and Harrod Concrete and Stone
Company (the Company) appeal from an order and opinion entered by the Franklin
Circuit Court on January 7, 2005, in which the trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of Joan M. Harrod. In the trial court's order and opinion, it held that David, as
trustee, breached his fiduciary duty owed to the beneficiaries of the Harrod Family Trust
(the Trust) when he overcompensated the Company by reimbursing it for all the
premiums it had paid regarding a life insurance policy owned by the Trust. As a result,
the trial court ordered the Company to reimburse the Trust $305,923.00. On appeal,
David argues that the Company was entitled to be reimbursed for all the premiums it
paid. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court's decision on this issue.
Additionally, Joan M. Harrod has filed a cross-appeal from the trial court's
order and opinion and from the trial court's order of January 4, 2006, in which it denied
Joan's Motion to Alter, Amend or Vacate the trial court's order and opinion. In its order
and opinion, the trial court granted summary judgment in David's favor holding that he
had no fiduciary duty to notify Joan of her withdrawal rights pursuant to Crummey v.
C.I.R., 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968); that David had no fiduciary duty to disburse the
interest and dividends accumulated by the Harrod Family Trust to the trust established for
Joan's benefit which was known as “Joan's Trust”; that the Harrod Family Trust was
entitled to be reimbursed $85,616.41 by Joan because David, as trustee, had erroneously
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overpaid Joan's Trust. On cross-appeal, Joan argues that the trial court erred when it
denied her motion to alter, amend or vacate because it failed to construe her initial
complaint liberally to include a claim that David breached his fiduciary duty for failing to
direct the Settlor of the Trust, William R. Harrod, to notify her of her Crummey
withdrawal rights.
Joan argues that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to alter,
amend, or vacate because the Company should reimburse the Trust even more than
$305,923.00 regarding the premium payments because the contract in which the Trust
agreed to reimburse the Company was a contributory plan. Joan claims the trial court
erred when it denied her motion because the Trust was entitled to prejudgment interest
regarding the $305,923.00 because those damages were liquidated. Joan claims the trial
court erred when it granted summary judgment and held that David was not required to
disburse the interest and dividends accumulated by the Trust to Joan's Trust and that she
was required to reimburse the Trust. According to Joan, a provision in the Trust
Instrument stated that Joan's Trust was entitled to receive the remainder of the net death
benefits, and Joan argues that this provision constituted a specific bequest allowing Joan's
Trust, as beneficiary, to receive the accumulated interest and dividends from the time of
William R. Harrod's death until the time David, as trustee, disbursed the Trust's assets.
Finding that the trial court did not adequately address the issue of
prejudgment interest, we vacate that portion of the trial court's order and remand.
Concluding that the trial court misconstrued the terms “death benefits” and “net death
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benefits” used in the Trust Instrument, we reverse in part, vacate in part and remand. We
affirm the remainder of the trial court's decision.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
William R. Harrod, who was the sole shareholder and president of the
Harrod Concrete and Stone Company, died on August 17, 2000. Prior to William's death,
he devised an estate plan to care for his wife, Joan M. Harrod, and his children from a
prior marriage, David Harrod, Margaret Elizabeth H. Barrett, Stuart R. Harrod and
Catherine J. Harrod. To that end, William executed, on December 28, 1992, a trust
instrument (the Trust Instrument) that established an irrevocable trust for his family (the
Harrod Family Trust or the Trust). Between 1992 and 1997, William originally funded
the Harrod Family Trust with gifts of shares of voting common stock in the Company.
When William drafted the Trust Instrument, he included a provision giving
Joan the right to withdraw the first $10,000.00 of each gift received by the Trust pursuant
to Crummey, 397 F.2d at 82.1 According to the Trust Instrument, once the Trust received
a gift, “[t]he trustee or the Settlor shall promptly after a power of withdrawal shall
become effective notify each person having a withdrawal power of the existence of the
power.”
In 1993, William contrived to fund the Trust with a life insurance policy
from the Valley Forge Life Insurance Company (the Valley Forge Policy). The Valley
Forge Policy had a face value of $3,000,000.00, and it insured William's life. The
1
The other beneficiaries were also given withdrawal rights, but their withdrawal rights were
each limited to a fraction of any gift received by the Trust.
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Company purchased the Valley Forge Policy in December 1987, and, from that time
onward, it consistently paid all of the policy's premiums. From 1987 to 1993, the
Company owned the Valley Forge Policy, but, on May 20, 1993, the Company assigned
its ownership interest in the policy to William. On May 21, 1993, William assigned his
ownership interest in the policy to the Harrod Family Trust.
Anticipating that the Trust would be primarily funded by at least one life
insurance policy, William, the Settlor of the Trust included in the Trust Instrument the
following,
2.3 Upon the death of the Settlor this trust shall end and its
remaining balance (which includes all property, if any,
passing to the trustee under Settlor's will or otherwise by
reason of Settlor's death) shall be distributed as follows:
(a) The net death benefits from all insurance policies
received by the trust on Settlor's life, after all payments on
any loans by this trust against them at Settlor's death and all
payments to any company pursuant to a split-dollar life
insurance agreement against them at Settlor's death, shall be
distributed as follows:
(1) If Settlor's spouse shall be married to Settlor at Settlor's
death and shall not renounce Settlor's will, the first
$1,000,000 of those net death benefits shall be distributed
outright to Settlor's spouse.
(2) The next $300,000 of those net death benefits shall be
held pursuant to Paragraph 2.4 for Settlor's daughter,
CATHERINE J. HARROD, if she shall then be living, or, if
not, this bequest shall be null and void.
(3) If Settlor's spouse shall be married to Settlor at Settlor's
death and shall not renounce Settlor's will, the remainder of
those net death benefits shall be held, administered and
distributed upon the following trusts, terms and conditions, as
“JOAN'S TRUST”[.]
...
(d) The rest and residue of this trust at Settlor's death shall be
divided into as many equal shares as there are the following
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named children of Settlor then living and the following
named children then living and the following named children
of Settlor then deceased, but leaving issue then living:
MARGARET ELIZABETH H. BARRETT, DAVID R.
HARROD and STUART R. HARROD.
Contemporaneously with William's transfer of the Valley Forge Policy to
the Harrod Family Trust, the Company, by and through William as its president, and the
Trust, by and through David as trustee, entered into a split-dollar insurance plan (the
Insurance Plan) which established the Company's and the Trust's shared responsibility to
pay the policy's premiums. According to the Insurance Plan,
(a) Each annual premium on the policy shall be paid as
follows:
(1) The Owner (A) Shall pay a portion of each premium equal to the current
term rate for the Insured's [William's] age multiplied by the
excess of the current death benefit over the Company's
current Policy Interest. Here, the “current term rate” shall
mean the lesser of the Insurer's annual term insurance rate or
the rates specified in Revenue Rulings 64-328 and 66-110.
(2) The Company shall pay all premium amounts not paid by
the Owner.
So, pursuant to the Insurance Plan, the Trust was responsible for paying a portion of the
Valley Forge Policy's premiums, and the Company was responsible for paying “all
premium amounts not paid by” the Trust. Additionally, the Company and the Trust
included in the Insurance Plan that, “[i]n exchange for the Company's payment of its
premium contribution . . ., the Owner agrees to return to the Company the amount of its
Premium Advance on the . . . Insured's [William's] death.” According to the Insurance
Plan, “[t]he Company's Premium Advance shall be an amount equal to the cumulative
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total of its share of premiums paid on the Policy.” It is undisputed that the Trust never
paid any portion of the policy's premiums and that the Company continued to pay the full
amount of each premium as it did when it owned the policy prior to the execution of the
Insurance Plan.
In addition to the Valley Forge Policy, the Trust acquired, on October 27,
1999, a $1,000,000.00 life insurance policy from the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance
Company (Northwestern Policy) on William's life to further fund the Trust. William
made the first and only premium payment of $46,479.97 for the Trust. Although William
made this premium payment, it is undisputed that neither he nor the Company ever
owned this subsequent policy. Furthermore, the Northwestern Policy was not subject to
the prior Insurance Plan nor was it subject to any other split-dollar agreement.
As previously stated, William died on August 17, 2000. After William's
death, the Harrod Family Trust received $3,000,000.00 in proceeds pursuant to the Valley
Forge Policy and $13,147.98 in interest that had accrued on the policy's proceeds from
the date of William's death until the date the insurance company paid off the policy. In
addition, the Trust received $1,000,000.00 in proceeds from the Northwestern Policy,
$4,392.61 in postmortem dividends and $9,041.31 in reimbursement for the unused
portion of the initial premium payment. After the Trust received these funds, David, as
trustee, disbursed the following: $691,651.75 to the Company reimbursing it for all the
premiums it paid on the Valley Forge Policy ($305,923.00 represents the amount of
premiums the Company paid prior to execution of the Insurance Plan); $50,000.00 to
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Joan for spousal support pursuant to an agreement between the Trust and Joan;
$300,000.00 to the trust established by the Trust Instrument for Catherine Harrod;
$1,000,000.00 to Joan outright and $2,043,963.66 to “Joan's Trust”. After David made
these disbursements, the Trust had a remaining balance of $17,153.74 that David had not
disbursed.
On November 5, 2001, Joan filed a complaint with the Franklin Circuit
Court against David Harrod, individually and as trustee of the Harrod Family Trust, and
against Harrod Concrete and Stone Company. In her complaint, Joan alleged that David,
as trustee, had breached his fiduciary duty when he failed to notify her of her Crummey
withdrawal rights. Joan alleged that David, as trustee, had breached his fiduciary duty
when he paid the Company $691,651.75 as reimbursement for all of the premiums it had
paid on the Valley Forge Policy, and she sought reimbursement for the Trust for the
entire sum of $691,651.75. According to Joan, even though the Insurance Plan provided
that the Trust would reimburse the Company for its share of the premiums that it had paid
since the Insurance Plan was executed, the Trust was not obligated to reimburse the
Company for any amount because the Company and the Trust had both ignored the
Insurance Plan. Lastly, Joan alleged that David had breached his fiduciary duty when he
failed to transfer the Trust's remaining balance of $17,153.74 to Joan's Trust. Joan
argued that the Trust's remaining balance was interest earned on the death benefits
received by the Trust from the two insurance policies and thus were part of the net death
benefits from the policies. Because the Trust Instrument provided that Joan's Trust would
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receive the remainder of the net death benefits, Joan alleged that her trust was entitled to
the remaining $17,153.74.
On December 14, 2001, David, individually and as trustee, and the
Company filed answers to Joan's complaint. David, in his capacity as trustee of the
Harrod Family Trust, filed a counterclaim against Joan alleging that he had paid to Joan's
Trust an amount in excess of the remainder of the net death benefits received by the
Trust, and he asked for the Trust to be reimbursed for this unspecified but excessive
amount. In addition, David asked for the remaining beneficiaries to be joined as
defendants, pursuant to the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 13.08 and 19.01.
On October 27, 2003, Joan filed a motion and memorandum in support of
summary judgment. On December 3, 2003, David and the Company filed a response to
Joan's motion for summary judgment, and David sought a partial summary judgment on
his counterclaim.
On January 7, 2005, the Franklin Circuit Court entered its order and
opinion resolving the parties' motions for summary judgment. Regarding Joan's claim
that David breached his fiduciary duty by failing to notify her regarding her Crummey
withdrawal rights, the trial court turned to the Trust Instrument which stated
unequivocally that “the trustee or the Settlor shall promptly . . . notify . . .” the
beneficiaries. The trial court noted that a trustee's powers and duties are either mandatory
or discretionary, and, if the settlor authorized the trustee to perform or not perform an act
or authorized the trustee to exercise his judgment regarding how or when a power should
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be utilized then the trustee's obligation or power is discretionary as opposed to
mandatory. The trial court held
[t]he Settlor relieved the Trustee of a mandatory duty to
notify when he used the disjunctive particle “or” to express an
alternative or option to act or not to act. This Court will not
upset the decision of the Trustee not to perform this
discretionary duty to the Plaintiff when the decision appears
to have been made in good faith.
Even though David and the other defendants had not requested summary judgment
regarding this issue, the trial court determined that all the facts necessary to decide the
issue were before it, so it granted summary judgment in David's favor.
Regarding Joan's claim that David had breached his fiduciary duty when he
paid $691,651.75 to the Company reimbursing it for each and every premium it had paid
on the Valley Forge Policy, the trial court looked to the recital contained in the Insurance
Plan, and it determined that the plan was prospective only; it did not contemplate
reimbursing the Company for premium payments it had made when it had owned the
Valley Forge Policy prior to the execution of the Insurance Plan. Therefore, the trial
court granted summary judgment in Joan's favor and ordered the Company to repay the
Trust $305,923.00 representing the amount of the premium payments that the Company
had made prior to the execution of the Insurance Plan.
Regarding Joan's claim that David breached his fiduciary duty by failing to
transfer the Trust's remaining balance of $17,153.74 to Joan's Trust, the trial court noted
that Joan argued that the insurance policies' death benefits included the return of any
premium payment and any interest or dividend accrued. However, the trial court
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determined that the drafters of the Trust Instrument had used the conventional meaning
for the term “death benefits” which was the face amounts of the Valley Forge Policy and
the Northwestern Policy. The trial court noted that the Trust Instrument required the
Trust to reimburse the Company for its premium payments from the death benefits and
required the Trust to pay any loans against the policies from the death benefits. The
Trust Instrument also required that the remaining amount, the “net death benefits,” was to
be distributed to Joan, to Catherine Harrod's Trust and to Joan's Trust. However, the trial
court held the death benefits from the two policies did not include the return of the
unused portion of the Northwestern Policy's premium payment nor did it include the
interest and dividends that had accrued since William's death. The trial court held that
these assets should have been distributed according to the residuary clause found in the
Trust Instrument; thus, the trial court held that David had breached the fiduciary duty that
he owed to the beneficiaries pursuant to the residuary clause when he transferred “an
amount that exceeded the face amount of the policies” to Joan's Trust. Consequently, the
trial court determined that the Trust was entitled to recover that excess amount from Joan.
Thus, it granted summary judgment in David's favor regarding Joan's last claim and
granted summary judgment in David's favor regarding his counterclaim. The trial court
ordered Joan to reimburse the Trust in the amount of $85,616.41. This amount
represented the $50,000.00 that David had paid Joan in spousal support and $35,616.41
in interest, dividends and a premium refund regarding the Northwestern Policy.
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On January 18, 2005, Joan filed a preliminary motion to alter, amend or
vacate pursuant to the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 54.02, 56.03 and 59.05.
Then, on October 11, 2005, Joan filed a memorandum in support of her motion to alter,
amend or vacate. In her memorandum, Joan requested that the trial court clarify its
opinion regarding the issue of her right to be notified of her Crummey withdrawal rights.
Joan did not argue that the trial court erred in its decision, but she contended that the
Trust Instrument clearly provided that she was to receive notice. She argued that the trial
court should modify its opinion and order to clarify that it did not address whether or not
she received notice and that the trial court's judgment did not preclude a claim to enforce
her Crummey withdrawal rights.
In Joan's memorandum, she agreed with the trial court's decision that the
Insurance Plan only required the Trust to reimburse the Company for the premiums it
paid after the execution of the the Insurance Plan. However, she argued that the
Company was not entitled to reimbursement for the full amount of each premium it paid
subsequent to the execution of the plan but was only entitled to be reimbursed for a
portion of each premium. Joan acknowledged that the Trust was responsible for paying a
portion of the Valley Forge Policy's premiums, and she acknowledged that the Trust
never paid any portion of the policy's premium. In support of her argument, Joan pointed
out that the Insurance Plan was a split-dollar plan. However, she claimed that not only
was the Insurance Plan a split-dollar plan, but it was also a collateral assignment plan.
Furthermore, not only was the Insurance Plan a collateral assignment plan, but it was also
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a PS-58 offset plan, also known as a contributory plan. According to Joan, because the
Insurance Plan was such a plan and because the Insurance Plan defined the Company's
“Premium Advance” as “the cumulative total of its share of premiums paid,” the Court
should have concluded that the Company was not entitled to reimbursement for the full
amount of each premium payment but only for a portion, and it should have recalculated
and increased the amount the Company owed the Trust.
In Joan's motion to alter, amend or vacate, she raised for the first time the
issue of prejudgment interest. Agreeing with the trial court that David overcompensated
the Company for its premium payments, Joan claimed that the amount that David
overpaid the Company represented an amount of liquidated damages. Joan argued that,
because the damages were liquidated, the trial court was bound to award prejudgment
interest as a matter of course. Moreover, Joan argued that if the overpayment represented
unliquidated damages, then it would be within the trial court's sound discretion whether
or not to award prejudgment interest. According to Joan, because David breached his
fiduciary duty when he overcompensated the Company, equity demanded that the trial
court award prejudgment interest regarding that amount.
Lastly, Joan asked the trial court to reconsider its decision that the death
benefits did not include the interest and dividends that had accrued on the Trust's assets.
In support of this argument, Joan averred that the Trust Instrument stated that the
remainder of the net death benefits were to be transferred to Joan's Trust. Joan insisted
that this provision constituted a specific bequest. Joan pointed out the beneficiary of a
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specific bequest was entitled to receive any accumulations and additions that accrued on
the bequest asset from the time the testator died until such time the asset was distributed.
Therefore, because the remainder of the net death benefits was a specific bequest, she
was entitled to any interest or dividends that had accrued. Thus, not only was she
entitled, by and through Joan's Trust, to the $35,616.41 in interest, dividends and
premium refund but she was also entitled to the $17,153.74 that David had failed to
distribute.
On January 4, 2006, the trial court summarily denied Joan's motion to alter,
amend or vacate without addressing any of the issues raised therein. As previously
stated, David, as trustee, filed a direct appeal from the trial court's order granting
summary judgment regarding the amount he overcompensated the Company for its
premium payments. Joan filed a cross-appeal regarding all the issues set forth in her
motion to alter, amend or vacate.
II. DAVID HARROD'S DIRECT APPEAL
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When we review a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment, we
must determine whether the circuit court correctly found that no genuine issue of material
fact exists and that, as a matter of law, the moving party was entitled to judgment in its
favor. Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). Because the findings of
fact are not in issue, we review the trial court’s decision de novo. Id.
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Regarding David's direct appeal, when the trial court granted summary
judgment in Joan's favor, it did so by interpreting the language found in the Insurance
Plan. It is well established in the Commonwealth that the construction and interpretation
of contracts, such as the Insurance Plan, involve questions of law. First Commonwealth
Bank of Prestonsburg v. West, 55 S.W.3d 829, 835-836 (Ky. App. 2000). We review
questions of law de novo and are not bound to defer to the lower court's interpretation.
Cinelli v. Ward, 997 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky. App. 1998).
B. ANALYSIS
On appeal, David argues that the Franklin Circuit Court ignored the plain
language contained in the Insurance Plan regarding the Company's right to be reimbursed
for all of the premiums it paid on the Valley Forge Policy. According to David, when a
trial court construes a contract, it must determine the intent of the parties by considering
the purpose and the subject matter of the contract and the situation and circumstances of
the parties. McHargue v. Conrad, 312 Ky. 434, 227 S.W.2d 977, 979 (Ky. 1950). In
addition, the trial court must determine the logical and reasonable meaning of the
language used in the contract. Reynolds Metal Co. v. Glass, 302 Ky. 622, 195 S.W.2d
280, 283 (Ky. 1946).
According to David, the Insurance Plan stated that “the Owner agrees to
return to the Company the amount of its Premium Advance[.]” David avers that the
Insurance Plan defines the term “Premium Advance” as “an amount equal to the
cumulative total of its share of the premiums paid on the Policy.” Furthermore, David
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points out that, according to the Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, the word
“cumulative” means “increasing by successive additions.” Based on this definition,
David insists that because the word “cumulative” was used in the definition for
“Premium Advance,” William Harrod, the decedent, clearly and unambiguously intended
for the Company to be reimbursed for all premium payments it made on the Valley Forge
Policy including those payments made prior to the execution of the Insurance Plan.
The parties to the Insurance Plan, the Harrod Family Trust and the Harrod
Concrete and Stone Company, stated in the Plan that “[i]n exchange for the Company's
payment of its premium contribution . . ., the Owner agrees to return to the Company the
amount of its Premium Advance on the . . . Insured's [William's] death.” Thus, the
Company was contractually entitled to be reimbursed for its “Premium Advance.” In the
Plan, the parties agreed that “[t]he Company's Premium Advance shall be an amount
equal to the cumulative total of its share of premiums paid on the Policy.” We agree with
David that these provisions are clear and unambiguous. However, we disagree with
David's conclusion that these provisions entitled the Company to be reimbursed for the
premiums it paid prior to the execution of the Insurance Plan.
In the interpretation of writings . . . the primary factor to be
considered is to determine the intent of the maker, . . . which
in turn is to be determined by the language employed. If that
language is plain and unambiguous its meaning should be
upheld as so expressed, uninfluenced by any unwise or
unusual result that might follow the upholding of the plainly
expressed writing . . . which is but following frequent
expressions of courts to the effect that the intention to be
gathered from employed language is the one that it plainly
expresses, and not the one that may have been in the mind of
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the composer, but which he failed to express. In other words,
the intention is gathered from what the writers of such
documents . . . actually said and not from what they may have
intended to but did not say.
Reynolds Metal Co. v. Glass, 302 Ky. 622, 195 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Ky. 1946) (quoting
Department of Revenue v. McIlvain, 302 Ky. 558, 195 S.W.2d 63, 64-65 (Ky. 1946)).
So, while the word “cumulative” may mean “increasing by successive additions,”2 this
definition does not logically compel David's conclusion that the Trust and the Company
intended for the Company to be reimbursed for the premium payments that it had made
prior to the execution of the Plan.
The parties defined the term “Premium Advance” by stating it “shall be an
amount equal to the cumulative total of its share of premiums paid on the Policy.”
(Emphasis added.) In his reply brief, David insists that “shall” is merely a mandatory
word of command that means “must.” However, we agree with the Second Circuit
regarding the meaning of “shall” as follows:
There is no doubt that “shall” is an imperative, but it is
equally clear that it is an imperative that speaks to future
conduct. Even the most demanding among us cannot
reasonably expect that a person “shall” do something
yesterday.
Salahuddin v. Mead, 174 F.3d 271, 274-275 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added.).
Furthermore, while Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1072 (10th ed. 2001)
defines “shall” as “must”, it also defines “shall” as a word “used to express what is
inevitable or seems likely to happen in the future,” and as a word “used to express
2
This is only one of many definitions for the word “cumulative” found in the Merriam-Webster
Collegiate Dictionary.
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simple futurity.” (Emphasis added.) In addition, the word “advance,” which the parties
used as a noun in the term “Premium Advance,” means “a moving forward,” or “progress
in development,” or “a progressive step,” or “a provision of something (as money or
goods) before a return is received.” So, in addition to the word “shall,” the word
“advance” connotes futurity. Considering the entire definition for “Premium Advance”
and giving it its most natural construction, we agree with the trial court that the Insurance
Plan expresses that the Company was only entitled to be reimbursed for the cumulative
total of those premiums it paid subsequent to the execution of the Plan.
In the alternative, David argues that the language in the Insurance Plan was
ambiguous regarding the Company's reimbursement. Because the language in the
contract was ambiguous, he argues the trial court should have considered the extrinsic
evidence that David presented regarding his father's intent. David avers that William
Harrod's accountant, William Johnson, and William Harrod's attorney, Martin Weinberg,
both testified that all of the Company's premium payments were to be repaid by the Trust.
In addition to this evidence, David avers that William Harrod stated in certain handwritten notes that, “The co. will be paid back the premiums it had paid. ($52,000 per
year) out of death proceeds.” Based on this evidence, David alleges that his father,
William Harrod, intended for the Company to be reimbursed for all the premiums.
According to David, if the trial court had considered this evidence, it would have surely
ruled in his favor because his evidence was undisputed.
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When a court interprets a contract, its primary objective is to enforce the
parties' intentions. 3D Enterprises Contracting Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County
Metropolitan Sewer District, 174 S.W.3d 440, 448 (Ky. 2005) (citing Cantrell Supply,
Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 94 S.W.3d 381, 384 (Ky. App. 2002)).
When no ambiguity exists in the contract, we look only as
far as the four corners of the document to determine the
parties' intentions. Hoheimer v. Hoheimer, 30 S.W.3d 176,
178 (Ky. 2000). “The fact that one party may have intended
different results, however, is insufficient to construe a
contract at variance with its plain and unambiguous terms.”
Cantrell, 94 S.W.3d at 385.
3D Enterprises Contracting Corp., 174 S.W.3d at 448 (emphasis added.). In the present
case, the Franklin Circuit Court found no ambiguity within the Insurance Plan; thus, it
had no need to look beyond the four corners of the Plan to consider the extrinsic evidence
presented by David regarding his father's alleged intentions concerning the Company's
reimbursement. As we have previously held that the Plan contained no ambiguity
regarding this issue, we agree with the trial court's decision and conclude that it did not
err when it refused to consider David's extrinsic evidence.
III. JOAN HARROD'S CROSS-APPEAL
A. ANALYSIS
1. The Franklin Circuit Court erred when it decided that the Company was entitled
to be reimbursed for the full amount of the each premium it paid on the Valley
Forge Policy.
On cross-appeal, Joan acknowledges that the trial court was correct when it
ruled that the Insurance Plan did not entitle the Company to be reimbursed for the
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premium payments it made on the Valley Forge Policy prior to the execution of the Plan.
However, Joan insists that the trial court erred when it decided that the Company was
entitled to be reimbursed for the full amount of each premium it paid pursuant to the
Plan. According to Joan's interpretation of the Insurance Plan, the Company was only
entitled to be reimbursed for its “share” of the premiums paid because the Insurance Plan
defined the term “Premium Advance” as “the cumulative total of its share of the
premiums paid on the Policy.” (Emphasis added by Cross-Appellant.) Joan contends that
the parties to the Insurance Plan intended for the word “share” used in the definition of
“Premium Advance” to mean the amount of the premiums paid by the Company minus
the current term rate paid by or attributed to the Trust because the Trust never actually
paid any portion of any of the premiums after the execution of the Plan. Joan reasons that
the Company was not entitled to be reimbursed for the full amount of each premium
payment it made subsequent to the execution of the Insurance Plan but was only entitled
to be reimbursed for its “share.”
According to Joan, the parties intended the word “share” to mean the
amount of the premiums paid by the Company minus the current term rate attributed to
the Trust because the Insurance Plan was a split-dollar insurance agreement. According
to Joan, the Insurance Plan was not just a split-dollar plan, but it was also a particular
type of split-dollar plan known as a “collateral assignment plan.” These plans exist
within the context of an employer-employee relationship and are characterized by who
owns the life insurance policy in question and by who funds it. Joan avers that with a
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collateral assignment plan the employee owns the policy and has authority to name the
beneficiary of the policy. While the employee owns said policy, the employer pays the
premiums on behalf of the employee; furthermore, the premiums paid by the employer
are deemed to be a series of loans from the employer to the employee. In exchange for
these loans, the employee assigns an interest in the policy's cash value to the employer for
the amount of the “loans,” i.e., the premium payments it has made on behalf of the
employee.
In addition, Joan claims that not only was the Insurance Plan a collateral
assignment plan, but it was also a specific type of collateral assignment plan known as a
PS-58 offset plan, also known as a contributory plan. Joan explains with a contributory
plan, the employee owns the insurance policy, and he pays that portion of the policy's
premium equal to the PS-58 rate. The employer will then pay the balance of the policy's
premium. However, Joan points out that with some contributory plans, the employer
also pays the employee's portion, the PS-58 portion, of the premium. If the employer
does so then it may expense and deduct the employee's portion of the premium as
compensation to the employee. So when the employee dies, the employer will be
reimbursed for the amounts it has paid toward the policy's premiums that exceeded the
PS-58 rate, but the employer will not be reimbursed for the PS-58 portion that it paid on
the employee's behalf. Joan asserts that the Insurance Plan was a PS-58
offset/contributory plan, because, in the Insurance Plan, the parties stated that the Trust
was responsible for paying a portion of each premium payment that was “equal to the
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current term rate for the Insured's age multiplied by the excess of the current death
benefit over the Company's current Policy Interest.” Joan claims that this provision set
the Trust's premium obligation at the PS-58 rate. Thus, the Company was only
responsible for paying that portion of each premium which exceeded the PS-58 rate. So,
even though the Company paid the entire amount for each premium, she concludes that
the Insurance Plan expressly limited the Company to only recovering the amounts it paid
in excess of the PS-58 rate because the parties used the word “share” in the definition for
the term “Premium Advance.” Because the parties used the word “share,” Joan
speculates that the parties must have been referring to the amounts in excess of the PS-58
rate; otherwise, the word “share” would be superfluous.
Thus, Joan concludes that the trial court erred when it determined that the
Company was entitled to be reimbursed for the entire amount of the premiums paid after
the execution of the Insurance Plan because the Plan is clear that the Company was only
entitled to be reimbursed for the amounts it paid in excess of the PS-58 rate. Thus, Joan
reasons that we should reverse the trial court's judgment and direct it to increase the
amount the Company is required to pay the Trust, $305,923.00, by another $72,135.00,
representing the PS-58 rate.
According to AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 2d,
[a] “split-dollar life insurance arrangement” is any
arrangement between a life insurance contract “owner” and a
“non-owner” under which:
• either party to the arrangement pays, directly or indirectly,
all or any portion of the premiums on the life insurance
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contract, including a payment by means of a loan to the other
party that is secured by the life insurance contract; and
• at least one of the parties to the arrangement paying
premiums is entitled to recover, either conditionally or
unconditionally, all or any portion of those premiums, and the
recovery is to be made from, or is secured by, the proceeds of
the life insurance contract.
33A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Taxation § 8351 (2007) (citations omitted.). Considering this
definition, it is painfully obvious, based on the language found in the Insurance Plan, that
the parties to the Plan, the Harrod Family Trust and the Harrod Concrete and Stone
Company, intended for the Plan to be a split-dollar insurance arrangement. None of the
parties to this current case dispute this, and we certainly agree.
However, Joan claims that the Plan was not just a split-dollar arrangement
but that it was specific type of split-dollar arrangement known as a collateral assignment
plan. Regarding collateral assignment plans, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 2d, states that
payments by the sponsor (i.e., the party providing life
insurance benefits to the other party under the split-dollar
arrangement) generally would have been treated as a series of
loans to the benefited party, where the employee was
designated as the contract owner (commonly called a
collateral assignment split-dollar plan). In this case,
premiums paid by the employer would have been treated
as a series of loans by the employer to the employee if the
employee was obligated to repay the employer, whether out
of contract proceeds or otherwise.
33A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Taxation § 8359 (emphasis added.).
Furthermore, Joan claims that not only was the Plan a collateral assignment
plan but it was also a specific type of collateral assignment plan known as a PS-58
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offset/contributory plan. However, according to Joan's definition for a collateral
assignment plan and the explanation found in AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 2d, a splitdollar arrangement can only qualify as a collateral assignment plan, and, therefore, as a
contributory plan, if an employee owns the life insurance policy in question, and his or
her employer pays part or all of the policy's premiums. According to the record, the
Company purchased the Valley Forge Policy in December 1987 and owned the policy
from that time until, on May 20, 1993, when it transferred the policy to William Harrod,
the Settlor of the Harrod Family Trust. Less than twenty-four hours later, on May 21,
1993, William transferred ownership of the policy to the Harrod Family Trust. In fact,
the Insurance Plan states clearly and unambiguously that the owner of the Valley Forge
Policy was the Harrod Family Trust. So when the Trust and the Company executed the
Insurance Plan, the owner of the policy, the Trust, was not an employee of the Company.
In fact, the Trust was never an employee of the Company, and the record contains no
evidence to suggest otherwise. Collateral assignment plans and PS-58 offset/contributory
plans by their very nature only exist where an employee owns the policy and the
employer pays the premiums, either in whole or in part. So, while the Insurance Plan
may superficially resemble a collateral assignment plan and may superficially resemble a
PS-58 offset/contributory plan, it does not meet the critical criterion: an employeremployee relationship between the owner of the policy and non-owner who pays the
premiums, to qualify as either. Joan's long and overly complicated argument fails based
on her own definitions. Consequently, we find no error with the trial court's denial of her
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motion to alter, amend or vacate regarding this issue.
2. The Franklin Circuit Court erred when it failed to award prejudgment interest.
In Joan's motion to alter, amend or vacate the trial court's judgment, she
asked the trial court to award the Harrod Family Trust prejudgment interest on the
amount the Company was required to pay the Trust due to David's overcompensating the
Company regarding its premium payments. The trial court summarily denied Joan's
motion without addressing any of Joan's specific issues. Now, on appeal, she argues that
the trial court erred when it failed to award prejudgment interest.
Where an award of damages is for a liquidated amount, then prejudgment
interest is required. Nucor Corp. v. General Electric Co., 812 S.W.2d 136, 141 (Ky.
1991). A “liquidated amount” is one that can be determined by simple calculation, can
be determined with reasonable certainty, can be determined pursuant to fixed rules of
evidence or can be determined by well-established market values. 3D Enterprises
Contracting Corp., 174 S.W.3d at 450. Joan argues that the amount the Company should
repay to the Trust is readily ascertainable; thus, it is a liquidated amount that requires an
award of prejudgment interest.
In the alternative, Joan concedes that the amount of the overpayment may
be an unliquidated amount. If so, she acknowledges the decision to award prejudgment
interest falls within the trial court's sound discretion. Nucor Corp., 812 S.W.2d at 141.
However, she argues that David, as trustee of the Harrod Family Trust, ignored the
language found in the Insurance Plan and overcompensated the Company for its premium
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payments which was detrimental to the Trust and its beneficiaries. She, therefore, insists
that equity demands that the Trust be made whole, and the only way to do that is for the
trial court to award prejudgment interest.
"Liquidated damages" are damages the amount of which has
been made certain and fixed either by the act and agreement
of the parties or by operation of law to a sum which cannot be
changed by the proof. Liquidated damages are the sum which
a party to a contract agrees to pay if he or she fails to perform
and which, having been arrived at by good-faith effort to
estimate actual damages that will probably ensue from
breach, is recoverable as agreed-upon damages should breach
occur. They are also defined as damages the amount of
which has been ascertained by judgment or by the specific
agreement of the parties or which are susceptible of being
made certain by mathematical calculation from known
factors. The term applies when a specific sum of money has
been expressly stipulated by the parties to a contract as the
amount of damages to be recovered by either party for a
breach of the contract by the other. The sum must be
stipulated and agreed upon by the parties at the time they
enter their contract, and such clauses are permissible where
they are neither unconscionable nor contrary to public policy.
By contrast, "unliquidated damages" are damages that have
been established by a verdict or award but cannot be
determined by a fixed formula so they are left to the
discretion of the judge or jury. In general, damages are
unliquidated where they are an uncertain quantity, depending
on no fixed standard, referred to the wise discretion of a jury,
and can never be made certain except by accord or verdict.
22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 489 (2007) (citations omitted.). According to the Supreme
Court of Kentucky, to determine whether damages are liquidated or unliquidated, the trial
court “must look at the nature of the underlying claim, not the final award.” 3D
Enterprises Contracting Corp., 172 S.W.3d at 450. Because the trial court summarily
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denied Joan's claim for prejudgment interest, we have no insight to the lower court's
reasoning regarding this issue. The trial court made no determination regarding the
nature of Joan's claims and whether the damages awarded were liquidated or
unliquidated. And, assuming that the trial court did determine that the damages were
unliquidated, we have no way of reviewing whether or not the lower court correctly
exercised its discretion because it made no findings of facts or conclusions of law to
review. Therefore, we vacate that part of the trial court's order regarding prejudgment
interest and remand for it to reconsider the issue and to enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law on this issue.
3. The Franklin Circuit Court erred when it failed to order the Trustee to distribute
the interest that had accrued on the Trust's assets to Joan's Trust.
In her third assignment of error, Joan argues that the trial court erred when
it failed to order the interest that had accrued on the Trust's assets to be distributed to
Joan's Trust. In support of this argument, Joan points out that, according to the Trust
Instrument, Joan's Trust is entitled to receive the remainder of the net death benefits.
According to Joan, this provision in the instrument constituted a specific bequest as
opposed to a pecuniary bequest. Joan argues that the beneficiary of a specific bequest is
entitled to the accumulations and additions to the bequest asset from the time the testator
died until the asset is disbursed, even if it has changed form. In re Gykllstom's Will, 172
Misc. 655, 15 N.Y.S.2d 801, 809 (N.Y. Sur. 1939).
According to Joan, the Trust Instrument's provision that the remainder of
the net death benefits goes to Joan's Trust does not use the words “an amount equal to” or
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“the sum of,” which are words that indicate that a bequest is pecuniary, so she concludes
that the provision is a specific bequest. In addition, Joan argues that there is no reason to
treat the proceeds from a life insurance policy differently from securities because an
insurance policy is a type of security. Ruh's Ex'r v. Ruh, 270 Ky. 792, 110 S.W.2d 1097,
1104-1104 (Ky. 1937). And, she notes that a gift of stock is considered a specific
bequest. Accordingly, she concludes that the remainder of the death benefits qualifies as
a specific bequest entitling Joan's Trust to receive the interest and dividends that have
accrued on the proceeds of the two life insurance policies since William Harrod's death.
She argues, therefore, that the trial court erred when it ordered her to refund $85,616.41
to the Harrod Family Trust, and it erred when it refused to order David to disburse the
remaining $17,153.74 of the Trust's assets to Joan's Trust.
The resolution of this issue does not turn upon whether or not this provision
constitutes a specific versus pecuniary bequest; rather, it turns upon what the Settlor,
William Harrod, meant by the terms “death benefits” and “net death benefits.” The
question then becomes did William Harrod intend for the “death benefits” and “net death
benefits” to include the interest and dividends that have accumulated on the face amounts
of the life insurance policies.
In the Trust Instrument, the Settlor did not define the term “death benefits”;
however, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 406 (7th ed. 1999) defines that term as “[a]n amount
paid to a beneficiary on the death of an insured.” This definition strongly suggests that
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the term “death benefits,” ordinarily, refers to the proceeds a beneficiary receives from
one or more life insurance policies. According to AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 2d,
In the case of the death of an insured within the risk and
conditions of a life insurance policy, few questions arise as to
the extent of the insurer's liability. Ordinarily, the amount
payable, except for the deduction of the insured's
indebtedness to the insurer, or the payment of interest by the
insurer, is the face amount of the policy.
44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1448 (2007) (citations omitted.). So, usually, the proceeds
from a life insurance policy, that is the “death benefits,” constitute the face amount of the
policy plus interest. Regarding such interest, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 2d, states that
in general, “interest is chargeable against an insurer under a life insurance policy, payable
on proof of death, from the time such proof was furnished and accepted.” 44 AM. JUR. 2D
Insurance § 1450 (2007) (citations omitted.). So, using the ordinary meaning of the term
“death benefits,” it would include any interest that accrued from the time that the
insurance company received proof of the insured's death to the time that the insurance
company accepted that proof. Based on this construction, we conclude that William used
the term “death benefits” in the Trust Instrument to refer to the face amounts of the
policies plus any interest that accrued from the time the Trust submitted proof of his
death to the time the insurance companies accepted that proof.
Regarding the term “net death benefits,” the pertinent part of the Trust
Instrument reads that
[t]he net death benefits from all insurance policies received
by the trust on Settlor's life, after all payments on any loans
by this trust against them at Settlor's death and all payments
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to any company pursuant to a split-dollar life insurance
agreement against them at Settlor's death, shall be
distributed[.]
Based on the natural construction of this provision, the “net death benefits”
consisted of the “death benefits.” In other words, it is the face amount of the life
insurance policies plus the applicable interest as discussed supra, minus the payoff of all
of the Trust's outstanding loans less the Company's reimbursement for the premiums it
paid pursuant to the Insurance Plan.
According to the Trust Instrument, Joan's Trust was entitled to receive the
remainder of the net death benefits, that is the “net death benefits” as defined supra,
minus the $1,000,000.00 that the trustee was directed to disburse to Joan outright and
$300,000.00 that the trustee was directed to distribute to the Catherine Harrod Trust. As
the recipient of the remainder of the net death benefits, Joan's Trust was not entitled, as
Joan insists, to the return of the unused portion of the Northwestern Policy's premium or
to the interest and dividends that accrued on the Harrod Family Trust's assets from the
time of William's death until the time David, the trustee, disbursed those assets. Based on
the natural construction of the term “death benefits” considering the Trust Instrument as a
whole, Joan's Trust was only entitled to receive the interest that accrued on the face
amounts of the policies from the time the Trust submitted proof of William's death to the
insurance companies to the time the insurance companies accepted that proof.
The record in this case does not reveal if such interest accrued and, if so,
how much. Therefore, we reverse that part of the trial court's judgment in which it held
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that the term “death benefits” only included the face amounts of the life insurance
policies and remand with instructions for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine if interest accrued on the face amounts of the insurance policies from the time
that the Trust submitted proof of William's death to the insurance companies to the time
the companies accepted such proof. If interest did accrue, then the trial court should
determine how much accrued. Because this amount is presently unknown, once
determined, it may impact the amount of money to which Joan's Trust was entitled.
Therefore, we vacate that portion of the trial court's judgment in which it determined that
Joan was liable to refund $85,616.41 to the Harrod Family Trust. Depending upon how
much interest accrued as discussed above, Joan may be liable for an amount less than
$85,616.41.
However, we note that she is still liable to refund $50,000.00 to the Trust,
representing the amount of spousal support she received from the Trust. We instruct the
trial court to re-examine this issue once it has determined the amount of interest that
accrued on the face amounts of the life insurance policies as discussed supra.
Finally, because Joan's Trust was only entitled to the interest that accrued
on the face amounts of the insurance policies from the time that proof of William's death
was submitted to the time the companies accepted such proof, the trial court was correct
that Joan's Trust was not entitled to the remaining $17,153.74. Therefore, we affirm that
part of the trial court's judgment.
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4. The Franklin Circuit Court erred when it failed to fully address Joan's claims
regarding her Crummey withdrawal rights.
Finally, on cross-appeal, Joan claims that the trial court erred by failing to
fully address her claims regarding her withdrawal rights pursuant to Crummey, 397 F.2d
at 82. Joan claims that she agrees with the trial court's decision that David's obligation to
notify her and the other beneficiaries regarding their Crummey withdrawal rights was
discretionary. However, she argues that the trial court should have construed her
complaint liberally to allow her to pursue an additional claim against David, as Trustee,
for breach of his fiduciary duty because he failed to direct the Settlor, William Harrod, to
notify her of her withdrawal rights. According to Joan, William Harrod was either a cotrustee or an agent of the Trust. Either way, she argues that David, as Trustee, was
responsible for William's alleged failure to notify her.
In Count I of Joan's complaint which she labeled as “Breach of Fiduciary
Duty by Failure to Give Notice of Trust Withdrawal Rights,” she claimed that she
was never given a copy of the Trust Agreement until
sometime after Mr. Harrod's death and had no knowledge of
her beneficial interest in the Harrod Family Trust while her
husband was living. As a beneficiary of the Harrod Family
Trust during the life of Mr. Harrod, she never received an
accounting of the trust and was never contacted by David R.
Harrod, as Trustee, to ascertain her needs with respect to
discretionary distributions of income or corpus. With respect
to each and every one of the gifts or “additions” made to the
Harrod Family Trust by Mr. Harrod . . . , Mrs. Harrod was
never notified of the additions or of her right to withdraw the
first $10,000.00 thereof. As a result, David R. Harrod, as
Trustee, breached his fiduciary duty to Mrs. Harrod and
should be adjudged liable to her for the value of the additions
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which she could have withdrawn from the trust had she been
notified of them.
According to the Supreme Court of Kentucky,
[w]hile it is true that the Rules of Civil Procedure with respect
to stating a cause of action should be liberally construed and
that much leniency should be shown in construing whether a
complaint on which a default judgment is based states a cause
of action, this Court cannot read away the requirement of
Civil Rule 8.01 which requires “. . . a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief. . . .” There must be maintained some minimum
standard in the art of pleading which must be met. Pike v.
George, Ky., 434 S.W.2d 626 (1968); Johnson v. Coleman,
Ky., 288 S.W.2d 348 (1956).
Morgan v. O'Neil, 652 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Ky. 1983). In Joan's complaint, she clearly and
unequivocally alleged that David, as trustee of the Harrod Family Trust, had breached his
fiduciary duty to her by failing to notify her of her Crummey withdrawal rights. She
never mentioned in her complaint that William Harrod as the Settlor of the Harrod
Family Trust also had a duty to notify her. And, she never alleged that David, as trustee,
was responsible for William's alleged failure to notify her. No matter how liberally we
construe Joan's complaint, we cannot read into it a claim that simply was never there in
the first place. Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied Joan's motion to alter,
amend or vacate, and we affirm the trial court's order regarding this issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
A. DAVID'S DIRECT APPEAL
Regarding David's argument that the trial court erred when it determined
that the Company was not entitled to be reimbursed for the premiums it paid on the
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Valley Forge Policy prior to the execution of the Insurance Plan, the Franklin Circuit
Court's order and opinion is AFFIRMED.
B. JOAN'S CROSS-APPEAL
Regarding Joan's first assignment of error that the trial court erred when it
decided that the Company was entitled to be reimbursed for the full amount of each
premium it paid on the Valley Forge Policy after the execution of the Insurance Plan, the
Franklin Circuit Court's order denying Joan's motion to alter, amend or vacate and its
order and opinion are AFFIRMED.
Regarding Joan's second assignment of error that the trial court erred when
it failed to award prejudgment interest, the trial court's order denying Joan's motion to
alter, amend or vacate is VACATED IN PART and REMANDED with instructions set
forth supra.
Regarding Joan's third assignment of error that the trial court erred when it
failed to order the Trustee to distribute the interest that had accrued on the Trust's assets
to Joan's Trust, the trial court's order denying Joan's motion to alter, amend or vacate and
its order and opinion are REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART and
REMANDED with instructions as explained supra.
Regarding Joan's final assignment of error that the trial court failed to fully
address her claims regarding her Crummey withdrawal rights, the trial court's order
denying Joan's motion to alter, amend or vacate and its opinion and order are
AFFIRMED.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS/CROSSAPPELLEES:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Lynn C. Stidham
Lexington, Kentucky
Jonathon Melton
Lexington, Kentucky
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