JOHNNY D. ALLEN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 16, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000199-MR
JOHNNY D. ALLEN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CASEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES G. WEDDLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00031
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, DIXON AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
DIXON, JUDGE: Appellant, Johnny D. Allen, appeals as a matter of right from the
Casey Circuit Court's denial of his motion for RCr 11.42 post-conviction relief. Finding
no error, we affirm.
In July 2000, Appellant was indicted in the Casey Circuit Court for murder
and first-degree arson, following his confession to shooting his wife and then setting her
residence on fire. The Commonwealth thereafter filed a notice of aggravating
circumstances and its intent to seek the death penalty. On January 4, 2002, Appellant
appeared in open court with his counsel and entered a plea of guilty to both the murder
and arson charges. In exchange for his guilty plea, the Commonwealth recommended a
sentence of life imprisonment for murder, and twenty years imprisonment for arson, with
said sentences to run concurrently. On February 25, 2002, Appellant again appeared with
his attorney and was questioned as to his desire to plead guilty in exchange for the
Commonwealth's recommended sentence. The trial court entered judgment on March 6,
2002.
On March 8, 2002, Appellant, acting pro se, wrote a letter to the court
seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that he had been misadvised by trial
counsel.1 At Appellant's request, an attorney was appointed to represent him and to
determine if an evidentiary hearing was warranted. On May 13, 2002, Appellant
appeared with appointed counsel and was advised by the trial court that he would be
afforded an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. However,
after consultation with his counsel, Appellant stated that he was, in fact, satisfied with
both his plea and sentence and that he no longer wished to withdraw his guilty plea.
On February 28, 2005, Appellant filed the instant pro se motion to vacate
judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42, alleging that his guilty plea was not knowing and
voluntary, but was rather the product of his trial counsel's deficient performance. By
order entered August 29, 2005, the trial court denied Appellant's motion, noting:
Appellant had first sent a letter to the trial court on February 22, 2002, “to obtain information
and assistance in filing a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42.”
1
2
The defendant's motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 sets out the
same grounds as was alleged by the defendant in his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court appointed counsel to
represent the defendant and was prepared to hold an
Evidentiary Hearing. The defendant, in open court, stated he
was satisfied with his sentence and did not want to withdraw
his guilty plea.
The Court presided in the proceedings involving the
defendant and is personally familiar with all of the
proceedings, including the defendant's plea of guilty. The
allegations now made by the defendant have absolutely no
merit. The allegations are rebutted by the record.
Appellant thereafter appealed to this Court.2
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984), sets forth the standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel, and
requires a showing that (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The twopart Strickland test also applies to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).
A criminal defendant may demonstrate that his guilty plea was involuntary
by showing that it was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. In such a case, the
trial court is to “consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the guilty plea and
juxtapose the presumption of voluntariness inherent in a proper plea colloquy with a
2
Apparently, after Appellant filed his pro se notice of appeal, counsel was appointed to
represent him. However, On April 18, 2006, DPA filed a motion in this Court to withdraw on
the grounds that “this action does not appear to be a 'proceeding that a reasonable person with
adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense.'” (Quoting KRS 113.110(2)(c)).
This Court granted DPA's motion to withdraw by order dated May 31, 2006.
3
Strickland v. Washington inquiry into the performance of counsel.” Rigdon v.
Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Ky. App. 2004)(Quoting Bronk v.
Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Ky. 2001)(footnotes omitted)). However, advising
a defendant to plead guilty is not, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate any degree of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Beecham v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 234, 236-7
(Ky. 1983). Rather, the defendant must show (1) “that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel's performance fell outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance;” and (2) “that the deficient performance so seriously affected the outcome of
the plea process that, but for the errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that
the defendant would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial.”
Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Ky. App. 1986). See also Rigdon,
supra.
In light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including Appellant's
confession to the charged crimes, as well as the possible sentence that he faced on the
capital murder charge, it is highly unlikely that he would have rejected the plea
agreement on the remote possibility that he might have been acquitted. As for his
argument that he was “coached” into pleading guilty by his counsel, we agree with the
trial court that the record refutes this allegation. The “Motion to Enter Guilty Plea” that
Appellant signed states that his plea was “freely, knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
made.” Also, the trial court noted in its order that he questioned Appellant as to
voluntariness of his plea and Appellant stated that he wanted to plead guilty to both
charges. Finally, when he appeared before the court on his motion to withdraw his plea,
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Appellant specifically rejected the offer of an evidentiary hearing, and confirmed that he
was satisfied with his guilty plea and resulting sentence.
We conclude that the trial court properly denied Appellant's RCr 11.42
motion without an evidentiary hearing. RCr 11.42(5). See also Haight v. Commonwealth,
41 S.W.3d 436 (Ky. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 998 (2001); Fraser v. Commonwealth,
23 S.W.3d 619 (Ky. 2001).
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Johnny D. Allen, Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky 41472
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
5
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