CARLA VANWINKLE (NOW BENSON) v. VICKI L. PETRY AND DOUGLAS H. PETRY
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 19, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2006-CA-000066-ME
CARLA VANWINKLE (NOW BENSON)
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MADISON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE JEAN CHENAULT LOGUE, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-CI-01175
VICKI L. PETRY AND
DOUGLAS H. PETRY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND VACATING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER1 AND DIXON, JUDGES; PAISLEY,2 SENIOR JUDGE.
PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE:
Carla VanWinkle (now “Benson”) seeks
appellate review of a December 5, 2005 order of the Madison
Family Court in which the family court modified the grandparent
visitation of Carla’s parents, Douglas H. and Vicki L. Petry
1
Judge David A. Barber concurred in this opinion prior to the expiration of
his term of office on December 31, 2006. Release of the opinion was delayed
by administrative handling.
2
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
(hereinafter referred to as the “Petrys”) by giving the Petrys
an extra weekend of visitation each month.
In her brief, Carla
argues that the family court erred when it, on its own motion,
modified the Petrys’ visitation; that Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 405.021, the grandparent visitation statute, is
unconstitutional; and that the Petrys’ continued status as third
party petitioners violates her constitutionally protected right
to make decision regarding her children without undue
interference.
Finding that the family court erred, we vacate
two provisions of the December 5th order and remand.
In February of 1994, Carla married Michael VanWinkle,
and, during the marriage, the couple had two children: Emily and
Joseph.
At some point, Carla met and began having an affair
with Keith Benson.
Carla eventually moved out of the family
residence, and she and the children moved in with her parents,
the Petrys.
Later, on October 15, 2002, Carla filed a petition
for dissolution of marriage with the Madison Family Court.
After the dissolution proceeding was initiated, both
Carla and Michael began accusing one another of being unfit to
care for their children and each sought sole custody.
The
situation between Carla and Michael continued to deteriorate,
and, on December 13, 2002, Carla filed a domestic violence
petition against Michael.
The family court, on December 20th,
held a hearing regarding Carla’s domestic violence petition.
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During the hearing, the parties made numerous allegations of
abuse, neglect and violence.
Since the allegations caused
concern, the family court ordered the Cabinet for Families and
Children, now the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, to
investigate.
After Carla and Michael had consulted with their
attorneys, they agreed that the Petrys should have temporary
custody of the children while the Cabinet investigated the
allegations of domestic violence.
On December 20th, the court entered a temporary custody
order pursuant to the parents’ agreement which granted temporary
custody to the Petrys.
In this order, the family court found
that the children were dependent, neglected or abused.
Oddly
enough, the family court also entered another order on December
20th in which it granted joint custody to Carla and Michael.
After the Cabinet completed its investigation, the
family court revisited Carla’s domestic violence petition on
January 3, 2003.
The family court did not find sufficient
evidence of domestic violence, yet, despite this, the family
court did not return the children to their parents.
Instead,
the family court entered another order on January 3rd in which
the court ordered that the parties’ children would reside with
the Petrys until the court ordered otherwise.
In the January 3rd
order, the family court made no mention of dependency, neglect
or abuse, and it specifically stated that the Petrys should not
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be considered the children’s de facto custodians.
The family
court also set forth a visitation schedule for Carla and
Michael.
On January 31, 2003, the Petrys moved the family court
for permission to intervene as third party petitioners in the
dissolution action.
Along with the intervention motion, the
Petrys filed a petition for custody and visitation.
Although
the Petrys had only had temporary custody of the children for a
little over a month, they argued in their petition that the
family court should grant permanent custody of the children to
them since the family court had previously found the children to
be dependent, neglected or abused and since they had formed a
significant relationship with the children.
In the alternative,
the Petrys asked for visitation pursuant to KRS 405.021 if the
court declined to grant them permanent custody.
On February 18,
2003, the family court granted the Petrys’ motion to intervene,
and a three way custody battle began.
Later, on July 9, 2003, the family court entered a
decree of dissolution of marriage but did not address the
custody issue.
On October 2, 2003, Carla, Michael and the
Petrys entered into an agreed order which granted joint custody
of the children to Carla and Michael and granted grandparent
visitation to the Petrys.
At this point, the Petrys no longer
had any legal right to make decisions or be involved in
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decisions regarding the children.
On November 14, 2003, Carla
filed a pro se motion seeking permission to change the
children’s school and daycare arguing that she had plans to move
to Lexington, Kentucky.
At a hearing held on November 17, 2003,
the family court denied Carla’s motion.
Carla subsequently
moved to Lexington but maintained the children in the same
school and daycare in Madison County.
As a result, Carla had to
transport the children back and forth along the interstate
highway between Richmond and Lexington.
On December 16, 2003, the Petrys filed an ex parte
motion for immediate sole custody of the children.
According to
the Petrys, the family court had previously ordered that the
children were to continue to attend the Kit Carson Elementary
School and to continue to attend daycare at Kidz [sic]
Connection.
The Petrys argued that Carla had moved to Lexington
and intended to transport the children back and forth along the
interstate between Lexington and Richmond in order to comply
with the court’s previous order.
The Petrys felt that
transporting the children between Lexington and Richmond on a
day to day basis during the week was too dangerous.
Furthermore, they noted that Michael was living in Jackson
County and argued that it would be in the children’s best
interest if they had sole custody.
On that same day, the family
court granted temporary sole custody to the Petrys.
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The family
court did not find such custody would be in the children’s best
interest nor did it find that the children were dependent,
neglected or abused.
On December 22, 2003, the family court
held a hearing on the custody of the children.
At the hearing,
Vicki Petry testified that both Carla and Michael had been
evicted and both owed their landlords back rent.
Vicki also
testified that the children had been expelled from their daycare
because Carla and Michael had failed to pay the tuition and that
the parents owed approximately $1,000.00 in back tuition.
Not
only that, Vicki alleged that, when the children stayed with
Michael, they were forced to sleep in his living room on a
couch.
Subsequently, on March 2, 2004, the court ordered that
the Petrys would continue to have temporary sole custody of the
children.
After the family court granted temporary custody to
the Petrys, both Carla and Michael filed numerous motions, each
seeking to regain custody of the children.
On November 22,
2004, Carla moved the family court to set aside all of its
previous custody orders.
In a January 11, 2005 order detailing
the history of the case, the family court denied Carla’s motion.
In this order, the family court repudiated its earlier finding
that the children were dependent, neglected or abused.
In
addition, the family court stated that based on evidence adduced
at the December 22, 2003 hearing, it had previously found by
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clear and convincing evidence that Carla and Michael were unfit
parents.
However, a thorough search of the record reveals that
the family court had made no such finding either in a written
order or from the bench.
After the court denied Carla’s motion to set aside the
previous custody orders, Carla filed a petition for writ of
prohibition and mandamus asking this Court to prohibit the
family court from granting the Petrys continuing standing to
pursue custody of the children and asking this Court to order
the family court to restore custody to her and Michael.
We
denied the petition, holding that Carla had failed to show the
necessary exceptional circumstances that would justify the
extraordinary relief of either mandamus or prohibition.
After the original action in this Court had been
resolved, Carla, Michael and the Petrys entered into an agreed
order on July 28, 2005, which granted joint custody to Carla and
Michael; relegated the Petrys to grandparent status; and granted
grandparent visitation of one weekend per month to the Petrys,
pursuant to KRS 405.021.
However, on that same day, the Petrys
filed yet another ex parte motion.
In this motion, they sought
to set aside the newly-minted agreed order claiming that Carla’s
attorney had contacted their attorney and had stated that Carla
was planning to move to Florida with the children.
According to
the record, by July 28, 2005, Carla had not only married Keith
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Benson but had also had his baby.
Furthermore, Keith, along
with the baby, had moved to Florida to supposedly enhance the
profitability of his internet company.
On July 28, 2005, the
family court granted the Petrys’ ex parte motion and granted
temporary custody of the children to Michael.
After an August
8th hearing, the family court entered an order on August 26th in
which the court reinstated the July 28th agreed order with two
provisos: 1) the parents could not leave the Commonwealth with
the children and 2) the parents were to share their parenting
time on a seven day rotation.
On September 23, 2005, less than a month after
regaining custody, Carla moved the family court for permission
to move to Florida with the children.
On that same day, the
family court denied Carla’s motion to relocate but stated that
it would reconsider such a motion after six months if she
provided proof of a Florida address, proof that Keith Benson’s
business was more profitable in Florida, and proof that Carla
was meeting her financial obligations.
After the family court denied her motion to relocate,
Carla began negotiating with Michael regarding their parenting
time.
In an unprecedented display of cooperation, Carla and
Michael agreed to temporarily designate Michael as the
children’s primary residential custodian allowing Carla to move
to Florida in order to obtain the information necessary to
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support a new motion to relocate.
Carla and Michael agreed that
the children would spend holidays and summer vacation with her
in Florida and would spend the remainder of the year with
Michael.
Michael and Carla also agreed that the children would
continue to visit with the Petrys once each month pursuant to
the agreed order.
Carla’s attorney prepared a new agreed order
reflecting the changes upon which the parties had agreed, but
this new agreed order did not contain a signature line for the
Petrys.
On November 28, 2005, the Petrys filed yet another ex
parte motion regarding custody.
The Petrys argued that Carla
had abandoned the children and had moved to Florida.
On
November 28, 2005, the family court entered an ex parte order
granting joint custody of the children to Michael and the
Petrys.
The family court held a hearing regarding the Petrys’
ex parte motion on December 5, 2005.
Both Carla and Michael
argued that Carla had not abandoned the children but that they
had agreed that Michael would temporarily be designated as the
children’s primary residential custodian.
Citing Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000),
Carla argued that fit parents have a constitutional right to
raise their children without undue interference from a third
party.
Carla pointed out that the agreement with Michael did
not affect the Petrys’ visitation rights so they had no right to
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be involved in that agreement.
However, the family court
disagreed and held that Carla and Michael could not enter into
any further agreed orders without the participation of the
Petrys.
The family court also reinstated joint custody to the
parents; prohibited the parents from traveling outside of the
Commonwealth with the children; ordered that the Petrys would
have to agree with Carla’s visitation; and, on its own
initiative, modified the Petrys’ visitation granting an
additional weekend of visitation per month to them.
Now, Carla
seeks relief from the family court’s December 5th order.
In Carla’s brief, she acknowledges that she and
Michael signed an agreed order in October of 2003 which granted
the Petrys visitation with the children one weekend per month,
pursuant to KRS 405.021.
In addition, Carla believes that this
visitation is in the children’s best interest and she does not
challenge it.
However, Carla does challenge the additional
weekend of visitation that the family court awarded to the
Petrys during the December 5, 2005 hearing.
Pursuant to KRS 405.021, grandparents have the right
to petition a trial court for visitation with their
grandchildren; however, if the parents object, the grandparents
must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that such
visitation would be in the grandchildren’s best interest.
Vibbert v. Vibbert, 144 S.W.3d 292, 295 (Ky.App. 2004).
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Carla
points out that prior to the December 5th hearing, the Petrys had
not filed a petition for grandparent visitation as required by
KRS 405.021, and, at the hearing, they did not request extra
visitation either.
The family court merely awarded this extra
visitation sua sponte, and since it did not mention KRS 405.021,
Carla contends that the family court granted the extra
visitation without authority.
Moreover, Carla cites both
Gladish v. Gladish, 741 S.W.2d 658, 659 (Ky.App. 1987) and
Chandler v. Chandler, 535 S.W.2d 71 (Ky. 1976) for the
proposition that a trial court cannot, on its own initiative,
modify a custody decree without a request to modify.
Since a
trial court cannot modify custody sua sponte, Carla reasons that
a trial court should not be able to modify visitation sua sponte
either.
Regarding grandparent visitation, this court
previously held:
[T]hat the appropriate test under KRS
405.021 is that the courts must consider a
broad array of factors in determining
whether the visitation is in the child’s
best interest, including but not limited to:
the nature and stability of the relationship
between the child and the grandparent
seeking visitation; the amount of time spent
together; the potential detriments and
benefits to the child from granting
visitation; the effect granting visitation
would have on the child’s relationship with
the parents; the physical and emotional
health of all the adults involved, parents
and grandparents alike; the stability of the
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child’s living and schooling arrangements;
the wishes and preferences of the child.
The grandparent seeking visitation must
prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the requested visitation is in the best
interest of the child.
Vibbert v. Vibbert, supra.
If a grandparent wishes to have visitation with a
grandchild, he or she must petition the circuit court in the
county in which the child resides and must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that visitation is in the child’s best
interest.
Furthermore, in analyzing the issue of the child’s
best interest, the circuit court should consider the factors set
forth in Vibbert.
In this case, the Petrys did not petition the
family court for additional visitation; did not raise the issue
of additional visitation at the December 5th hearing; and did not
present any evidence that additional visitation would be in the
children’s best interest.
In addition, the family court made no
finding, pursuant to KRS 405.021, either from the bench or in a
written order, that additional visitation would be in the
children’s best interest, nor did it consider the factors set
forth in Vibbert.
We find that the family court erred when it
granted the additional visitation without following the required
procedures.
Thus, we vacate that part of the December 5, 2005
order that granted additional visitation.
However, this ruling
does not preclude the family court from granting additional
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visitation to the Petrys in the future if the mandates of KRS
405.021 and Vibbert are followed.
We also vacate the provision
of the family court’s order that provides that the Petrys must
approve any changes regarding Carla’s time with the children.
Such an arrangement violates the parents’ rights under Troxel v.
Granville, supra as discussed below.
In the alternative, Carla claims that KRS 405.021 is
unconstitutionally vague.
However, since we vacate that portion
of the family court’s order in which it granted additional
visitation, we decline to address the merits of Carla’s
constitutional challenge.
In addition to challenging the additional visitation,
Carla also challenges the Petrys’ status as third party
petitioners in the dissolution action.
Carla does not dispute
that the Petrys had a right to intervene in the dissolution
action in January of 2003; however, Carla claims that the
Petrys’ continuing involvement in the dissolution action
violates her and Michael’s constitutional rights to make
decisions regarding their parenting time.
According to Carla,
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution protects a parent’s fundamental right to
make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of his
or her child without undue interference. Troxel v. Granville,
supra at 65.
Carla contends that the family court has allowed
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the Petrys to continually thwart her and Michael’s ability to
make decisions for their children, especially when it comes to
decisions about custody and parenting time.
Regarding a parent’s right to raise his or her child,
the United States Supreme Court stated the following:
The liberty interest at issue in this casethe interest of parents in the care,
custody, and control of their children-is
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by this Court.
More than 75 years ago, in Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401, 43 S.Ct.
625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923), we held that the
“liberty” protected by the Due Process
Clause includes the right of parents to
“establish a home and bring up children” and
“to control the education of their own.”
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535, 45 S.Ct.
571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925), we again held
that the “liberty of parents and guardians”
includes the right “to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their
control.” We explained in Pierce that
“[t]he child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.” Id., at 535, 45
S.Ct. 571. We returned to the subject in
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64
S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944), and again
confirmed that there is a constitutional
dimension to the right of parents to direct
the upbringing of their children. “It is
cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder.” Id.,
at 166, 64 S.Ct. 438.
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In subsequent cases also, we have recognized
the fundamental right of parents to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children. See, e.g.,
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92
S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (“It is
plain that the interest of a parent in the
companionship, care, custody, and management
of his or her children ‘come[s] to this
Court with a momentum for respect lacking
when appeal is made to liberties which
derive merely from shifting economic
arrangements’” (citation omitted));
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92
S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (“The
history and culture of Western civilization
reflect a strong tradition of parental
concern for the nurture and upbringing of
their children. This primary role of the
parents in the upbringing of their children
is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition”); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54
L.Ed.2d 511 (1978) (“We have recognized on
numerous occasions that the relationship
between parent and child is constitutionally
protected”); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584,
602, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979)
(“Our jurisprudence historically has
reflected Western civilization concepts of
the family as a unit with broad parental
authority over minor children. Our cases
have consistently followed that course”);
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102
S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)
(discussing “[t]he fundamental liberty
interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child”);
Glucksberg, supra, at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258
(“In a long line of cases, we have held
that, in addition to the specific freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights, the
‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due
Process Clause includes the righ[t] . . . to
direct the education and upbringing of one’s
children” (citing Meyer and Pierce)). In
light of this extensive precedent, it cannot
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now be doubted that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
fundamental right of parents to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children. (emphasis added.)
Troxel v. Granville, supra at 65-66.
Even though a parent has a
fundamental and constitutionally protected right to make
decisions regarding his or her child, that right is not
unfettered.
For example, in a dissolution action, a trial court
may grant joint custody of a child to both parents, or it may
grant sole custody to one parent, thereby, limiting the other
parent’s right to make decisions for the child. KRS 403.270.
Pursuant to KRS 403.340, based upon a showing that a change of
circumstances has occurred and the modification of custody is
necessary to the serve the best interest of the child, a trial
court may modify custody stripping both parents of custody and
vesting custody in a third party such as a de facto custodian.
The Commonwealth’s ability to interfere with a parent’s custody
does not end there.
Pursuant to KRS Chapter 620, the
Commonwealth can remove a child from a parent’s custody through
a dependency, neglect or abuse action.
Against this backdrop of law, we now turn our
attention to the facts of this case.
In the Petrys’ various ex
parte motions, they never alleged that Carla and Michael were
unfit; never alleged that the children were dependent, neglected
or abused; and never alleged that they, the Petrys, were acting
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as de facto custodians.
Apparently, the Petrys were operating
under the assumption that they had a continuing right to make
decisions for the children or, at least, be involved in such
decisions even when the family court had granted joint custody
to Carla and Michael.
However, after the July 28th agreed order,
the only right the Petrys had regarding the children involved
visitation.
They simply had no legal right to be involved in
decisions regarding the children.
Despite this, they continued
to file ex parte motions with the family court seeking custody
of the children when they disagreed with the parents’ decisions.
By doing so, the Petrys unduly interfered with the parents’
constitutionally protected rights to make decisions for their
children.
See Troxel v. Granville, supra.
While we can certainly find no fault with the family
court for entertaining the Petrys’ various ex parte motions, we
are disturbed by the family court’s willingness to grant those
motions even though the Petrys never claimed that the parents
were unfit; or that the children were dependent, neglected or
abused; or that they were acting as de facto custodians.
Furthermore, the family court never found the Petrys to be de
facto custodians, and, while it found that the children were
dependent, neglected or abused in December of 2002, it later
retracted that finding, stating that the finding was a mistake.
In addition, the family court never found that Carla and Michael
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were unfit parents, despite the family court’s insistence to the
contrary.
The family court repeatedly treated the Petrys as if
they had a legal right to be involved in decisions regarding the
children even though it had granted joint custody to Carla and
Michael.
By doing so, the family court gave virtual veto power
to the Petrys over the parents’ decisions.
Thus, the family
court violated, on several occasions, Carla and Michael’s
parental rights as recognized by Troxel v. Granville, supra.
However, we cannot grant the relief that Carla is
seeking, that is the dismissal of the Petrys from the
dissolution action.
Since the Petrys have been granted
visitation pursuant to KRS 405.021, they remain parties to the
action to that extent.
We hasten to add that simply because
they have such visitation does not give them the legal right to
be involved in decisions regarding the children unless those
decisions affect their visitation.
Furthermore, if we were to
dismiss the Petrys from this action, such a dismissal would not
preclude them from filing, at some point in the future, another
motion to intervene.
Despite the merits of such a motion, the
family court would be bound to entertain it, and, if such a
motion were meritorious, the family court would be bound to
grant it.
However, this is not a license for the Petrys to
continue using the court system to meddle in the parents’
decisions regarding the children.
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At this point in time Carla
and Michael have joint custody of the children, and they, not
the Petrys, have the legal right and obligation to make
decisions regarding the children.
The fact that the Petrys may
disagree with some of the parents’ decisions is not sufficient
grounds for the Petrys to seek and be awarded custody of the
children.
Moreover, we caution the family court to be mindful
that due process protects Carla and Michael’s fundamental right
to make decisions regarding the care, custody and control of
their children.
The provisions of the family court’s December 5, 2005
order awarding additional visitation to the Petrys and requiring
the Petrys’ approval regarding Carla’s visitation are vacated.
The remainder of the order is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Traci H. Boyd
Boyd & Boyd, PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
Douglas H. Petry, pro se
Berea, Kentucky
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