ROY SETTLES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
JANUARY 5, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000051-MR
ROY SETTLES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 84-CR-00092
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON1 AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; MILLER,2 SPECIAL JUDGE.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Roy Settles, pro se, has appealed from an order
entered by the Fayette Circuit Court on December 13, 2005, which
denied his pro se motion pursuant to CR3 60.20(f) to vacate his
sentence pursuant to a judgment entered on August 14, 1984.
Having concluded that the trial court did not abuse its
1
Judge Rick A. Johnson completed this opinion prior to the expiration of his
term of office on December 31, 2006. Release of the opinion was delayed by
administrative handling.
2
Retired Judge John D. Miller, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
discretion by denying Settles the extraordinary relief he seeks,
we affirm.
On January 20, 1984, Settles was indicted by a Fayette
County grand jury on two counts of murder,4 one count of burglary
in the first degree,5 and one count of theft by unlawful taking.6
The charges arose from the July 2, 1983, murder of Charles C.
Combs and his wife, Betty Combs, during Settles’s attempted
burglary of their home.
On June 16, 1984, Settles was convicted
by a jury on two counts of manslaughter in the first degree,7 one
count of burglary in the first degree, and one count of theft by
unlawful taking.
He was sentenced to prison on August 14, 1984,
for a total of 65 years.
Settles appealed his conviction as a
matter of right to the Supreme Court of Kentucky,8 which affirmed
the conviction in an Opinion made final on December 12, 1985.
Thereafter, on September 26, 2005, Settles filed a pro
se motion to vacate judgment pursuant to CR 60.02(f),9 as well as
4
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 507.020.
5
KRS 511.020.
6
KRS 514.030.
7
KRS 507.030.
8
Case No. 1985-SC-000105-MR.
9
CR 60.02(f) provides:
On motion a court may, upon such terms as are
just, relieve a party or his legal representative
from its final judgment, order, or proceeding upon
the following grounds: . . . (f) any other reason of
-2-
a motion for appointment of counsel and a request for an
evidentiary hearing.
In the motion, Settles claimed that there
was insufficient evidence of his guilt for burglary and theft by
unlawful taking, and he claimed prosecutorial misconduct,
ineffective assistance of counsel, and cumulative error.
The
Commonwealth filed its response on November 22, 2005, stating
that none of Settles’s claims constituted a reason of an
extraordinary nature justifying relief from his sentence, and
that the motion was not made within a reasonable time period.
The trial court denied the CR 60.02 motion on December 13, 2005,
as time-barred, without holding an evidentiary hearing.
This
appeal followed.
In Gross v. Commonwealth,10 the Supreme Court
summarized the procedures for appellate review in criminal
cases.
The Supreme Court stated that the structure for
appellate review is not haphazard or overlapping.11
A criminal
defendant must first bring a direct appeal when available, then
utilize RCr 11.42 by raising every error of which he should be
aware.12
CR 60.02 should be utilized only for extraordinary
situations not subject to relief by direct appeal or by way of
an extraordinary nature justifying relief. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time. . . .
10
648 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1983).
11
Id. at 856.
12
Id.
-3-
RCr 11.42.13
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the procedural
requirements described in Gross in its Opinion in McQueen v.
Commonwealth:14
A defendant who is in custody under sentence
or on probation, parole or conditional
discharge, is required to avail himself of
RCr 11.42 as to any ground of which he is
aware, or should be aware, during the period
when the remedy is available to him. Civil
Rule 60.02 is not intended merely as an
additional opportunity to relitigate the
same issues which could “reasonably have
been presented” by direct appeal or RCr
11.42 proceedings. RCr 11.42(3); Gross v.
Commonwealth, supra, at 855, 856. The
obvious purpose of this principle is to
prevent the relitigation of issues which
either were or could have been litigated in
a similar proceeding.15
Gross and McQueen clearly establish that “[a]n issue
raised and rejected on direct appeal may not be litigated [in an
RCr 11.42 proceeding] by claiming that it amounts to ineffective
assistance of counsel.”16
This same logic applies to CR 60.02
motions since, by the very terms of the rule, it provides for
“extraordinary relief” just as RCr 11.42 does.
Settles failed
to demonstrate how he could meet the high burden of showing his
entitlement to extraordinary relief under CR 60.02.
13
Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856.
14
948 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1997).
15
Id. at 416.
16
Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Ky. 1998), cert. denied, 526
U.S. 1025, 119 S.Ct. 1266, 143 L.Ed.2d 361 (1999).
-4-
In his brief, Settles argues that his trial counsel
was ineffective because counsel failed to protect his
constitutional rights.
However, Settles has not provided any
information as to what constitutional rights counsel failed to
protect, and how counsel failed to protect those constitutional
rights.
He also claims that counsel withheld favorable
information from the jury, but he fails to provide any detail as
to what the favorable information was or how it would require a
reversal of his sentence.
In any event, Settles is precluded
from raising any issues relating to ineffective assistance of
counsel because he never filed a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42,
and he did not make these claims in his direct appeal to the
Supreme Court.
Additionally, Settles failed to exercise due diligence
in pursuing this claim.
Under CR 60.02, a motion must be filed
within a reasonable time if the motion is based upon an
extraordinary reason justifying the relief sought.
Here,
Settles waited until September 26, 2005, to file his CR 60.02
motion with the trial court.
A delay of over 20 years under the
circumstances of this case is not reasonable and does not comply
with the requirements of CR 60.02.
Therefore, the trial court
did not err in denying Settles’s CR 60.02 motion.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
-5-
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Roy Settles, Pro Se
Sandy Hook, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Rickie L. Pearson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.