ROCKLAND GEORGE v. ESTATE OF MARION DOUGLAS GEORGE, DECEASED; HON. MATTHEW J. WIXSOM, ADMINISTRATOR; AND ELOISE T. GEORGE
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RENDERED: MARCH 9, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002613-MR
ROCKLAND GEORGE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. DAVID HAGERMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00495
ESTATE OF MARION DOUGLAS GEORGE,
DECEASED; HON. MATTHEW J. WIXSOM,
ADMINISTRATOR; AND ELOISE T. GEORGE
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; EMBERTON,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Rockland George appeals from a November 1, 2005, order of the
Boyd Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of the Estate of Marion Douglas
George, Deceased, Hon. Matthew J. Wixsom, Administrator (Estate). We reverse and
remand.
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section
110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
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Rockland George (Rockland) is the son of Marion Douglas George
(Douglas). In 1993, a guardianship proceeding was initiated in the Boyd District Court
(Action No. 93-H-00005). Rockland and Douglas’s second wife, Eloise George, were
appointed co-guardians of Douglas. Being dissatisfied with the inventory and accounting
filed by his stepmother Eloise, Rockland filed exceptions to both. Following a hearing,
the district court accepted the inventory and accounting provided by Eloise. The district
court also dissolved the co-guardianship and appointed Rockland the conservator of
certain real property and various items of personal property belonging to Douglas. Eloise
remained Douglas’s guardian.
On December 24, 1994, Douglas died testate. Pursuant to Douglas’s will,
his entire estate passed to Rockland. As Douglas’s surviving spouse, Eloise renounced
the will. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 392.080. In the probate proceeding (Action
No. 95-P-00177), Rockland alleged that certain property claimed by the Estate was, in
fact, owned by him personally. However, the district court determined that the issue of
ownership of property claimed by the Estate had been previously litigated in the
guardianship proceeding and could not be relitigated in the probate proceeding. The
court further ordered that Eloise would receive her statutory one-third (1/3) share of the
real property, including the farm. It appears that an appeal was taken to the circuit court
and was subsequently affirmed.2
Since we were not furnished with the record of the probate or guardianship proceedings, some of these facts were
taken from an Opinion of this Court rendered in Appeal Nos. 2003-CA-00078-MR and 2004-CA-000266-MR on
May 13, 2005. Those appeals adjudicated the issue of whether Rockland George was barred from claiming
ownership of certain real property that was titled of record to Marion Douglas George at the time of his death and
subsequently passed under Douglas’s will, but subject to the renunciation provisions of KRS 392.080.
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In May 2004, the Estate filed a complaint in the Boyd Circuit Court seeking
to sell the personal and real property of the Estate for purposes of settling same. KRS
395.510. Rockland answered and asserted ownership of certain items of personal
property claimed by the Estate. The Estate subsequently filed a motion for summary
judgment against Rockland. Therein, the Estate argued that the issue of ownership of
personal property claimed by the Estate had been previously decided in the guardianship
and probate proceedings in district court; thus, the doctrine of res judicata and/or
collateral estoppel barred relitigation. On November 1, 2005, the circuit court granted
summary judgment in favor of the Estate. The Court specifically concluded:
[A]ll issues in regards to Rockland George’s alleged
ownership of property belonging to the estate of Marion
Douglas George has been previously litigated in various
District Courts, Circuit Courts, Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court. The Defendant, Rockland George, wants to
assert the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, but this Court
finds that same has been litigated and raised in previous
Courts and specifically finds that the ownership of property
belonging to the estate of Marion Douglas George has been
litigated to the extent that the previous Orders of other Courts
have been entered stating that the Inventory accepted by the
District Court in 1994 is the personal property that belongs to
Marion Douglas George [now the Estate] . . . .
This appeal follows.
Rockland contends the circuit court erred by concluding that the issue of
ownership of certain personal property claimed by the Estate was barred by the doctrine
of res judicata. In particular, Rockland argues that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction in the probate proceeding to adjudicate ownership of personal property
claimed by the Estate, thus barring application of res judicata. In support thereof,
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Rockland cites this Court to KRS 24A.120, which defines the jurisdiction of the district
court:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Civil cases in which the amount in controversy does
not exceed four thousand dollars ($4,000), exclusive of
interest and costs, except matters affecting title to real
estate and matters of equity; however, nothing herein
shall prohibit execution levy on real estate in
enforcement of judgment of District Court;
Matters involving probate, except matters contested in
an adversary proceeding. Such adversary proceeding
shall be filed in Circuit Court in accordance with the
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure and shall not be
considered an appeal; and
Matters not provided for by statute to be commenced
in Circuit Court shall be deemed to be nonadversarial
within the meaning of subsection (2) of this section
and therefore are within the jurisdiction of the District
Court.
According to Rockland, KRS 24A.120(2) clearly grants the district court
jurisdiction over probate proceedings but specifically exempts therefrom all “matters
contested in an adversary proceeding.” Rockland believes that adjudication of ownership
of personal property claimed by the Estate constitutes an “adversary proceeding” over
which the district court lacked jurisdiction. Instead, Rockland asserts that jurisdiction
was properly vested in the circuit court incident to the action filed by the executor for
final settlement of the Estate under KRS 395.510.
This case presents a rather novel legal issue. Moreover, it must be pointed
out that the procedural history of this case is rather convoluted, and we are hampered by
the fact that neither the record of the probate proceeding nor the record of the
guardianship proceeding was included in the record on appeal. However, we are of the
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opinion that summary judgment was improperly granted as a matter of law. See
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991) .
In this case, we are faced with the task of determining the proper boundary
between the probate jurisdiction of the district court and the probate jurisdiction of the
circuit court. KRS 24A.120(2) clearly vests the district court with jurisdiction over
probate matters with the notable exception of “matters contested in an adversary
proceeding.” The definition of the term “adversary proceeding” is somewhat circuitous
and is found in KRS 24A.120(3):
Matters not provided for by statute to be commenced in
Circuit Court shall be deemed to be nonadversarial within the
meaning of subsection (2) of this section and therefore are
within the jurisdiction of the District Court.
It has been recognized that “[t]he test of jurisdiction in the Circuit Court over probate
matters would thus involve finding a statute that would authorize beginning suit in
Circuit Court.” 1 Merritt, Kentucky Practice, § 756 (2d ed. 1984). Stated differently, the
district court possesses jurisdiction over all probate actions except actions that by statute
may be commenced in the circuit court.
In the case sub judice, the instant settlement action was commenced in
circuit court by the Estate pursuant to KRS 395.510. Under this statute, a personal
representative of an estate may file an action in circuit court seeking settlement of the
estate. KRS 395.515 provides further elucidation of such settlement action filed in circuit
court:
In such an action the petition must state the amount of the
debts and the nature and value of the property, real and
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personal, of the decedent, so far as known to the plaintiff; if it
appears that there is a genuine issue concerning the right of
any creditor, beneficiary or heir-at-law to receive payment or
distribution, or if it appears that there is a genuine issue as to
what constitutes a correct and lawful settlement of the estate,
or a correct and lawful distribution of the assets, such issues
may be adjudicated by the court; and, if it shall appear that
the personal estate is insufficient for the payment of all debts,
the court may order the real property descended or devised to
the heirs or devisees who may be parties to the action, or so
much thereof as shall be necessary, to be sold for the payment
of the residue of such debts.
Under its specific language, the circuit court is statutorily empowered to
adjudicate issues concerning: 1) the right of a creditor, beneficiary, or heir at law to
receive payment or distribution; 2) the proper settlement of the estate; and 3) the proper
distribution of assets of the estate. We believe implicit to the above delineated powers is
necessarily the authority to initially adjudicate ownership of the assets claimed by the
estate, including disputes concerning ownership of personal property. Accordingly, we
conclude that the circuit court is vested specifically with jurisdiction to settle the estate
under KRS 395.510 and incidentally with authority to determine ownership of personal
property.3
As KRS 395.510 specifically authorizes the commencement of a settlement
action in circuit court, such action is consequently considered an “adversary proceeding”
under KRS 24A.120(2) over which the district court lacks jurisdiction. It therefore
follows that the district court’s prior adjudication in the probate proceeding of ownership
Our ruling is distinguishable from the prior ruling of this Court in Appeal Nos. 2003-CA-00078-MR and 2004CA-000266-MR insofar as that ruling pertained to real property which passed under the will, subject to the
provisions of KRS 392.080. Real property does not pass to the estate upon death, nor is it an asset subject to
probate. Slone v. Casey, 194 S.W.3d 336 (Ky.App. 2006). However, KRS 395.515 does permit the sale of real
property, per court order, if personalty is not sufficient to pay debts of the estate.
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of the disputed personal property is not entitled to the preclusive effect of res judicata.
See Fischer v. Jeffries, 697 S.W.2d 159 (Ky.App. 1985). Thus, we hold that summary
judgment was improperly entered and upon remand the circuit court shall adjudicate the
issue of ownership of personal property claimed by the Estate.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Boyd Circuit Court is reversed
and this cause remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
M. Kevin Lett
Ashland, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, ESTATE OF
MARION DOUGLAS GEORGE:
Matthew J. Wixsom
Ashland, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, ELOISE T.
GEORGE:
Jeffrey L. Preston
Catlettsburg, Kentucky
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