CADLE COMPANY, SERVICER FOR C&W v. MMAPCO, LLC
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RENDERED: MAY 18, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002611-MR
CADLE COMPANY, SERVICER FOR C&W
ASSET ACQUISITION, LLC
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES M. SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-003986
v.
MMAPCO, LLC
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ACREE, KELLER, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Cadle Company appeals from a dismissal with prejudice of their
foreclosure case against MMAPCO, LLC. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the
judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
In 1996, Fifth Third Bank loaned $60,000.00 to Marie D. Mason. In return,
Mason executed a note in favor of Fifth Third and granted it a mortgage on her home.
Fifth Third assigned the mortgage to C&W Asset Acquisition, and Cadle is the servicer
for C&W. Shortly before her death, Mason deeded her home to MMAPCO, which is
incorporated and controlled by her son Phillip J. Mason. This case involves an attempt to
foreclose on this property due to non-payment.
This case was filed May 2, 2003. On June 16, 2003, the trial court granted
a Motion for More Definite Statement filed by MMAPCO and entered an order allowing
Cadle ten days to respond. Cadle failed to respond, and MMAPCO filed their first
Motion to Dismiss July 14, 2003. Cadle finally filed its response July 25, and the trial
court denied the Motion to Dismiss.
On February 3, 2004, the trial court granted a Motion to Compel and
ordered Cadle to respond to discovery requests first served by MMAPCO on June 19,
2003. Fifteen days later, MMAPCO filed another Motion to Dismiss and requested a
monetary award for Cadle's failure to comply. The trial court again denied the Motion to
Dismiss but granted reasonable expenses incurred to obtain the Court's Orders
Compelling Discovery in the sum of $615.00. The amount was paid one year later after
MMAPCO filed a Motion for Sanctions. MMAPCO filed another Motion to Dismiss in
the interim but was again denied.
The court entered its Trial Order July 13, 2005. Among other requirements,
the Trial Order mandated that the parties exchange witness lists by October 20, 2005,
ninety days prior to the scheduled trial date. MMAPCO served its witness list on October
20, 2005. At the pretrial hearing on October 28, 2005, MMAPCO informed the trial
court that Cadle had not yet identified its witnesses, and the court admonished Cadle to
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comply with the Trial Order. Despite the admonishment, Cadle had yet to submit its
witness list prior to the court's dismissal of the case November 21, 2005. Cadle hereby
appeals the dismissal with prejudice of its case.
Cadle argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed
Cadle's case against MMAPCO. We disagree.
Kentucky CR 41.02(1) governs the involuntary dismissal of cases for
failure to comply with a court order, and we review the trial court's decision under the
abuse of discretion standard. See Ward v. Housman, 809 S.W.2d 717 (Ky.App. 1991).
In ruling on a motion for involuntary dismissal, the trial court must take
care in analyzing the circumstances and must justify the extreme action of depriving the
parties of their trial. Considering whether a case should be dismissed for dilatory conduct
of counsel, trial courts must consider these relevant factors: 1) the extent of the party's
personal responsibility; 2) the history of dilatoriness; 3) whether the attorney's conduct
was willful and in bad faith; 4) meritoriousness of the claim; 5) prejudice to the other
party; and 6) alternative sanctions. Id. at 719.
In the case at hand, it is clear that it was no one other than Cadle's fault that
the repeated delays took place. Moreover, the record clearly reflects a history of
dilatoriness by Cadle to virtually every order issued by the trial court. It is unclear
whether the attorney's conduct was necessarily in bad faith, but it is difficult to interpret it
as anything but willful. Additionally, the meritoriousness of the claim is in serious
question given that in Cadle's long overdue response to MMAPCO's Motion for
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Sanctions, it admitted that there had been a release issued on this property but that it had
no knowledge of the decision to issue the release and could offer no witnesses with
adequate knowledge of the transaction. Finally, Cadle's counsel claims to have been
unaware of the dismissal of this case until December 13, 2005. This admission only
serves to weigh further in favor of this dismissal since Cadle had still not produced the
witness list as of that date, which was a mere month before the scheduled trial date. It is
clear that Cadle's blatant disregard for the orders of the trial court would have severely
prejudiced MMAPCO given that the witness list would have only been available to
MMAPCO less than one month before trial. This is a seriously inadequate amount of
time to allow MMAPCO to prepare for trial and is clearly prejudicial. No other sanctions
seem appropriate given the clear prejudice and history of dilatoriness. Therefore, we find
it within the discretion of the trial court to have dismissed this case with prejudice.
Cadle also contends that it was denied due process of law because it did
not receive notice of either the motion to dismiss or the subsequent order. We disagree.
The notice of the motion to dismiss was sent from MMAPCO's attorney, whereas the trial
court's Order dismissing the case was sent from the court. It would appear that not only
is Cadle's attorney incapable of following the court's orders, but he/she is also unable to
receive incoming mail. Regardless of this issue, however, the record indicates that Cadle
repeatedly failed to follow the court's orders. It is on this basis that the dismissal was
granted. We will not now overturn the trial court based on Cadle's own mail delivery
issue.
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
KELLER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
ACREE, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
ACREE, JUDGE, DISSENTING: I respectfully dissent. While the
dilatory habits of Appellant's counsel are obvious to us, only the trial court is in a position
to assess all the relevant factors set forth in Ward v. Housman, 809 S.W.2d 717 (Ky.App.
1991). We said in Toler v. Rapid American, 190 S.W.3d 348 (Ky.App. 2006):
The responsibility to make such findings as are set forth in
Ward before dismissing a case with prejudice falls solely
upon the trial court. Accordingly, even though we
understand and sympathize with the court's desire to move the
cases on its docket along in a timely and expeditious manner,
we find ourselves compelled to vacate its orders as to
dismissal here and to remand this action for further
consideration in light of Ward.
Id. at 351-52 (emphasis added).
The order from which the appeal is taken makes no reference whatsoever to
the factors specifically enumerated in Ward, and enumerated again in Toler, and once
again in the very recent case of Jaroszewski v. Flege, 204 S.W.3d 148, 150 (Ky.App.
2006). Because the responsibility for making findings as to these factors “falls solely
upon the trial court,” I believe this case should be remanded with instructions that the
trial court do so.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brian E. Chapman
Cincinnati, Ohio
Gregory E. Watson
Louisville, Kentucky
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