CYNTHIA A. GOODSON v. DONALD W. GOODSON
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 9, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002549-ME
CYNTHIA A. GOODSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM NICHOLAS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID E. MELCHER, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-CI-00056
DONALD W. GOODSON
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; WINE, JUDGE; PAISLEY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE: Cynthia A. Goodson appeals from a judgment entered on
November 10, 2005 by the Nicholas Family Court in which the family court denied
Cynthia's motion to modify her ex-husband's child support obligation. On appeal,
Cynthia argues that her motion was not to modify her ex-husband's support obligation but
was to initially establish such an obligation. She also argues that if her motion was for
modification, then she was entitled to a rebuttable presumption that a material change in
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Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section
110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
circumstances justifying an increase had occurred. Finding that the family court abused
its discretion, we vacate and remand.
On June 17, 1996, Cynthia married Donald W. Goodson. While their
marriage produced no offspring, Cynthia had a daughter, Elizabeth, born on May 9, 1990,
from a previous relationship. Donald adopted Elizabeth on October 7, 1999. On May 24,
2002, Cynthia filed a pro se petition for dissolution of the parties' marriage with the
Kenton Family Court since she was residing in Kenton County at the time. On that same
day, she and Donald entered into a settlement agreement in which she received sole
custody of Elizabeth and Donald would not be granted any visitation nor would he be
required to pay child support. The Kenton Family Court incorporated the settlement
agreement into the decree of dissolution of marriage which it entered on July 2, 2002.
Subsequently, Cynthia, along with Elizabeth, moved to Nicholas County,
and, on August 26, 2005, Cynthia moved the Nicholas Family Court to initially establish
child support payments for Donald or, in the alternative, modify his current obligation,
which was zero. In a judgment entered on November 10, 2005, the family court found
that Cynthia had failed to allege any substantial change in circumstances and failed to
allege that the settlement agreement was unconscionable; thus, it denied Cynthia's
motion.
On appeal, Cynthia argues that her motion was not to modify Donald's
support obligation but was, in fact, a motion to initially establish support pursuant to
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.211 since Donald's child support obligation had
not been previously established. In the alternative, Cynthia argues that this case should
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be remanded to the family court since she was not given an opportunity to show that a
substantial change in circumstances had occurred.
Also, in the alternative, relying on KRS 403.213, Cynthia argues that if her
motion was for modification, then the point was not whether the separation agreement
was unconscionable but whether there had been a substantial change in circumstances
that would justify modification of Donald's current child support obligation, which was
zero. Relying on Tilley v. Tilley, 947 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. App. 1997), Cynthia argues that in
dissolution proceedings where the parties have entered into a settlement agreement, the
trial court retains jurisdiction over the issue of child support, and, if the moving party is
able to show a 15% discrepancy between the agreed-upon amount of support and the
amount that would be required under the guidelines, then the moving party is entitled to a
rebuttable presumption that a material change justifying modification has occurred.
Regarding matters of child support, the family court has broad discretion,
and, ordinarily, we will not reverse a family court's decision regarding support unless it
abused that discretion. Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, 521 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Ky. 1975). However,
while the lower court has extensive discretion, this discretion has limits. See Price v.
Price, 912 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. 1995) and Keplinger v. Keplinger, 839 S.W.2d 566 (Ky. App.
1992).
In 1972, the General Assembly passed KRS 403.180 which allows the
parties to a dissolution action to enter into a written separation agreement addressing the
issues of property, child custody, child support and visitation. While the parties may
address child support in such an agreement, the terms regarding support are not binding
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on the trial court. KRS 403.180(2). According to KRS 403.213(1), the provisions of any
dissolution decree addressing child support may be modified, but only if a motion for
modification is filed and the moving party demonstrates “a material change in
circumstances that is substantial and continuing.” Furthermore, if the trial court applies
the guidelines set forth in KRS Chapter 403 to the parties' circumstances at the time the
moving party files his or her motion and if the result under the guidelines is equal to or
greater than a 15% change in the amount of support due per month, then the moving
party is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that a material change in circumstances has
occurred. KRS 403.213(2).
In Wiegand v. Wiegand, 862 S.W.2d 336 (Ky. App. 1993), this Court
addressed the issue of whether a trial court could modify an ex-husband's child support
obligation where he and ex-wife had set his obligation by agreement. In Wiegand, exwife and ex-husband agreed in 1983 that ex-husband would pay child support in the
amount of $125.00 per month. In 1992, ex-wife moved the trial court for an increase in
ex-husband's support obligation because, under the guidelines set forth in KRS Chapter
403, his obligation would have been $334.00 per month. Id. The trial court denied the
motion stating that the evidence rebutted the presumption that a material change in
circumstances had occurred. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed the denial and held that:
KRS 403.213 does not require there to be a change in either
party's income before a trial court may modify an existing
child support award. Instead, in a situation such as the one
here, where there was at least a 15% discrepancy between the
guidelines and the noncustodial parent's existing child support
obligation, the existence of this fact standing alone creates a
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rebuttable presumption that there is a material change in
circumstances pursuant to KRS 403.213(2).
Id. at 337.
In Tilley v. Tilley, 947 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. App. 1997), this Court addressed a
similar situation as found in Wiegand. In Tilley, ex-wife and ex-husband entered into a
settlement agreement in 1991 that had been prepared by ex-wife's attorney. Id. at 64. In
the agreement, the parties had agreed that ex-husband would pay child support in the
amount of $250.00 per month, which was less than what ex-husband would have paid
under the guidelines. Furthermore, the agreement stated that ex-wife understood that exhusband's support obligation was less than the base amount mandated by the guidelines.
Id. In 1995, ex-wife moved the trial court for an increase in ex-husband's child support
obligation. Holding that it was not required to consider the parties' settlement agreement,
the trial court granted ex-wife's motion. Following the holding in Wiegand, this Court
affirmed the trial court's decision and additionally held:
[O]nce an award of child support entered pursuant to the terms
of a separation agreement under KRS 403.180 is reopened for
modification, “the child support must be set anew pursuant to
KRS 403.210 et seq.” Furthermore, in reaching its decision,
the trial court is to consider both the changes in finances of
both parents as well as the needs of the child. Thus, it was
proper for the trial court to disregard the prior agreement of the
parties as to the amount of child support payable by [exhusband] in deciding to raise the amount. (citations omitted.)
Id. at 65. We can find no meaningful distinction between the facts in the present case and
the facts in Wiegand and Tilley; thus, the holdings in those cases control. Therefore, the
family court was not bound by Cynthia's and Donald's previous settlement agreement,
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and the record demonstrates that a 15% discrepancy existed between Donald's support
obligation, which was zero at the time Cynthia filed her motion, and any obligation he
would have been required to pay under the guidelines found in KRS Chapter 403.
Furthermore, pursuant to KRS 403.213(2) and the holdings in Wiegand and Tilley,
Cynthia was indeed entitled to a rebuttable presumption that a material change in
circumstances had occurred. Furthermore, Donald never presented evidence that rebutted
this presumption. As a result, the family court abused its discretion when it failed to give
the benefit of this rebuttable presumption to Cynthia.
We are mindful of the potential for unfairness if a party in a dissolution
action uses an agreement to receive child support below the guideline amount to extract
concessions on other issues and then subsequently seeks an increase in support when
there is no actual material change in the financial circumstances of the parties. In this
case, Donald claims that he assumed all the marital and personal debt of Cynthia. In
addition, Donald agreed to forfeit any visitation with his child. The record does not
provided us with the basis for such an arrangement. Obviously, in matters of custody,
visitation, and child support the court is not bound by the parties’ agreement because the
welfare of the child is involved. These are factors the family court should consider on
remand.
The judgment denying Cynthia's motion to modify is vacated and this case
is remanded to the Nicholas Family Court to hold an evidentiary hearing in order to
reconsider Cynthia's motion in light of KRS Chapter 403 and the holdings in Wiegand
and Tilley and to give both parties an opportunity to present evidence.
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COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
WINE, JUDGE, CONCURS WITH RESULT AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
WINE, JUDGE, CONCURRING: I concur in the result. In May 2002 after
a six-year marriage, the parties decided to divorce. The separation agreement, drafted by
the appellant, states in clear and unequivocal terms that she shall have sole custody of the
child the appellee had only recently adopted and that the appellee shall not enjoy
visitation with the child nor shall he be required to pay child support. The final decree,
which incorporated the agreement, was entered on July 2, 2002. At that time, the child
was 12 years of age.
Three years later in the spring of 2005, the appellant filed a complaint for
support first in the Court of Common Pleas in Athens County, Ohio, then before the
Kenton Circuit Court. Subsequently, the matter was transferred to the Nicholas Family
Court. For three years, the appellee had no contact with either his adopted daughter or
his ex-wife. The child would be more than 16½ years of age.
While it is difficult to comprehend why a parent would forfeit his or her
right to visit with a minor child, for any amount of money or reason, here the appellee
elected to do so. On remand, the lower court may revisit all issues including custody and
visitation pursuant to KRS 403.180(2). However, it is unlikely the appellee and child
will reestablish a relationship at this late date.
Contrary to the appellant's contentions, child support was established in
2002 when the court ordered no support should be paid. This is an attempt to modify that
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order, therefore, KRS 403.213 is applicable. If there is a fifteen (15) percent change in
the amount due per month, child support must be set anew pursuant to KRS 403.210.
Tilley v. Tilley, 947 S.W.2d 63 ( Ky. App. 1997).
If as alleged in his written arguments the appellee is unemployed, the court
will decide his potential income pursuant to KRS 403.212(d) and subject to the totality of
the circumstances. Polley v. Allen, 132 S.W.3d 223 (Ky. App. 2004).
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Dawn Curran Letcher
Carlisle, Kentucky
Eric Tedder
Carlisle, Kentucky
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