WLEX COMMUNICATIONS, LLC v. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MAY 4, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002453-MR
WLEX COMMUNICATIONS, LLC
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-04126
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN
COUNTY GOVERNMENT
APPELLEE
OPINION
DISMISSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; MOORE AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: WLEX Communications, LLC, appeals from a summary
judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court entered November 1, 2005, in favor of the
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (LFUCG). WLEX, a local television news
broadcaster, alleged that the government had violated provisions of Kentucky’s Open
Records Act (KRS 61.870- 61.884) by failing to make available a copy of the recording
of a 911 telephone call placed to the Division of Police. For the reasons that follow, we
dismiss this appeal.
In a note dated April 27, 2004, Leigh Searcy, a reporter for WLEX,
requested LFUCG’s Chief of Police to prepare copies of “a call to the Lexington Police
911 Center concerning a student with a medical problem on a school bus on April 21,
2004 at around 3:30 PM.” Searcy directed the Chief of Police to notify Mike Taylor at
WLEX once the copies were made available.
By correspondence addressed to Mr. Taylor dated May 4, 2004, the
Division of Police formally denied Searcy’s request. LFUCG stated two reasons for
declining to authorize release of the material: (1) because the telephone call was made by
a juvenile whose privacy it was required to protect and (2) because the matter had been
transferred to the Division of Fire: “... we do not have a dispatch record. You will need
to contact the Division of Fire for your Request.” The correspondence was prepared by a
Communications Unit Assistant, who noted that he was available to address any
questions with respect to the request. WLEX made no response nor did it pursue the
matter further with LFUCG.
Nearly two months later, the Office of the Attorney General notified
LFUCG that Taylor had appealed the decision to deny Searcy’s request for a copy of the
911 recording. In its correspondence, the attorney general requested a copy of the
disputed recording and asked whether it was LFUCG’s position that the public disclosure
of 911 recordings was unauthorized as a matter of law.
By letter dated July 6, 2004, LFUCG responded to the attorney general and
explained that Searcy’s request for material had been denied pursuant to relevant
-2-
statutory and case law. Citing our holding in Bowling v. Brandenburg, 37 S.W.3d 785
(Ky.App. 2001), LFUCG noted that the public’s right to know the contents of the 911
recording must yield to the legitimate privacy interests of the person who had called for
emergency assistance. LFUCG argued that a release of the requested information could
not only have an adverse affect upon the person (in this case, a juvenile) who placed the
disputed call but that it could also be expected to have a chilling effect upon citizens’ use
of the 911 system. LFUCG indicated that it was willing to provide a summary of the 911
call dispatch with all the collected personal data redacted.
As noted earlier, LFUCG initially believed that no such record existed.
Since the call was of a medical nature, standard operating procedure would dictate that it
be forwarded to the Division of Fire and Emergency Services. Normally under such
circumstances involving a medical situation with no criminal activity alleged, a summary
of a 911 call would not be made. However, further research indicated that police officers
were in fact dispatched to the scene. Thus, after discovering this additional fact, LFUCG
attached a copy of the summary to the correspondence and forwarded another copy
directly to Taylor as a supplemental response to Searcy’s request on behalf of WLEX.
LFUCG argued that this redacted information gave WLEX proper insight into the
government’s response as contemplated by the Open Records Act by protecting the
privacy of the individual caller and not compromising recourse to the 911 system.
In separate correspondence to the attorney general, dated July 7, 2004,
LFUCG explained that it could not provide a copy of the 911 call recording as requested
-3-
by that office because the computer-generated material had been destroyed -- pursuant to
a regular retention schedule -- nearly two weeks before LFUCG received any indication
that WLEX would challenge its decision. (As noted earlier, nearly two months passed
between LFUCG's first correspondence denying the request before Taylor challenged that
denial before the attorney general.)
On September 9, 2004, the attorney general issued its Open Records
Decision. The attorney general concluded that while LFUCG had articulated a good-faith
argument in support of its position to decline to disclose the information, it had
nonetheless improperly denied Searcy’s request for access to the material. The attorney
general found as follows:
While we agree that LFUCG may present proof, on a casespecific basis, to sustain its denial of a request for a particular
911 recording, the question of “whether an invasion of
privacy is ‘clearly unwarranted’ is intrinsically situational,
and can only be determined within a specific context,”
Kentucky Board of Examiners of Psychologists v. The
Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co., Ky., 826 S.W.2d
324 (1992) cited in Bowling at 787. The proof presented by
LFUCG, in the instant appeal, does not sustain its denial of
WLEX-TV’s request.
****
The decision of the Court of Appeals in Bowling turned, in
large part, on the context of domestic violence out of which it
arose, and the likelihood that in that context the caller would
be subject to retaliation, harassment, or public ridicule.
Neither of these factors is present in the instant appeal.
Assuming arguendo that the caller’s identity could be
determined through voice identification technology, he need
not be concerned with the potential for retaliation,
harassment, or public ridicule. His were the actions of a
-4-
quick-thinking youth who courageously responded to a
serious medical emergency, and are more likely to result in
accolades than insults. Accordingly, his privacy interest is
reduced. Conversely, the public’s interest in the actions of
the bus driver, as a public servant discharging his or her
public function, the 911 operation, as a public servant
discharging his or her public function, and the responding
police officers, as public servants discharging their public
function, which are captured on the 911 recording, are
significant indeed. The written summary which LFUCG
belatedly offers as an alternative to the actual tape only dimly
reflect[s] what transpired in the course of the 911 call and is
subject to editing. While the summary is the preferred
alternative to total nondisclosure, in cases where a heightened
privacy interest outweighs the public’s interest in disclosure,
it is not an adequate substitute for the actual tape in the case
on appeal. In this case, the public’s right to know the
contents of the 911 tape recording outweighs the minimal
privacy interest of the student who placed the call to obtain
emergency assistance. We therefore find that LFUCG
improperly withheld the tape.
04-ORD-161 at 4-6.
With respect to destruction of the computer-generated recording of the 911
call, the attorney general observed as follows:
We are obligated to note that the requested record was
apparently destroyed in the regular course of business after
WLEX-TV submitted its open records request but before
WLEX-TV initiated this open records appeal. Unfortunately,
the record is no longer available for inspection.
The attorney general found no evidence to suggest that LFUCG had willfully concealed a
public record.
On October 8, 2004, LFUCG filed an action in Fayette Circuit Court to
appeal the decision of the attorney general. LFUCG alleged that the attorney general had
-5-
erred in concluding that it had improperly withheld the contents of the 911 recording
from public disclosure. WLEX answered the complaint. Pursuant to KRS 61.882(3), the
trial court undertook a de novo review of the matter.
On August 5, 2005, LFUCG filed a motion for summary judgment and
argued that it had properly resisted WLEX’s request for disclosure of the recording of the
911 call on various grounds. LFUCG observed that the call to the Division of Police did
not report any criminal activity or conduct; did not result in any police assistance; and
was not the subject of any official written report. As a result, it concluded, the 911 call
recording was exempt from disclosure under the provisions of KRS 61.878(1)(i).
LFUCG also addressed its destruction of the computer-generated recording.
The government contended that state library and archives officials had investigated the
matter and had concluded that LFUCG had acted in accordance with its regular retention
schedule and had properly destroyed the recording after sixty (60) days.
In its prompt response to LFUCG’s motion, WLEX disagreed that LFUCG
had acted properly in withholding the 911 call recording. While resisting LFUCG’s
motion for summary judgment, WLEX nonetheless expressly regarded the destruction of
the tape as “tangential” and “non-critical.”
The trial court granted LFUCG’s motion for summary judgment on
November 1, 2005. This appeal followed.
On appeal, WLEX presents several arguments for reversal of the trial
court’s judgment. It argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the 911 call
-6-
recording was exempt from disclosure pursuant to the provisions of KRS 61.878(1)(i). It
also concludes that the juvenile caller’s privacy interest is de minimus and should be
disregarded in favor of disclosure. Finally, WLEX believes that our decision in Bowling
v. Brandenburg, Id. should be overruled. WLEX also maintains that LFUCG ought to be
subjected to a civil fine for willfully failing to produce the 911 call recording and that
LFUCG should be ordered to pay its legal fees. “Particularly this is true because after
proceeding to seek an opinion of the Attorney General in 04-ORD-161 which was
favorable to it, WLEX was involuntarily made a party to this litigation, thus requiring it
to incur additional fees and expenses, all over an audiotape LFUCG had already
destroyed.” Brief at 23.
WLEX acknowledges in its brief that the destruction of the disputed
recording poses an obstacle to our review. Since the recording no longer exists, we
clearly cannot compel LFUCG to produce it for public inspection. Yet, while the
controversy is no longer a “live” one, WLEX encourages the court to review the matter
on the grounds that it “significantly affects the public interest” and is likely to recur. We
do not agree.
Unless there is an actual case involving a present, ongoing controversy, the
issues surrounding it become moot. Our courts are not at liberty to give advisory
opinions -- even on important public issues. Philpot v. Patton 837 S.W.2d 491 (Ky.
1992). Indeed, our courts lack jurisdiction to decide issues that do not arise from a live
controversy. See Commonwealth v. Hughes, 873 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1994), citing In Re
-7-
Constitutionality of House Bill No. 222, 90 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. 1936)(“Power to render
advisory opinions conflicts with Kentucky Constitution Section 110 and thus cannot be
exercised by the Court”).
However, as WLEX duly notes, a dispute that is said to be “capable of
repetition, yet evading review” presents an exception to the mootness doctrine. We agree
that where such an exception applies, courts do have the discretion to consider issues
otherwise regarded as nonjusticiable. However, this exception is quite limited and
narrowly-drawn.
The decision whether to apply the exception involves two
questions: whether (1) the challenged action is too short in
duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or
expiration and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the
same complaining party would be subject to the same action
again.
Philpot, 837 S.W.2d at 493, citing In re Commerce Oil Co., 847 F.2d 291, 293 (6th Cir.
1988).
This case falls squarely within the mootness doctrine. If we were to reverse
the court’s order with respect to LFUCG’s decision not to release the copy of the 911 call
recording, the reversal would have no effect as the recording has been destroyed and is no
longer subject to public disclosure. Although the matter arguably involves an issue of
public importance, it is not subject to “capable of repetition, yet evading review”
exception to the mootness doctrine. There is no reasonable expectation or possibility that
the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again or even that the
precise factual scenario could ever be duplicated. We note parenthetically that WLEX
-8-
has contributed to the applicability of the mootness doctrine and that our review is
precluded at least in part by its own delay in seeking a legal opinion from the attorney
general.
As we held in Bowling, the determination of whether the public has the
right to examine particular materials as balanced against individual privacy rights
necessarily entails a case-by-case, fact-specific inquiry to determine whether the
individual involved has a reasonable expectation of privacy -- and if so, whether that
expectation of privacy supersedes the interests of public disclosure of the requested
materials under the circumstances.
Bowling, 37 S.W.3d at 788, remains good law, and we find no justification
to consider overruling it. Its balancing test is not of its own fabrication but is founded
upon Zink v. Commonwealth, 902 S.W.2d 825 (Ky.App. 1994), which also employed a
meticulous analysis of the countervailing rights of personal privacy versus public
disclosure:
Zink ..., following the Board of Examiners standard, stated
that upon a finding that the sought-after information was of a
personal nature, the analysis proceeds to a determination of
whether public disclosure constitutes a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy. “This latter determination
entails a 'comparative weighing of antagonistic interests' in
which the privacy interest in non-disclosure is balanced
against the general rule of inspection and its underlying
policy of openness for the public good.” Zink, 902 S.W.2d at
828. The competing interests here are the 911 caller's right to
privacy when seeking police assistance versus the public's
right to know about the conduct of government agencies.
Id.
-9-
In pursuing judicial review of this matter, LFUCG was availing itself of its
legitimate constitutional right of access to the courts. In addition, § 115 of the
Constitution of Kentucky guarantees this appeal as a matter of right. We find no basis in
this case for assessment of a civil fine, costs, or attorneys' fees. WLEX has
acknowledged that there was no willful or wrongful conduct on the part of LFUCG in the
destruction of the tape. And we find no bad faith or frivolous conduct in LFUCG's
decision to resort to the courts for a binding interpretation of an opinion of the attorney
general which – regardless of how persuasive it may be – is not binding as a matter of
law as is a court opinion and order.
As we have concluded that the issue in this case is nonjusticiable and not
subject to the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness
doctrine, we dismiss this appeal.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
C. Timothy Cone
Elizabeth S. Hughes
Lexington, Kentucky
Leslye M. Bowman
Michael R. Sanner
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT: ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Elizabeth S. Hughes
Lexington, Kentucky
Michael R. Sanner
Lexington, Kentucky
- 10 -
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.