DAVID POWERS, D/B/A BETTER HOME TECHNOLOGY; BILL HARDY D/B/A BILL HARDY STEREO v. DERMOT HALPIN AND HILARY HALPIN
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RENDERED: APRIL 6, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002322-MR
DAVID POWERS, D/B/A BETTER HOME
TECHNOLOGY; BILL HARDY D/B/A BILL
HARDY STEREO
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-01249
DERMOT HALPIN AND HILARY HALPIN
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ABRAMSON, JUDGE; KNOPF AND ROSENBLUM,1 SENIOR JUDGES.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE: In 2001, Appellees Dermot and Hilary Halpin were planning to
remodel their basement and install a home theater and entertainment system including a
50” high definition television (HDTV) set. At some point, they mentioned their plans to
David Powers, an electrician doing some work in their home. Powers referred them to
Bill Hardy, a Lexington dealer specializing in high-end electronics.
Senior Judges William L. Knopf and Paul W. Rosenblum sitting as Special Judges by
assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
1
Upon being contacted by the Halpins about their plans, Hardy
recommended that they consider a ReVox television. Hardy further informed the Halpins
that Brian Tucker, the president of ReVox USA, had a store in Chicago that they could
visit. The Halpins subsequently traveled to Chicago to view various HD television
systems. While there, they visited with Tucker who told them that the ReVox sets were
high definition, that they were the best in the market, and that they were “flying off the
shelves.” In fact, when the Halpins later purchased a ReVox television, they were among
the first people in the United States to do so, and Tucker eventually admitted that he had
never before sold an HD plasma television.
Upon their return from Chicago, the Halpins were invited to Hardy's shop
to view a demonstration of a 42” ReVox television. Tucker, Hardy and Powers were all
present at the demonstration and, according to the Halpins, all allegedly claimed that the
ReVox system was “state of the art” and the “best system available.” They also indicated
that the high cost of the ReVox set the Halpins were interested in was reflective of the
fact that it was of the highest quality.
The Halpins contend that Tucker, Hardy and Powers all made numerous
assertions that the ReVox television sets were superior to all other brands. Based at least
in part on these assertions, the Halpins decided to purchase a 50” ReVox television.
Soon after delivery and installation of the system, they noticed problems with the quality
of the picture displayed by their new television. Upon the advice of the Appellants, the
Halpins invested several thousand dollars on various additional pieces of equipment in an
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effort to improve the poor picture quality. After these efforts failed, Tucker admitted that
although the ReVox set sold to the Halpins was able to receive an HDTV signal, it could
not display it as an HDTV picture. Additionally, the Halpins subsequently received
correspondence from ReVox USA's European parent corporation, ReVox GMBH,
indicating that though it was in the process of developing HD products, the company did
not yet sell a 50” HDTV set.
The Halpins brought suit against Powers, Hardy and ReVox USA
(Defendants) alleging a violation of Kentucky's Consumer Protection Act (KCPA), KRS
367.110 et seq. In May 2005, the Halpins tried their case before a jury in the Fayette
Circuit Court. On May 18, 2005, the jury returned a verdict against all Defendants
except Powers. With the addition of attorney's fees and costs, the judgment totaled
$141,117.02. Despite the jury's conclusion to the contrary, on June 24, 2005, the trial
court rendered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict against Powers making him jointly
and severally liable for the final judgment along with his co-defendants. Alleging
numerous errors, Powers and Hardy (Appellants) have appealed the judgment to this
Court.2 Agreeing with them that the trial court committed various errors, we reverse and
remand for a new trial.3
“Defendants” is used herein to refer to those defendants at trial (Powers, Hardy and ReVox
USA) while “Appellants” is used to refer to Powers and Hardy, the only Defendants who
appealed.
2
Appellants have filed a motion to strike the Halpins' brief. The basis for this motion is the
Halpins' reference in their brief to a complaint from a separate civil action that is not a part of the
record on appeal. Though the brief states that the complaint is attached as an exhibit, no copy
was appended to any of the copies of the brief provided to this Court. Regardless, because our
3
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As we have noted, the Appellants have alleged that the trial court
committed several errors before, during and after the trial. In order to facilitate our
review, we will address them in the approximate order that they arose during the
proceedings below. The first alleged error concerns the trial court's denial of Hardy's
October 13, 2004 motion to substitute The Stereo Shoppe, Ltd. as a defendant in his
stead. In a May 12, 2005 order, the court denied Hardy's motion yet added The Stereo
Shoppe, Ltd. as a defendant in addition to Hardy. While the trial court's decision to add
The Stereo Shoppe, Ltd. as a party is somewhat unusual, we are not persuaded by Hardy's
objections that the decision was in error. Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 21
provides that “[p]arties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any
party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.”
Given the fact that Hardy waited approximately seventeen months after the Halpins filed
their complaint to raise any objection, we are not prepared to conclude that the court's
decision to add The Stereo Shoppe, Ltd. but leave Hardy as an individual defendant was
unjustified.
We next turn to the letter sent to the Halpins in November 2002 by a
representative of ReVox GMBH, ReVox USA's parent company and manufacturer of the
Halpins' television. This letter stated:
Permit me to introduce myself as Markus Halbing, product
manager for ReVox GMBH in Villingen, Germany. Our
representative in the U.S., Brian Tucker, has informed me of
the initial problem and your current dissatisfaction with the Edecision does not rely on the challenged complaint, we deny the Appellants' motion by separate
order entered on the same date as this Opinion.
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650 plasma. It is my understanding that we solved one
problem but has [sic] left the performance level not to your
expectations as compared to the High Definition products
from other manufacturers.
As you may know, Europe does not have a High Definition
program from their TV broadcast network and therefore have
not put high priority marketing a HD plasma product.
Recently ReVox has addressed the needs of the High
Definition markets and will have a “state-of-the-art” 50” HD
product, which we expect to deliver not later than 2 weeks
after your confirmation.
We at ReVox hope that you will give us the opportunity to
serve you and help realize your expectations of our fine
products by accepting our new High Definition model in
exchange for the E-650 that you presently have.
Please don't hesitate to call me at the factory (until 11 am
your time) or correspond by e-mail if you have any further
questions.
Prior to trial, the trial court ruled that the letter's third paragraph—ReVox's offer of a
replacement HD television—was to be redacted before the letter could be presented to the
jury. Appellants argue that this redaction deprived them of the opportunity to show that
the Halpins were offered an opportunity to mitigate their damages and chose not to do so.
Whether or not the Halpins may have been justified in rejecting this offer, we believe that
the jury should have seen the letter in its entirety. The trial court erred in redacting the
letter and disallowing all references to the replacement offer.
On the day of trial, the trial judge insisted that she would not change her
prior decision to redact the third “offer” paragraph from the letter because what was at
issue was what happened early in the parties' dealings and not what happened toward the
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end of the dispute. While there can be no doubt that what was said between the parties
prior to the Halpins' decision to purchase their ReVox television is important, the
Halpins' damages claim rendered what happened later in the process—an offer of
mitigation through replacement of their television with a new HDTV model—equally
relevant.
Appellees argue that because ReVox's offer was made in an attempt to
settle the parties' dispute, it is not admissible pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Evidence
(KRE) 408. This rule states:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish,
or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept a valuable
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise
a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is
not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim
or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in
compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This
rule does not require the exclusion of evidence otherwise
discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of
compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require
exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose,
such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a
contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a
criminal investigation or prosecution.
While there is little doubt that ReVox's offer of a replacement television would not have
been admissible to prove liability, KRE 408 does not require exclusion of such evidence
when it is offered “for another purpose.” Federal courts interpreting the Federal Rule of
Evidence identical to our own KRE 408 have consistently held that “another purpose”
includes the issue of mitigation of damages. See, e.g., Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank of
Commerce, 808 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1987); Urico v. Parnell Oil Co., 708 F.2d 852 (1st Cir.
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1983). We agree that the question of damage mitigation is likewise a valid exception to
the general inadmissibility rule in KRE 408.
Moreover, we do not agree with the Halpins that ReVox's replacement offer
constituted an offer of compromise for the purpose of settling a claim. When they
received the ReVox letter in November, 2002, the Halpins had not yet filed a lawsuit and
would not do so until the following year. Under these circumstances, the Halpins'
assertion that the letter was an inadmissible offer of compromise, if taken to its logical
conclusion, necessarily leads to the unreasonable result that any effort to address a
customer's complaints, regardless of when made or the circumstances surrounding it,
would always fall within the purview of KRE 408 and would rarely, if ever, be
admissible.
Additionally, under the particular facts of this case, the trial court's
redaction of the offer from ReVox's letter clearly had an unjust and unfairly prejudicial
result. That is, the Halpins were allowed to testify before the jury that the Defendants
never offered to resolve the dispute by providing a true HDTV set. While it is true that
ReVox GMBH, ReVox USA's parent corporation, extended the replacement offer, that
offer clearly stated that it was made after consultation with Brian Tucker, president of
ReVox USA, a defendant in the Halpins' action and ReVox GMBH's United States
representative. Further, the Halpins admitted that the offer was delivered by the
Defendants and that they believed it to be from them. Under these circumstances, the
ReVox letter in its entirety was admissible and the trial court erred by excluding it.
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Appellants also argue that the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of
certain definitions found on an Internet site maintained by the Consumer Electronic
Association (CEA). The Appellants contend that the CEA information is “opinionated”
and contains no indication of who prepared the information or when it was written.
Without a proper foundation as to the identity of the CEA and the date of the information,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether this information complies with KRE
201(b), which provides in relevant part:
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either:
(1) Generally known within the county from which the
jurors are drawn, or, in a nonjury matter, the county in
which the venue of the action is fixed; or
(2) Capable of accurate and ready determination by resort
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.
On the record before us, it appears, at a minimum, the CEA website was a source whose
accuracy could reasonably be questioned. The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of
facts which did not comport with KRE 201(b). See also Polley v. Allen, 132 S.W.3d 223
(Ky. App. 2004) (error to judicially notice statistics from Internet site where the source,
accuracy and reliability were disputed).
Moreover, the trial court should not have included the CEA definitions in
the jury instructions. This court has previously held that the trial court should define
words or expressions used in the instructions that are not commonly used or understood
by the general public. See Island Creek Coal Co. v. Rodgers, 644 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. App.
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1982). See also 2 J. Palmore, Instructions to Juries, § 13.11(m) (2006) (when words or
expressions not commonly understood by the general public are used in instructions they
must be defined). A review of the trial court's instructions reveals that aside from the
CEA definitions included as Instruction No. 1, the terms defined therein are found
nowhere else in the instructions. Because of this, while the parties were free to debate the
definitions of the terms in question and offer relevant evidence concerning them, their
inclusion in the instructions served no purpose and was prohibited by Kentucky law.
We turn next to the “amendment” of the jury instructions by the trial court
in response to questions posed by the jury during deliberations. Interrogatory No. 1 of
the written instructions stated:
Are you satisfied from the evidence that plaintiffs purchased
the ReVox TV and related entertainment system primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes; that defendants used
unfair, deceptive, misleading, or unfair business practices in
their dealings with plaintiffs regarding the ReVox TV and
related entertainment system; and, as a result, plaintiffs
suffered an ascertainable loss of money?
The interrogatory provided only for a single “yes” or “no” answer.
Following the commencement of deliberations, the jury sent the following
written questions to the trial judge:
Do we have to find that each defendant individually was
unfair, deceptive or misleading?
If the jury finds that the Halpins are to get their money back
do the Halpins get to keep the equipment?
Can Powers be excluded?
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If we excuse 1 person not guilty, will that dismiss all 3
defendants?
Upon receipt of these questions, the trial court addressed the issues raised therein with
counsel. While the counsel quickly agreed upon a stipulated answer to the question of
who would have possession of the ReVox television if the Halpins were awarded a
judgment, they did not agree on how the remaining questions should be answered. As a
result of both counsels'4 admitted failure to anticipate the possibility of the jury finding
some, but not all, of the Defendants liable, the instructions tendered by both sides and
ultimately adopted by the trial court included only the single joint and several liability
interrogatory set forth above. However, when faced with the jury's question concerning
the liability of individual Defendants, the Halpins argued that a joint and several verdict
would be unfair and the jury should be allowed to decide the individual liability of each
party. Conversely, the Defendants objected on the basis that the Halpins had asserted in
their complaint only a single claim for joint and several liability5 and therefore the jury
must find either all of the Defendants liable or none of them. The trial court ultimately
ruled in the Halpins' favor and provided the following answers to the jury's questions.
Do we have to find that each defendant individually was
unfair, deceptive or misleading?
You may find one, two, or all three defendants was or were
unfair, deceptive or misleading.
Can Powers be excluded?
4
Powers, Hardy and ReVox USA, Inc. were all represented by the same attorney.
In fact, this was admitted by the Halpins during the discussion with the court about the jury
questions.
5
- 10 -
Yes, see explanation of question.
If we excuse 1 person not guilty, will that dismiss all 3
defendants?
No!
On review, alleged errors regarding jury instructions are considered
questions of law that this Court examines under the de novo standard of review.
Hamilton v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 208 S.W.3d 272 (Ky. App. 2006). Further, unless
the record demonstrates that the verdict was not influenced by an improper instruction,
for purposes of review we must assume that it was. Barrett v. Stephany, 510 S.W.2d 524
(Ky. 1974). In general, we acknowledge that if, during deliberations, a trial judge
corrects an obvious mistake or oversight in jury instructions, any error is harmless. Foley
v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 876 (Ky. 1996) (any error in initially failing to set forth
intent element in instructions on murder charge was harmless given obvious nature of
intent requirement); Garner v. Commonwealth, 645 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. 1983) (no error
after court discovered that erroneous instruction was given to jury, the jury was brought
out of jury room to be given amended instructions, and the court ordered the jury not to
disclose verdict already reached and to return to jury room to deliberate with the amended
instructions). In the present matter, however, the trial court's answers to the jury's
questions did not merely address a simple error in the instructions, nor did they supply an
obvious omission. Rather, by redefining the manner in which the jury was to decide and
ascribe liability, the trial court fundamentally altered the very nature of the instructions.
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We are unable to find any authority in Kentucky law permitting such wholesale rewriting
of jury instructions after deliberations have begun. Because of this, and also because of
the likelihood of resulting confusion to the jury, we find reversible error in the trial
court's handling of the jury instructions.
The record clearly establishes that because the Halpins sought from the
outset of their lawsuit a joint and several verdict, the Defendants tried the case in an “all
or nothing” fashion. It is not unreasonable to assume, therefore, that if the Defendants
had been informed before the jury retired to deliberate that the question of liability would
be addressed separately as to each Defendant, the strategy employed by them in defense
of the lawsuit may have been substantially different. At a minimum, if the trial court had
included in the written instructions a separate liability interrogatory for each Defendant,
counsel at least would have had the opportunity to address the strength of the Halpins'
claim against each Defendant in closing argument.
Once the trial court decided to fundamentally alter the jury instructions,
arguably error might still have been avoided if counsel had been afforded the opportunity
to reargue the matter to the jury. See, e.g., Joseph v. Commonwealth, 262 S.W.2d 673
(Ky. 1953) (in prosecution for voluntary manslaughter, where attorneys for both parties
were given the opportunity to reargue, an additional instruction not given until after
argument on right of defendant to defend self and uncle was not improper); Druggist
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baker, 254 S.W.2d 691 (Ky. 1952) (correction of instructions after
argument of case was not prejudicial error, where counsel was afforded an opportunity to
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reargue the case after correction). Because no such opportunity was given, the trial
court's amended instructions clearly prejudiced the Appellants and warrant a new trial.
Moreover, any retrial should include separate liability instructions for each
of the Defendants. As the jury's split verdict in this matter suggests, the alleged liability
of each Defendant did not arise from a single event or course of conduct. Each
Defendant is legally responsible for his, or its, own individual acts. Once the jury
determines which, if any, of the Defendants are liable for violations of the KCPA, the
jury should then determine what damages, if any, proven by the Halpins were caused by
each of the Defendants found to have violated the KCPA.
Finally, because this case is being remanded for a new trial, we need not
address the trial court's subsequent order rendered June 24, 2005, entering a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict against Powers. However, it bears mention that a judgment
notwithstanding a verdict should never be entered without careful attention to the
controlling legal standard. “In ruling on either a motion for a directed verdict or a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a trial court is under a duty to consider the
evidence in the strongest possible light in favor of the party opposing the motion.”
Taylor v. Kennedy, 700 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. App. 1985). The trial court must give the
opposing party the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference which can be drawn
from the evidence. Id. The trial court may not enter a directed verdict or judgment
notwithstanding the verdict “unless there is a complete absence of proof on a material
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issue in the action, or if no disputed issue of fact exists upon which reasonable men could
differ.” Id.
In sum, our review of the record reveals numerous errors. The cumulative
result of these errors is that a verdict was rendered by an improperly instructed jury. This
verdict may well have been the result of jury confusion and was certainly rendered
without the jury hearing all of the evidence the parties were entitled to present.
Consequently, we vacate both the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court entered on July
12, 2005, and the June 24, 2005 judgment against Powers notwithstanding the verdict and
remand this matter for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert L. Abell
Lexington, Kentucky
Thomas D. Bullock
Bullock & Coffman, LLP
Lexington, Kentucky
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