PATTY LEE SALLAZ (NOW SNIPES) v. ROBERT B. SALLAZ
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 19, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2005-CA-002311-ME
PATTY LEE SALLAZ (NOW SNIPES)
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ROWAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BETH LEWIS MAZE, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-CI-00021
v.
ROBERT B. SALLAZ
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; HENRY AND PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGES.1
PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE:
Patty Lee Sallaz, now Snipes, (Patty)
appeals from an order entered by Rowan Circuit Court in which
the trial court modified custody over Patty’s two children and
granted sole custody to Patty’s ex-husband, Robert B. Sallaz
(Rob).
On appeal, Patty argues that the trial court modified
custody based on events that occurred prior to entry of the
dissolution decree; that the trial court ignored the only
1
Senior Judges Michael L. Henry and Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special
Judges by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
psychological evaluation performed in the case; that the trial
court shifted the burden of proof away from Rob and that the
trial court considered inadmissible hearsay in resolving the
modification issue.
Finding that the trial court did not abuse
its considerable discretion, we affirm.
Rob and Patty were married in December of 1994 in
Rowan County, Kentucky.
During the marriage, Rob and Patty had
two children: Rebecca, born in December of 1994, and Cody, born
in November of 1996.
In January of 2002, after more than seven
years of marriage, Rob filed with Rowan Circuit Court a petition
for dissolution of his and Patty’s marriage.
On January 23, 2002, Patty and Rob voluntarily entered
into a property settlement, child custody, visitation and
support agreement (custody agreement).
In the custody
agreement, Patty and Rob agreed to joint custody of the children
and agreed to an equal division of parenting time with each one
getting the children every other week.
In addition, they agreed
that neither would be designated as the primary residential
custodian.
On April 3, 2002, the trial court signed the decree
of dissolution which was entered by the clerk of the court on
April 4, 2002.
In the dissolution decree, the trial court
incorporated the custody agreement.
On April 4, 2002 the same day the decree was entered,
Patty filed a motion to set aside the custody agreement.
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Patty
argued that she signed the custody agreement, even though she
thought it was not in the best interest of the children, because
Rob asserted “that he was going to allege in court that
[Patty’s] past conduct was such that she was not an appropriate
custodian for the children[.]”
In addition, Patty claimed that
Rob was not Cody’s biological father and asked the trial court
to sever Rob’s relationship with Cody.
Later, on April 15, 2002, Patty filed, pursuant to the
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02, a motion to alter,
amend or vacate the dissolution decree.
In this second motion,
Patty merely incorporated the arguments from her earlier motion.
On May 10, 2002, after a hearing, the trial court denied both of
Patty’s motions.
In its order, the trial court found that Rob
had no prior knowledge regarding Cody’s disputed paternity, and,
by withholding this information until the day that the decree
was entered and then by attempting to use it to sever Rob’s ties
with Cody, the trial court noted that Patty was acting
deceptively and may have tried to perpetrate fraud upon the
court.
Noting that Patty freely signed the custody agreement
acknowledging that Rob was Cody’s father, the court determined
that paternity testing would be detrimental to Cody’s mental and
emotional well-being and ordered that the issue of paternity was
best left presumed.
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After the trial court denied Patty’s motions, she
filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s May 10
order.
However, subsequently, Patty filed with this Court a
motion to voluntarily dismiss her appeal.
In October of 2002,
we granted that motion, but, in the same month, an individual
named Richard Scott Ramey filed with Rowan Circuit Court a
motion to intervene in Rob’s and Patty’s dissolution action.
Ramey stated that he was Cody’s biological father, and, to
support this claim, Ramey had attached a DNA test result, which
showed, with 99.95% probability, that Ramey was Cody’s
biological father.
Despite this, the trial court denied Ramey’s
motion, holding that Rowan District Court was the proper forum
in which to establish paternity.
After his motion was denied,
Ramey took no further action, and, for a while, all went quiet
in the parties’ dissolution action.
Some nineteen months later, Rob filed a motion to
modify custody as set forth in the dissolution decree.
In
support of his motion, Rob attached his own signed affidavit in
which he alleged that, after the hearing regarding Patty’s
motions, Patty told Cody that Rob was not his father even though
the trial court had ordered her not to do so.
In addition, Rob
alleged that Patty told the children that, when Patty was
fourteen years old, Patty had murdered her maternal grandmother;
had shot her own mother and had been sentenced to 30 years in
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prison for the crimes.
According to the affidavit, while the
parties were married, they had agreed that it would be in the
children’s best interest for them not to reveal this information
to the children.
Lastly, Rob alleged that, during those weeks
in which the children were with Patty, they would experience
greater difficulties at school.
Based on these allegations, Rob
requested the trial court to grant him sole custody of the
children.
After Patty responded to Rob’s motion, the trial court
set the matter for an evidentiary hearing.
And, on August 11,
2004, the trial court conducted a hearing regarding Rob’s
motion.
After speaking with children on the record and hearing
numerous witnesses, the trial court decided to hold the hearing
in abeyance and ordered both Patty and Rob to be psychologically
evaluated at the University of Kentucky.
After the first
hearing but before the evaluations were performed, the trial
court, upon its own initiative, sought to obtain records from
various state agencies regarding Patty’s murder conviction and
regarding her past mental health records.
After receiving those
documents, the trial court reviewed them, gave both parties’
attorneys an opportunity to review them and then forwarded the
records to the evaluators at the University of Kentucky.
After
Patty and Rob were evaluated, the trial court conducted another
evidentiary hearing on July 14, 2005.
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During both hearings, both Patty and Rob testified
about numerous issues.
Patty testified about the circumstances
leading up to and surrounding the murder of her grandmother.
She also testified about Cody’s paternity and claimed that Rob
knew about Cody’s paternity before Cody was born.
And she
testified about the children’s performance at school claiming
that they performed well at school while in her care.
Rob testified that he knew, before he and Patty
married, that Patty had killed her grandmother.
He also
testified about Cody’s paternity and claimed that, after Patty
had told Cody about the boy’s biological father, Cody’s demeanor
changed.
Rob further testified that both Cody and Rebecca
questioned Rob numerous times about Cody’s paternity.
Rob also
testified about the children’s school performance and claimed
that Rebecca’s home work performance suffered when she was with
Patty.
Also numerous witnesses testified on both Patty’s and
Rob’s behalf regarding various issues.
Patty’s mother testified
and contradicted Patty’s testimony about the circumstances
leading up to and surrounding the murder.
In addition, one of
Rebecca’s teachers testified that, when Rebecca was with Patty,
Rebecca did not do her homework as consistently as when Rebecca
was with Rob.
Rebecca’s teacher also testified that Rebecca
appeared more withdrawn at school when Rebecca was staying with
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Patty.
The teacher also testified that, during the school year,
she tended to interact with Rob more than Patty, and she opined
that, while Patty was not uninterested in Rebecca’s school
performance, Rob appeared to be more interested than Patty.
One
of Cody’s teachers testified that Cody maintained good grades no
matter where he was staying, but the teacher testified that Cody
appeared to act out more when he was staying with Patty.
This
teacher also testified that she found in Cody’s desk several
pictures he had drawn that were of a sexual nature.
According
to this teacher, the picture incident occurred during one of
Patty’s weeks.
After hearing all the testimony presented at both
hearings, the trial court modified the custody agreement and
granted Rob sole custody of both children.
In addition, the
trial court granted standard visitation to Patty.
Feeling that
the trial court focused too much on her criminal past and on the
issue regarding Cody’s paternity, Patty now appeals to this
Court presenting numerous assignments of error for our
consideration.
A. USE AND CONSIDERATION OF FACTS THAT AROSE PRIOR TO THE ENTRY
OF THE DECREE
In her appellate brief, Patty contends that the trial
court modified custody granting Rob sole custody based on the
fact that, when Patty was fourteen, she murdered her
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grandmother, and, based on the fact that, while married to Rob,
she had an extramarital affair that resulted in her getting
pregnant with Cody.
Based on this contention, Patty avers that Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.340(3) mandates that a prior custody
decree may only be modified on facts that arose since the entry
of the prior decree or that were unknown to the trial court at
the time the decree was entered.
So, based upon KRS 403.340(3),
Patty argues that the trial court erred since it modified
custody based on facts that arose well before Rob even sought
dissolution and since the trial court was aware of these facts
prior to entry of the dissolution decree.
Also, Patty insists that, during the hearings, the
trial court focused almost exclusively on the facts and
circumstances surrounding her grandmother’s murder.
And,
according to Patty, the trial court’s consideration of Patty’s
criminal past tainted the trial court’s willingness to even
consider her testimony and her arguments against modification.
When we review a circuit court’s child custody
decision, we will not reverse unless its findings of fact are
clearly erroneous or its decision reflects a clear abuse of the
considerable discretion granted trial courts in custody matters.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01.
v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky. 1986).
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See also Reichle
The modification of custody decrees is controlled by
KRS 403.340(3), which states in pertinent part:
If a court of this state has jurisdiction
pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, the court shall not modify
a prior custody decree unless after hearing
it finds, upon the basis of facts that have
arisen since the prior decree or that were
unknown to the court at the time of entry of
the prior decree, that a change has occurred
in the circumstances of the child or his
custodian, and that the modification is
necessary to serve the best interests of the
child. (Emphasis added.)
As can be seen, Patty is correct that a court cannot modify a
prior custody decree unless facts have arisen since the prior
decree that show a change in circumstances warranting
modification or facts that were unknown to the court at the time
it entered the decree have been uncovered warranting
modification.
Patty, in essence, contends that the trial court
modified custody based solely on the facts that she murdered her
grandmother, an event that occurred well before the dissolution
decree was entered.
Despite this contention, the record shows,
and the trial court’s order reflects, that the trial court heard
testimony about events that occurred before the entry of the
decree and heard testimony about events that occurred after the
decree was entered.
And, as the record reflects, the trial
court had no knowledge, prior to entry of the decree, regarding
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any event that occurred prior to entry of the decree.
A cursory
reading of KRS 403.340(3) reveals that a trial court can
consider events that occurred prior to entry of the decree if
the court did not know of the events at the time it entered the
decree.
The record shows that the trial court considered events
that occurred after the decree was entered and considered an
event that occurred before entry of the decree.
Since KRS
403.340(3) permits this, the trial court neither violated KRS
403.340(3) nor abused its discretion when it modified custody.
In addition, Patty contends that Rob based his motion
to modify custody on Patty’s murderous past and on Cody’s
disputed paternity.
And, citing KRS 403.340(3), Williams v.
Williams, 290 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1956), and Ward v. Ward, 407
S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1966), Patty argues that Rob could not use these
facts as the basis for his motion since they arose before the
dissolution decree was entered.
Despite Patty’s contention to the contrary, Rob did
not base his modification motion upon the murder or Cody’s
disputed paternity.
As the record shows, Rob based his motion
on allegations that Patty had told the children about murdering
her grandmother, which Rob felt to be harmful to them; on
allegations that Patty had told Cody that Rob was not the little
boy’s father and on allegations that the children’s school
performance suffered during the weeks that they stayed with
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Patty.
Since these alleged events arose after the entry of the
dissolution decree, there was no violation of KRS 403.340(3).
B. FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE EVALUATION PERFORMED AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
In her second assignment of error, Patty reminds us
that, according to KRS 403.340(4)(b) and KRS 403.270(2)(e), a
trial court must consider the mental health of all individuals
involved in a custody proceeding.
And she points out that the
trial court did in fact order both she and Rob to be evaluated
at the University of Kentucky.
The record reflects that,
pursuant to the trial court’s order, Mr. Lane Veltkamp and one
of his associates did evaluate Patty and Rob.
Since Mr.
Veltkamp’s evaluation was the only one performed in the present
case, Patty opines that it was the only one that shed any light
on her and Rob’s mental health.
Furthermore, Patty argues that
Mr. Veltkamp’s evaluation clearly supported her arguments since
Mr. Veltkamp opined that she was free of debilitating mood or
anxiety symptoms, that she and Rob were both adequate parents,
and that the children were more comfortable with her.
However,
Patty insists that the trial court ignored Mr. Veltkamp’s
evaluation, yet, since it was the only one, Patty argues that
the trial court was bound under KRS 403.340(4)(b) and KRS
403.270(2)(e) to consider it.
And, since the trial court
ignored the evaluation and focused solely on the state of
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Patty’s mental health when she was fourteen, Patty reasons that
the trial court violated both KRS 403.340(4)(b) and KRS
403.270(2)(e) and committed reversible error.
Apparently, Patty assumes that if the trial court had
considered Mr. Veltkamp’s evaluation, then the evaluation would
have persuaded the trial court to rule in her favor.
however, is specious reasoning.
This,
As the fact-finder in the
present case, the trial court had the sole responsibility to
weigh the probative value and credibility of all the evidence
presented to it and to choose which evidence it found most
convincing.
Commonwealth, Dep’t of Highways v. Dehart, 465
S.W.2d 720, 722 (Ky. 1971).
evaluation.
This applied to Mr. Veltkamp’s
Moreover, the trial court’s order clearly
demonstrates that the court considered Mr. Veltkamp’s evaluation
and found it unpersuasive.
This too was in the trial court’s
discretion since it was not bound to accept as true any
testimony from any witness, including Mr. Veltkamp who testified
via report. Dunn v. Commonwealth, 151 S.W.2d 763, 764-765 (Ky.
1941).
Since the trial court considered Mr. Veltkamp’s
evaluation, it did not violate either KRS 403.340(4)(b) or KRS
403.270(2)(e).
C. BURDEN OF PROOF
In her brief, Patty points out that, during the
custody proceeding, the trial court entered seven orders on its
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own initiative seeking to obtain Patty’s past mental health
records and records regarding Patty’s criminal history.
According to Patty, the trial court sought these records in
order to resolve the conflict between Patty’s testimony and her
mother’s testimony regarding the murder.
Now, on appeal, Patty argues that because the trial
court entered these seven orders, it shifted the burden of proof
from Rob, who moved for modification, to herself, or, in the
alternative, the trial court assumed the burden of proof,
thereby, relieving Rob of his burden.
Either way, Patty insists
that the trial court committed reversible error.
According to Wilcher v. Wilcher, 566 S.W.2d 173, 175
(Ky. App. 1978), the party seeking modification of a custody
decree bears the burden of proof.
In this case, since Rob was
the party seeking modification, he bore that burden.
In her
brief, Patty contends that the trial court shifted the burden of
the proof from Rob to her, but she fails to expound upon that
argument.
Instead, she argues that because the trial court, on
its own initiative, entered seven orders seeking records
regarding Patty, the trial court assumed the burden of proof.
Patty cites neither statute nor case law to support her
argument, and we fail to see how the trial court, by obtaining
these records, relieved Rob of his burden of proof.
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D. HEARSAY EVIDENCE
As previously mentioned, the trial court obtained, on
its own initiative, records regarding Patty’s past.
Patty
points out that the trial court did not file these documents in
the record; instead, the court ordered the records sealed.
Even
though the trial court sealed the records, it considered them in
resolving Rob’s motion to modify custody.
Since the trial court
considered the documents but never filed them in the record,
Patty contends that documents constituted hearsay evidence
pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 801(c).
Furthermore, none of the recognized hearsay exceptions applied
to the documents since the trial court never identified the
specific documents upon which it relied.
Since the trial court
relied on hearsay, Patty insists that the order modifying
custody must be vacated.
In Patty’s reply brief, she insists that she properly
preserved the hearsay issue; however, while Patty points to
instances where she objected to the trial court’s use of the
documents during the second hearing, in those instances, Patty
objected to the documents on the grounds of relevancy not
hearsay.
Thus, she did not preserve the issue of hearsay for
our review.
And, while we will not address the merits of
Patty’s hearsay argument, we note that the documents obtained by
the trial court tended to fall under one of the three following
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hearsay exceptions: statements for purposes of medical treatment
or diagnosis pursuant to KRE 803(4); records of regularly
conducted activity pursuant to KRE 803(6) or public records and
reports pursuant to KRE 803(8).
CONCLUSION
Finding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, the order modifying custody is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stephen E. Neal
WHITE PECK CARRINGTON, LLP
Mt. Sterling, Kentucky
Donald E. Blair II
CAMPBELL, ROGERS & BLAIR, PLLC
Morehead, Kentucky
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