DARRYL C. BEASLEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 5, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002197-MR
DARRYL C. BEASLEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDITH E. MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-002644
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON1 AND WINE, JUDGES; MILLER,2 SPECIAL JUDGE.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Darryl C. Beasley, pro se, has appealed from an
order of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered on September 28,
2005, which denied his motion to amend his sentence pursuant to
RCr3 11.42, without the appointment of counsel and without
holding an evidentiary hearing.
Having concluded that the trial
1
Judge Rick A. Johnson completed this opinion prior to the expiration of his
term of office on December 31, 2006. Release of the opinion was delayed by
administrative handling.
2
Retired Judge John D. Miller, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
3
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
court did not err by denying Beasley’s motions based upon the
face of the record, we affirm.
The sentence at issue in this appeal followed the
indictment of Beasley by a Jefferson County grand jury on
November 20, 2002, for trafficking in a controlled substance in
the first degree,4 and for being a persistent felony offender in
the second degree (PFO II).5
The trafficking charge arose from
Beasley’s arrest on March 13, 2002.
The indictment stated that
Beasley had “previously been convicted of Trafficking in
Marijuana by a final judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court of
Kentucky (94CR0240), on or about the 17th day of August, 1994,
and is now being charged as a second or subsequent offender
under Chapter 218A, Controlled Substances, of the Kentucky
Revised Statutes.”6
The PFO II charge was based upon two
convictions from 1992 for possession of a controlled substance
and trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree.
4
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1412.
5
KRS 532.080(2). This statute states: “A person who is found to be a
persistent felony offender in the second degree shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate term of imprisonment pursuant to the sentencing provisions of
KRS 532.060(2) for the next highest degree than the offense for which
convicted.”
6
Since Beasley was charged as a subsequent offender under KRS
218A.1412(2)(b), the charge for trafficking in a controlled substance in the
first degree was enhanced from a Class C felony to a Class B felony. A Class
C felony carries a penalty of not less than five years, or more than ten
years, in the penitentiary. A Class B felony carries a penalty of not less
than ten years, or more than 20 years, in the penitentiary.
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On February 17, 2004, Beasley appeared before the
trial court with counsel and pled guilty to the charges.
His
guilty pleas were entered pursuant to a plea agreement signed by
Beasley, his attorney, and the Commonwealth’s Attorney.
The
agreement provided for a prison sentence of ten years on the
trafficking conviction, enhanced to 20 years by the PFO II
conviction.7
On September 26, 2005, Beasley filed a pro se motion
pursuant to RCr 11.42 requesting that the trial court amend his
sentence.
Specifically, Beasley asserted:
4.
The defendant did not have a subsequent
offense8 of trafficking in a controlled
substance, schedule[ ] II cocaine at
the time of his Indictment in this
case.
5.
The defendant did not have a prior
offense for PFO purposes at the time he
was Indicted by the Commonwealth of
Kentucky and therefore was not subject
to PFO enhancement.
Beasley also requested in the motion that the trial court hold
an evidentiary hearing and appoint him counsel.
In support of
his motion, Beasley filed a memorandum stating that counsel had
been ineffective by failing to properly investigate his prior
record to determine whether he could be convicted as a
7
Because of the PFO II enhancement and a trafficking conviction as a Class B
felony, Beasley could have received a sentence ranging from not less than 20
years, nor more than 50 years, or life imprisonment.
8
Apparently, Beasley means “prior offense” or that he “did not qualify as a
subsequent offender.”
-3-
subsequent offender and as a PFO II; and that since he had
received incomplete and incorrect information from his counsel,
his guilty plea had not been entered knowingly, voluntarily, or
intelligently.
The trial court summarily denied the motion in a
handwritten order entered on September 28, 2005.
On October 6, 2005, Beasley filed a motion “for a new
trial to vacate court’s adverse decision” pursuant to CR 59.05
and CR 52.02.
He requested that the trial court make written
findings of fact and conclusions of law as to its basis for
denying his RCr 11.42 motion.
The trial court denied the motion
in an order entered on October 11, 2005.
The only substantive
findings in the order were as follows:
The plea was knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily made. The Defendant pled to
Trafficking in Controlled Substance in the
First Degree (Subsequent Offender), a Class
B felony carrying [a] 10-20 year sentence.
His previous felony conviction in 92-CR-2253
(December 1, 1992) clearly supported his
Persistent Felony Offender in the Second
Degree plea and enhancement of his sentence.
He received the minimum sentence on
Trafficking in Controlled Substance in the
First Degree (ten years) even though it was
enhanced by the Persistent Felony Offender
in the Second Degree conviction.9
This appeal followed.
Beasley argues on appeal that if his trial counsel had
properly investigated his prior record, counsel would have
9
The trial court did not address whether Beasley’s trafficking conviction was
properly enhanced as a subsequent offender based on a 1994 marijuana
trafficking conviction.
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determined that Beasley did not qualify as a subsequent offender
or as a PFO II.
Beasley claims that since his guilty plea was
based upon incorrect information, the plea was not knowingly,
voluntarily, or intelligently entered.
In addressing Beasley’s
arguments, the Commonwealth’s brief provided little assistance,
including the following:
The appellant maintains that his prior
marijuana conviction was a misdemeanor thus
not grounds for a PFO II charge, he also
claims that his prior felony conviction
under Indictment 92-CR-2253 is also
insufficient for a PFO II charge. The
appellant’s argument that his sentence[ ]
was erroneously enhanced is totally without
merit as the record shows the enhancement
results from a prior felony under Indictment
92-CR-2253, and not the marijuana charge of
Indictment 94-CR-240 as argued by appellant.
Although the appellant argues incessantly
that the basis for the PFO II charge was a
misdemeanor marijuana conviction, he is
incorrect. The basis of the PFO II charge
is a felony conviction for Possession and
Conspiracy to Traffick in Controlled
Substance.
. . . .
To qualify as a PFO II, the statute
merely requires, in pertinent part, that a
person has been “convicted of one (1)
previous felony.” KRS 532.080(2). The
record shows, and the appellant does not
dispute, that Indictment 92-CR-2253 was a
felony for which he received a sentence of
five (5) years. Moreover, the appellant
does not present any facts that he was
outside the time frame for the PFO II
conviction. Instead, the appellant merely
makes conclusory and confusing statements.
-5-
Such statements are not sufficient to
support the appellant’s contentions.
The appellant’s sentence, then, is
appropriate and valid. The appellant either
confused or mischaracterized the basis of
his enhanced sentence, and he cannot bring
any legitimate grounds to have it amended.
The trial court recognized such and denied
the appellant’s motion. The trial court
addressed those issues with findings of fact
and determined that the appellant’s
arguments were not supported by the record.
The PFO II charge that enhanced his sentence
to twenty (20) years is based on a felony
conviction, not the marijuana charge as
asserted by the appellant. Therefore, the
denial by the Jefferson Circuit Court must
be affirmed.
In order to show ineffective assistance of counsel in
the context of a guilty plea, a defendant must show that his
attorney’s performance was deficient, and except for that
deficiency he would not have pled guilty, but would have
insisted on a jury trial.10
In order to be constitutionally
valid, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently.11
In addition, RCr 8.08 requires a trial court to
determine at the time of the guilty plea “that the plea is made
voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge.”12
10
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 724 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Ky.App. 1986) (citing Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)).
11
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969);
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973);
Woodall v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 104 (Ky. 2001).
12
See also Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Ky. 2001); and Haight
v. Commonwealth, 760 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Ky. 1988).
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The validity of a guilty plea is determined from the totality of
the circumstances surrounding it.13
A guilty plea is invalid if
the defendant does not understand the nature of the
constitutional protections that he is waiving, or if he has such
an incomplete understanding of the charges against him that the
plea cannot stand as an admission of guilt.14
In this case, Beasley was indicted for trafficking in
a controlled substance as a subsequent offender based upon the
Commonwealth’s allegation that Beasley had been convicted in
1994 of trafficking in marijuana.
Our review of the record
below confirms that Beasley was convicted of trafficking in a
controlled substance in 1994.
While Beasley was initially
indicted in 1994 for promoting contraband in the first degree,
which is a class D felony,15 he subsequently entered an Alford16
plea to the amended charge of trafficking in marijuana, less
than eight ounces, a misdemeanor.17
It has been clearly established that a conviction for
any offense under KRS 218A constitutes an offense for the
13
See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d
747 (1970); and Kotas v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Ky. 1978).
14
James v. Cain, 56 F.3d 662, 666 (5th Cir. 1995).
15
Jefferson County Indictment No. 94-CR-000240.
16
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1977).
17
He was sentenced to 12 months in jail, conditionally discharged for two
years following 60 days of home incarceration.
-7-
purposes of the subsequent offender statutes.
In Byrd v.
Commonwealth,18 this Court held “that one may become a subsequent
offender based upon any prior conviction under KRS 218A”
[emphasis original].
Thus, Beasley’s misdemeanor conviction in
1994 for trafficking in marijuana under eight ounces qualified
him as a subsequent offender for enhancement purposes under KRS
218A.1412(2)(b).
Beasley’s contention that he did not meet the
requirements for a PFO II conviction is also without merit.
Beasley was convicted on December 1, 1992, of conspiracy to
traffick in a controlled substance in the third degree, second
offense, and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, suspended
for five years.
Since the offense at issue in this appeal was
committed on March 13, 2002, the felony which was enhanced
clearly occurred within five years of the completion of the 1992
felony sentence.
Beasley also claims that the trial court erred in
failing to appoint counsel and to hold an evidentiary hearing as
requested in his RCr 11.42 motion.
RCr 11.42(5) provides in
part as follows:
Affirmative allegations contained
in the answer shall be treated as
controverted or avoided of record. If
the answer raises a material issue of
fact that cannot be determined on the
18
709 S.W.2d 844, 845 (Ky.App. 1986).
-8-
face of the record the court shall
grant a prompt hearing and, if the
movant is without counsel of record and
if financially unable to employ
counsel, shall upon specific written
request by the movant appoint counsel
to represent the movant in the
proceeding, including appeal.
In Fraser v. Commonwealth,19 our Supreme Court
summarized the procedure to be followed in determining
entitlement to appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing
as follows:
[T]he trial judge shall determine whether
the allegations in the motion can be
resolved on the face of the record, in which
event an evidentiary hearing is not
required. A hearing is required if there is
a material issue of fact that cannot be
conclusively resolved, i.e., conclusively
proved or disproved, by an examination of
the record. . . . The trial judge may not
simply disbelieve factual allegations in the
absence of evidence in the record refuting
them. . . .
If an evidentiary hearing is required,
counsel must be appointed to represent the
movant if he/she is indigent and
specifically requests such appointment in
writing. . . .
Since the trial court did not err by determining that Beasley’s
allegations could be resolved on the face of the record, he was
not entitled to a hearing or to appointment of counsel.
Accordingly, the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court
is affirmed.
19
59 S.W.3d 448, 452-453 (Ky. 2001).
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Darryl C. Beasley, Pro Se
Lexington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Robert E. Prather
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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