SHERRY WHITTLE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 28, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002149-MR
SHERRY WHITTLE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM RUSSELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE VERNON MINIARD, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00037
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND NICKELL, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Sherry Whittle appeals from the final judgment of the Russell
Circuit Court entered on September 19, 2005, sentencing her to six years’ imprisonment
following her conviction by a jury. Having concluded that Whittle was not entitled to a
directed verdict of acquittal based on the evidence as a whole, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
On March 22, 2005, Whittle was indicted by a Russell County grand jury
for theft of a controlled substance,2 for theft by unlawful taking under $300.00,3 and for
being a persistent felony offender in the first degree (PFO I).4 At a jury trial held on July
21, 2005, the Commonwealth presented testimony from Amos and Lutha Cooper, who
testified to the following events: The Coopers reside in Russell County, Kentucky.
Close to their residence, on the same property, is a house owned by the Cooper’s son,
who has continually resided in Texas for more than 20 years. This house is maintained
and rented out by the Coopers. In 2005 Aldon McQueary visited the Cooper’s home
several times to inquire about renting the vacant house. Particularly, on February 15,
2005, McQueary visited the Cooper’s home and was accompanied by Whittle. While in
the Cooper’s home, Whittle asked to use the telephone. Mr. Cooper sat in the same room
as Whittle while she used the telephone, but McQueary waited in the kitchen out of the
sight line of Mr. Cooper. Following the phone call, McQueary and Whittle left the
residence.
Thereafter, Mrs. Cooper arrived home from a doctor’s appointment. As
was her usual custom, she placed her purse in a chair in a spare bedroom next to the
living room and closed the door. McQueary and Whittle returned to the Cooper’s home
accompanied by a child. During this visit, Whittle indicated that she would like to see the
rest of the Cooper’s home. Without consent from either of the Coopers, Whittle opened
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1418.
3
KRS 514.030.
4
KRS 532.080(3).
-2-
the door to the spare bedroom next to the living room, went into the room with the child,
and then commented on the carpet asking if it was “outdoor” carpet. Whittle knelt down
and appeared to be feeling the carpet. Neither one of the Coopers could see Whittle
doing anything other than touching the carpet. Whittle then indicated that she wanted to
see the remainder of the house and started to go through the kitchen and upstairs, but
Mrs. Cooper asked Whittle not to go upstairs. Whittle and the child abruptly left the
house through a door in the kitchen. Later, Whittle sent the child back inside the house to
get McQueary.
At some point during that night, Mrs. Cooper went to the spare bedroom to
put some change into her purse. However, she noticed that her change purse, checkbook,
and wallet were all missing. Mrs. Cooper contacted McQueary and inquired about his
wife possibly taking the items, but McQueary advised Mrs. Cooper that Whittle was not
his wife and that he did not know about the missing items. The Coopers reported the
missing checkbook, wallet, and change purse to the police.
At some point thereafter, Mrs. Cooper was contacted by the police and
asked if there were any bottles of medication missing from the home. She discovered
that a bottle of Hydrocodone was missing from among Mr. Cooper’s medications. Mrs.
Cooper told the police that the medication had been in a basket with all the other
medications at least seven days prior to McQueary and Whittle being present in the
residence, and that no one other than McQueary and Whittle had been to the residence
-3-
since the last time Mrs. Cooper had removed the bottle from the basket in the kitchen,
filled Mr. Cooper’s prescription tray, and replaced the bottle.
At the close of the Commonwealth’s case, Whittle moved for a directed
verdict of acquittal on all charges. She argued that the Commonwealth had proven only
that she was in the residence, not that she had committed any of the crimes for which she
was charged. The trial court denied the motion. Neither Whittle nor McQueary testified
and the defense put forth no other evidence. At the close of the case for the defense,
Whittle renewed her motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, but the motion was denied.
The jury found Whittle guilty of theft of a controlled substance, theft by
unlawful taking, and being a PFO II.5 The jury fixed a penalty of three years in prison on
the conviction for theft of a controlled substance, enhanced to six years by virtue of her
conviction as a PFO II, and 12 months in prison on the conviction for theft by unlawful
taking, with both sentences to run concurrently.
Whittle filed a motion for a new trial on July 26, 2005, claiming the trial
court erred in denying her motions for a directed verdict of acquittal and that the trial
court erred in denying counsel’s motion to continue the trial. The trial court denied
Whittle’s request for a new trial and on September 13, 2005, Whittle was sentenced
according to the jury’s verdict. The trial court entered its final judgment on September
19, 2005. This appeal followed.
5
The indictment was amended on March 26, 2006, in accordance with the jury’s verdict and
sentence to show that Whittle was charged as being a PFO II.
-4-
Whittle’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred when it
denied both of her motions for a directed verdict of acquittal. Specifically, Whittle
claims the evidence presented at trial proved only that she was present in the home on
February 15, 2005, not that she had committed any crime.
In Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991), our
Supreme Court restated the rule as applied to a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal
as follows:
On motion for directed verdict the trial court must draw all
fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of
the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a
reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given.
For the purposes of ruling on the motion, the trial court must
assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but
reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight
to be given to such testimony.
In our review of the denial of a directed verdict, we are to determine “if under the
evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt . . . then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal” [citation omitted]. Id. at 187.
“Credibility and weight of the evidence are matters within the exclusive province of the
jury” [citations omitted]. Commonwealth v. Smith, 5 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Ky. 1999). See
also Commonwealth v. Suttles, 80 S.W.3d 424, 426 (Ky. 2002); and Young v.
Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 148, 165 (Ky. 2001).
The evidence in this case demonstrated that Whittle was present at the
scene of the crime, she was in the rooms from which the items were taken, and she had
-5-
ample opportunity to take the items in question. The evidence presented by the
Commonwealth showed the missing items were present in their proper places in the
residence prior to Whittle’s arrival in the home, and that the items were missing after she
left. The Coopers testified consistently with one another and their testimony was not
rebutted.
This case presents a close question because the evidence is primarily
circumstantial. However, circumstantial evidence alone and reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom may be sufficient to support a conviction. Blades v. Commonwealth,
957 S.W.2d 246 (Ky. 1997). Viewing the evidence and inferences in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth and leaving questions of credibility and weight to the
jury, we conclude that it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to find Whittle guilty.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Russell Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. Brandon Pigg
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Jeffrey A. Cross
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.