TIMONTE DESHAW HARRIS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 27, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002125-MR
TIMONTE DESHAW HARRIS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-01202
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; MOORE AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: Appellant Timonte Harris appeals the Fayette Circuit Court's order
denying his RCr 11.42 Motion to Vacate or Set Aside the Judgment entered against him.
After a careful review of the record, we affirm the Fayette Circuit Court's order.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant was convicted, following a jury trial, of wanton murder. He was
sentenced to a term of thirty years of imprisonment. On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme
Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence. See Harris v. Commonwealth, 134
S.W.3d 603 (Ky. 2004). In doing so, the Supreme Court summarized the facts of the case
as follows:
At approximately 8:30 p.m. on September 15, 2001, Jeffrey
(“Eenie”) Reed was shot to death while driving a white
Oldsmobile Achieva belonging to the mother of his cousin,
Tyson Fee. Fee was riding as a passenger in the vehicle when
the shooting occurred. Fee testified that another vehicle
pulled behind them as they drove down Merino Street in
Lexington and that someone in that vehicle began shooting at
them. Fee attempted to return fire with his .357 magnum
Smith & Wesson revolver, but was unsuccessful because
there was no cartridge in the chamber. Reed was shot in the
back but was able to stop and exit the vehicle before
collapsing in the street. Fee drove to 710 Pine Street, the
home of another cousin, and hid his revolver and car keys
under a mattress. He then directed his cousin to call the
police to report Reed's death. Because of darkness, Fee was
unable to identify the vehicle from which the shots were fired
or to recognize anyone in the vehicle. Two eyewitnesses
testified that the shots came from a black vehicle chasing a
white vehicle and that there appeared to be three people in the
black vehicle. Appellant had access to a black Honda
belonging to his mother.FN1
FN1. One of the eyewitness (sic), however, described the
black vehicle as a two-door car with gold rims whereas other
evidence indicated that the black Honda owned by
Appellant's mother was a four-door car without gold rims.
The Commonwealth's theory was that Appellant shot Reed as
part of a cycle of revenge and retaliation between Reed and
Fee on one side and Appellant and Dewan Mulazim on the
other. Mulazim once described Appellant to the police as his
“buddy” and “partner.” In support of its theory, the
Commonwealth first proved that on August 15, 2001, Reed
and Mulazim were involved in an argument during which
Reed knocked Mulazim to the ground and Mulazim retaliated
by shooting Reed in the leg. Reed's girlfriend testified that on
the night of September 14, 2001, Reed and Fee were at her
apartment when they spotted Mulazim and Appellant in the
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neighborhood. She heard someone say, “Go get a gun,”
following which Reed and Fee left her residence. Shortly
thereafter, she heard gunshots in the vicinity. Fee testified
that on September 15th, he and Reed were parked in the white
Oldsmobile when Appellant approached them on foot.
Appellant accused Reed of shooting at him the previous
evening. When Appellant reached in his pants as if to draw a
gun, Reed started the vehicle, and he and Fee sped away.
Reed's cousin, Jeremiah Sullivan, testified that he
encountered Appellant on the night of the shooting and that
Appellant was waving a .9mm Glock pistol, saying, “I just
got one of 'em” (sic) Appellant told Sullivan that “I rode on
'em ... Eenie and Tyson, chased 'em down,” explaining that
they had shot at him the previous night because he was with
Mulazim, who had previously shot Reed. Appellant
continued to exclaim, “Well, man, I got 'em, dog, I got 'em. I
know I done hit one of them. They tried to kill me.”
Appellant described how he had driven up behind their
vehicle while holding his gun in front of the windshield and
shooting.
When police interviewed Mulazim on September 17, 2001, he
denied being with Appellant on either the night of the 14th or
the night of the 15th but revealed that a man nicknamed “Mal
Viddy,” whom he identified as a brother of Brian Brown, was
driving the vehicle from which the shots that killed Reed
were fired. The jury could have reasonably concluded that
the three people the eyewitnesses observed in the black car
were Appellant, Mulazim, and Horace (“Mal Viddy”) Brown
(who testified that he was not with Appellant when Reed was
killed). At trial, Mulazim testified that he had “made up” the
story about “Mal Viddy,” but admitted that he had shot Reed
on August 15th and that someone had shot at him and
Appellant on the night of September 14th.
The police found three bullet holes in Fee's white Oldsmobile.
The fatal bullet passed through the license plate holder, the
trunk, the rear seat, the driver's seat, and Reed's body. The
bullet was not found, but the police discovered six .9mm shell
casings at the crime scene. Neither was the murder weapon
found, but a ballistics expert testified that all six casings were
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fired from the same Glock .9mm pistol. The medical
examiner who performed the autopsy testified that the
entrance wound of the bullet into Reed's body was consistent
with a wound caused by a medium-sized bullet, such as a
.9mm bullet.
Harris, 134 S.W.3d at 605-07.
After the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence,
Appellant filed his pro se RCr 11.42 Motion to Vacate or Set Aside the Judgment in the
circuit court, alleging that he had been denied the effective assistance of trial counsel on
the following grounds: (1) counsel failed to object to the admission of Appellant's
statement to the police; (2) counsel failed to explain to the jury the instructions for lesser
included offenses; (3) counsel failed to object to the Commonwealth's closing argument;
(4) counsel failed to object to the testimony presented by the victim's mother; and (5)
counsel failed to investigate and adequately present readily available evidence.
Furthermore, Appellant claimed that his RCr 11.42 motion should be granted based on
the cumulative effect of the aforementioned errors by counsel.
Appellant moved for the appointment of counsel and for an evidentiary
hearing. The circuit court appointed counsel for Appellant. Appointed counsel filed a
supplement to Appellant's RCr 11.42 motion, adding the following claim: (1) trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance when counsel failed to effectively address the
issue of ballistics evidence presented that enhanced the credibility of a key prosecution
witness. Appointed counsel also reiterated Appellant's claim that trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and adequately present evidence, as well as
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Appellant's claim that his RCr 11.42 motion should be granted due to the cumulative
effect of all of the aforementioned errors.
The Fayette Circuit Court denied Appellant's RCr 11.42 motion. As part of
the court's order, the court noted that because Appellant had failed to prove that he
received the ineffective assistance of counsel during trial, an evidentiary hearing was not
required.
Appellant now appeals, raising the following claims: (1) trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance when counsel failed to investigate and adequately present
readily available evidence; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when counsel
failed to effectively address the issue of ballistics evidence presented that enhanced the
credibility of a key prosecution witness; (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
when counsel failed to object to the admission of Appellant's statement to the police; (4)
the trial court applied an improper standard when it denied Appellant's motion for an
evidentiary hearing; and (5) the cumulative effect of the errors denied Appellant his
rights to a fair trial, due process, and a reliable verdict. Finally, in a footnote in his
appellate brief, Appellant asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when
counsel advised Appellant not to testify at trial.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion brought under RCr 11.42, such as that brought by Appellant in
this case, "is limited to issues that were not and could not be raised on direct appeal."
Simmons v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Ky. 2006). "An issue raised and
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rejected on direct appeal may not be relitigated in this type of proceeding by simply
claiming that it amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. "The movant has the
burden of establishing convincingly that he or she was deprived of some substantial right
which would justify the extraordinary relief provided by [a] post-conviction proceeding. .
. . A reviewing court must always defer to the determination of facts and witness
credibility made by the circuit judge." Id. (citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS1
A. CLAIM THAT TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
BY FAILING TO INVESTIGATE AND ADEQUATELY PRESENT EVIDENCE
Appellant first claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
when counsel failed to investigate and adequately present available evidence to refute the
Commonwealth's theory that Appellant was seeking revenge against the victim by
shooting him. Specifically, Appellant contends that counsel should have presented
evidence showing that there were no problems between Appellant and the victim until the
day before the victim was killed, when the victim shot at Mr. Mulazim while Appellant
was present. Mr. Mulazim previously shot the victim in the leg on August 15, 2001.
Additionally, Appellant asserts that counsel should have presented evidence to refute the
Commonwealth's assertion that he and Mr. Mulazim were "partners" and "buddies,"
rather than mere acquaintances.
Regarding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Kentucky
Supreme Court has noted that:
1
Appellant's present claims were not brought in his direct appeal.
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The standards which measure ineffective assistance of
counsel are set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); accord Gall v.
Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985). In order to be
classified as ineffective, the performance of counsel must be
below the objective standard of reasonableness and so
prejudicial as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial and a
reasonable result. Strickland, supra. “Counsel is
constitutionally ineffective only if performance below
professional standards caused the defendant to lose what he
otherwise would probably have won.” United States v.
Morrow, 977 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1992). The critical issue is
not whether counsel made errors, but whether counsel was so
thoroughly ineffective that defeat was snatched from the
hands of probable victory. Morrow, supra. The purpose of
RCr 11.42 is to provide a forum for known grievances, not to
provide an opportunity to research for such grievances.
Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1983).
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance, the court must
focus on the totality of evidence before the judge or jury and
assess the overall performance of counsel throughout the case
in order to determine whether the identified acts or omissions
overcome the presumption that counsel rendered reasonable
professional assistance. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477
U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Morrow;
[Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436 (Ky.2001)], supra.
A defendant is not guaranteed errorless counsel or counsel
judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel likely to render
and rendering reasonably effective assistance. Haight; See
also McQueen v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1997).
Simmons, 191 S.W.3d at 561.
Appellant alleges that trial counsel failed to present evidence to challenge
the Commonwealth's assertion that he and Mr. Mulazim were "partners" and "buddies,"
rather than mere acquaintances. However, Appellant's appointed counsel, in the
supplemental brief filed in the circuit court regarding Appellant's RCr 11.42 motion,
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acknowledged that trial counsel had "objected to the use of the term 'partner' to describe
the relationship" between Mr. Mulazim and Appellant, but the objection was overruled.
Additionally, during his closing argument, trial counsel noted the evidence that had been
introduced at trial which refuted the Commonwealth's argument that Appellant and Mr.
Mulazim were "partners." Specifically, trial counsel mentioned that one witness testified
that she had grown up with Appellant and known him all of his life, but she did not know
Mr. Mulazim. Trial counsel stated that another witness had testified that she knew both
Appellant and Mr. Mulazim, but she had never seen them together. Furthermore, trial
counsel noted that no witness had testified that Appellant and Mr. Mulazim were "close
buddies," as the Commonwealth had alleged. Therefore, because trial counsel objected to
the Commonwealth's use of the term "partners," and because trial counsel noted the
evidence which refuted that they were partners, Appellant is unable to show that counsel's
performance was deficient, or that counsel's failure to introduce evidence showing that
Appellant and Mr. Mulazim were not partners prejudiced his defense. See Simmons, 191
S.W.3d at 561.
Appellant also claims that counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he
failed to introduce evidence showing that there were no problems between Appellant and
the victim until the day before the victim was killed, when the victim shot at Mr.
Mulazim while Appellant was present. However, this claim fails because even if counsel
had presented such evidence, Appellant acknowledges that there were problems between
the victim and himself that began the day before the victim was killed, and the jury could
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have assumed that the murder stemmed from such problems. Thus, because Appellant is
unable to show that counsel's failure to present such evidence prejudiced his defense, this
ineffective assistance of counsel claim lacks merit. See id.
B. CLAIM THAT TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
BY FAILING TO EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS BALLISTICS EVIDENCE
Appellant next alleges that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
when he failed to effectively address the issue of ballistics evidence presented that
enhanced the credibility of a key prosecution witness, Jeremiah Sullivan. Specifically,
Appellant contends that the Commonwealth's ballistics expert, Warren Mitchell,
"superficially supported the suspect testimony of" Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Sullivan testified
that he observed Appellant waving a 9-millimeter Glock pistol and announcing, in the
presence of approximately a half dozen individuals, that he shot the victim. Appellant
alleges that when the ballistics expert testified that the gun used to kill the victim was a
Glock, he lent credibility to Mr. Sullivan. He contends that the ballistics report prepared
by Mr. Mitchell did not mention that a 9-millimeter Glock pistol was used to kill the
victim. Furthermore, Appellant asserts that his counsel failed to tell him about the
aforementioned evidence, because if he had known, he would have "informed counsel
that, on the street, the term 'Glock' is synonymous with 'gun.'" Appellant argues that trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to introduce evidence demonstrating
that "Glock" is synonymous with "gun" and that 9-millimeter firearms are commonly
found in Lexington, where the victim was killed. He asserts that trial counsel was also
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ineffective in failing to adequately challenge the testimony of the ballistics expert on the
aforementioned evidence.
Although Appellant contends that when Mr. Sullivan testified that he had
seen Appellant waiving a Glock, he merely meant that Appellant was waiving some sort
of gun, Mr. Sullivan's testimony at trial refutes that assertion. During trial, the prosecutor
specifically asked Mr. Sullivan what type of gun Appellant was waiving, and Mr.
Sullivan responded that the gun was a 9-millimeter Glock. The prosecutor then asked
Mr. Sullivan if he knew what a 9-millimeter Glock looked like, and he responded
affirmatively. The prosecutor asked Mr. Sullivan if he was certain that the gun was a 9millimeter Glock, and Mr. Sullivan responded that Appellant was carrying such a gun.
Therefore, even if trial counsel had presented evidence indicating that some
people use the term "Glock" interchangeably with "gun," Appellant is unable to prove
that counsel's failure to present this evidence prejudiced his defense because Mr. Sullivan
affirmatively testified that he knew what a Glock looked like and he was certain that the
gun waved by Appellant was a Glock. Consequently, Appellant has failed to establish
that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present this evidence. See
Simmons, 191 S.W.3d at 561.
Further, even if counsel had presented evidence showing that 9-millimeter
Glock guns are commonly found in Lexington, as Appellant alleges counsel should have,
such evidence would not have refuted the allegation that Appellant shot the victim with a
Glock. Therefore, Appellant is unable to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
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assistance by failing to present this evidence because Appellant cannot show that such
failure prejudiced his defense. See id.
Appellant also contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to
adequately challenge the testimony of the ballistics expert. At trial, Mr. Mitchell testified
that every one of the six shell casings found at the scene of the crime was fired from the
same 9-millimeter Glock pistol. Although Appellant argues that the ballistics report did
not reveal that a 9-millimeter Glock was used to kill the victim, any failure on trial
counsel's part to challenge the ballistics evidence presented at trial did not prejudice
Appellant's defense to the extent that counsel would be considered ineffective. This is
because Mr. Sullivan testified that he saw Appellant waiving a 9-millimeter Glock and
stating that he had shot someone by holding his pistol out in front of a car's windshield
and shooting at the person. Based on this testimony by Mr. Sullivan, Appellant cannot
show that his counsel's allegedly deficient performance in failing to challenge the
ballistics evidence prejudiced his defense. Thus, this ineffective assistance claim lacks
merit. See Simmons, 191 S.W.3d at 561.
Moreover, Appellant acknowledges that trial counsel was able to elicit
testimony alleging that people in another vehicle had been trying to shoot at a vehicle in
which the victim rode the same day that he was killed. Therefore, this evidence tends to
refute Mr. Sullivan's testimony implying that Appellant was the murderer, and it shows
that trial counsel's performance was not deficient and that he did not render ineffective
assistance. See Simmons, 191 S.W.3d at 561.
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C. CLAIM THAT TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
BY ADVISING APPELLANT NOT TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL
In a footnote in his appellate brief, Appellant asserts that trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance when counsel advised Appellant not to testify at trial.
Appellant alleges that he would have testified if counsel had not advised against it, and if
he had testified, he would have attested that the term "Glock" is used interchangeably "on
the street" with the word "gun." However, Appellant makes no attempt at developing his
argument in support of this constitutional claim. Thus, his allegation is conclusory. It
fails because he did not show how counsel's performance in giving this advice was
deficient or prejudicial, particularly considering that Mr. Sullivan testified that he knew
what a 9-millimeter Glock looked like, and he was certain that the gun he observed
Appellant waiving was a 9-millimeter Glock. Consequently, this ineffective assistance of
counsel claim lacks merit. See id.
D. CLAIM THAT TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE ADMISSION OF APPELLANT'S
STATEMENT TO THE POLICE
Appellant next claims that he received the ineffective assistance of trial
counsel when trial counsel failed to object to the admission of his statement to the police.
However, Appellant's argument is misplaced. In fact, during a hearing several days
before trial, the parties and the court discussed trial counsel's various objections to the
admission of certain parts of Appellant's statement, as well as whether or not those parts
of the statement would be redacted when the statement was shown to the jury during trial.
Thus, trial counsel clearly objected to certain parts of the statement, and it may have been
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his trial strategy to not object to the admission of the entire statement. In fact, one part of
the statement that counsel did not object to was when Appellant informed the police that
he was with his girlfriend, and that he was drunk and asleep in a van at the time that the
victim was killed. During trial, counsel elicited testimony from Appellant's girlfriend,
Nakia Bailey, in which she testified in accordance with Appellant's statement, i.e., she
attested that Appellant was drunk and asleep in her van when the victim was killed.
Therefore, trial counsel's objections to parts of the statement, but not to others, was
presumably part of his trial strategy, and Appellant is unable to show that trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to object to the entire statement. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. At 689. ("[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that
is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)).
E. CLAIM THAT TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Appellant next contends that the trial court applied an improper standard
when it denied his motion for an evidentiary hearing. He contends that the trial court
cited Maye v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 731 (Ky. 1965), when it denied his
evidentiary hearing, and reasoned that a hearing was unnecessary because Appellant
failed to show that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel under Maye.
Appellant alleges on appeal that the trial court should have relied on the case of Fraser v.
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Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2001), as a basis for determining whether he had
established his ineffective assistance claims, thus warranting an evidentiary hearing.
However, Appellant's argument is misplaced, as the trial court cited only
Fraser as support for its holding that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary.
Furthermore, the trial court analyzed Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims
under Strickland, rather than Maye, and Strickland is still binding precedent. Contrary to
Appellant's contention, the trial court did not cite Maye in determining whether
Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims had merit to warrant an evidentiary
hearing. Rather, the trial court cited Maye in support of the court's determination that
Appellant's "allegations [were] insufficient on their face to meet the burden required by
an RCr 11.42 motion." Thus, Appellant's assertions are misplaced.
Furthermore, the trial court properly denied Appellant's motion for an
evidentiary hearing concerning his RCr 11.42 motion to vacate. Pursuant to RCr
11.42(5), if there is "a material issue of fact that cannot be determined on the face of the
record the court shall grant a prompt hearing. . . ." In the present case, because the trial
court had determined that Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims lacked
merit based on the record as a whole, the court denied his motion for an evidentiary
hearing.
On appeal, after "the trial court denies a motion for an evidentiary hearing
on the merits of allegations raised in a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42, our review is
limited to whether the motion on its face states grounds that are not conclusively refuted
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by the record and which, if true, would invalidate the conviction.” Sparks v.
Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. App. 1986) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
In the present case, Appellant's claims were conclusively refuted by the
record, as discussed supra. Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied Appellant's
motion for an evidentiary hearing. See id.
F. CLAIM CONCERNING THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ALLEGED
ERRORS
Finally, Appellant contends that the cumulative effect of the errors resulted
in a denial of his rights to a fair trial, due process, and a reliable verdict. He cites Funk
v. Commonwealth, 842 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1992), a case involving a direct appeal of a
criminal conviction, as support for his claim. In Funk, the Supreme Court held that even
when errors are not sufficient to warrant reversal individually, "the cumulative effect of
the prejudice" may warrant reversal. Funk, 842 S.W.2d at 483.
The Commonwealth challenges Appellant's claim and cites Sanborn v.
Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1998), in its appellate brief. In Sanborn, the
movant filed a motion to vacate pursuant to RCr 11.42 alleging, inter alia, claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Sanborn's RCr 11.42 motion was denied and on appeal,
the Supreme Court held that "[t]he contention that cumulative error by counsel
establishes a federal or state violation of the constitution is without merit. In view of the
fact that the individual allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are unconvincing,
they can have no cumulative effect." Sanborn, 975 S.W.2d at 913.
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Because Sanborn involved an appeal from the denial of a motion brought
under RCr 11.42 that raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, as well as a claim
involving the cumulative effect of those alleged errors by counsel, Sanborn is more on
point with the facts of the present case than Funk, which involved a direct criminal
appeal. Thus, Sanborn is controlling in this appeal, and Appellant's cumulative effect of
the errors claim fails because his individual assertions of the ineffective assistance of
counsel lack merit. See id.
Accordingly, the order of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Joseph Ray Myers
Amber Marie Ramanauskas
Frankfort, Kentucky
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Frankfort, Kentucky
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