GERARD EDWARD SEALEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 26, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002018-MR
GERARD EDWARD SEALEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES D. ISHMAEL, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00308
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; WINE, JUDGE; PAISLEY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
WINE, JUDGE:
Gerard Edward Sealey appeals the Fayette Circuit
Court’s refusal to accept his open guilty plea to theft by
unlawful taking over $300.00 on March 4, 2005.
For the
following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s findings.
Sealey’s case was one of the first proposed for the
Rapid Disposition Program (RDP) operated by the Fayette
Commonwealth Attorney’s Office.
When Sealey was accepted for
the program, the prosecution offered four years on a plea of
1
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
guilty to theft by unlawful taking over $300.00, in exchange for
Sealey proceeding by information and pleading guilty at his
arraignment.
Sealey had ten previous shoplifting misdemeanors
and at least one prior felony conviction.
The Commonwealth
noted that Sealey was eligible for persistent felony offender
(PFO) status, at least in the second degree.
Pursuant to the agreement, Sealey signed a waiver of
indictment and was scheduled for arraignment on February 18,
2005.
When he appeared for his arraignment, Sealey refused to
accept the original bargain, seeking more favorable terms.
The
prosecutor advised if he did not accept the plea deal by the end
of the day, the offer would be withdrawn and the Commonwealth
would indict Sealey as a PFO.
Sealey signed a waiver of indictment; however, because
Sealey’s attorney had been preoccupied in a death penalty case,
he failed to deliver the discovery papers to Sealey prior to the
arraignment.
discovery.
Sealey then asked for a week to review the
Again, the Commonwealth stated that the offer had to
be accepted that day or it would be off the table, reiterating
the purpose of rapid dispositions.
The trial court passed the
matter to the end of the docket to allow Sealey additional time
to review the two or three pages of reports and pictures
provided in discovery.
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Upon the return of Sealey and his attorney to the
courtroom, counsel informed the court that there was a breakdown
in the attorney-client relationship.
Defense counsel advised
the trial court Sealey became angry and cursed at him when
presented with the discovery.
could not take it anymore.
nothing but insult him.
Defense counsel indicated that he
Sealey claimed defense counsel did
The trial court allowed defense counsel
to withdraw and the matter was continued for two weeks for
assignment of another counsel.
Subsequently, on March 4, 2005, Sealey’s new counsel
informed the trial court at a status hearing that Sealey was
prepared to enter an open plea as no new indictment had been
returned.
Sealey sought to plead guilty to theft by unlawful
taking over $300.00, without a recommendation from the
Commonwealth, allowing the trial court to impose a penalty
between one and five years.
Sealey asked the trial court to
waive any formal pre-sentence investigation report and sentence
him that day.
Sealey argued to the trial court that the
Commonwealth had two weeks to indict him for being a PFO but had
failed to do so.
The Commonwealth objected, advising they had scheduled
for the following Tuesday a grand jury hearing to charge Sealey
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with either second-degree PFO or possibly first-degree PFO.2
The
prosecutor argued that allowing Sealey to plead would further
his attempt to take advantage of the system.
The Commonwealth
further asserted that Sealey’s stalling tactics and disruptive
behavior at his arraignment would encourage others who were
offered a rapid disposition in the future to similarly
manipulate the system.
The trial court noted that Sealey had an opportunity
to review the discovery against him.
Sealey also had an
opportunity on February 18, 2005, to plead guilty and accept the
prosecutor’s offer of four years without the enhanced PFO in the
second-degree charge but Sealey refused to do so.
The trial
court decided not to accept Sealey’s guilty plea.
Consequently, Sealey was arraigned for a second time
on March 11, 2005, on the superseding indictment of theft by
unlawful taking over $300.00 and for being a second-degree PFO.
On April 22, 2005, Sealey entered a conditional guilty plea to
the Commonwealth’s recommendation of four years on theft by
unlawful taking over $300.00 enhanced to six years as a PFO in
the second degree.
On September 8, 2005, the trial court
sentenced Sealey to a total of six years and granted probation.
2
The Commonwealth originally planned to indict Sealey for being a firstdegree PFO when it was thought that he had been convicted of a felony in New
York. The Commonwealth later discovered that the Sealey in the case sub
judice was not the Gerard Sealey convicted of a felony in New York. Thus,
Sealey was indicted as a second-degree PFO.
-4-
Sealey argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when it refused to accept his open guilty plea on
March 4.
Specifically, Sealey asserts that the trial court
favored the Commonwealth by allowing the prosecution several
additional weeks to obtain the PFO indictment, but refused to
grant Sealey only one week to review the discovery during
arraignment.
Sealey argues these unfair actions by the trial
court amount to abuse of discretion.
We disagree.
Sealey was given the opportunity to
avoid the PFO charge and review the discovery but instead chose
to use the time arguing with and verbally abusing his attorney.
Thus, Sealey knowingly wasted his time, fully aware that the
Commonwealth’s offer would expire and he would lose the
opportunity to avoid the PFO charge.
By the time of the hearing on March 4, Sealey had
backed out of the RDP offer and slowed the process considerably.
In addition, the Commonwealth was in the process of ensuring
that the appropriate charges were filed against Sealey and
presented to the grand jury as there was some confusion with a
Gerard Sealey with a felony conviction in New York.
Consequently, the trial court concluded that Sealey had waived
his participation in the RDP.
It is well within the trial court’s discretion to
refuse to accept a guilty plea.
Cobb v. Commonwealth, 821
-5-
S.W.2d 817, 818 (Ky.App. 1992).
While a defendant has an
absolute right under RCr 8.08 to unconditionally plead guilty to
charges against him in an indictment, RCr 8.08 also states that,
“the court may refuse to accept a guilty plea.”
See also
Commonwealth v. Corey, 826 S.W.2d 319 (Ky. 1992).
Sealey contends that the trial court had no legitimate
reason to reject his guilty plea, but the record clearly shows
that Sealey failed to take advantage of an opportunity to avoid
any enhancement under the PFO statute.
Under these
circumstances, the trial court was well within its discretion to
allow the Commonwealth a reasonable amount of time to present
the PFO charge for a subsequent grand jury hearing.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction by the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Herbert T. West
Fayette County Legal Aid
Lexington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Susan Roncarti Lenz
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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