GREGORY KERRY BLAIR v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 15, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002017-MR
GREGORY KERRY BLAIR
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00315
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; PAISLEY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Gregory Kerry Blair (Greg) entered a conditional guilty plea
pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09 in the Fayette Circuit
1
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Court to the amended charges2 of possession of a controlled substance in the first degree3
and persistent felony offender in the first degree (PFO I)4 and received a sentence of ten
years’ imprisonment. Within the guilty plea, Greg reserved the right to appeal the circuit
court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. It is from this denial that he appeals to
this Court. For the following reasons, we affirm.
On January 14, 2005, officers from the Lexington Metro Police Department
were patrolling an area5 of Lexington due to citizen complaints of loitering and drug
activity. The area is known to the police department as a high crime area, as well as an
area known for drug activity.6 Officers in the area were in both marked and unmarked
patrol cars. At approximately 10:00 p.m., Officer Matthew Greathouse observed two
persons acting suspiciously in the Hedgewood Court area, and noted that one of the two
turned and walked away when he noticed the officer's patrol car. A few moments later,
2
Greg was originally charged with trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree,
resisting arrest, operating on a suspended operator's license, no/expired registration plates, and
persistent felony offender in the first degree. Pursuant to the plea negotiations, the trafficking
charge was amended to possession of controlled substance in the first degree, the PFO I
remained unchanged, and the other three charges were dismissed.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1415.
4
KRS 532.080(3).
5
The officers were patrolling the Woodhill, Osage, and Hedgewood Court areas of Lexington,
Kentucky.
6
Greg alleges in his brief that the Commonwealth failed to prove that the area being patrolled
was a high crime area. We note that there was no trial in this matter, only the suppression
hearing which is at issue in this appeal. Officers testified therein that the area was known for
criminal activity and Greg did not dispute this. In fact, in his testimony, Greg states that there
had been some recent home invasions and robberies in the area. Taken together, the court could
reasonably find, for purposes of a suppression motion, that the officers' statements were true.
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Officer Greathouse saw the same two individuals on Osage Court and radioed for an
unmarked vehicle to come to the scene to assist him in his observation of the subjects.
Officer Dean Hammond and Officer K. Huddleston arrived in the area in their unmarked
cruiser and observed the two subjects exiting a residence. One of the subjects, later
identified as Greg, got into a white vehicle and drove away from the area. Officer
Hammond and Officer Huddleston determined that they should follow the subject vehicle
for further observation while Officer Greathouse remained on Osage Court to continue
his observation.
The trailing officers noticed that the white vehicle had an expired
registration plate and that the driver failed to give a turn signal when making a left turn.
After approximately three-quarters of a mile, the white vehicle made a turn onto a deadend street. The officers decided to attempt a traffic stop based upon the aforementioned
violations and placed a “light bar” on the dashboard of their cruiser. Before the officers
could activate their emergency equipment, the white vehicle pulled to the side of the road
and the driver got out, leaving the driver's side door ajar, and began to move away from
the officers.7 The officers exited their vehicle to pursue the driver. According to their
testimony, the officers had their badges hanging on chains around their necks and were
wearing Lexington Police ball caps. A foot chase ensued,8 wherein the officers
7
There was a dispute at the hearing as to whether Greg immediately began to run from the
officers upon exiting the vehicle or was simply walking away from them. For purposes of this
appeal this distinction is irrelevant.
8
We note that Greg testified that he had been a high school track and field star, competing in the
400 and 800 meter runs, and had even qualified for the United States Olympic team.
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repeatedly identified themselves and ordered Greg to stop. During the pursuit, Officer
Huddleston observed Greg drop an unknown item9 near a vehicle parked on the street.
At one point, Officer Huddleston had a grip on Greg's sweatshirt, but Greg
was able to wrestle free and continue to run. He changed his course and began to run
directly toward a dimly-lit yet highly-traveled roadway. This change of course caused
Greg to run directly past Officer Hammond who identified himself as a police officer and
again ordered him to stop. Greg continued to run down the middle of the road, with both
officers in pursuit. Officer Hammond drew his Taser X2610 (taser) and deployed it into
Greg's back. Greg fell to the ground, sustaining minor injuries in the fall. Officer
Hammond testified that Greg continued to struggle and was non-compliant, so a second
blast from the taser was administered,11 at which time the officers were able to take Greg
into custody.
9
The item was later recovered and found to be a set of gray digital scales.
10
Officer Hammond's taser is a Conducted Energy Weapon that uses nitrogen propelled probes
connected to the weapon by wires which carry a high-voltage electric charge to the target. The
charge overpowers the normal electrical signals within the body's nerves, causing loss of
muscular control and coordinated action. Two probes are deployed from the weapon and can
travel up to 21 feet. These probes are barbed and can penetrate up to two inches of clothing prior
to delivering the electric current.
11
For purposes of clarity, we note that the second shock was through the same wires as the
initial shock, and not a second set of wires fired from the weapon.
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Greg was placed under arrest for the expired registration plate,12 resisting
arrest,13 and operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license.14 The officers thereupon
conducted a search of Greg incident to that arrest, finding 7.2 grams of crack cocaine, a
cellular telephone, 12 empty plastic baggies, and $147.00 in U.S. currency, in addition to
the digital scales which Greg dropped during the pursuit. Based upon these findings,
Greg was indicted by a Fayette County grand jury for trafficking in a controlled
substance in the first degree,15 resisting arrest, operating a motor vehicle on suspended
operator's license, no/expired registration plates, and PFO I.
On June 2, 2005, Greg filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from
him on the grounds that the police had only reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry16
stop, and that the search and seizure were unreasonable. A hearing was held on the
motion on June 22, 2005, wherein Officer Greathouse and Officer Hammond testified, as
did Greg. All three testified as to their actions on the night of the arrest. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court ordered the parties to submit briefs supporting
their positions prior to its issuing a ruling. On July 29, 2005, the circuit court verbally
overruled the suppression motion during a status hearing, stating its reasoning on the
12
KRS 186.170.
13
KRS 520.090.
14
KRS 186.620.
15
KRS 218A.1412.
16
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
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record. No written findings were entered and Greg did not object thereto. The trial
court's written order was entered on August 2, 2005.
On August 26, 2005, Greg entered a conditional guilty plea to the amended
charges of possession of controlled substance in the first degree, and PFO I, reserving the
right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. On September 28, 2005, Greg was
sentenced, pursuant to the Commonwealth's recommendation, to five years on the
possession charge, enhanced to ten years by the PFO I charge. The following day, Greg
entered his notice of appeal on the sole issue of the denial of his suppression motion.
The standard for our review is set forth in Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). Under that decision, the
determination of a circuit court regarding a suppression motion based on an alleged
illegal search is subject to a two-pronged analysis. First, historical facts should be
reviewed for clear error, and the facts are deemed to be conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence. Second, determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause
are mixed questions of law and fact and are therefore subject to de novo review. See also
Baltimore v. Commonwealth, 119 S.W.3d 532, 539 (Ky.App. 2003). Furthermore, we
are bound to give “due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges
and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699.
In the case at bar, Greg contends the circuit court erred in denying his
suppression motion because his interaction with the police officers was in violation of the
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Fourth Amendment17 search and seizure provisions and the guidance set forth in Terry,
arguing the officers utilized excessive force in effectuating his arrest for the crimes he
allegedly committed. Pursuant to Ornelas, we shall first address the historical facts for
clear error and then consider the circuit court's determination of reasonable suspicion and
probable cause. Furthermore, as Greg has alleged the use of excessive force in
effectuating his search and seizure, we must also look at the officers' actions in view of
the Fourth Amendment's “reasonableness” standard elucidated in Graham v. Conner, 490
U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989).18
The historical facts are relatively simple and were presented at the
suppression hearing through the testimony of the defendant and officers involved in the
underlying arrest. The date, time, and location of the incident are undisputed and are
therefore conclusive. The testimony reveals the officers were following Greg's vehicle in
an unmarked cruiser and they did not activate their emergency equipment at any time
during the encounter. Officer Greathouse's observations precipitating Officer
Hammond's and Officer Huddleston's arrival on-scene were never challenged during the
17
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”
18
In Graham, the United States Supreme Court held excessive force claims should be “analyzed
under the Fourth Amendment's 'objective reasonableness' standard, rather than under a
substantive due process standard.” 490 U.S at 388-9. Further, “the 'reasonableness' inquiry in an
excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are
'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard
to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397. We therefore will analyze Greg's claims
pursuant to this Constitutional guidance.
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hearing and are thus not in issue. Likewise, there is no dispute a foot chase occurred
prior to Greg's arrest.
Greg does dispute whether he was made aware that the two men following
him were, in fact, police officers. Conflicting testimony was given as to whether the
officers' identification was plainly visible. Further conflicting testimony was elicited
regarding whether the officers informed Greg of their identity as police officers when
ordering him to stop running. Greg also alleged he did not fail to signal a left-hand turn
and denied the officers were ever in a position to identify his license plates as being
expired, contrary to the testimony given by Officer Hammond. Finally, contrary to the
testimony of Officer Hammond that Greg had broken free from the grip of Officer
Huddleston, Greg testified that neither of the officers had laid hold of him until after he
was lying on the ground.19
In reviewing the record, we find that the circuit court took all of the
evidence into account, including the supplemental briefs presented by the parties, prior to
making a decision. The rule in Kentucky is that if substantial evidence appears in the
record to support the circuit court's findings, even if there is conflicting evidence, the
decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky.
19
In his brief, Greg calls into question certain other facts testified to only by the police officers,
now claiming that the Commonwealth failed to prove its allegations. However, on review, we
must look only at the evidence presented to the circuit court in order to determine whether there
was clear error with regard to determination of the facts. Without conflicting evidence, the trial
court is free to draw inferences consistent with the evidence actually presented. However,
insofar as the facts complained of go to the circuit court's determination of reasonable suspicion
and/or probable cause, we shall address them de novo in keeping with the ruling in Ornelas.
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2003); Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. Moreover, “judging the
credibility of witnesses and weighing evidence are tasks within the exclusive province of
the trial court.” Id. (citing Bowling v. Natural Resources & Environmental Protection
Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406 (Ky.App. 1994)). We find the historical facts relied upon by
the circuit court were supported by substantial evidence and are therefore not clearly
erroneous. Thus, the facts for purposes of this appeal, are conclusive.
Our next inquiry addresses the Circuit Court's determination of the
existence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. When making such a determination,
the “totality of the circumstances--the whole picture--must be taken into account. Based
upon that whole picture, the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). In United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), it was held that such a
“process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make
inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that
might well elude an untrained person” [internal quotation marks omitted] [citations
omitted].
A brief recitation of some of the facts of this case, which we have held
above to be conclusive, are necessary to a proper determination of reasonable suspicion
or probable cause. Officer Greathouse testified about the arousal of his suspicions by two
male subjects in the Osage Court area. He then testified that he called for back-up
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officers to come to the scene. Officer Hammond and Officer Huddleston arrived shortly
thereafter and also observed suspicious activity. The Osage Court area was classified by
the officers as a “high-crime” area and no contradictory testimony was elicited. Officer
Hammond testified that he observed Greg enter and operate a white vehicle which failed
to signal a left-hand turn. He further testified that he was able to observe that the
registration plate on Greg's vehicle had expired. Additionally, Officer Hammond
testified that he and his partner had determined to effectuate a traffic stop based on these
observed violations, but that Greg stopped his vehicle, exited, and began moving away
from the officers before emergency equipment could be activated.20 The location of these
events was a dimly lit dead-end street with no overhead street lamps. The officers,
identified by their badges and ball caps, ordered Greg to stop. Instead, and for no
apparent reason, Greg began to flee from the officers, thus not allowing an opportunity
for the officers to make their full intentions known. No testimony indicated the officers
knew Greg or whether he might be armed, and this only added risk to an already
dangerous interaction.21 After numerous orders to stop were ignored, and Greg broke free
from the grip of Officer Huddleston, a taser was deployed to effectuate an arrest.
When taken individually, and in isolation from the totality of the evidence,
many of these factors could be characterized as being indicative of innocent conduct. In
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277, the United States Supreme Court reiterated the fact that
20
Logically, then, no traffic stop was ever actually effectuated.
21
In Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997), the United
States Supreme Court acknowledged the inherent danger involved in routine traffic stops, even
absent extraordinary circumstances. We wholeheartedly agree with that position.
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determinations of whether “reasonable suspicion exists, however, need not rule out the
possibility of innocent conduct” [citation omitted]. See also United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). We are simply required to look at the
circumstances as a whole in making our determination. In doing so, we find that the
totality of the evidence in the case sub judice clearly indicates the officers did, in fact,
have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting Greg was engaged in criminal
activity, in accord with Cortez. Thus, on these facts, the officers were justified in
attempting to stop and detain Greg for purposes of further investigation.
In addition, we note that after the officers had reasonable suspicion criminal
activity was afoot, the situation quickly ripened into probable cause to arrest when Greg
forcibly resisted the officers. Although Greg argues that he was merely offering “passive
resistance” or being “nonsubmissive” and not resisting, the facts do not bear out his
argument. We find no way of how wrestling oneself from the firm grasp of a police
officer can be termed as “passive resistance” or “simple nonsubmission.” Furthermore,
Greg's continued flight down a darkened street toward a heavily traveled roadway created
an escalating risk of physical injury to himself, the pursuing officers, and any motorist or
bystander who happened along his path. Given these facts, the officers could reasonably
believe that, if issued a citation, Greg would not appear at the time designated for further
court proceedings, thus permitting them to make a physical arrest pursuant to KRS
431.015(2); and because misdemeanor offenses had been committed in their presence,
KRS 431.005(1)(d) authorized the officers to make an arrest without a warrant.
- 11 -
Therefore, the officers had reasonable suspicion and probable cause to effectuate an
arrest, and in fact did so, once Greg was apprehended.
It is axiomatic that a search following an arrest is permissible as incident to
that lawful arrest. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d
427 (1973); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967);
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 ,79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Pruitt v.
Commonwealth, 286 S.W.2d 551 (Ky. 1956); and Johnson v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.2d
913 (Ky. 1931). In Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224, the United States Supreme Court stated
that “[i]t is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. . . . The validity of the search of a
person incident to a lawful arrest has been regarded as settled since its first
enunciation[.]” Thus the search of Greg's person, being incident to a valid arrest, passes
constitutional muster, and the Circuit Court committed no error when it properly refused
to suppress the evidence obtained thereby.
Our final analysis then turns to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
standard and its application to the use of force by Officer Hammond in effectuating the
search and seizure. Greg contends the use of a taser to accomplish his arrest and the
subsequent search and seizure was violative of his Fourth Amendment rights, arguing at
length that this action constitutes unreasonable use of force.22 In Graham, 490 U.S. at
22
A review of his arguments reveals an implied call for the total elimination of the use of tasers
in the Commonwealth as such devices have been declared to be “deadly weapons” in some other
jurisdictions. However, Greg cites us to no controlling, nor even persuasive, authority to support
this proposition. No published cases from Kentucky state courts mention the word “taser”, and
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396, the United States Supreme Court noted that “the right to make an arrest or
investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical
coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” A three-part test was mandated by Graham when
analyzing reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, including (1) the severity of the
crime or crimes in issue, (2) whether there is an immediate threat to the safety of the
arresting officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect is attempting to flee in order to
escape arrest or is actively resisting such arrest.
Greg first argues that the crimes at issue in his case are merely minor traffic
violations, and thus any use of force was unnecessary. However, he fails to recognize
that the officers herein were legitimately attempting to make a physical arrest and that he
repeatedly refused to comply with their orders for him to stop. Furthermore, Greg's
argument fails to take into account the fact that he forcibly escaped from the grasp of
Officer Huddleston. These facts certainly give rise to the reasonable belief by a police
officer at the scene that some amount of force was necessary.
Next, Greg makes the unsupported argument that he posed no threat to the
officers or others, as he was not armed and did nothing to put the officers at risk. Again
we will not impute knowledge to the officers of facts for which there is no support. An
officer involved in the day-to-day service of protecting the public must always be
mindful of the possibility that a suspect is armed or dangerous, along with the many other
inherent dangers involved in law enforcement. There is nothing in the record to indicate
the few Sixth Circuit federal cases in which the term is referenced are civil suits filed by
prisoners concerning allegations of civil rights violations.
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that the officers herein should have felt otherwise. Furthermore, the mere fact that Greg
was inexplicably fleeing down the middle of a darkened street toward a heavily traveled
intersection clearly indicates a possible danger to the safety of the officers and other
motorists and passersby.
Finally, Greg argues that although he did run away from the officers, he
was not “fleeing” as that term is defined by statute or “evading arrest.”23 Because he
allegedly was unaware of the officers' true identities and because they allegedly did not
properly convey their intentions in ordering him to stop, he argues that his act of running
was entirely proper under the circumstances. However, based upon the totality of the
facts before us, this argument is without merit. It is uncontroverted that the police
identified themselves prior to the foot chase, and that they were wearing their badges
around their necks and ball caps clearly indicating their identity as police officers. The
officers also verbally identified themselves and ordered Greg to stop. The failure, if any,
of Greg to comprehend the officers' reasonable attempts to inform him of their identity
23
KRS 520.100, the applicable statute, sets forth the offense of fleeing or evading police as
follows:
(1)
A person is guilty of fleeing or evading police in the second
degree when:
(a)
As a pedestrian, and with intent to evade or
flee, the person knowingly or wantonly
disobeys a direction to stop, given by a
person recognized to be a peace officer who
has an articulable reasonable suspicion that a
crime has been committed by the person
fleeing, and in fleeing or eluding the person
is the cause of, or creates a substantial risk
of, physical injury to any person. . . .
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and intentions may best be explained by Greg's decision to run from the officers
immediately upon exiting his vehicle. By very definition, Greg was fleeing from the
officers, and thereby attempting to escape arrest. Despite his assertions to the contrary,
Greg again evidenced that he was actively resisting being arrested when he wrenched
himself from the grip of Officer Huddleston. There is nothing in the record to validate
Greg's claims of simple passive resistance and nonsubmission. Greg's fleeing and
resistance weighs heavily in favor of the force used by these officers to effectuate arrest.
“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that
police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments--in circumstances that are
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving--about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. We find the facts presented to these
officers on the scene were such that they reasonably believed the use of force was
necessary to prevent danger and effectuate Greg's arrest. These officers wisely utilized
their training and the professional tools provided to them when presented with this tense
situation that Greg, himself, created. Greg's argument that tasers are deadly weapons or,
at the least, a last resort prior to the use of lethal force, finds no support in the law.24 Nor
are we convinced that the administration of the second shock from the taser was facially
unreasonable. The force employed was reasonably proportionate to the difficult, tense,
24
Greg cites this Court to several cases from other jurisdictions in an attempt to bolster his
argument. However, only two of those cases deal with the use of tasers, and neither of them
constitute controlling precedent. The limited informational and analytical value of these cases in
relation to the unreasonable use of force by law enforcement is noted. We find nothing in any of
these cases which remotely indicates tasers are considered in any jurisdiction to be deadly
weapons, nor that their use should be discontinued. Furthermore, all of the cases cited are easily
distinguishable from the case at bar from even the most cursory of readings.
- 15 -
and uncertain situation Officer Huddleston and Officer Hammond faced and did not
constitute excessive force. Although being struck by a taser is an unpleasant experience,
the use thereof is not excessive per se. Under the “totality of the circumstances,” we find
Officer Hammond's use of the taser did not violate Greg's constitutional rights.
The Circuit Court correctly denied Greg's motion to suppress after taking
into consideration the facts, law, and lengthy arguments of counsel. Having found no
error, we affirm the order of the Fayette Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Richard Hoffman
Cincinatti, Ohio
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Jared Squires
Lexington, Kentucky
Louis F. Mathias, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT: ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Jared Squires
Lexington, Kentucky
Louis F. Mathias, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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