JOSEPH BETHEL v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 13, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001932-MR
JOSEPH BETHEL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIE REINHARDT WARD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00207
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
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BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; WINE, JUDGE; PAISLEY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE: Joseph Bethel appeals from a judgment of conviction and
final sentence entered by the Campbell Circuit Court on August 25, 2005. After a jury
trial, Bethel was convicted of possession of a controlled substance in the first degree and
theft by unlawful taking under $300.00. The trial court sentenced Bethel to serve a total
of four years in prison. On appeal, Bethel argues that an incriminating statement that he
made to a police officer should have been suppressed since he was in custody at the time
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Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
and the officer did not inform him of his Miranda rights prior to interrogating him.
Bethel also claims that his conviction was tainted because, during the suppression
hearing, a police officer, who was on the stand, mouthed silently to the prosecutor, “What
do I say?” Finally, Bethel claims that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on
possession of drug paraphernalia because, according to Bethel, such an instruction was
crucial to his defense. Finding that the trial court erred when it refused to suppress
Bethel's incriminating statement, we reverse and remand.
On March 30, 2005, Bethel entered a Meijer retail and grocery store in Cold
Springs, Campbell County, Kentucky. While in the store, Bethel stole a phone charger
by removing it from its package and placing it in his coat pocket. He then left the store.
Prior to stealing the charger, Bethel had caught the attention of Angela Ford, one of
Meijer's loss prevention officers, because he was wearing a large, bulky coat. Ford
decided to keep an eye on Bethel and watched him steal the charger. She followed
Bethel as he left the store and stopped him, identifying herself as store security. She
asked Bethel to accompany her back into the store, but he initially refused. After several
minutes, Ford convinced Bethel, and he voluntarily accompanied her to the store's loss
prevention office. At approximately the same time, the police were contacted.
While in the loss prevention office, Ford asked Bethel for identification, but
he claimed that his wallet had been stolen. Fearing that Bethel may have been armed,
Ford asked for his coat, but he refused. Ford asked Bethel to empty his pockets, and he
produced two wallets, a knife, some papers and the charger. Bethel then returned the
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items to his pockets. Shortly thereafter, Les Caudell, an officer with the Cold Springs
Police Department, along with another officer, arrived.
After Officer Caudell and the other officer entered the small loss prevention
office, Officer Caudell positioned himself between Bethel and the door and asked Bethel
if he had any dangerous items on his person. After Bethel denied having any dangerous
objects, Officer Caudell searched Bethel's person and found a metal spoon, a glass vial
containing an unknown liquid and two syringes. Officer Caudell then asked Bethel for
what purpose he used these items, and Bethel replied to ingest heroin. Officer Caudell
then arrested Bethel.
Later, Bethel was indicted and charged with possession of a controlled
substance in the first degree since heroin residue had been found on the spoon and with
theft by unlawful taking under $300.00. Bethel proceeded to a jury trial on August 1,
2005, and, prior to the trial, Bethel moved the trial court to suppress the incriminating
statement he made to Officer Caudell regarding his use of heroin. At the suppression
hearing, Angela Ford testified to the previously mentioned facts and claimed that Bethel
voluntarily accompanied her to the store's loss prevention office. At the suppression
hearing, Officer Caudell also testified about the previously mentioned facts and stated
that, upon entering the loss prevention office, he decided that he was going to arrest
Bethel for shoplifting. He admitted that he did not inform Bethel of his rights pursuant to
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) but claimed that
he did not interrogate Bethel regarding any criminal charges. According to Officer
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Caudell, he searched Bethel because he was concerned that Bethel might be armed, and
the officer claimed that after the search, he recognized the syringes found upon Bethel's
person as diabetic syringes. Since Bethel possessed diabetic syringes, Officer Caudell
testified that he asked Bethel for what purpose he used the items purely out of concern for
Bethel's health because he thought Bethel may be diabetic. Although the officer admitted
that Bethel was not free to leave, he insisted that Bethel was not in custody at the time
and that he did not subject Bethel to a custodial interrogation.
After hearing the testimony, the trial court found that Bethel had voluntarily
returned to the store at Ford's request. Based on Ford's testimony and demeanor
regarding how she asked Bethel to accompany her back into the store, the trial court
found that Bethel could have refused. The trial court found that Bethel never asked to
leave the loss prevention office. Furthermore, the trial court found that when Officer
Caudell questioned Bethel, he was merely asking for information that police officers
normally request prior to an arrest. The trial court stated that it did not think that Bethel
would have thought that he was in custody at the time. Thus, the trial court denied
Bethel's suppression motion.
After the suppression motion was denied, Bethel's jury trial was held, and
he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance in the first degree and theft by
unlawful taking under $300.00.
On appeal, Bethel first contends that the trial court erred when it failed to
suppress the incriminating statement he made to Officer Caudell. According to Bethel,
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the test to determine whether he was in custody and was subjected to a custodial
interrogation is whether a reasonable person, in his situation, would have felt free to end
the interrogation and leave. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133
L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). Bethel avers that he had been caught for shoplifting; had been
placed in a small room; and, once the police arrived, Officer Caudell stood directly
between him and the door, thereby blocking the only exit. Based on these facts, Bethel
insists that a reasonable person in that situation would not have felt that he was free to
leave. Bethel concludes that he was in custody and had been subjected to a custodial
interrogation without the benefit of the Miranda warnings. In addition, Bethel argues
that, at the suppression hearing, Officer Caudell testified that he had no intentions of
allowing Bethel to leave, and, while Bethel acknowledges that the officer never told him
that, Bethel argues that Officer Caudell's body language clearly indicated that Bethel was
not free to leave.
When we review suppression issues, we initially examine the trial court’s
findings of fact to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence. If so, then the
findings are conclusive. Next, we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law
to the facts. Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky.App. 2002).
Regarding the issue of police custody, the United States Supreme Court
held:
[A] person has been “seized” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave. Examples
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of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the
person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an
officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or
the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled. In
the absence of some such evidence, otherwise inoffensive
contact between a member of the public and the police
cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person.
U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554-555, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)
(citations omitted). In this case, the record discloses that Bethel was caught shoplifting.
He voluntarily accompanied Ford into the store's loss prevention office, which was a
small room with a door that was always kept shut. After Bethel had been in the office for
a short time, the police officers arrived, and Officer Caudell positioned himself between
Bethel and the door, the only means for leaving the office. And, most importantly of all,
Officer Caudell thoroughly searched Bethel, engaging in “physical touching of the person
of the citizen[.]” Id. Given the totality of these circumstances, a reasonable person in
Bethel's situation would not have believed that he was free to leave. On the contrary, he
would expect to be arrested for shoplifting. Thus, the trial court erred when it found that
Bethel was not in custody at the time he made his incriminating statement.
The Commonwealth relies on Bedell v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 779
(Ky. 1993) to support its argument that Bethel was not in custody. In Bedell, the
defendant voluntarily accompanied police to the police station for questioning. Id. at
782. The police informed the defendant of his rights. Furthermore, they did not
physically touch or restrain him nor did they engage in coercive displays of authority. Id.
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In contrast, in the present case, Officer Caudell did not inform Bethel of his rights. He
physically blocked Bethel's only means of exiting the room, and he searched Bethel,
which was a clear display of the officer's authority. Given these differences, we find
Bedell to be distinguishable from the present case. The Commonwealth also relies on
Baker v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 142 (Ky. 1999), Taylor v. Commonwealth, 182
S.W.3d 521 (Ky. 2006), and Dennis v. Commonwealth, 464 S.W.2d 253 (Ky. 1971).
However, these cases fail to support its position. In Baker, there was no questioning at
all but an order for the suspect to remove his hands from his pockets. In Taylor, the
officers specifically advised the suspect that he was not under arrest and there was no
interrogation. In Dennis, the court found that the defendant's statement was a voluntary
comment. At the time he made the incriminating statement, Bethel had been seized and
was in custody.
However, even though Bethel was in custody at the time does not
automatically mean his statement should have been suppressed. It is well settled that
whenever a person who is in police custody is subjected to interrogation, the police must
first advise that person of his Miranda rights. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301,
100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). For Miranda purposes, “interrogation” means
any express questioning by the police that will elicit an incriminating response or any
words or actions by the police that the police should reasonably know will elicit an
incriminating response. Id. An “incriminating response” is any response, either
inculpatory or exculpatory, that the prosecution might later seek to introduce at trial. Id.
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Turning back to the record, we find that Officer Caudell searched Bethel
and found a metal spoon, a glass vial which contained an unknown liquid, and two
syringes. Without informing Bethel of his Miranda rights, the officer asked Bethel for
what purpose he used these items. Officer Caudell testified that he asked this question
because he thought that Bethel may have been diabetic. However, despite this claim,
Officer Caudell's question to Bethel constituted words spoken by a police officer that the
officer should have reasonably known could elicit an incriminating response. Rhode
Island v. Innis, supra. In fact, Officer Caudell's question did elicit an incriminating
response. Although the questioning of Bethel was brief, Officer Caudell subjected Bethel
to a custodial interrogation without first informing Bethel of his Miranda rights, thus
violating Miranda. Therefore, the trial court erred when it did not suppress Bethel's
incriminating statement.
The Commonwealth argues that introduction of Bethel's incriminating
statement at trial if it was error, was harmless. We recognize that the Commonwealth
had a relatively strong case against Bethel even without his statement. However, Bethel's
incriminating statement helped the Commonwealth to establish one of the elements of
possession of a controlled substance: knowledge. Under these facts, we do not believe
that the introduction of the statement was harmless error.
In his second argument, Bethel alleges that, at the suppression hearing
during cross-examination, Officer Caudell looked around to make sure that neither the
judge nor defense counsel was watching and that he then mouthed silently to the
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prosecutor, “What do I say?” Based on this, Bethel insists that the prosecutor used
prohibited false testimony at the suppression hearing. According to Bethel, Officer
Caudell so wanted Bethel to be convicted that he inappropriately sought the prosecutor's
advice while on the stand, tainting his conviction.
Since Bethel did not preserve this issue for appeal, we can only review its
merits if it rises to the level of palpable error under Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 10.26. The Kentucky Supreme Court defines palpable error as an
irregularity which affects a party’s substantial rights and, if the appellate court does not
address the irregularity, it will result in a manifest injustice to the party. Schoenbachler
v. Commonwealth, 95 S.W.3d 830, 837 (Ky. 2003). In other words, after considering the
whole case, if the appellate court does not believe that there is a substantial possibility
that the result would have been any different, then the irregularity will be deemed nonprejudicial. Id.
After reviewing the videotape of the suppression hearing, we cannot
determine what Officer Caudell mouthed silently nor can we determine to whom he was
directing this behavior. Moreover, we cannot determine how this behavior negatively
affected Bethel's substantial rights; thus, we find no palpable error and decline to address
the merits of this claim.
In his final argument, Bethel avers that his defense at trial was that, given
the evidence, the jury could find him guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia instead of
finding him guilty of possession of a controlled substance. Thus, he tendered a jury
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instruction regarding possession of drug paraphernalia which the trial court rejected.
Bethel claims that the evidence supported such an instruction, and, since his defense was
that he was only guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia, then the trial court was
required to so instruct the jury. Bethel admits that possession of drug paraphernalia is not
a lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled substance but argues that, given
the unique facts of his case, possession of drug paraphernalia was, in fact, a defense to
possession of a controlled substance.
The case of Hudson v. Commonwealth, 202 S.W.3d 17 (Ky. 2006) is
directly on point regarding this issue. In Hudson, the defendant was arrested and charged
with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, fourth offense
(DUI). At the defendant's subsequent trial, he submitted a jury instruction regarding
alcohol intoxication (AI) and argued that alcohol intoxication was a defense to DUI. Id.
at 19. On appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court, the defendant argued that AI was a
lesser-included offense to DUI. Id. at 20. However, the Supreme Court held that AI was
not a lesser-included offense of DUI since each required proof of an element that the
other did not. Id. In the alternative, the defendant argued that AI was a “lesser” offense
that acted as defense to DUI because a finding of guilt regarding AI would preclude a
finding of guilt regarding DUI. Id. at 21. Regarding this odd notion, the Supreme Court
held:
That, of course, is incorrect. If alcohol intoxication is not a
lesser included offense of DUI, then, if properly charged, the
jury could find guilt of both. Further, the fact that the
evidence would support a guilty verdict on a lesser uncharged
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offense does not entitle a defendant to an instruction on that
offense.
Id. (citations omitted).
Bethel's argument is virtually identical to the defendant's argument in
Hudson. And, like in Hudson, the argument is without merit. While the evidence may
have supported an instruction regarding possession of drug paraphernalia, Bethel was not
entitled to such an instruction since 1) it was not a lesser-included offense of possession
of a controlled substance and 2) a finding of guilt regarding possession of drug
paraphernalia would not have precluded a finding of guilt regarding possession of a
controlled substance. Thus, the trial court did not err when it refused to instruct the jury
regarding possession of drug paraphernalia.
Since the trial court erred when it failed to suppress Bethel's incriminating
statement, we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.
WINE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, DISSENTING: I cannot agree that Bethel's
Miranda rights were violated. He was not subjected to a custodial interrogation. The
police officer's question about the syringes was innocuous on its face. Bethel could have
refused to answer differently or not to answer at all. The syringes were diabetic syringes
that could have been used for health purposes.
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Officer Caudell's explanation of his question was that he was seeking to
find out if Bethel were diabetic. That question was legitimate on its face and did not
require a Miranda warning. The fact that Bethel answered it in an inculpatory manner
should not require suppression of his statement. If, on the other hand, Officer Caudell
had directly asked if the syringes were drug related, a Miranda warning would have been
required, and its absence would require suppression of the statement.
Thus, I would affirm the trial court in its ruling to deny suppression and
would let the conviction stand.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Samuel N. Potter
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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