R. V. PERKINS; ROBERTA PERKINS v. ABEX CORPORATION and R. V. PERKINS; ROBERTA PERKINS v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION; LEAR SIEGLER, INC.; OWENS CORNING FIBERGLAS CORP.; WAGNER ELECTRIC COMPANY; DANA CORPORATION; BORG-WARNER CORPORATION; GARLOCK, INC.; THE LINCOLN ELECTRIC COMPANY; ROSS BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; RAPID- AMERICAN CORPORATION; ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES; UNITED STATES GYPSUM CO.; GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; ANCHOR PACKING COMPANY
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RENDERED: APRIL 6, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001748-MR
R. V. PERKINS;
ROBERTA PERKINS
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JEFFREY T. BURDETTE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00146
ABEX CORPORATION
AND
APPELLEE
NO. 2005-CA-002141-MR
R. V. PERKINS;
ROBERTA PERKINS
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JEFFREY T. BURDETTE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00146
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION;
LEAR SIEGLER, INC.; OWENS
CORNING FIBERGLAS CORP.;
WAGNER ELECTRIC COMPANY; DANA CORPORATION;
BORG-WARNER CORPORATION; GARLOCK, INC.;
THE LINCOLN ELECTRIC COMPANY; ROSS
BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; RAPIDAMERICAN CORPORATION; ARMSTRONG WORLD
INDUSTRIES; UNITED STATES GYPSUM CO.;
FLEXITALLIC, INC.; GAF CORPORATION;
APPELLEES
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; ANCHOR
PACKING COMPANY
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND STUMBO, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE: R. V. Perkins and Roberta Perkins appeal from
orders of the Pulaski Circuit Court dismissing their complaint against the appellees
alleging injuries due to R.V.’s occupational exposure to asbestos. Because the circuit
court failed to make adequate findings in support of dismissal pursuant to Ward v.
Housman, 809 S.W.2d 717 (Ky.App. 1991), and Toler v. Rapid American, 190 S.W.3d
348 (Ky. App. 2006), we vacate and remand.
On February 18, 1999, the Perkinses filed a complaint against numerous
defendants, including the appellees herein, alleging that R. V. had sustained injuries due
to his occupational exposure to asbestos. The complaint contended that the defendants
had caused R.V.’s exposure to asbestos.
One of the few substantive steps taken in the case occurred shortly
thereafter when, on May 4, 1999, the Perkinses filed their response to a discovery request
served by one of the defendants. A substantial period of time followed in which no
substantive steps were taken.
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
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At various times during the pendency of this action, several of the
defendants filed for bankruptcy.2 Further, in December 2001, DaimlerChrysler
Corporation sought removal to federal court. On November 20, 2002, DaimlerChrysler
filed a status report stating that the Perkinses’ claim against it had been remanded back to
the Pulaski Circuit Court.
It appears that it was not until 2004 that another substantive step was taken
in the case when, on June 25, 2004, the Perkinses filed a response to General Electric
Corporation’s request for admissions. Another period of inactivity then ensued.
On June 1, 2005, a little less than a year subsequent to the last substantive
step, Abex Corporation filed a motion to have the lawsuit, as against itself, dismissed for
lack of prosecution pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 41.02. The
same day, the Perkinses filed a motion for a pretrial conference and trial date. A hearing
on Abex’s motion to dismiss was held on July 1, 2005. On July 27, 2005, the circuit
court entered an order dismissing the Perkinses’ claim against Abex with prejudice. The
Perkinses subsequently filed their notice of appeal from that order. (Appeal No. 2005CA-001748-MR).
On August 19, 2005, DaimlerChrysler filed a similar motion to dismiss
pursuant to CR 41.02. On September 16, 2005, the circuit court entered an order granting
not only DaimlerChrysler’s motion to dismiss but also dismissing all defendants to the
In their notice of appeal, the Perkinses state “it is understood by the Perkins that some of the
above defendants are currently in bankruptcy, including Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp.;
Armstrong World Industries; United States Gypsum Co.; Flexitallic, Inc., and GAF
Corporation.”
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litigation. The Perkinses subsequently filed their notice of appeal from that order.
(Appeal No. 2005-CA-002141-MR).
Because Appeal No. 2005-CA-001748-MR and Appeal No. 2005-CA002141-MR concern the same underlying circuit court lawsuit and share a common
factual and procedural background, we address both appeals herein.
The Perkinses contend that the circuit court erred in dismissing each of the
defendants to the case without proper consideration of the factors contained in Ward v.
Housman, 809 S.W.2d 717 (Ky.App. 1991). We agree.
The circuit court’s July 27, 2005, order states, in its entirety, as follows:
This matter being before the Court on Defendant Abex
Corporation’s (‘Abex”) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Prosecution, the Court having heard arguments of counsel and
being otherwise sufficiently advised,
This Court has analyzed the factors in Ward v. Housman, 809
S.W.2d 717 (Ky.App 1991) and determined that they favor
dismissal. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
that Abex’s Motion be and hereby is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s
claims against Abex are DISMISSED with PREJUDICE.
This is a final and appealable order and there is no just cause
for delay.
Similarly, the circuit court’s order of September 16, 2005, dismissing the remaining
defendants stated, in its entirety, as follows:
This matter being before the Court on Defendant
DaimlerChrysler Corporation’s f/k/a Chrysler Corporation
(“DaimlerChrysler”) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Prosecution, the Court having heard arguments of counsel and
being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that DaimlerChrysler’s
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution is GRANTED.
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Plaintiff’s claims against DaimlerChrysler and Plaintiff’s
claims against all remaining Defendants, Lear Siegler, Inc.,
Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., Owens-Illinois, Inc., Wagner
Electric Company, Dana Corporation., Borg-Warner
Corporation, Garlock, Inc., the Lincoln Electric Company,
Ross Brothers Construction Company, Rapid-American
Corporation, Armstrong World Industries, Inc., United States
Gypsum Co., General Electric Company, Anchor Packing
Co., Flexitallic, Inc., and GAF Corporation are hereby
DISMISSED in their entirety WITH PREJUDICE. This
Order is entered Nunc Pro Tunc, retroactive to July 27, 2005.
This is a final and appealable order and there is no just cause
for delay.
Dismissals for lack of prosecution pursuant to CR 41.02 and CR 77.02 are
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Midwest Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Wireman, 54 S.W.3d 177, 179 (Ky.App. 2001); Wright v. Transportation Cabinet, 891
S.W.2d 412, 413 (Ky.App. 1995). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial
judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles.” Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258, 272 (Ky.2004) (citations omitted); see
also Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Ky. 1994). “The power of dismissal
for want of prosecution is an inherent power in the courts and necessary to preserve the
judicial process.” Nall v. Woolfolk, 451 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Ky. 1970).
However, dismissal of a case pursuant to CR 41.02 “should be resorted to
only in the most extreme cases” and we must “carefully scrutinize the trial court's
exercise of discretion in doing so.” Polk v. Wimsatt, 689 S.W.2d 363, 364-65 (Ky.App.
1985). The rule permitting a court to involuntarily dismiss an action “envisions a
consciousness and intentional failure to comply with the provisions thereof.” Baltimore
& Ohio Railroad Co. v. Carrier, 426 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Ky. 1968). Since the result is
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harsh, “the propriety of the invocation of the Rule must be examined in regard to the
conduct of the party against whom it is invoked.” Id. at 941.
Moreover, it is incumbent on the trial court to consider each case “in light
of the particular circumstances involved; length of time alone is not the test of diligence.”
Gill v. Gill, 455 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Ky. 1970). In addition, the court should determine
whether less drastic measures would remedy the situation, especially where there is no
prejudice to the party requesting dismissal. See Polk, 689 S.W.2d at 364-65; Toler v.
Rapid American, 190 S.W.3d 348, 351 (Ky.App. 2006).
In the Toler case, a panel of this court stated:
Further factors relevant to whether the court should dismiss an action with
prejudice can be found in Ward v. Houseman, 809 S.W.2d 717 (Ky.App.
1991). In Ward, this Court adopted the guidelines set forth in Scarborough
v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871 (3d Cir.1984) for determining whether a case
should be dismissed for dilatory conduct under Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure-the counterpart to our CR 41.02(1). We
specifically held that the following factors should be considered: (1) the
extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the history of dilatoriness;
(3) whether the attorney's conduct was willful and in bad faith; (4) the
meritoriousness of the claim; (5) prejudice to the other party; and (6) the
availability of alternative sanctions. Ward, 809 S.W.2d at 719.
Id. at 351.
While the circuit court’s July 27, 2005, order refers to the court having
considered the factors set forth in Ward, the conclusory nature of this statement precludes
us from undertaking any meaningful review of the circuit court’s decision. Further, the
September 16, 2005, order omits any reference to Ward. Accordingly, we find ourselves
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hesitant to affirm or reverse the trial court because the record is unclear as to whether the
Ward factors were properly considered.3 See Toler, supra.
While the parties discussed the Ward factors in their briefs and urge that the
factors compel a decision in their respective favor, the responsibility to make findings
concerning the Ward factors before dismissing a case with prejudice falls solely upon the
circuit court. Id. Accordingly, even though we understand and sympathize with the
court's desire to move the cases on its docket along in a timely and expeditious manner,
we find ourselves compelled to vacate its orders as to dismissal here and to remand this
action for further consideration in light of Ward.4 In doing so, we express no view as to
whether dismissal with prejudice will ultimately be merited.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the orders of the Pulaski Circuit Court
dismissing the Perkinses claims and remand for additional proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
The July 27, 2005, order contains a notation that the order was “submitted by” counsel for
Abex, which we construe as prepared and tendered by counsel.
3
Upon remand the circuit court should also make findings identifying any parties who may be in
bankruptcy, if any, and factor their bankruptcy status into its consideration concerning the
appropriateness of dismissal.
4
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Kenneth L. Sales
Joseph D. Satterley
Paul J. Kelley
Louisville, Kentucky
JOINT BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP; THE
LINCOLN ELECTRIC COMPANY;
LEAR SIEGLER DIVERSIFIED
HOLDING CORP., AS SUCCESSOR-ININTEREST TO LEAR SIEGLER, INC.;
LINCOLN ELECTRIC COMPANY;
GARLOCK, INC.; ANCHOR PACKING
COMPANY; BURNS INTERNATIONAL
SERVICES CORP. F/N/A BORGWARNER AUTOMOTIVE, INC.; ABEX
CORPORATION; RAPID-AMERICAN
CORPORATION; ROSS BROTHERS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY AND
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY:
Byron N. Miller
Sallie J. Stevens
THOMPSON MILLER & SIMPSON, PLC
Louisville, Kentucky
D. Patterson Gloor
Jeffery R. Sandler
Phillip M. Abellera
Shantel D. Wood-Bill
GLOOR LAW GROUP, LLC
Chicago, Illinois
Kevin M. McGuire
Jon R. Fritz
JACKSON & KELLY, PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
John A. Sheffer
SHEFFER LAW FIRM
Louisville, Kentucky
John K. Gordinier
PEDLEY ZIELKE & GORDINIER, PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
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Richard L. Lancianese
BAKER & LANCIANESE
Huntington, West Virginia
Gilbert Busby
LYNN, FULKERSON, NICHOLS &
KINKEL
Lexington, Kentucky
Robert C. Ewald
WYATT TARRANT & COMBS
Louisville, Kentucky
J. Michael Wells
THE BUSH LAW OFFICE
Louisville, Kentucky
Scott T. Dickens
Tachau Maddox Hovious & Dickens
Louisville, Kentucky
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