BOBBY RILEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MARCH 23, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001579-MR
BOBBY RILEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS M. STEPHENS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00183-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; WINE, JUDGE; PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE.1
PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE: This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Kenton
Circuit Court, which sentenced Bobby Riley to serve one year after he was found guilty
of complicity in receiving stolen property valued at $300.00 or more. Riley argues that
the Commonwealth failed to provide sufficient evidence of (1) his complicity in the
commission of the offense, (2) the value of the stolen items, and (3) the venue where the
crime occurred.
1
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
Riley’s conviction stemmed from an incident where various items were
stolen from parked cars in the Lakeside Park area of Kenton County. On January 26,
2004, Deputy Jeremy Adams of the Kenton County Sheriff’s Office received a request
for assistance from Lakeside police officers. They had received an anonymous complaint
that a car was being driven slowly in a suspicious manner in the Lakeside Park area.
When Deputy Adams arrived, the vehicle had already been stopped. The car was parked
in front of a dark house. There were two open, forty-ounce bottles of beer on the front
floorboard on the passenger’s side. There were also footsteps in the snow leading from
the passenger’s door of the car to the rear of the darkened house. Deputy Adams
questioned the driver and sole occupant of the car, Henrietta Bravard. Bravard consented
to a search of the car, which yielded several items including a compact disc player,
several compact discs, a leather computer bag, a laptop computer, a DVD drive and a
label maker. The articles had identification on them which enabled Bravard to contact
their owners, Donald Starnes and Shawn Traylor, who confirmed that the items had been
stolen from their cars. Bravard was arrested and made a statement to the police that
implicated Bobby and Stanley Riley in the thefts. Bobby Riley was picked up shortly
thereafter, arrested and charged with complicity in receiving stolen property.
At Riley’s trial, Bravard testified that the Rileys had been in the car with
her that evening, and that they had driven around looking for “Mike’s house.” Bobby
Riley had made her stop a couple of times, while he attempted to visit “Mike.” She also
recalled Bobby Riley throwing something into the back seat which she described as a
-2-
cardboard box and a bunch of papers. When she was asked whether she saw Riley place
any of the stolen items in the car, she explained that she could not see anything because
she was resting her head on the steering wheel due to an earlier head injury. The jury
found Riley guilty of the complicity charge, and he received a sentence of one year.
On appeal, Riley argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his
motion for a directed verdict based on insufficiency of the evidence.
Our standard of review with respect to the sufficiency of evidence to
support a criminal conviction is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Potts v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 345, 349 (Ky. 2005) citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
The statute which defines the elements of the offense of receiving stolen
property states in pertinent part as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of receiving stolen property when he
receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of another
knowing that it has been stolen, or having reason to believe
that it has been stolen, unless the property is received,
retained, or disposed of with intent to restore it to the owner.
(2) The possession by any person of any recently stolen
movable property shall be prima facie evidence that such
person knew such property was stolen.
(3) Receiving stolen property is a Class A misdemeanor
unless the value of the property is three hundred dollars
($300) or more, in which case it is a Class D felony[.]
-3-
KRS 514.110.
Complicity is defined as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of an offense committed by another
person when, with the intention of promoting or facilitating
the commission of the offense, he:
(a) Solicits, commands, or engages in a conspiracy with such
other person to commit the offense; or
(b) Aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such person in planning
or committing the offense; or
(c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the
offense, fails to make a proper effort to do so.
KRS 502.020.
Riley contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he had placed
the stolen items in Bravard’s car, and that it failed to introduce testimony identifying the
property found in the car as the same property that was stolen from the victims.
The jury heard that Riley had been riding with Bravard in the car, that the
car made suspicious stops at Riley’s request, at which time he exited the car, and that he
placed a box in the back of the car. Bravard was unable to explain at trial the
inconsistency between her trial testimony (that she did not see Riley place anything in the
car except the cardboard box and some papers) and her statement to police on the night of
the arrest that the Rileys were in the area breaking into vehicles, stealing items and
placing the stolen items into her vehicle. The essential elements of a crime may be
proven by circumstantial evidence. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 184 S.W.3d 544,
-4-
548-49 (Ky. 2005). In Riley’s case, ample circumstantial evidence was offered for a
reasonable jury to infer that Riley had placed the stolen items in Bravard’s car.
As to Riley’s accompanying argument that insufficient evidence was
offered to prove that the items found in the car were the items actually stolen from
Starnes and Traylor, we note that Officer Adams found Starnes’ business card inside the
leather computer bag, which also contained the laptop computer, the DVD drive, and the
label maker. Adams immediately called Starnes who confirmed that these were the items
that had been stolen. There was also identification in the compact disc storage case
recovered from Bravard’s car which enabled Deputy Adams to contact Traylor, who
confirmed that the compact disc case and compact disc player had been stolen from his
car. Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could conclude that the items found in
Bravard’s car were those belonging to Starnes and Traylor.
Riley next argues that the Commonwealth failed to establish the value of
the stolen items with sufficient specificity to satisfy the requirement for a felony that the
property be valued at over $300.00. The only evidence as to the value of the items came
from the testimony of Traylor and Starnes. Traylor testified that his compact discs were
worth “about $200.00” and his compact disc player was worth between $150.00 and
$200.00. Starnes assigned the following values to his property: $250.00 for the DVD
drive, $75.00 to $99.00 for the leather computer bag, $39.00 for the label maker, and
$1500.00 for the laptop computer. Riley has acknowledged “that the testimony of the
owner of stolen property is competent evidence as to the value of the property.”
-5-
Commonwealth v. Reed, 57 S.W.3d 269, 270 (Ky. 2001) citing Poteet v. Commonwealth,
556 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Ky. 1977). The testimony of Traylor and Starnes was sufficiently
detailed to establish the value of the stolen items: they testified with specificity as to the
value of each individual item from their own personal knowledge. It was not necessary,
as Riley contends, for the witnesses to provide information as to the brand of the items,
the time of purchase or the purchase price.
Riley further argues, relying on Commonwealth v. Reed, 57 S.W.3d 269
(Ky.App. 2001), that while an owner may testify to the value of the items stolen, that
testimony must be limited to items actually found in the defendant’s possession. In other
words, testimony by an owner that establishes a total value for all the items stolen,
without regard for or limited to the items found in the defendant’s possession, cannot
support a conviction for receiving stolen property.
The Reed holding is inapplicable here. All of the items stolen from Traylor
and Starnes were indisputably found in Bravard’s possession, and Riley was found to be
in complicity with her. The situation is clearly distinguishable from Reed, where only a
few of the stolen items were found in the defendant’s possession whereas the owner
testified only as to the total value of all the items stolen. Commonwealth v. Reed, 57
S.W.3d at 271.
Finally, Riley argues that venue was not properly established because the
Commonwealth failed to prove that the crime occurred in Kenton County.
Venue must be proved, but since it does not affect the issue of
guilt or innocence, although the instructions submit it as one
-6-
of the elements to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, in
this jurisdiction it has been consistently held that slight
evidence, supported by inferences and reasonable
presumptions of knowledge by local jurors, is sufficient. . . .
What is slight evidence may itself give rise to a difference of
views. If the evidence discloses the offense was committed
in a city, town or village, or at or near some well-known
landmark or public place, or in a particular district or
locality, it has been regarded as sufficient. The reason is
that the jury being of the vicinage are presumed to have
knowledge of local geography. It is recognized, however,
that they may not know the location of private places, such as
the homes of particular persons.
Woosley v. Commonwealth, 293 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Ky. 1956)(emphasis added; internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
The jury was repeatedly informed that the theft took place in the Lakeside
Park area. They were also made aware that the call from Lakeside Park police regarding
the suspicious car was answered by Jeremy Adams, a Kenton County Sheriff’s Deputy.
See Justice v. Commonwealth, 294 S.W. 1046 (Ky. 1927). This constituted sufficient
evidence for the jury to infer that the crime was committed in Kenton County.
For the foregoing reasons, the final judgment and sentence of imprisonment
imposed by the Kenton Circuit Court is affirmed.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
WINE, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
WINE, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent from the majority
opinion. As stated by the learned trial judge, the prosecution “made this case more
difficult than it needed to be.” At the conclusion of opening statements, the appellant’s
-7-
counsel moved for a directed verdict because the Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney
failed to state the elements of the crime charged against the appellant, including value,
venue, and the name of the charged offense. RCr 9.42(a). However, the court properly
denied the motion. Hourigan v. Commonwealth, 883 S.W.2d 497 (Ky.App. 1994).
The court reminded the Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney of the need to
establish value after the appellant’s counsel finished cross-examination of the first
witness, Mr. Traylor. Without objection, the prosecutor then established the value of two
items stolen from Traylor’s auto.
Ms. Bravard testified the appellant and his brother Stanley got in and out of
the car several times. She could not remember who placed a box filled with papers in the
car, but thought the appellant might have. She never testified seeing either brother place
any of the stolen items in her car. The arresting officers never testified that the stolen
items were found in the box.
The Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney showed her a previously
handwritten statement, however never used the statement properly for impeachment
purposes or to refresh her recollection. Therefore, the content of the statement never
became substantive evidence. KRE 801(a)(1). Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788
(Ky. 1969). See also Hillard v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 758, 766 (Ky. 2005). When
asked by the prosecutor if she saw
-8-
Bobby “put something in the car,” she responded, “according to this I did.” The arresting
officer was never recalled to impeach her with her statement made at the time of her
arrest.
Mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to implicate an
individual in criminal activity. Hayes v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 574, 590 (Ky.
2005). See also Moore v. Commonwealth, 282 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Ky. 1955).
The appellant, who was arrested outside of the vehicle, was not in
possession of any stolen items. The Commonwealth failed to introduce at trial any of the
stolen items or pictures of same. Nor did either of the victims testify they saw the items
recovered from the Bravard car. However, name tags on the stolen items allowed the
investigating officers to contact the owners who confirmed the thefts.
I agree with the majority that a value of $300 was established by the
testimony of the prosecuting witnesses, Traylor and Starnes. Further, circumstances
established that Kenton County was the venue of the stop.
Thus, not only did the Commonwealth make the case more difficult than it
needed to be, the Commonwealth also failed to establish a crucial element – that the
appellant was ever in possession of the stolen items. Therefore, I would reverse and
remand with directions to enter a directed verdict of acquittal.
-9-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Euva D. May
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
David W. Barr
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
- 10 -
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.