ROY NEAL v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 23, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001255-MR
ROY NEAL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARTIN F. MCDONALD, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 00-CR-001557; 00-CR-002531; 00-CR-002661;
00-CR-002714; 01-CR-000366; 01-CR-000659; AND 01-CR-000898
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR AND WINE, JUDGES; PAISLEY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
21.580.
1
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Roy Neal appeals from a May 17, 2005, Opinion and Order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court denying his Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42 motion without an
evidentiary hearing. We vacate and remand.
Neal was indicted by a Jefferson County Grand Jury (Indictment Nos. 00CR-001557, 00-CR-002531, 00-CR-002661, 00-CR-002714, 01-CR-000366, 01-CR000659, and 01-CR-000898) on eight counts of theft by failure to make required
disposition of property over $300.00, four counts of theft by deception over $300.00, and
two counts of failure to transfer registration of a motor vehicle. Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 514.070, KRS 514.040, and KRS 186.190. Pursuant to seven plea
agreements, Neal pleaded guilty to the above charges. Five of the plea agreements
contained language that Neal agreed to pay restitution. Three of these five agreements
included specific amounts of restitution while two merely contained language that Neal
“agreed to restitution.” Two other plea agreements did not contain any reference to
restitution. However, neither the total amount of restitution nor a payment schedule was
included in any of the plea agreements.
On July 13, 2001, Neal was sentenced to a total of ten years' imprisonment.
The sentence was probated for five years. A condition of Neal's probation was that he
pay restitution. On October 16, 2001, a restitution order was entered requiring Neal to
pay total restitution of $91,882.00 plus interest. The restitution was to be paid in monthly
payments of $1,893.59 for a period of sixty months.
Appellant was subsequently indicted upon additional charges. A probation
revocation hearing was conducted and the circuit court found that appellant was in
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violation of the conditions of probation for failure to pay restitution. The court did not
revoke appellant’s probation pending the outcome of the new indictment. In February
2003, a second revocation hearing was conducted. Following the hearing, the court
revoked appellant’s probation for nonpayment of restitution.
Appellant subsequently filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion to vacate sentence.
The circuit court entered an order appointing counsel for appellant. Counsel entered an
appearance and filed a supplemental memorandum in support of appellant’s motion. The
Commonwealth subsequently responded. The court denied appellant’s motion without an
evidentiary hearing on May 17, 2005. This appeal follows.
When reviewing the denial of an RCr 11.42 motion without an evidentiary
hearing, we must determine whether movant’s allegations are refuted upon the face of the
record. Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2001). If there were material
issues of fact that could not be conclusively proved or disproved upon the face of the
record, the circuit court erred by denying the RCr 11.42 motion without an evidentiary
hearing. Id.
Appellant contends the circuit court committed error by denying his RCr
11.42 motion to vacate sentence without an evidentiary hearing. Specifically, appellant
contends he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel when counsel failed to insist
that restitution payments be established prior to entry of his guilty plea, failed to object to
the payment schedule when the restitution order was entered, and failed to inform
appellant that the five-year probationary period could be extended to allow smaller
monthly restitution payments.
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We are persuaded that probation should not be conditioned upon payment
of restitution without consideration of defendant’s ability to pay. 21A Am. Jur. 2d
Criminal Law § 908 (1998). However, it is incumbent upon a defendant, once put on
notice that the court is considering restitution as a condition of probation, to object at
sentencing. Id.
In the case sub judice, there is no evidence on the face of the record to
refute appellant’s allegation regarding counsel’s ineffective assistance. The record
reveals that the circuit court did not make a formal inquiry regarding appellant’s ability to
pay at the October 15, 2001, restitution hearing.2 If trial counsel failed to inquire as to
appellant’s ability to meet the restitution payments, and if appellant lacked such ability,
counsel’s performance was ineffective. See id. Thus, pursuant to the mandates of
Fraser, we are compelled to remand this matter to the circuit court for an evidentiary
hearing. See Fraser, 59 S.W.3d 448.
For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion and Order of the Jefferson Circuit
Court is vacated and this cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
WINE, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
2
The dissent intimates that during the restitution hearing the court asked if appellant could pay
the restitution. The record reveals, however, that this question was not asked at the restitution
hearing but instead was asked of appellant’s counsel at the July 9, 2001, sentencing. Based upon
the record before this Court, neither the exact amount of restitution, nor the payment terms were
known or set at sentencing. This necessitates an evidentiary hearing in the majority’s opinion.
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WINE, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent. During the plea colloquy in
December 2000, the prosecutor advised that restitution would be about $62,000.
However, if there were additional charges, restitution could be higher. In fact, there were
pleas to at least three more indictments. Following these pleas, the Appellant was
released on bond. At the July 9, 2001 sentencing, the Appellant received a ten-year
sentence instead of a possible twenty years. Without objection, a restitution hearing was
to be scheduled if the parties could not agree to a definite amount of restitution. Further,
at the sentencing hearing, the trial court was able to review the pre-sentence investigation
report which detailed the Appellant’s finances. The court asked the Appellant’s counsel if
the Appellant could make the restitution payments. The Appellant did not object when
counsel responded yes. During the restitution hearing, the total restitution was discussed
and a payment plan implemented. Although the Appellant may now wish he had received
more favorable terms, to wit lower payments and an extended period of time to repay, in
fact, the prosecutor was unwilling to agree to more lenient terms.
The Appellant failed to make the agreed $1,893.59 monthly payments and
in fact made no payments in six out of eleven months. This in spite of the fact he claimed
he wanted his attorney to secure an agreement that he pay $1,000 per month. As a result,
the Commonwealth moved to revoke the ten-year sentence. During the September 11,
2004 hearing, the Appellant admitted the prosecutor would not agree to an extension in
the period to pay restitution. The probation officer testified he encouraged the Appellant
to pay as much as he could each month.
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The court granted the Appellant’s request to continue the hearing. On
February 3, 2003, the probation officer advised the Appellant had made no payments
since August 2002. The Appellant’s probation was revoked.
It is within the trial court’s discretion to extend a period of probation
beyond the statutory five years. KRS 533.020(4). See also Commonwealth v. Griffin, 942
S.W.2d 289 (Ky. 1997).
The Appellant now claims he would have insisted on going to trial had he
known the standard probationary period could have been extended beyond five years.
However, he fails to articulate why the Commonwealth or court would have been more
amenable to extending the probationary period after a jury found him guilty. Thus, the
Appellant fails to meet the second prong of the Strickland test – that the deficient
performance so seriously affected the outcome of the plea process. Rather, it is unlikely
the Commonwealth would have recommended probation, thus exposing Appellant to
substantial time in the penitentiary. It is the goal of every defense counsel to secure the
best outcome for the client. The record clearly shows Appellant’s counsel succeeded in a
plea of a term of years one-half the maximum and a probated sentence, as well as his
immediate release from the county jail pending final sentencing. His failure to pay
restitution or to at least seek an amendment in the terms of his probation are not the result
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
As set out in the trial court’s order, the record obviates the need for a
hearing pursuant to RCr 11.42. I would affirm the trial court.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sarah Jost Nielsen
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael A. Nickles
Assistant Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
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