ROBERT HENRY v. ALLEN COUNTY
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 26, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001155-MR
AND
NO. 2005-CA-001252-MR
ROBERT HENRY
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM ALLEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM R. HARRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00037
ALLEN COUNTY
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
WINE, JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM AND HENRY, SENIOR JUDGES.1
HENRY, JUDGE:
Robert Henry appeals from a jury verdict and
judgment in favor of Allen County as to Henry’s wrongful
termination suit against the county.
Upon review, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
The facts of this case, as revealed at trial, are as
follows: Henry was employed by Allen County as a part-time dog
1
Senior Judges David C. Buckingham and Michael L. Henry sitting as Special
Judges by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
warden.
On Saturday, November 1, 2003, Patrick Dean – a
Scottsville, Kentucky resident – called the Allen County
dispatcher and reported that a dog was being dragged down the
road by a truck driven by Lonnie Douglas.
In response to the
report, the Allen County sheriff’s department dispatched two
deputies.
Henry was also dispatched to the scene because the
report involved an allegation of animal cruelty.
Henry and the
two deputies investigated the matter and found that Douglas had
several hunting dogs – including one that had been injured.
Douglas admitted that it was his practice to leash the dogs to
his moving truck in order to exercise them.
The injured dog in
question had apparently fallen and sustained a number of
abrasions and severe scrapes during one of these sessions.
The
injuries were not life-threatening.
Henry consequently wanted to take the injured dog to a
veterinarian for treatment and to confiscate Douglas’s remaining
dogs; however, Douglas refused to release any of his dogs to
Henry’s custody.
Later that day, Henry advised his immediate
supervisor, Jimmy Marsh, of what had happened.
In turn, Marsh
advised Johnny Hobdy, the Allen County Judge-Executive.
None of
the men were sure if they had the legal authority to confiscate
Douglas’s dogs, or at least the non-injured ones.
Hobdy
ultimately gave Marsh instructions that Henry was to take the
injured dog to the veterinarian for medical treatment, but that
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he was not to confiscate the other dogs until they could confer
with the Allen County Attorney about the situation on the
following Monday, November 3rd.
Henry denies ever being given
instructions by Marsh not to take the other dogs, but he was
aware that a meeting on the matter with the County Attorney was
set for that Monday.
In the meantime, Henry followed the advice of Andy
McDowell, an animal control officer in neighboring Warren
County, and returned to Douglas’s farm on Sunday, November 2nd,
to take all of the dogs into custody.
Henry drove the injured
dog to the veterinarian for treatment and lodged the other dogs
in the animal shelter.
After the dogs were confiscated, Henry
told Marsh what he had done.
Marsh subsequently told Hobdy, who
– upon hearing the news – called Henry and fired him for not
following the “chain of command” and ignoring instructions.
After his discharge, Henry filed a “cruelty to animals”
complaint against Douglas.
Douglas was prosecuted and found
guilty.
On January 30, 2004, Henry filed a verified complaint
against Allen County in the Allen Circuit Court claiming that
his discharge was in violation of the Kentucky Whistleblower Act
contained in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 61.101 to 61.103.
Specifically, Henry contends that he was discharged because he
reported Douglas’s criminal activity, and that his actions are
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considered protected under the Act.
Allen County denied this
allegation, contending that it discharged Henry for a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason.
The case was tried before an Allen
County jury for three days beginning on March 9, 2005.
The jury
found for Allen County, and a judgment reflecting the jury’s
verdict was entered on March 16, 2005.
Henry’s subsequent post-
trial motion to alter, amend, or vacate the verdict was rejected
in an order entered on May 10, 2005.
This appeal followed.
appeal, Henry raises seven separate grounds for relief.
On
We
address each ground in turn.
ARGUMENTS
I.
Henry first argues that it was an abuse of discretion
for the trial court to allow Allen County Attorney William P.
Hagenbuch, Jr. to participate as counsel on behalf of the county
at trial because he called Hagenbuch to testify as a witness.
On October 28, 2004, Henry filed a motion asking the trial court
to recuse Hagenbuch from the case due to his participation in
the criminal prosecution of Lonnie Douglas; the court heard and
denied the motion on November 16, 2004.
Henry subsequently
filed a motion in limine on February 24, 2005 again asking the
court to exclude Hagenbuch as an attorney for Allen County
because:
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... he will be a witness called by the
Plaintiff. Attorney Hagenbuch’s testimony
is very important, because he knows that
Lonnie Douglas threatened to sue the County
for taking possession of his dogs, his
knowledge of the criminal warrant and
complaint issued against Lonnie Douglas, his
knowledge of who made the decision to return
Lonnie Douglas’ dogs to him, and his
conversation with Ann Chynoweth. Attorney
Hagenbuch cannot be both a witness and an
advocate for Allen County.
Once again, the court denied the motion - this time following a
lengthy evidentiary hearing on the first day of trial.
However,
the court did allow Henry to call Hagenbuch as a witness.
On
appeal, Henry again argues that Hagenbuch “should not have acted
as an advocate for Allen County and as a witness.”
Kentucky Supreme Court Rules (SCR) 3.130-3.7(a)
provides that a lawyer generally “shall not act as an advocate
at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary
witness.”
In cases where this rule comes into play, a trial
court must take special care to balance a party’s right to be
represented by counsel of his or her own choosing versus
prejudice to the opposing party’s case.
Zurich Ins. Co. v.
Knotts, 52 S.W.3d 555, 558 (Ky. 2001), citing SCR 3.130-3.7(a),
Comment (4) (“[A] balancing is required between the interests of
the client and those of the opposing party.
Whether the
opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the
nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the
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lawyer’s testimony, and the probability that the lawyer’s
testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses.
Even if
there is risk of such prejudice, in determining whether the
lawyer should be disqualified due regard must be given to the
effect of disqualification on the lawyer’s client.”).
With this said, however, the disqualification of
counsel “is a drastic measure which courts should be hesitant to
impose except when absolutely necessary.”
Id. at 560, citing
University of Louisville v. Shake, 5 S.W.3d 107 (Ky. 1999).
Of
particular note here, “the showing of prejudice needed to
disqualify opposing counsel must be more stringent than when the
attorney is testifying on behalf of his own client, because
adverse parties may attempt to call opposing lawyers as
witnesses simply to disqualify them.”
Id.
The opposing party
must prove that (a) counsel’s testimony is important to his
proof at trial; (b) it is probable that counsel’s testimony will
conflict with that of other witnesses; and (c) the information
obtained from counsel is unattainable from other sources.
Id.
We review a trial court’s decision as to a motion to recuse or
to disqualify an attorney for abuse of discretion.
See 7
Am.Jur.2d Attorneys at Law § 204 (1997).
At the evidentiary hearing, Hagenbuch testified that
he had no involvement in the events leading up to Henry’s
discharge, and that he did not learn of Henry’s firing until he
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talked to Hobdy on Monday, November 3, 2003.
He also indicated
that he did not give his legal opinion that Allen County lacked
the authority to confiscate Douglas’s healthy dogs until after
Henry was fired.
He further indicated that he recused himself
from the criminal prosecution against Douglas upon learning that
Henry was contemplating suing the county.
The trial court
ultimately held that Hagenbuch had no important information
regarding Henry’s discharge, that Henry offered no evidence that
would contradict Hagenbuch’s testimony, and that Henry had not
established that the information to which Hagenbuch would
testify was unobtainable from other witnesses.
The court also
noted that the county had “more than an academic interest” in
having Hagenbuch as a representative because it more than likely
had no insurance coverage to cover a potential punitive damages
award.
As noted, the court consequently denied Henry’s motion
to disqualify Hagenbuch as counsel, but allowed Henry the option
of calling him at trial as a witness.
After reviewing the parties’ briefs and the record, we
do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling
in this fashion.
The court gave ample consideration to Henry’s
position and heard testimony from two witnesses before reaching
its decision.
Moreover, we are skeptical that the jury was
“confused” by Hagenbuch’s status as a witness and attorney given
that he did not take an active role as an advocate in front of
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the jury; instead, his involvement at trial appears to have been
limited to arguing over jury instructions out of the jury’s
presence.
Our case law is clear that disqualification of an
attorney under SCR 3.130-3.7 should only occur when “absolutely
necessary.”
Zurich, 52 S.W.3d at 160, citing Shake, supra.
We
simply do not believe that the court abused its discretion in
finding that such a necessity was nonexistent here.
Henry also argues that Hagenbuch should have been
disqualified pursuant to SCR 3.130-1.9, which deals with
situations where attorneys may have a conflict of interest
relating to a former client.
Henry specifically contends that
Hagenbuch was his “representative” in the context of Lonnie
Douglas’s criminal prosecution because he was the complaining
party at the beginning of that proceeding.
Henry also raised
the argument at the evidentiary hearing that Henry’s former
status as an Allen County employee precluded Hagenbuch’s
representation of Allen County at trial here due to a conflict
of interest.
In reviewing the record, however, it appears that
although Henry raised this general “conflict of interest”
argument during the evidentiary hearing, the trial court instead
based its ruling entirely on SCR 3.130-3.7.
We cannot find that
Henry ever asked the court to specifically address his SCR
3.130-1.9 contention before Hagenbuch testified at trial.
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Our
case law is well-established that a failure to insist on a
ruling or admonition from a trial court when an objection is
made as to a particular matter operates as a waiver of that
issue for purposes of appellate review.
Hayes v. Commonwealth,
175 S.W.3d 574, 596 (Ky. 2005), citing Bell v. Commonwealth, 473
S.W.2d 820, 821 (Ky. 1971); Commonwealth v. Pace, 82 S.W.3d 894,
895 (Ky. 2002), citing Bell, supra.
We similarly believe that
Henry has failed to preserve any conflict argument here by
failing to insist upon a ruling on this point at the trial
level.
With this said, however, we also note that Henry has
provided us with nothing in terms of substantive legal authority
to support his theories as to there being an attorney-client
relationship between Hagenbuch and himself, nor any evidence to
suggest that he was ever a “client” of Hagenbuch while in his
capacity as a dog warden in Allen County, with the exception of
a general citation to SCR 3.130-1.9.
Indeed, Hagenbuch
testified that he had never been involved in a suit involving
the Allen County Animal Shelter, and that he had never consulted
with Henry about the facts of this case.
Consequently, we again
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
failing to disqualify Hagenbuch on these grounds.
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II.
Henry next argues that it was an abuse of discretion
for the trial court to include the word “may” in its punitive
damages instruction instead of the word “shall.”
We disagree.
The instruction in question reads as follows:
If you have answered ‘YES’ to the question
on Instruction No. 2 and ‘NO’ to the
question on Instruction No. 3 you may, in
your discretion, award to the Plaintiff as
punitive damages such sum, if any, as you
believe will punish the Defendant for its
conduct and discourage such conduct in the
future.
While we question whether this issue is even properly reviewable
given that the jury did not ever reach the issue of punitive
damages in its determination, we nevertheless consider it
because it is easily resolvable.
While it is true that the Kentucky Whistleblower Act
allows for the awarding of punitive damages, see KRS 61.103(2);
KRS 61.990(4); Commonwealth Dept. of Agriculture v. Vinson, 30
S.W.3d 162, 165 (Ky. 2000), our courts have long held that “[i]t
is the well-settled rule in this and in almost all jurisdictions
that punitive damages are not recoverable as a matter of right,
but that their allowance rests entirely in the discretion of the
jury.”
Hurst v. Southern Ry. Co. in Kentucky, 184 Ky. 684, 212
S.W. 461, 462 (1919) (Citations omitted); see also Wittmer v.
Jones, 864 S.W.2d 885, 890 (Ky. 1993) (“The jury’s decision as
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to whether to award punitive damages remains discretionary
because the nature of punitive damages is such that the decision
is always a matter within the jury’s discretion.”).
As our
predecessor court noted in Neely v. Strong, 186 Ky. 540, 217
S.W. 898 (1920):
The rule is that an instruction which
permits the recovery of punitive damages
should designate the elements in the act
complained of which the jury must believe
from the evidence to exist to warrant their
imposition and to direct the jury that, if
it believes that such elements existed in
the act complained of, it may, in the
exercise of a sound discretion, impose
punitive damages not to exceed the sum, in
all, of the damages claimed.
Id., 217 S.W. at 901 (Emphasis added) (Citations omitted).
The instruction in question clearly complies with this
well-established authority and the long-standing premise that
punitive damages are inherently discretionary.
Indeed, our
predecessor court has held that it is error for a trial court to
give an instruction to a jury mandating an award of punitive
damages in the event the grounds for such an award existed
instead of leaving the matter to the jury’s discretion.
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Logan’s Adm’x, 178 Ky. 29, 198 S.W.
537, 538 (1917) (Citation omitted).
We also note that Henry’s
own proffered jury instructions reflect these principles of law,
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despite his arguments to the contrary.2
Accordingly, his
argument must be rejected.
III.
Henry next contends that the trial court erred in
conducting its own questioning of witness Jimmy Marsh, his
immediate supervisor at the animal shelter, as to what
instructions Marsh actually gave him on Saturday, November 1st
concerning the confiscation of Lonnie Douglas’s dogs.
As noted
by Allen, however, Henry failed to make any sort of
contemporaneous objection to this questioning or any motion to
strike the answers resulting therefrom at trial.
“As there were
no objections made, the trial court was not given the
opportunity to pass upon the merits of these allegations which
are not properly preserved for review.
decline to consider this challenge.”
We must therefore
Gray v. Commonwealth, 979
S.W.2d 454, 457 (Ky. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Morrow
v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.3d 558 (Ky. 2002); see also Charash v.
Johnson, 43 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Ky.App. 2000).
In any event,
Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 614(b) grants trial courts the
2
“Jury Instruction No. 2” of Henry’s “Amended Jury Instructions,” offered on
March 8, 2005, reads – in relevant part – as follows: “If you find for the
Plaintiff, Robert Henry, under Jury Instruction No. 1, and if you are further
satisfied from the evidence that the Defendant ... acted towards the
Plaintiff, Robert Henry, with reckless disregard, you may in your discretion
award punitive damages against the Defendant[.]” (Emphasis added).
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authority to interrogate witnesses,3 and from our review of the
record we do not believe that the trial court abused this
authority here.
Consequently, Henry’s assertions in this
respect must again be rejected.
IV.
Henry next argues that the trial court failed to
properly instruct the jury on Allen County’s burden of proof
under the Kentucky Whistleblower Act.
In order to demonstrate a
violation of KRS 61.102, an employee must establish four
specific elements:
(1) the employer is an officer of the state;
(2) the employee is employed by the state;
(3) the employee made or attempted to make a
good faith report or disclosure of a
suspected violation of state or local law to
an appropriate body or authority; and (4)
the employer took action or threatened to
take action to discourage the employee from
making such a disclosure or to punish the
employee for making such a disclosure.
Davidson v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Military Affairs, 152 S.W.3d
247, 251 (Ky.App. 2004), citing Woodward v. Commonwealth, 984
S.W.2d 477, 480-81 (Ky. 1998).
“The employee must show by a
preponderance of evidence that ‘the disclosure was a
contributing factor in the personnel action.’”
3
Id., citing KRS
Specifically, KRE 614(b) provides: “Interrogation by court. The court may
interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party.” We also note
that KRE 614(d) allows for objections to a court’s interrogation to “be made
out of the hearing of the jury at the earliest available opportunity.” As
noted, no such efforts were made here.
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61.103(3) & 61.103(1)(b).
Once this burden is met, “[t]he
burden of proof is then on the state employer ‘to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the disclosure was not a material
fact in the personnel action.’”
Id., citing KRS 61.103(3).4
After reviewing the instructions tendered to the jury,
we must reject Henry’s argument.
“Instruction No. 2” asks the
jury whether “the Plaintiff made a good faith report of an
actual or suspected violation of State or Local law to an
appropriate authority” and whether “the Plaintiff’s good faith
report was a contributing factor in the decision to terminate
his employment.”
If the jury answered “Yes” to this inquiry
(which it did not do), it was instructed to then move on to
“Instruction No. 3,” which asks: “Do you believe that the
Defendant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the
Plaintiff’s good faith report of an actual or suspected
violation of State or Local law was not a material factor in the
decision to terminate the Plaintiff’s employment?”
We believe
that said instructions clearly and appropriately reflect the
burden-shifting elements set forth in KRS 61.103(3) and
Davidson.
As the jury found that Henry did not meet his burden
4
KRS 61.103(3) reads as follows: “Employees filing court actions under the
provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall show by a preponderance of
evidence that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel
action. Once a prima facie case of reprisal has been established and
disclosure determined to be a contributing factor to the personnel action,
the burden of proof shall be on the agency to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the disclosure was not a material fact in the personnel
action.”
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of establishing by a preponderance of evidence that his
“disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel action,”
there was no need for it to consider the question of whether
Allen County had established by clear and convincing evidence
that the disclosure was not a material factor in the decision to
fire him.
Accordingly, we must conclude that no error exists
here.
V.
Henry next argues that it was error for the trial
court to remark to the prospective jurors during voir dire that
defense counsel’s wife was from Allen County.
Again, however,
Henry failed to make any objection or voice any requests for
relief at the time this remark was made.
Accordingly, the issue
is not preserved for our review.
VI.
Henry next contends that the trial court erred in
allowing Andy McDowell’s deposition testimony to be read to the
jury when McDowell was unavailable to testify and efforts to
secure his live testimony by Henry were unavailing.
As noted
above, McDowell was the animal control officer in Warren County
from whom Henry sought advice about taking Douglas’s dogs.
The
deposition was originally conducted during the discovery process
by Allen County.
The use of depositions at trial is covered by
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 32.01, and any decisions
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by a trial court relating to such use are left to the court’s
“reasonable discretion.”
See Phelps Roofing Co. v. Johnson, 368
S.W.2d 320, 324 (Ky. 1963).
Henry specifically contends that “[i]t was an abuse of
discretion [for the trial court] to not order Andy McDowell to
testify live at trial.”
However, from our review of the record,
it appears as if no request for such an order was ever made by
Henry or anyone else, and that it was Henry himself who chose to
read parts of the deposition to the jury.
Moreover, Henry has
again cited us to nothing in terms of legal authority in support
of his argument, as is required by CR 76.12(4)(c)(v).5
Instead,
his argument is nothing more than a recitation of his failed
personal efforts to secure McDowell’s presence at trial.
We
also note that while the subject heading of Henry’s argument
suggests that he claims further error in the fact that Allen
County was allowed to read its deposition questions and answers
to the jury before his, nothing in his actual argument itself
addresses this claim.
We therefore decline to address it.
Consequently, we again find that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion as to this issue.
5
CR 76.12(4)(c)(v) provides, in part, that an appellant's brief shall contain
“[a]n ‘ARGUMENT’ conforming to the Statement of Points and Authorities, with
ample supportive references to the record and citations of authority
pertinent to each issue of law....”
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VII.
Henry finally argues that the jury panel was tainted
by a juror’s communications regarding the case.
Specifically,
he contends that his counsel was informed by another client that
juror Johnna Michelle Marr talked about this case at her place
of employment, and that Marr was involved in another potential
“whistleblower” situation at the time the case was being tried.
Although Henry claims that this argument was preserved in his
pre-trial motions in limine and in his post-trial motions, we do
not find from our review of those motions nor the post-trial
motion hearing that this is even remotely the case.
Indeed, it
does not appear that this argument was ever presented to the
trial court, and it is not otherwise contained or supported in
the record; instead, it is a matter raised for the first time on
appeal.
While this fact, in and of itself, does not prevent us
from considering a claim of juror misconduct, see CR 61.02;
Deemer v. Finger, 817 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Ky. 1990), we also note
that we have been provided with no supporting documentation or
evidence – particularly affidavits - on appeal to substantiate
Henry’s claims.
Accordingly, even if we were to review Henry’s
argument under a “palpable error” standard – which we have not
been asked to do – we do not believe that we have been given
enough information to meet this heightened standard.
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Put more
succinctly, we believe that we have been provided with nothing
of substance upon which to base a claim of error.
We further note that from our review of Henry’s motion
to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, the only claim for
error relating to voir dire reads as follows:
The last jurors that were on the jury did
not completely answer the prior questions
presented by the Plaintiff in [voir] dire.
It was an abuse of discretion to not call
more jurors, so the Plaintiff was not
pressured to accept the jurors that did not
answer many of the prior questions before
the question regarding $650,000.00 damages.
However, we again note that Henry failed to raise any sort of
objection to the number of potential jurors, nor their failure
to fully answer all of the proffered questions during voir dire.
We further note that Henry appears to have withdrawn this claim
of error at the post-trial hearing on his motion to alter,
amend, or vacate the verdict.
The claim is therefore not
preserved for our review, and all of Henry’s contentions in this
respect are rejected.
CONCLUSION
Having found no grounds for vacation or reversal as to
any of Henry’s appellate claims, we need not consider the issues
set forth in Allen County’s cross-appeal.
Accordingly, the jury
verdict and judgment of the Allen Circuit Court is hereby
affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Nancy Oliver Roberts
Bowling Green, Kentucky
D. Gaines Penn
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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