RICK BELL v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 2, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001000-MR
RICK BELL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCREARY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JERRY D. WINCHESTER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00088
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ACREE, AND SCHRODER,1 JUDGES; HUDDLESTON,2 SENIOR JUDGE.
ACREE, JUDGE:
Rick Bell (Bell) appeals the judgment of the
McCreary County Circuit Court sentencing him to two (2) years in
prison.
On February 23, 2005, the jury returned a verdict
finding Bell guilty of the first degree sexual abuse of R.W.
For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm.
1
Judge Wilfrid A. Schroder completed this opinion prior to the expiration of
his term of office on December 31, 2006. Release of the opinion was delayed
by administrative handling.
2
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
Bell and his wife, Jean Bell (Mrs. Bell), have a
daughter, Jennifer.
Jennifer is mentally handicapped and has a
physical illness that has rendered her completely disabled.
Jennifer is bedridden and breathes with the assistance of a
ventilator.
Due to her illness, Jennifer requires twenty-four
(24) hour respiratory and nursing care.
To assist them with
Jennifer’s care, the Bells utilized private duty
nurses/respiratory therapists through Lifeline Home Health
(Lifeline).
For sixteen hours each day, during two eight-hour
shifts, one of five Lifeline nurses/therapists spent time in the
Bell home.
R.W. was employed by Lifeline and began working the
day shift in the Bell home in June 2003.
During her shift, Bell
was usually home and Mrs. Bell was not.
R.W. testified that she
began having problems with Bell during the last few weeks she
worked in his home.
During those weeks, Bell began making
sexually suggestive comments to R.W.
Initially, she did not
tell anyone.
On June 15, 2004, while R.W. was at Jennifer’s
bedside, Bell came into the room and began discussing his sex
life.
He then left the room.
R.W. continued her work and Bell
again came into Jennifer’s bedroom.
floor near R.W.
Bell bent over towards the
R.W. testified that she thought he was
adjusting the position of Jennifer’s air mattress.
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However,
Bell grabbed the lower part of R.W.’s leg from behind and began
moving his hand up towards her genital region.
to stop and tried to break free of him.
R.W. told Bell
Bell did not stop and
continued moving his hand up her leg and grabbed her behind and
crotch area.
R.W. was finally able to free herself from Bell’s
grasp.
Bell threw his hands into the air and said, “Okay, okay,
okay.”
Bell then left the room.
R.W. remained in the Bell home for approximately
thirty minutes.
She left when a delivery person arrived at the
house and was able to accompany her to her car.
She drove to
her husband’s business and told him about the incident.
R.W.
then drove to Lifeline to inform Rosalyn Allison (Allison), her
supervisor, of what had occurred.
At trial, three other Lifeline nurses employed at the
Bell home testified to incidents in which Bell engaged in
similar behavior they deemed inappropriate.
Also, during
rebuttal, Allison testified that when confronted with the
allegations against her husband, Mrs. Bell stated “he may have
done it, but they always left with a smile on their faces.”
Bell denied all of the allegations made by R.W. and
the other testifying nurses.
He and his wife expressed their
belief that the nurses were retaliating against them because of
complaints Mrs. Bell made to Lifeline about each of them.
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The jury returned a verdict finding Bell guilty of
first degree sexual abuse.
Pursuant to a plea bargain with the
Commonwealth, Bell received a sentence of two years.
This
appeal followed.
On appeal, Bell raises five issues:
(1) the trial
court erroneously denied him access to the employment records of
prosecution witnesses; (2) the employment records should have
been admitted into the record on avowal for appellate review;
(3) the Commonwealth failed to provide proper notice of its
intention to introduce evidence of prior bad acts; (4) evidence
of prior bad acts were wrongly admitted at trial, and; (5) the
trial court's jury instructions failed to define the term
“forcible compulsion.”
Prior to trial, in October 2004, Bell filed a Motion
to Allow Release of Employment and Complaint Records.
Bell
sought to inspect the personnel records of two prosecution
witnesses R.W. and another Lifeline nurse who worked in the Bell
home.
The Commonwealth never had these records, they were in
the possession of Lifeline.
The motion generally listed
possible uses of any potential evidence, but it did not state
why the records were being sought or what information would be
found that was material to this case.
The motion was denied.
Bell filed a Renewed Motion to Allow Release of Employment and
Complaint Records in January 2005.
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Again he sought the records
of R.W. and her fellow caregiver in addition to two other
Lifeline nurses employed in the Bell home and potential
prosecution witnesses.
requesting the records.
Bell provided no further reasoning for
The renewed motion was denied.
Bell states that it was his belief that the nurses
testifying in this case made it a practice to accuse clients of
impropriety when they believed the clients were dissatisfied
with their work, hoping that later complaints by the clients
would not be believed by the employer.
He sought the records
hoping to find evidence to support this theory and use when
cross-examining the women.
However, Bell gives no basis for his
theory or support for his assertion that evidence of this kind
would have been found in the records.
Bell has failed to offer anything other than his
supposition that this scheme existed.
There is nothing in the
record that suggests these women accused other clients of
inappropriate behavior, had other clients who were dissatisfied
with their work, or had complaints filed against them by other
clients.
Bell cites Eldred v. Commonwealth, 906 S.W.2d 694 (Ky.
1995), in support of his position.
However, Eldred dealt with a
defendant’s right to discover witnesses’ mental health records,
not employment records.
More importantly, Eldred was abrogated
by Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554 (Ky. 2003).
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In
Barroso, the Supreme Court held in-camera review of a witness’s
psychotherapy records is authorized only upon receipt of
evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable belief that the
records contain exculpatory evidence.
Id. at 564.
Even if we
were to treat employment records on a par with mental health
records, Bell’s argument fails.
Bell did not establish a
reasonable belief that the nurses’ employment records contained
exculpatory evidence.
a belief.
He presented no evidence to support such
Consequently, the trial court did not err by denying
either motion.
We also disagree with Bell’s contention that the trial
court erred by refusing to allow him to “put disallowed evidence
[of the employment records] on the record through avowal.”
For
support, Bell relies on Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE)
103(a)(2), which states in pertinent part:
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits
or excludes evidence unless a substantial
right of the party is affected; and
. . . .
(2) Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is
one excluding evidence, upon request of
the examining attorney, the witness may
make a specific offer of his answer to
the question.
KRE 103(a)(2) allows a party to preserve disallowed
oral evidence in the record so that upon review, an appellate
court can determine whether the trial court erred in excluding
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the evidence.
this case.
Again, this rule of evidence does not apply in
Whether the information contained in the employment
records was admissible evidence to be heard before a jury, was
never at issue.
The trial court deemed the records
undiscoverable.
Bell offers no procedure and this court knows
of none that allows undiscoverable materials to be entered into
the record.
We find Bell’s line of reasoning to be without
merit.
Bell next challenges the admission into evidence of
testimony concerning prior bad acts.
error.
Again, we perceive no
Bell claims testimony from the three other nurses
employed at the Bell home was outside the parameters of KRE
404(b).
Each nurse testified to similar occurrences of unwanted
sexual advances by Bell.
KRE 404(b) proscribes introduction of other crimes,
wrongs or bad acts “to prove the character of a person in order
to show action in conformity therewith” subject to exceptions
such as those delineated in subsection (1) of that rule.
Evidence of this type may be admissible however:
If offered for some other purpose, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
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In Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882, 889 (Ky.
1994), the Supreme Court of Kentucky reaffirmed its prior
holding that:
[E]vidence of criminal conduct other than
that being tried, is admissible only if
probative of an issue independent of
character or predisposition, and only if its
probative value on that issue outweighs the
unfair prejudice with respect to character.
Quite recently, the Supreme Court cited Bell v.
Commonwealth in reiterating the criteria for admission of such
evidence:
“In determining the admissibility of other crimes
evidence, three inquiries need to be separately addressed:
relevance, (2) probativeness, and (3) prejudice.”
(1)
Matthews v.
Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 19 (Ky. 2005).
Applying the Bell criteria to the admission of the
allegedly improper evidence in Bell's case, we find no abuse of
the discretion afforded the trial court.
The testimony was
directed to proving that Bell’s actions were part of an on-going
course of conduct.
Each incident involved a female Lifeline
employee working in Bell’s home.
Each act occurred in Bell’s
home when the nurse was on duty.
All but one instance, involved
Bell engaging in inappropriate sexual conversation with his
victim.
Each act involved Bell taking the victim by surprise
and inappropriately touching her.
The evidence is sufficiently
similar and denotes commonality necessary to fit the exception
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of KRE 404(b)(1).
This evidence constitutes proper KRE 404(b)
plan or “course of conduct” evidence and as such was properly
admissible.
Obviously it is prejudicial to Bell, however the
relevance and probative value of the testimony clearly
outweighed its prejudicial impact.
Bell further argues that the Commonwealth failed to
comply with the requirement in KRE 404(c) that the prosecution
give “reasonable pretrial notice” of its intention to use
evidence of the defendant's prior acts.
Appellant's argument is
without merit, as he raised objections to this exact issue (1)
by filing and arguing a motion in limine prior to trial; and (2)
when the evidence was offered at trial.
Soto v. Commonwealth,
139 S.W.3d 827, 858 (Ky. 2004) (“KRE 404(c) is satisfied if the
accused is provided ‘with an opportunity to challenge the
admissibility of this evidence through a motion in limine and to
deal with reliability and prejudice problems at trial.’”)
(citation omitted); see also Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d
13, 31-32 (Ky. 1998).
Finally, Bell argues that the trial court erred by not
defining the term “forcible compulsion” in the jury
instructions.
Because this issue is unpreserved, we must review
this matter, if at all, under the palpable error rule of RCr
10.26, which provides:
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A palpable error which affects the
substantial rights of a party may be
considered by the court on motion for a new
trial or by an appellate court on appeal,
even though insufficiently raised or
preserved for review, and appropriate relief
may be granted upon a determination that
manifest injustice has resulted from the
error.
The palpable error rule “is not a substitute for the requirement
that a litigant must contemporaneously object to preserve an
error for review . . . .
In determining whether an error is
palpable, ‘an appellate court must consider whether on the whole
case there is a substantial possibility that the result would
have been any different.’”
Commonwealth v. Pace, 82 S.W.3d 894,
895 (Ky. 2002)(citation omitted).
In the present matter, we
must determine whether the jury would have found Bell not guilty
had the definition of forcible compulsion been included.
Pertaining to the instruction on sexual abuse, the
jury was given the following instruction:
You will find the Defendant guilty of FirstDegree Sexual Abuse under this Instruction
if, and only if, you believe from the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of
the following:
A. That in this county on or about June 15,
2004, and before the finding of the
Indictment herein, he subjected Robin
Warrick to sexual contact; AND
B. That he did so by forcible compulsion.
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The trial court did not include in the instructions
the following definition of “forcible compulsion” found in KRS
510.010:
Physical force or threat of physical force,
express or implied, which places a person in
fear of immediate death, physical injury to
self or another person, fear of the
immediate kidnap of self or another person,
or fear of any offense under this chapter.
Physical resistance on the part of the
victim shall not be necessary to meet this
definition.
R.W. testified that Bell grabbed the back of her leg
and fondled her as she physically resisted and verbally
protested.
Bell continued his assault on R.W. until she was
able to physically push him away from her.
This act of physical
force is sufficient to meet the definition of forcible
compulsion.
We agree with Bell that including the definition
would have offered the jury further guidance in its decisionmaking.
However, we do not believe that doing so would have
changed the outcome of the jury’s deliberations, and we find no
error.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the McCreary County Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Linda Roberts Horsman
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew R. Krygiel
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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