COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, TRANSPORTATION CABINET AND LINDA JUSTICE v. DAN HALL
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 1, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY SUPREME COURT: AUGUST 15, 2007
(FILE NO. 2007-SC-0215-DG)
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000862-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
TRANSPORTATION CABINET AND
LINDA JUSTICE
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANNY P. CAUDILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00150
v.
DAN HALL
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, GUIDUGLI, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
This appeal presents this Court with the first
opportunity to consider whether Kentucky should allow the
interlocutory appeal of an order denying as a matter of law
immunity claims raised by the Commonwealth of Kentucky, its
agencies or officials in defense of litigation.
The United
States Supreme Court has charted a procedural course for the
federal courts which allows for immediate appeal of orders
denying either absolute or qualified immunity claims before the
party claiming that immunity is subjected to the burden and
expense of trial.
Finding the rationale of those cases equally
persuasive for cases pursued in Kentucky courts, we hold that an
order denying summary judgment on absolute or qualified immunity
grounds is subject to immediate appellate review to the extent
that it raises purely legal issues.
After reviewing the merits
of the pending action, we reverse that portion of the trial
court’s order denying the absolute immunity claim of the
Appellant Commonwealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet, but
affirm that portion of the order denying summary judgment on the
qualified immunity claim of Appellant Linda Justice.
RELEVANT FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
On February 18, 2000, the Transportation Cabinet
placed Dan Hall, an Equal Employment Opportunity Officer at the
Cabinet’s Pikeville office, on involuntary administrative leave.
Hall’s leave was described more specifically as “sick leave for
medical evaluation.”
According to the Cabinet, Hall had
responded angrily and inappropriately to the denial of his
request for permission to work on a holiday, to a change in
office security measures, and to an unfavorable performance
review.
Because of Hall’s uncharacteristically angry behavior,
Cabinet officials were allegedly concerned that he posed a
danger to himself or others in the office.
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The Cabinet required
Hall to take sick leave and conditioned his return to work upon
his being psychologically evaluated and found fit.
On Hall’s appeal, the Personnel Board upheld the
Cabinet’s order.
However, the Franklin Circuit Court, by order
rendered June 13, 2001, ruled that though the Cabinet had
authority pursuant to 101 KAR 2:102 § 2(2)(a)(4) to order Hall
to use his paid sick leave, the Cabinet did not have authority
to compel either a psychological evaluation or sick leave
without pay.
Accordingly, the circuit court ordered the Cabinet
to return Hall to his former position.1
The Cabinet appealed
that ruling and this Court, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed,
noting that the Cabinet was not authorized to substitute
involuntary sick leave for disciplinary proceedings.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet v. Hall, 2001CA-002244-MR (rendered November 22, 2002).
In the meantime, on February 15, 2001, Hall filed suit
in the Floyd Circuit Court against the Cabinet and his former
supervisor, Linda Justice, the Chief District Engineer for the
Pikeville district.
Alleging that the Cabinet and Justice (the
Defendants) undertook the February 2000 personnel action against
him in retaliation for his having reported Justice’s possible
ethical violations, Hall seeks damages under KRS 61.101 – KRS
61.103, the so-called Whistleblower Statutes, and under 42
1
Notwithstanding the circuit court order, Hall remained on unpaid, involuntary
sick leave until January 30, 2002, when the Cabinet terminated him for having
exhausted his one year unpaid leave allowance. Apparently Hall’s
administrative appeal of his termination is still pending.
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U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil rights statute.2
In February
2005, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground,
among others, that they are both immune to Hall’s federal civil
rights claim:
the Cabinet because it is not a “person” subject
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability, and Justice because she is
entitled to qualified immunity.
By order entered April 8, 2005,
the circuit court denied the motion.
This Court entered an order requiring the Defendants
to show cause why their appeal should not be dismissed due to
the absence of a final and appealable order.
In their response,
Defendants urged this Court to follow the lead of the federal
courts and permit interlocutory appeals from orders denying
summary judgment on immunity grounds.
A motion panel of the
Court passed this procedural issue to the merits panel for full
consideration of this issue of first impression.
APPEALABILITY OF THE ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON IMMUNITY
GROUNDS
Only judgments entered pursuant to a final order may
be reviewed on appeal, CR 54.01, and generally an order
overruling a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and
not appealable.
Gumm v. Combs, 302 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. 1957).
While this appeal appears to run afoul of that general rule, as
the Defendants aptly note, immunity claims are unlike other
defenses.
Immunity is not merely a defense against liability,
2
Although Hall’s complaint does not refer to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it does seek
damages for the alleged violation of his First Amendment rights, a claim the
parties have apparently agreed to construe as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.
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but is a shield against suit itself, meant to protect the state
and to a lesser extent its individual officers from the expense
and harassment of trial.
Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Government v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128, 135 (Ky. 2004).
Because
that interest in avoiding the burden of litigation is lost if
immunity is improperly denied and the claimant is subjected to
trial, an appeal from the final judgment comes too late to
afford meaningful relief.
For that reason, the United States
Supreme Court has held that “the denial of a substantial claim
of absolute immunity is an order appealable before final
judgment[.]”
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525, 105 S.Ct.
2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982)).
Similarly, the Supreme Court has held “that a district court’s
denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it
turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 [the appellate
jurisdiction statute] notwithstanding the absence of a final
judgment.”
2817.
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 530, 105 S.Ct. at
See also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct.
2151, 2156, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (emphasizing that to be
immediately appealable the qualified immunity issue must not
involve a genuine factual dispute, but rather must be “a purely
legal one: whether the facts alleged (by the plaintiff, or, in
some cases, the defendant) support a claim of violation of
clearly established law.”
(citation and internal quotation
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marks omitted)).
The Defendants maintain that the trial court’s denial
of their summary judgment motions should similarly be deemed a
final order for the purposes of CR 54, thereby permitting
immediate review of their immunity claims.
We agree.
Otherwise, as explained by the Supreme Court, meaningful review
is impossible.
Accordingly, notwithstanding the absence of a
final judgment, the Defendants have appropriately invoked this
Court’s jurisdiction, and we may entertain their appeal to the
extent that it raises purely legal grounds for challenging the
trial court’s order denying their immunity claims.
Cf. Sample
v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 695 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[A] denial of
qualified immunity on purely legal grounds is immediately
appealable.
A denial of qualified immunity that turns on
evidentiary issues is not.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Because our review is limited to issues of
law, the scope of that review is de novo.
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Id.
THE CABINET IS NOT A “PERSON” SUBJECT TO SUIT
UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Turning then to the merits of the appeal, 42 U.S.C. §
1983 provides that “every person” who, under color of state law,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress[.]
As the Cabinet correctly observes, the United States Supreme
Court has held that the States are not “persons” within the
purview of § 1983, Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), nor are
proxies of the State such as its agencies and its officials
acting in their official capacities.
Id.; Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79
L.Ed.2d 67 (1984).
In Jefferson Co. Fiscal Court v. Peerce, 132
S.W.3d 824, 835 (Ky. 2004), the Kentucky Supreme Court noted
that it is “well-established” that governmental entities which
enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity are not “persons” subject to
suit under § 1983.
Because the Cabinet’s immunity precludes
that portion of Hall’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit, the trial court
erred by denying its motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly,
we must reverse the trial court’s order in that respect, and
remand for entry of a new order dismissing Hall’s § 1983 claim
against the Cabinet.
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JUSTICE IS SUBJECT TO SUIT BECAUSE QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY DOES NOT APPLY
A state official, such as Justice, performing
discretionary duties and sued in her individual capacity for
monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, may assert a qualified
immunity defense.
As the Kentucky Supreme Court recently
explained:
Qualified immunity protects state and local
officials who carry out executive and
administrative functions from personal
liability so long as their actions do not
violate “clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct.
2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982.)
The Harlow objective reasonableness standard
“is intended to provide government officials
with the ability to ‘reasonably anticipate
when their conduct may give rise to
liability for damages.’” Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 647, 107 S. Ct.
3034, 3043, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987) (quoting
Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195, 104 S.
Ct. 3012, 3019, 82 L. Ed. 2d 139 (1984)).
In Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S. Ct.
2508, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002), the Supreme
Court held the objective reasonableness
standard requires a determination as to
whether the defendant official had “fair
warning” that his/her conduct violated
federal law.
Lamb v. Holmes, 162 S.W.3d 902, 907-08 (Ky. 2005).
In making
that determination, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit has ruled, courts are to employ a three-step
inquiry:
First, we determine whether, based upon the
applicable law, the facts viewed in the
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light most favorable to the plaintiff[] show
that a constitutional violation has
occurred. Second, we consider whether the
violation involved a clearly established
constitutional right of which a reasonable
person would have known. Third, we
determine whether the plaintiff has offered
sufficient evidence to indicate that what
the official allegedly did was objectively
unreasonable in light of the clearly
established constitutional rights.
Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d at 695-96.
(emphasis supplied).
Thus, the qualified immunity determination is not about the
merits of the underlying § 1983 claim, but rather is a threshold
determination based on the facts as viewed in the light most
favorable to plaintiff.
The plaintiff must make a satisfactory
showing as to each of these three elements to defeat the public
official’s qualified immunity defense.
Id. at 696.
According to Hall’s deposition testimony, in early
1999 he informed the Secretary of the Cabinet that Justice had
promoted a relatively inexperienced office worker over a
significantly more experienced one and, further, the promoted
employee had fraudulent academic credentials.
Later, in
December 1999, he complained to the Secretary that Justice had
approved encroachment permits3 for companies which then hired
Justice’s husband to provide construction services.
Hall
alleges that his relationship with Justice became strained
following the first complaint.
He further alleges that in
January 2000, soon after his complaint about the encroachment
permits, Justice gave him the first unsatisfactory performance
3
Encroachment permits grant adjoining landowners permission to build access
ways to state-controlled roads.
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rating in his thirteen years as a State employee.
Justice
insists that Hall’s allegedly angry response to the performance
rating led to his administrative suspension and eventually to
his termination.
However, Hall maintains that the poor
performance rating and his suspension were in fact retaliation
for his reports to Justice’s superiors concerning her
potentially unethical hiring and permitting decisions.
That
retaliation, he claims, violated his clearly established First
Amendment right to speak out on matters of public concern and
entitles him to damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Construing the record in the light most favorable to
Hall, as we must, we agree that he has adequately alleged a
constitutional violation.
As Hall correctly notes, his speech
as a public employee is protected if it “may be fairly
characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public
concern[,]” and if his interest in speaking freely is not
“outweighed by the state’s interest in promoting the efficiency
of public services.”
Williams v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 24
F.3d 1526, 1534 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); internal
quotation marks omitted).
Speech disclosing public corruption,
moreover, “is a matter of public interest,” id. at 1535
(citation omitted), and the “disclosure” of that alleged
corruption need not be made to the public at large, but may be
made privately to an employer or superior.
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Givhan v. Western
Line Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410, 99 S.Ct. 693,
58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979).
Here, Hall’s report concerning the promotion of an
inexperienced employee with allegedly fraudulent academic
credentials could perhaps be characterized as an internal office
matter, rather than an issue of public concern.
However, his
report that some of the encroachment permits Justice approved
may have violated KRS 11A.020(1)(a) and (c) -- provisions of the
Executive Branch Code of Ethics prohibiting officials from using
their offices for private gain -- clearly addressed an issue of
malfeasance that was of public concern.
There is no indication,
furthermore, and Justice does not claim, that Hall’s report was
likely to, or did, interfere in any way with the efficient
operation of the Cabinet’s Pikeville office.
We agree with
Hall, therefore, that his report concerning potentially
unethical encroachment permits was constitutionally protected
and any adverse actions taken against him by Justice for having
made that report, if proven, violate his First Amendment rights.
We further agree with Hall that the First Amendment
rights on which he premises his claim were clearly established
by January 2000, the time of the alleged violation.
As just
noted, by 1983 the United States Supreme Court had established
that public employees retain their First Amendment rights to
speak out on matters of public concern.
supra.
Connick v. Myers,
In 1994, in Williams v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, supra,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that a field
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office manager’s criticism of potentially corrupt or unlawful
hiring practices in her state agency came within that First
Amendment protection.
In light of those cases, a reasonable
public official in Justice’s position would have realized that
similar criticism of potentially unethical decisions regarding
encroachment permits was likewise a matter of legitimate public
concern protected under the First Amendment.
Finally, in light of Hall’s clearly established First
Amendment right to inform the Secretary of what he believed to
be Justice’s improper involvement with encroachment permits
inuring to the benefit of her husband’s construction company,
Justice’s alleged response -- her allegedly pretextual
performance review and her role in Hall’s allegedly illegal
suspension -- were, if proven, objectively unreasonable.
A
reasonable official had “fair warning” that Hall’s First
Amendment right to speak out on matters of public interest was
not to be sanctioned at all, much less sanctioned by suspension
from his job.
Thus, viewing the record in the light most favorable
to Hall, he has met the three-part test and Justice is precluded
from asserting qualified immunity.
At a trial on the merits of
Hall’s § 1983 action, the jury may reject his claim that his
poor performance review and suspension were unlawful retaliation
for the lawful exercise of his First Amendment rights and may
find instead that these were lawful actions taken for legitimate
reasons, wholly unrelated to Hall’s reports to Justice’s
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superiors.
For purposes of defeating qualified immunity and
securing his right to present his case to a jury, however, Hall
has met his threshold burden.
In sum, Justice is not entitled to qualified immunity
and thus the trial court did not err in denying her motion for
summary judgment.
The trial court did err in failing to
recognize that the Cabinet is immune to Hall’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim.
Accordingly, we reverse the April 8, 2005, order of the
Floyd Circuit Court to the extent that it denied summary
judgment to the Cabinet, but affirm that order’s denial of
relief to Justice, and remand for additional proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Stewart C. Burch
Logan & Gaines, PLLC
Frankfort, Kentucky
Lawrence R. Webster
Pikeville, Kentucky
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