CUSTOM TOOL AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY; RODNEY N. CUNNINGHAM v. SANDRA FULLER; JOHNSON, TRUE & GUARNIERI, LLP
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 19, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000857-MR
AND
NO. 2005-CA-001078-MR
CUSTOM TOOL AND
MANUFACTURING COMPANY;
RODNEY N. CUNNINGHAM
v.
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM ANDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES R. HICKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00248
SANDRA FULLER;
JOHNSON, TRUE &
GUARNIERI, LLP
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR JUDGE; ROSENBLUM,1 SENIOR JUDGE; MILLER,2 SPECIAL
JUDGE.
MILLER, SPECIAL JUDGE:
Custom Tool and Manufacturing Co. and
Rodney N. Cunningham appeal from a judgment of the Anderson
1
Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
2
Retired Judge John D. Miller, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
Circuit Court entered upon a jury verdict adjudging the
appellants liable to appellee Sandra Fuller upon various claims
associated with an incident in which Cunningham, Fuller’s
employer, called Fuller into his office and showed her
pornographic videos.
Fuller cross-appeals alleging
insufficiency of damages.
For the reasons stated below, we
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Parties
Custom Tool is a tool and dye and manufacturing
company headquartered in Anderson County, Kentucky.
The company
was founded by Cunningham and he and his wife own all of the
stock in the company.
Cunningham is the President and
Secretary/Treasurer of the Company, and his wife is the Vice
President.
Cunningham is the sole member of the Board of
Directors.
Fuller began working for Custom Tool in May or June of
1988.
Initially she was hired as a quality control employee in
the Wire Harness Division.
About 18 months following her
employment, she was promoted to plant manager of the division.
As plant manager, she reported directly to Cunningham.
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Fuller’s Version of Events
According to Fuller, from the time of her hiring it
was common to hear jokes and comments of a sexual nature on
Custom Tool premises, though during his time she did not
personally experience any direct sexual harassment.
However,
upon becoming manager of the wire harness plant, she began to
have more frequent and direct contact with Cunningham and began
experiencing individualized harassment.
According to Fuller, the harassment involved
inappropriate sexual comments.
Among these were an occasion
when she was kneeling down getting something off of a low shelf
and Cunningham commented that “he liked women in that position”;
an occasion when she was walking in front of Cunningham and he
commented “the view is really good from back here”; that
Cunningham constantly commented on the way she dressed, and when
she would wear shorts he would ask “where do your legs stop”;
that when she was leaning over her desk working on a project,
Cunningham would ask if she could bend over farther; that when
they were alone he would often raise the subject of pornographic
videos; and that when he would personally deliver her paycheck
he would make “sexually charged” comments.
Fuller testified
that while the foregoing made her feel uncomfortable, she dealt
with them by changing the subject back to work related matters.
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On March 11, 1999, Cunningham telephoned Fuller at
approximately 4:00 p.m. and asked if she could stop by his
office on her way home from work.
Fuller arrived as requested
and Cunningham asked her to wait around for a few minutes.
As
the last employee was leaving, Cunningham asked her to lock the
building door on her way out.
Cunningham then shut the door of his office, turned to
Fuller, and began telling her that he had been having dreams
about her, and that he had a pornographic video which he wanted
her to watch because it had a performer in it which he believed
resembled her.
Fuller testified that his comments shocked her.
Cunningham then picked up the VCR remote control and started
playing a pornographic video.
It initially depicted a woman
masturbating before progressing to oral sex involving another
performer.
Fuller stated that she did not believe the person in
the movie resembled her, but Cunningham kept insisting that it
did.
Cunningham then ejected the first video and put in a
second video which was cued to a scene depicting an interracial
couple engaging in sex.
As he played this video, Cunningham
instructed Fuller to come over to the edge of his desk.
Cunningham then leaned back in his chair, rubbed the
outside of his pants in the groin area and made an up and down
motion as if he were masturbating.
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While doing so, Cunningham
told Fuller that he gets excited while watching these videos.
Fuller exclaimed “gross,” and said she needed to leave.
Cunningham, however, kept insisting that she stay and watch more
of the videos as he began fast-forwarding to different scenes.
Fuller got up to leave, and as she turned toward the
door Cunningham physically restrained her by placing his arm
around her waist.
said “stop.”
Fuller immediately pulled away from him and
Fuller described the physical contact as “a
forcible pull against her will” which was unwelcomed and
threatening.
Fuller demanded that Cunningham open the door, but
before he did so, he suggested that the two of them take an
overnight trip together, which she perceived to be a proposition
for sex.
Fuller again demanded that Cunningham open the door,
and he finally did so.
Once outside, Cunningham began making excuses for why
he did what he had done by saying that his mother had been sick
and he had been under a lot of stress because his business was
struggling.
He also stated that he and his wife had been having
the best sex of their marriage and he could not understand why
he did what he had just done.
Fuller went home that evening and discussed the
incident with her husband.
He asked her if she wanted him to
call Cunningham and she said she would handle it herself.
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Fuller attempted to return to work on her next regular
workday, which was March 15, 1999.
She woke up at approximately
4:30 a.m. that morning as she always had to get ready for work,
but when she opened her closet and saw her Custom Tool work
shirts, she was physically unable to put them on as she felt she
had Cunningham’s name printed across her chest.
did go to work that day.
However, she
After she arrived at work, all she
could think about was what had occurred on March 11, and she
feared that Cunningham would walk in or call at anytime and that
she had no control over the situation.
Specifically, she
indicated that she felt she was at Cunningham’s mercy.
Fuller discussed the incident with Wanda Lay, who was
her office manager.
While doing so, Fuller described herself as
crying, having difficulty talking, and being emotionally out of
control.
Fuller testified that she was also concerned that
people would not believe her because Cunningham always made sure
the two of them were in a one on one circumstance when he would
make sexually suggestive comments and when he behaved as he did
on March 11.
Because Fuller believed that Cunningham would
again try to offer some excuse for his behavior, she decided she
could better protect herself if she were able to record his
comments so she purchased a tape recorder.
Ultimately, Fuller
concluded that she simply could no longer work at Custom tool if
she were unable to have a work-related conversation with her
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boss without having to worry about him making harassing and
unwelcome comments and her having to record him for her own
protection and proof.
Cunningham’s Version of Events
According to Cunningham, prior to March 11, 1999, he
and Fuller had shared in sexual-related jokes and had had
conversations about pornographic videos, and Fuller had been
receptive to this.
He denied that he had made any comments such
as “he liked women in that position”; “the view is great from
here”; or ever propositioned her for sex.
It is uncontested that in the spring of 1998 he and
Fuller attended a wire harness conference in El Paso, Texas.
During that visit, he and Fuller walked into Mexico and on the
way back to the hotel, the two went into an adult video store
and together viewed pornographic videos in a booth.
Later that
night they watched a basketball game in his hotel room.
Based upon their prior sexual-joking; conversations
regarding pornographic videos; and his understanding of Fuller’s
receptiveness to such matters, Cunningham did not believe Fuller
would be offended by his playing her the videos on March 11,
and, indeed, did not believe it was unwelcome.
Cunningham agrees generally with the events of March
11.
However, he maintains that he first asked Fuller if she
wanted to view the videos for the purpose of seeing the actress
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that supposedly looked like her, and she responded that she did.
As such, Cunningham believes that Fuller acquiesced in watching
the videos.
Cunningham also denies Fuller’s claims that he at
anytime locked his office door, attempted to block her access to
the door, placed his hands upon her at anytime, or propositioned
her to take an overnight trip.
He also maintains that at no
time did she appear upset by the events as they were happening
or as they left the office immediately afterwards.
Trial Proceedings
On November 24, 1999, Fuller filed a Complaint against
Custom Tool and Cunningham in Anderson Circuit Court.
Complaint alleged seven causes of action:
The
Sexual Harassment and
Hostile Work Environment in violation of the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act; Gender Discrimination in violation of the Kentucky
Civil Rights Act; Assault; Battery; Wrongful Discharge; Tort of
Outrage; and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.3
On December 20, 1999, Cunningham and Custom Tool filed
an answer to Fuller’s Complaint, in which they also asserted a
Counterclaim as follows:
that they had been damaged by Fuller’s
dereliction of her duties as plant manager with respect to
quoting, bidding and handling inventory for various jobs; that
3
We note that the tort of outrage and the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress are the same tort.
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they had been damaged by her failure to timely return her
company car; defamation; and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
Thereafter, Fuller filed an Amended Complaint
reasserting all of her original claims and, in addition, adding
an additional claim for Retaliation in violation of the Kentucky
Civil Rights Act based upon the appellants’ counterclaim.
Trial was held on September 20 – September 23, 2004.
The trial court entered a directed verdict dismissing
appellants’ counterclaims against Fuller.
Upon Fuller’s claims,
the jury returned a verdict as follows:
1. Sexual Harassment – Hostile Work Environment; verdict
in favor of Fuller; damages - $100.00.4
2. Constructive Discharge – verdict in favor of Fuller;
damages - $5,088.73.
3. Retaliation – verdict in favor of Fuller; damages $0.00.
4. Assault and Battery – verdict in favor of Cunningham
and Custom Tool.
5. Outrageous Conduct – verdict in favor of Fuller;
damages - $100.00.5
6. Punitive Damages (in connection with outrageous conduct
verdict) - $10,000.00.
4
The jury had originally returned a verdict of $0.00 damages, but the jury
was instructed to return to the jury room and award some amount of damages.
5
The jury had originally returned a verdict of $0.00 damages, but the jury
was instructed to return to the jury room and award some amount of damages.
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Post-verdict Fuller filed a motion for an award of
attorney fees.
On October 20, 2004, the trial court entered
judgment in accordance with the jury verdict.
The judgment also
awarded Fuller attorney fees and litigation expenses of
$59.518.89.
The parties filed motions to alter, amend, or
vacate in accordance with Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
59, which were denied.
These appeals followed.
APPPEAL NO. 2005-CA-000857-MR
We first consider the issues raised by Custom Tool and
Cunningham in their appeal.
ENTITLEMENT TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The appellants first contend that they were entitled
to summary judgment upon Fuller’s claims of Sexual Harassment –
Hostile Work Environment; Gender Discrimination; Assault;
Wrongful Discharge; Tort of Outrage; and Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress.
In other words, all claims originally
asserted by Fuller except the Assault and Battery claims.
As the appellants prevailed upon the Assault and
Battery counts, their claims to summary judgment on those issues
are moot.
The standard for summary judgments in Kentucky is
well-known.
One element of the analysis is whether “‘as a
matter of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the
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respondent to produce evidence at the trial warranting a
judgment in his favor and against the movant.’”
Steelvest, Inc.
v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 483 (Ky.1991)
(quoting Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255, 256
(Ky.1985)).
In using the word “impossible” in Steelvest, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that it “is used in a practical
sense, not in an absolute sense.” Perkins v. Hausladen, 828
S.W.2d 652, 654 (Ky. 1992).
Now that the trial has been held and the verdict
rendered, in retrospect, we now know that it was not impossible
for Fuller to have prevailed upon her claims of Sexual
Harassment – Hostile Work Environment; Gender Discrimination;
Assault; Wrongful Discharge; Tort of Outrage; and Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress.
Fuller prevailed with a
favorable verdict on all of these claims.
Hence, from our advantage of hindsight, we know that
the appellants were not entitled to summary judgment on these
counts because it was not impossible for Fuller to prevail at
trial.
ENTITLEMENT TO DIRECTED VERDICT
The appellants argue that they were entitled to a
directed verdict upon all claims in which the jury returned an
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adverse verdict.6
We first set forth our standard of review upon
denial of a directed verdict.
We then review the individual
claims.
Standard of Review
When reviewing a jury verdict, the appellate court is
restricted to determining whether the trial judge erred in
failing to grant a motion for directed verdict. The reviewing
court must consider all evidence favoring the prevailing party
as true and is not at liberty to determine the credibility or
weight which should be given to the evidence.
Lewis v. Bledsoe
Surface Mining Co., 798 S.W.2d 459 (Ky.1990).
The reviewing
court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
claimant, refrain from questioning the credibility of the
claimant, and from assessing the weight which should be given to
any particular item of evidence.
United Parcel Service Co. v.
Rickert, 996 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1999).
The appellate court is
required to consider the evidence in the strongest light
possible in favor of the opposing party.
S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. App. 1985).
Taylor v. Kennedy, 700
After completion of the
evidentiary review, the decision must be affirmed unless the
6
While the appellants moved for a directed verdict at the close of Fuller’s
case, she alleges that the directed verdict issue is not preserved because
the appellants did not move for a directed verdict at the close of all the
evidence. While it is well settled that a criminal defendant in a criminal
case must move for a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth’s case
in order to preserve sufficiency of the evidence as an issue for appeal, see
Baker v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 54 (Ky. 1998), we are unable to locate
corresponding authority that such is required in a civil case. We will
accordingly address the appellants directed verdict arguments on the merits.
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verdict rendered is “‘palpably or flagrantly’ against the weight
of the evidence so as ‘to indicate it was reached as a result of
passion or prejudice.’”
Lewis v. Bledsoe Surface Mining Co. at
461-462 (Ky. 1990).
Sexual Harassment – Hostile Work Environment
This claim arises under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 344.010 et seq.
Under the
Kentucky Civil Rights Act, it is unlawful for an employer, on
the basis of sex, to “discriminate against an individual with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment ··· [or] to limit, segregate, or classify employees
in any way which would ··· tend to deprive an individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect status as
an employee.”
KRS 344.040. The Kentucky Act is similar to Title
VII of the 1964 federal Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1), and should be interpreted consistently with federal
law.
Meyers v. Chapman Printing, 840 S.W.2d 814, 821 (Ky.
1992).
A sexual harassment claim can be brought based upon a
hostile or abusive work environment.
Meritor Saving Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986).
For
sexual harassment to be actionable under the Meritor standard,
it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the
conditions of the plaintiff's employment and create an abusive
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working environment.
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at
2405, 91 L.Ed.2d at 60; Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17,
114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 784-86, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2282-83, 141
L.Ed.2d 662, 675 (1998); Meyers, 840 S.W.2d at 821.
In other
words, hostile environment discrimination exists “when the
workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an
abusive working environment.”
Williams v. General Motors Corp.,
187 F.3d 553, 560 (6th Cir.1999)( citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21,
114 S.Ct. 367 (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
Moreover, the “incidents must be more than episodic; they must
be sufficiently continuous and concerted in order to be deemed
pervasive.”
Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority, 890
F.2d 569, 577 (2d Cir.1989).
As stated by the United States
Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems, the harassment must
also be both objectively and subjectively offensive as
determined by “looking at all the circumstances.”
510 U.S. 17,
23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 371, 126 L.Ed.2d 295, 302; Faragher, 524 U.S.
at 786-87, 118 S.Ct. at 2283, 141 L.Ed.2d at 676; Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-82, 118 S.Ct.
998, 1002-03, 140 L.Ed.2d 201, 208 (1998)( quoting Harris).
These circumstances may include “the frequency of the
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discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance.”
Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. at 371;
Ammerman v. The Board of Education of Nicholas County, 30 S.W.3d
793 (Ky. 2000).
In general, an isolated incident of sexual misconduct
is not actionable under Title VII.
Clark Cty. School District
v. Breeden, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 1510 (2001) (citing Faragher, 524
U.S. at 788); Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc., 113 F.3d 476,
482 (3d Cir. 1997).
In exceptional cases, however, an isolated
incident may be actionable under Title VII if it is extremely
serious such that it alters the terms and conditions of
employment to create a hostile or abusive work environment.
See
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. In other words, a single incident may
support a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment
if the incident is “of such a nature and occurs in such
circumstances that it may reasonably be said to characterize the
atmosphere in which a plaintiff must work. . . .”
LaRose v.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 21 F.Supp.2d 492 (E.D.Pa. 1998).
For example, a single incident of physical assault or offensive
touching has been held to be sufficiently severe to support a
hostile work environment claim. See e.g., Grozdanich v. Leisure
Hills Health Center, Inc., 25 F.Supp.2d 953, 969-70 (D.Minn.
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1998) (holding that a reasonable jury could find that an
isolated incident of sexual assault created a hostile work
environment).
See also Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 138 F.3d
733,736 (8th Cir.1998) (single attempted rape at national sales
meeting held sufficiently severe misconduct to be actionable);
Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir.1990)
(single incident where supervisor picked up plaintiff and forced
her face against his crotch impliedly considered to create
hostile environment); Fall v. Indiana University Bd. of
Trustees, 12 F.Supp.2d 870, 879 (N.D.Ind.1998) (single assault,
involving a groping of intimate areas, may create hostile
environment).
To establish a hostile work environment claim created
by a supervisor, an employee must prove “(1) that she is a
member of a protected group; (2) that she was subject to
unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based
on sex; and (4) that the harassment affected a term, condition,
or privilege of employment.”
Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co.,
223 F.3d 721, 736 (8th Cir. 2000) (Applying Title VII).
Again, we view the evidence on this issue in the light
most favorable to Fuller.
While the March 11, 1999, incident
was the culminating event, this is not a case of a single
isolated event.
Previous incidents included when Fuller was
kneeling and Cunningham commented that “he likes women in that
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position; the incident when Fuller was walking in front of
Cunningham and he commented “the view is good from here”; the
incident when he had suggested that they get a motel room
together; the incidents when he had raised the issue of
pornographic videos; and the incident when he took her to an
adult video store in El Paso, Texas.
The March 11, 1999, incident can only be characterized
as a “serious” or “severe” episode.
As previously recounted, on
that occasion Cunningham played a video of a woman masturbating
and engaging in oral sex and told Fuller that the performer
looked like her; played a second video involving interracial
oral sex; made a gesture simulating masturbation; locked the
office door during this time; stood between the door and Fuller;
placed his hands on Fuller; and propositioned her to go on an
overnight trip.
Based upon the particularly egregious conduct of March
11, 1999, in combination with the lesser incidents prior to
that, we will not disturb the jury’s findings that Cunningham’s
conduct created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment.
In connection with this argument the appellants
contend that they were entitled to prevail on this claim based
upon their defense that following the March 11, 1999, incident
the company had responded properly by investigating the incident
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and requiring Cunningham to attend sexual harassment sensitivity
training.
We note, however, that the appellants did not seek to
have the jury instructed upon this defense, and, accordingly,
the jury did not have the opportunity to weigh the merits of the
defense in its deliberations.
By failing to request an
instruction on the defense, we deem the matter as waived.
Lastly, in connection with this argument the
appellants contend that liability for this claim may not be
placed upon Cunningham individually.
However, the judgment does
not impose individual liability upon Cunningham for this claim
but, rather, places liability upon the company only.
This issue
is accordingly moot.
Constructive Discharge
The appellants allege that they were entitled to a
directed verdict upon Fuller’s constructive discharge claim.
"The commonly accepted standard for constructive
discharge is whether, based upon objective criteria, the
conditions created by the employer's action are so intolerable
that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign."
Northeast Health Management, Inc. v. Cotton, 56 S.W.3d 440, 445
(Ky. App. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Brooks v.
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Housing Authority, 132 S.W.3d
790, 807 (Ky. 2004).
Constructive discharge presents a question
of fact that, in jury trials, should be decided by the jury and
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not the trial court.
Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d
360, 361 (9th Cir.1987) Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Housing Authority, 132 S.W.3d 790, 807 (Ky. 2004).
Viewing the evidence introduced at trial in the light
most favorable to Fuller, we conclude that she produced evidence
of constructive discharge upon which reasonable jurors could
find for her under the above standard.
We have previously
discussed the conduct engaged in by Cunningham both prior to and
on March 11, 1999.
In addition, Fuller testified regarding her
inability to continue working under Cunningham.
This was
evidence sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict of
constructive discharge.
Retaliation
The appellants contend that they were entitled to a
directed verdict upon Fuller’s Retaliation claim.
KRS 344.280
provides, in relevant part, that
It shall be an unlawful practice for a
person, or for two (2) or more persons to
conspire:
(1) To retaliate or discriminate in any
manner against a person because he has
opposed a practice declared unlawful by this
chapter, or because he has made a charge,
filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in any
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this chapter; . . . .
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After filing her complaint, the appellants filed a
counterclaim alleging to the effect that they had been damaged
by Fuller’s dereliction of her duties as plant manager with
respect to quoting,
bidding and handling inventory for various
jobs; that they had been damaged by her failure to timely return
her company car; defamation; and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
Fuller argued that the counterclaims were brought in
retaliation for her having filed a lawsuit under the Civil
Rights Act.
A reasonable jury could have inferred and concluded
that the appellants were motivated in filing their counterclaim
against Fuller to retaliate against her for filing a Civil
Rights lawsuit against them.
We also note that Fuller was
granted a directed verdict upon all of these claims, and that
the appellants did not appeal the dismissal of those claims.
We
accordingly will not disturb the jury’s verdict on this claim.
Outrageous Conduct
The appellants contend that they were entitled to a
directed verdict upon Fuller’s outrageous conduct claim.
The
elements of this claim are as follows: 1) The wrongdoer's
conduct must be intentional or reckless; 2) The conduct must be
outrageous and intolerable in that it offends against the
generally accepted standards of decency and morality; 3) There
must be a causal connection between the wrongdoer's conduct and
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the emotional distress; and 4) The emotional distress must be
severe.
Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, 920 S.W.2d 61, 65 (Ky. 1996)
citing Craft v. Rice, 671 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Ky. 1984). It is for
the court to decide whether the conduct complained of can
reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit
recovery, bearing in mind that people are expected to withstand
bad manners, petty insults, unkind words and minor indignities.
See Whittington v. Whittington, 766 S.W.2d 73, 74 (Ky.App.1989)
(citing comment h to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46);
Kroger, 920 S.W.2d 61, 65.
The conduct at issue here is the March 11, 1999,
incident.
Again, that incident involved, as previously
recounted, Cunningham playing a video of a woman masturbating
and engaging in oral sex and telling Fuller that the performer
looked like her; playing a second video involving interracial
oral sex; making a gesture simulating masturbation; locking the
office door during this time; standing between the door and
Fuller; placing his hands on Fuller; and propositioning her to
go on an overnight trip.
We believe that the foregoing conduct can reasonably
be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery.
Moreover, Fuller testified as to her level of
emotional distress over the incident, and presented the
testimony of her husband and co-workers in support of same.
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We
note in particular that she was sufficiently upset over the
incident to quit her well-paying job as manager of the wire
harness plant.
As such, we will not disturb the jury’s verdict
on this claim.
Punitive Damages
The jury’s award of $10,000.00 in punitive damages is
supported solely by its verdict on the outrageous conduct
verdict.
And the appellants’ argument in opposition to the
award, as we construe their brief, is limited to the legitimacy
of the outrageous conduct verdict.
They make no argument that
the punitive damage award was excessive or was unconstitutional
under the BMW of N. Amer., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582, 116
S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), line of cases.
See also
Sand Hill energy, Inc. v. Smith, 142 S.W.3d 153 (Ky. 2004).
We
accordingly will limit our review to the issue as raised by the
appellants.
As previously discussed, we will not disturb the
outrageous conduct verdict.
As the appellant’s argument is
founded upon the premise that the outrageous conduct was
improper, neither will we disturb the punitive damages verdict.
FURTHER JURY DELIBERATIONS OF DAMAGES
When the jury returned its initial verdict, though it
had found in favor of Fuller on her claims of Sexual Harassment
– Hostile Work Environment; Constructive Discharge; Retaliation;
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and Outrageous Conduct, it returned a verdict of $0.00 damages
on each of these claims.
Fuller objected to the zero damage award on the Sexual
Harassment – Hostile Work Environment and Outrageous Conduct
claims, but not on the other two claims.
The trial court
instructed the jury to return to the jury room and award “some”
amount of damages on the Sexual Harassment – Hostile Work
Environment and Outrageous Conduct claims.
The jury did so, and
awarded $100.00 on each claim.
The appellants contend that the trial court erred by
permitting the jury to further deliberate on the Sexual
Harassment – Hostile Work Environment and Outrageous Conduct
claims.
We disagree.
“[I]n any case where the verdict is incomplete,
ambiguous, inconsistent, irregular or otherwise defective the
proper procedure should be that the jury be sent back to
complete or correct the verdict. . . . This is in accordance
with the basic principle of the Rules of Civil Procedure that
the trial court should be given the opportunity to correct upon
the trial any errors capable of correction by it, so as to avoid
the necessity of new trials.”
Smith v. Crenshaw, 344 S.W.2d
393, 395 (Ky. 1961).
The Sexual Harassment – Hostile Work Environment
instruction required the jury, as an element of the claim, to
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determine that the sexual harassing conduct had “caused injury
to the plaintiff’s psychological well-being.”
Similarly, the
instruction for the Outrageous Conduct claim required the jury
to determine that Fuller “did in fact suffer severe emotional
distress.”
Hence, for each of these claims the jury determined
that Fuller had suffered an injury.
The jury having so
determined, the verdict was inconsistent for failing to award
her some damages for those injuries.
The appellants rely upon Cooper v. Fultz, 812 S.W.2d
497 (Ky. 1991) (overruled on other grounds in Sand Hill Energy,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Company, 83 S.W.3d 483 (Ky. 2002)) and Miller
v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599 (Ky. 2001), for the proposition that the
verdicts were complete and, accordingly, Fuller’s remedy was to
file a motion for a new trial.
We are persuaded that Cooper and Miller, however, are
distinguishable.
Cooper and Miller concern whether it is
inconsistent to return a verdict for medical expenses and
yet fail to award damages for pain and suffering.
As stated in Miller “Miller's argument presupposes
legal inconsistency when a jury awards damages for medical
expenses and lost wages, but awards no damages to compensate the
plaintiff for pain and suffering.
The law in Kentucky, however,
does not require a jury to award damages for pain and suffering
in every case in which it awards medical expenses.”
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Miller
noted that there was evidence that the plaintiff had not
suffered additional pain and suffering as a result of the
automobile accident at issue in the case, and thus the jury’s
award of zero damages was supported by the evidence.
In our view, Cooper and Miller are limited to holding
that it is not necessarily inconsistent for a jury to make an
award for medical expenses and at the same time award $0.00 for
pain and suffering.
As noted above, however, both the Sexual
Harassment – Hostile Work environment instruction and the
Outrageous Conduct instructions contained an emotional harm
component as an element to recovery.
Hence, the damages
verdicts were necessarily inconsistent with the liability
verdicts.
It follows that the trial court properly instructed
the jury to deliberate further on the damage award for these
claims.
ATTORNEY FEES
The trial court awarded Fuller attorney fees and other
litigation expenses of $59,518.89 as requested.
The appellants
contend that this award is excessive.
KRS 344.450 provides that “[a]ny person injured by any
act in violation of the provisions of [The Kentucky Civil Rights
Act] shall have a civil cause of action in Circuit Court to
enjoin further violations, and to recover the actual damages
sustained, together with the costs of the law suit.
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The court's
order or judgment shall include a reasonable fee for the
plaintiff's attorney of record and any other remedies contained
in this chapter.”
The acceptable method of calculating a reasonable
attorney fee under KRS 344.450 was discussed in Meyers v.
Chapman Printing Company, Inc., 840 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1992).
“[T]he court should not undertake to adopt some arbitrary
proportionate relationship between the amount of attorney fees
awarded and the amount of damages awarded.”
Id. at 824-26.
Instead, an attorney fee should be calculated by multiplying
counsel's reasonable hours with a reasonable hourly rate to
produce a “lodestar” figure, which may then be adjusted due to
special factors in a particular case, such as the results
obtained by counsel.
Id. at 826.
When a statute authorizes the payment of attorney's
fees, our standard of review is to determine whether the court
abused its discretion.
King v. Grecco, 111 S.W.3d 877, 883
(Ky.App. 2002). The only requirement for a court is that the
award be “reasonable.”
Id.
with arithmetical accuracy.
An attorney fee cannot be fixed
The factors to be considered are
well summarized in Axton v. Vance, 207 Ky. 580, 269 S.W. 534,
536-537 (1925).
Briefly stated, they are: (a) Amount and
character of services rendered; (b) Labor, time, and trouble
involved; (c) Nature and importance of the litigation or
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business in which the services were rendered; (d) Responsibility
imposed; (e) The amount of money or the value of property
affected by the controversy, or involved in the employment; (f)
Skill and experience called for in the performance of the
services; (g) The professional character and standing of the
attorneys; and (h) The results secured.
See also Boden v.
Boden, 268 S.W.2d 632, 633 (Ky. 1954).
In the Final Order and Judgment, the trial court
addressed the issue of attorney fees as follows:
The plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
and other litigation expenses is granted.
The Court has reviewed the number of hours
expended by the plaintiff’s attorneys
concerning this matter and finds them to be
reasonable and necessary. The Court
specifically notes that no fees are being
sought for the plaintiff’s original
attorney[.] The Court further notes that
the plaintiff’s attorneys have not included
any hour for certain tasks, e.g., the
preparation and filing of the motion for
fees, and that they have carefully reviewed
their time records to delete some 22.7 hours
of time spent on this case, as well as not
billing for certain associate and paralegal
time. The Court also notes, and has
personally observed, that there was a
careful division of labor between
plaintiff’s two attorneys in terms of each
assuming responsibility for separate tasks,
thus avoiding any unnecessary duplication of
effort.
Finally, the Court finds that the hourly
rates sought for the plaintiff’s attorneys,
J. Guthrie True and David J. Guarnieri, are
reasonable. The rate of $300.00 per hour
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for Mr. True is reasonable given the nature
and extent of his experience. The rate of
$200.00 per hour for Mr. Guarnieri is
reasonable given the nature and extent of
his experience. Moreover, in finding that
these hourly rates are appropriate, the
Court has taken into consideration the
difficulty of prosecuting a civil
rights/sexual harassment case in Anderson
County, Kentucky. This is the first
occasion in this Court’s memory when a
plaintiff has obtained a verdict in a civil
rights/ sexual harassment case in Anderson
County. Moreover, this case was prosecuted
by an out-of-county plaintiff against a
local business and businessman. The
plaintiff’s attorneys assumed considerable
risk in attempting to prosecute a case
involving claims of sexual harassment under
such circumstances.
The trial court was in the best position to observe
Fuller’s attorneys, to assess their competency, and to determine
the value of their services to Fuller.
The trial court's
analysis as set forth above demonstrates that it carefully
reviewed the relevant factors in establishing a reasonable
attorney fee.
We also note that Fuller prevailed upon the
majority of her claims, including her Civil Rights claim, and
that the additional litigation expenses associated with the
other claims was negligible because the evidence necessary to
prosecute those claims was redundant with the Civil Rights
claim.
Considering the pertinent factors, we find no abuse of
discretion in the award of attorney fees.
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CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2005-CA-000857-MR
In her cross-appeal Fuller argues that “[b]ased upon
the evidence presented at trial concerning the appellants’
conduct and the attendant effects this conduct had on Fuller,
the zero awards for humiliation and emotional distress on the
issues of Constructive Discharge and Retaliation and the $100.00
awards for humiliation and emotional
distress on the Sexual
Harassment/Hostile Work Environment and the Outrageous Conduct
claims are grossly inadequate and clearly given in disregard of
the evidence.”
In Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984),7 our
Supreme Court set forth the test for a trial court to follow
when reviewing an award of actual damages for excessiveness or
inadequacy:
When presented with a motion for a new trial
on grounds of excessive damages, the trial
court is charged with the responsibility of
deciding whether the jury's award appears
“to have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice or in disregard of the
evidence or the instructions of the court.”
CR 59.01(d). This is a discretionary
function assigned to the trial judge who has
heard the witnesses firsthand and viewed
their demeanor and who has observed the jury
throughout the trial.
7
Davis was overruled on other grounds by Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 83 S.W.3d 483 (Ky. 2002). Sand Hill was subsequently vacated by Ford
Motor Co. v. Estate of Smith, 538 U.S. 1028, 123 S.Ct. 2072, 155 L.Ed.2d 1056
(2003).
- 29 -
Id. at 932.
2001).
See also Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Ky.
The Court went on to state the appropriate standard
for appellate review on the issue of excessive or inadequate
damages:
Upon reviewing the action of a trial judge
in (granting or denying a new trial for
excessiveness), the appellate court no
longer steps into the shoes of the trial
court to inspect the actions of the jury
from his perspective. Now, the appellate
court reviews only the actions of the trial
judge ··· to determine if his actions
constituted an error of law. There is no
error of law unless the trial judge is said
to have abused his discretion and thereby
rendered his decision clearly erroneous.
Davis, 672 S.W.2d at 932, quoting Prater v. Arnett, 648 S.W.2d
82, 86 (Ky. App.1983); see also Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d
806, 813 (Ky.App.2001).
In summary, we may only reverse the trial's court
order if we find that it was clearly erroneous.
Bayless v.
Boyer, 180 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Ky. 2005). We also note that “the
action of the trial judge is presumptively correct and the
appellate court will not hastily substitute its judgment for
that of the trial judge, who monitored the trial and was able to
grasp those inevitable intangibles which are inherent in the
decision making process of our system.”
Prater, 648 S.W.2d at
86.
Here, we cannot conclude that the trial curt abused
its discretion in denying Fuller a new trial upon her claims of
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Constructive Discharge, Retaliation, Sexual Harassment/Hostile
Work Environment, and the Outrageous Conduct.
While admittedly the evidence was contradictory, we
know of no objective test to determine the extent of one's
emotional distress that results from a civil wrong such as
occurred here.
We believe the matter is best left to a jury of
twelve ordinary citizens to evaluate.
As such, we conclude that
the circuit court did not err in declining to set the verdict
aside and grant a new trial on the issue of damages as requested
by Fuller.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Anderson
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS/CROSSAPPELLEES:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/CROSSAPPELLANTS:
David A. Weinberg
Lexington, Kentucky
J. Guthrie True
David J. Guarnieri
Frankfort Kentucky
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