BEN MUSGROVE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 17, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT:
OCTOBER 24, 2007
(2007-SC-0200-D)
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000719-MR
BEN MUSGROVE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCREARY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JERRY D. WINCHESTER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00023
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
Benjamin Musgrove has appealed from the
judgment and sentence of the McCreary Circuit Court entered on
March 7, 2005, following his conviction stemming from a charge
of Trafficking in a Controlled Substance First Degree.1
Having
concluded that the trial court erred in failing to excuse a
1
KRS 218A.1412 (2006).
disqualified juror during voir dire, we reverse and remand for a
new trial.
On October 3, 2003, Lake Cumberland Drug Task Force
Agent Robbie Clark and Kentucky State Police Detective Billy
Correll met with Mattie Patton, a confidential informant, to
arrange drug buys.
Ms. Patton arranged to buy a controlled
substance from the Appellant.
Upon arriving at Appellant’s
home, Patton asked Appellant how many “40s”2 she could get for
$200, and Appellant told her three.
Patton purchased three
Oxycontin pills from Appellant for $60 a piece.
Thereafter, a McCreary County Grand Jury indicted
Appellant for First-Degree Trafficking in a Controlled
Substance, and the case proceeded to trial on December 22, 2004.
During voir dire by defense counsel, juror number nine indicated
that he had served on the grand jury recently.
When asked how
recently he had served on the grand jury, he stated “last week.”
During a bench conference, defense counsel moved that the juror
be removed for cause due to the recent grand jury service.
The
Commonwealth stated that juror number nine had sat on the grand
jury for one day and that he had no knowledge of the Appellant’s
case.
The trial court denied the motion to strike juror number
nine for cause.
After a one-day jury trial, the jury returned a guilty
verdict against the Appellant for First-Degree Trafficking in a
Controlled Substance, and the trial court sentenced Appellant to
2
Ms. Patton testified that a “40” means Oxycontin, 40 Milligrams.
-2-
eight years.
The Appellant has instituted this appeal arguing
that his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury was
violated because juror number nine should have been struck for
cause.
Appellant argues that juror number nine was a
“disqualified juror” under KRS 29A.130 and 29A.080 and that
therefore, the trial court should have excused this juror as a
matter of law.
We agree and reverse the trial court’s
conviction and remand this case to McCreary Circuit Court for a
new trial.
Generally, a trial court’s decision whether to excuse
a juror for cause is reviewed for abuse of discretion.3
However,
this case turns on the interpretation of KRS 29A.130 and
29A.080.
The construction and application of statutes is a
question of law, and as such, is subject to the de novo standard
of review.4
The Appellant claims that the trial court erred by
failing to remove juror nine because by statute this juror was
disqualified from serving on the jury in this case.
The
Commonwealth argues that even if the trial court erred in
failing to remove juror nine for cause, this was harmless error
because Appellant used a peremptory strike to remove this juror
and he never sat on the jury which convicted the Appellant.5
3
Adkins v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 779 (Ky. 2003); Pendleton v. Commonwealth,
83 S.W.3d 522 (Ky. 2002).
4
Osborne v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 645, 648 (Ky. 2006), citing Bob Hook
Chevrolet Isuzu v. Transportation Cabinet, 983 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Ky. 1998).
5
See Morgan v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 99, 104 (Ky. 2006).
-3-
The sole issue before this Court is whether
Appellant’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury
was impaired when he was forced to use a peremptory challenge to
remove a juror who was otherwise disqualified from jury service
in this case.
The Appellant’s main contention is that since
Kentucky statutory law disqualified juror nine from sitting on
the jury, he should never have been permitted to remain
throughout voir dire once an objection was raised.
If juror
nine was disqualified as a petit juror in this case, and had
this juror not remained throughout voir dire, Appellant argues
that it would not have been necessary to use a peremptory
challenge to remove this juror.
Appellant cites KRS 29A.130,
which states:
(1)Except as set out in this section, in any
twenty-four (24) month period, a person
shall not be required to:
(c) Serve as both a grand and petit
juror.
This section does not state that a juror cannot serve on both
the grand and petit jury within the prohibited time frame; only
that the state cannot require or demand that any juror serve on
both a grand and petit jury within a twenty-four-month period.
However KRS 29A.130 is not the only relevant statute
in this case.
Additionally, KRS 29A.080(2)(g) must be
considered, which states:
(2) A prospective juror is disqualified to
serve on a jury if the juror . . . ;
-4-
(g) Has served on a jury within the
time limitations set out under KRS
29A.130.6
When read together, these two statutes form a bar disqualifying
any juror from serving on both the grand jury and the petit jury
within a twenty-four-month period.
Furthermore, KRS 29A.080(3)
states that the limitations on jury service contained in that
statute may not be waived.
The Commonwealth responds by claiming that the
Appellant did not properly preserve for appeal the argument that
juror number nine was barred by statute from serving on the
petit jury in this case.
However, this argument is without
merit.
At trial, Appellant’s counsel clearly and repeatedly
challenged juror nine for cause citing the fact that juror nine
had served on the grand jury recently, and this is one of the
specific reasons a juror may be “disqualified” under KRS 29A.080
and 29A.130.
The Commonwealth’s position would require
Appellant to cite with specificity the statute or section upon
which he was relying in order to remove juror number nine.
This
simply cannot be so, and the Commonwealth offers no case law or
statutory authority to support its position.
It is enough that
Appellant moved to strike juror nine for cause because he had
served on both the grand jury and petit jury in close proximity.
Therefore, Appellant’s position that KRS 29A.130 and KRS 29A.080
disqualified juror nine was sufficiently preserved in this case.
6
KRS 29A.080(2)(g).
-5-
The Commonwealth’s second position is that even if
Appellant’s statutory argument was properly preserved for
appeal, Appellant received all that he was entitled to receive
by having a fair and impartial jury.
The Commonwealth argues
that because Appellant used a peremptory strike to remove juror
nine, the trial court’s failure to remove juror nine was
harmless error.
In making this argument, the Commonwealth cites
to authority which states that a defendant’s right to be tried
by an impartial jury is infringed upon only if an unqualified
juror participates in the decision.7
Additionally, after the briefs had been filed in this
appeal, the Commonwealth filed a motion to cite subsequent
authority; namely Morgan v. Commonwealth.8
In Morgan, the
Supreme Court recently stated that as long as the jury that
actually hears and decides the case is impartial, there is no
constitutional violation, and even if a juror should have been
removed for cause, such error does not violate the
constitutional right to an impartial jury if the person did not
actually sit on the jury.9
However, Morgan and the cases cited by the
Commonwealth involved jurors who were biased or otherwise
prejudicial to the defendants, and the defendants in those cases
7
See Morgan v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 99 (Ky. 2006); Sanders v.
Commonwealth, 801 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Ky. 1990); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 836
S.W.2d 872, 890 (Ky. 1992), overruled on different grounds by St. Clair v.
Roark, 10 S.W.3d 482 (Ky. 1999).
8
189 S.W.3d 99 (Ky. 2006).
9
Morgan, 189 S.W.3d at 107.
-6-
were forced to use peremptory strikes.
Morgan held that a trial
court’s decision not to remove a biased juror from service is
not reversible error when the juror does not sit on the panel
which convicts the defendant.10
None of the cases upon which the
Commonwealth relies involved jurors who were disqualified from
service by statute.
Because the juror in this case was
disqualified by statute and should not have been permitted to
serve on a petit jury, the holding in Morgan is not controlling.
This case is easily distinguished from Morgan.
During
voir dire in Morgan, a juror disclosed that he was “good
friends” with the victim’s ex-husband, and that as a result, he
had heard a great deal about the alleged crimes.
When asked
whether he could find the defendant not guilty if the
Commonwealth failed to prove its case, the juror stated he would
feel like he would be betraying his friend and that he was
probably not the defense’s best choice as a juror.
The defense
moved to strike this juror for cause, but the trial court denied
this motion, and the defense was forced to use one of its
peremptory challenges to remove this juror.
The defendant was
later convicted at trial.
On appeal, the Supreme Court stated that the trial
court abused its discretion in not striking the juror for cause
because his answers during voir dire established a strong
inference of bias.11
10
Id.
11
It then stated that this was harmless error
Id. at 104.
-7-
because the defendant used one of his peremptory challenges to
make sure that a fair and impartial jury decided his case.12
The
Supreme Court quoted Dunbar v. Commonwealth and stated “[a]
defendant’s right to be tried by an impartial jury is infringed
only if an unqualified juror participates in the decision, and
as long as the jury that actually hears and decides the case is
impartial, there is no constitutional violation.”13
The Court
upheld the conviction because the biased juror was removed by
peremptory challenge and the error of the trial court in failing
to strike the biased juror was harmless since he did not play a
part in the conviction.
Morgan involves a different fact situation from the
case at hand.
There was no statutory basis for the juror in
Morgan to be deemed “disqualified,” meaning nothing would have
prevented this juror from being present at voir dire.
However,
in the case at hand, statutory law clearly “disqualified” juror
nine from serving on a petit jury since he had recently served
as a grand juror.
If the Morgan holding was controlling in this
case, it would render KRS 29A.080 and 29A.130 meaningless.
Court does not possess this power.
The
Because the legislature
deemed it necessary to place limitations on one’s qualifications
as a juror, this Court is bound to follow the statutes because
12
Id. at 106.
13
Id. at 107, citing Dunbar v. Commonwealth, 809 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1991).
-8-
procedural rules and statutes are not to be significantly
deviated from.14
Had juror nine not been disqualified under the
statutes and merely been biased, Morgan would be controlling and
the trial court’s failure to remove him would have been harmless
error.
However, in this case juror nine was disqualified from
service by statute and was not permitted to serve on a petit
jury.
Appellant should not have had to use a peremptory
challenge to remove this juror.
This creates reversible error.
It must be noted that this case presents peculiar
facts.
Normally, during jury orientation, the trial court would
ask questions as to why a prospective juror could not serve on a
jury or would be disqualified.
During this orientation process,
any disqualified jurors would be excused and would never be
empanelled.
However, at the time of orientation in this case,
juror nine had not yet sat on the grand jury and was not
disqualified.
He was empanelled on the petit jury and was later
pulled off the petit jury and placed on the grand jury.
Once he
was pulled off the petit jury and placed on the grand jury, he
became a disqualified juror by statute.
Because he had not sat
on the grand jury prior to the orientation process he was not
excused prior to voir dire in Appellant’s case.
This was the
only reason juror nine was present for voir dire in the first
place.
14
However, once a proper objection was raised, juror nine
Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 148 S.W.3d 817 (Ky. App. 2004).
-9-
should have been excused from the voir dire process due to the
statutory disqualification.
When a juror who is disqualified pursuant to KRS
29A.080 is permitted to remain in the jury pool following a
timely and properly made objection, the defendant’s due process
rights have been violated and he is entitled to a new trial.
In
Anderson v. Commonwealth,15 the defendant filed a motion for a
new trial following a jury verdict convicting him of seconddegree assault.
The motion alleged that one of the jurors in
his trial was a prior felon and thus disqualified pursuant to
KRS 29A.080 and Johnson v. Commonwealth.16
agreed and granted the defendant’s motion.17
The trial court
On appeal, the
Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s order because KRS 29A.080
disqualified the juror from service and remanded for a new
trial.18
The case before us is similar to Anderson in that
juror nine should have been stricken pursuant to KRS 29A.080.
Juror nine was statutorily ineligible to serve on Appellant’s
jury, and the trial court’s refusal to remove him for cause was
error.
We must reverse and remand for a new trial.
15
Anderson v. Commonwealth, 107 S.W.3d. 193 (Ky. 2003).
16
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 182, 223 S.W.2d. 741 (1949).
17
Anderson, 107 S.W.3d at 194-95.
18
Id. at 197.
-10-
For the foregoing reasons, the final judgment and
sentence of the McCreary Circuit Court is reversed and the case
is remanded for a new trial.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Donald H. Morehead
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Bryan D. Morrow
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-11-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.