PAULA PAYTON; AND MARY BLAKELY v. THOMAS E. CLAY; LACEY T. SMITH; AND THOMAS E. CLAY, PSC AND LACEY T. SMITH v. PAULA PAYTON; MARY BLAKELY; AND THOMAS E. CLAY
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 12, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000573-MR
PAULA PAYTON; AND
MARY BLAKELY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-006346
v.
THOMAS E. CLAY; LACEY T. SMITH;
AND THOMAS E. CLAY, PSC
APPELLEE
AND
NO. 2005-CA-000823-MR
LACEY T. SMITH
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-006346
PAULA PAYTON; MARY BLAKELY;
AND THOMAS E. CLAY
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: JOHNSON,1 JUDGE; PAISLEY,2 SENIOR JUDGE; MILLER,3
SPECIAL JUDGE.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Paula Payton and Mary Blakely have brought this
appeal from a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered on
March 7, 2005, dismissing their legal malpractice complaint
filed against their former attorneys Thomas E. Clay, Thomas E.
Clay, PSC, and Lacey T. Smith following a jury verdict in favor
of the attorneys.4
Having concluded that the trial court did not
err in allowing or excluding certain evidence, properly
instructed the jury, and properly granted a directed verdict in
favor of Clay and Smith, we affirm.
Payton and Blakely alleged the legal malpractice
occurred during Clay and Smith’s representation of them in an
action in the Bullitt Circuit Court in a case styled Holland
Income Tax, Inc. v. Payton and Blakely.5
At the time that the
Bullitt Circuit Court case was filed Payton and Blakely were
engaged in business preparing income tax forms.
Holland brought
1
Judge Rick A. Johnson completed this opinion prior to the expiration of his
term of office on December 31, 2006. Release of the opinion was delayed by
administrative handling.
2
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
3
Retired Judge John D. Miller, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
4
Additionally, Smith has filed a cross-appeal against Clay, Payton and
Blakely. We do not reach the merits of Smith’s cross-appeal because it is
moot in light of our affirmance of the trial court.
5
Civil Action No. 93-CI-00395.
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suit for injunctive relief against Payton and Blakely to enforce
a written franchise agreement and non-competition agreement it
had with Payton and Blakely.
Holland obtained a temporary
injunction enjoining Payton and Blakely from performing tax
preparation business while the lawsuit was pending, and a
permanent injunction enjoining Payton and Blakely for five years
under the non-competition agreement and awarded Holland over
$23,000.00 in damages for breach of the agreements.
Payton and Blakely then filed suit against Clay and
Smith for legal malpractice.
Specifically, Payton and Blakely
asserted that Clay and Smith were negligent in representing them
by failing to file a counterclaim for Holland’s alleged breach
of contract, failing to file two separate appeals they were paid
to file, failing to file a brief in this Court after Holland
filed an appeal regarding the temporary injunction, failing to
answer interrogatories, failing to answer requests for
production of documents, failing to answer requests for
admissions, failing to timely file a post-trial brief in the
Bullitt Circuit Court, and failing to certify parts of the
Bullitt Circuit Court record favorable to Payton and Blakely to
this Court.
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of Clay
and Smith on the claim that Payton and Blakely could no longer
bring a breach of contract action against Holland due to Clay
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and Smith’s negligence and a jury found in favor of Clay and
Thomas in regard to the remaining claims.
This appeal followed.
Payton and Blakely first assert that the trial court
erred by permitting Judge Thomas Waller to testify during the
trial of this matter.
Judge Waller presided over the action
Holland filed against Payton and Blakely in the Bullitt Circuit
Court.
He was called to testify during the malpractice trial by
Clay and Smith.
Prior to trial, Payton and Blakely filed a
motion in limine seeking to prevent Judge Waller from
testifying.
The trial court denied the motion and permitted
Judge Waller to testify; however, he was not permitted to
express any opinions.
At trial, Payton and Blakely renewed
their objection to Judge Waller’s testifying on the basis that
his testimony was prejudicial in itself, even if he only
testified concerning the proceedings and occurrences during the
Bullitt Circuit Court action and did not provide opinion
testimony regarding the alleged legal malpractice.
This
objection was overruled and Judge Waller was permitted to
testify.
Payton and Blakely rely upon Marrs v. Kelly,6 in
support of their contention that the trial judge erred in
permitting Judge Waller to testify during the trial of the
malpractice case.
6
In Marrs, a legal malpractice action was
95 S.W.3d 856 (2003).
-4-
filed on the basis that an attorney was negligent in failing to
introduce relevant evidence on behalf of his client in a
workers’ compensation proceeding.
In a deposition taken for the
malpractice action, the administrative law judge who presided
over the workers’ compensation action testified that she would
not have changed her award even if the evidence the attorney
failed to introduce had been presented.
On the basis of this
testimony, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the attorney in the malpractice action.
Our Supreme Court held that the testimony of the
administrative law judge should not have been allowed “as it
confused the role of an objectively reasonable judge with the
views of the particular judge and resulted in application of the
wrong standard for determining whether the legal malpractice
case should have been submitted to the trier of fact.”7
We
conclude, however, that Marrs is distinguishable from the facts
in the case before us.
First, Marrs does not totally prohibit a
judge who presided over the action underlying a legal
malpractice action from testifying in the legal malpractice
action.
Rather, “when the objective standard is observed in a
legal malpractice case, the judge in the underlying case may not
testify as to what a reasonable judge should have done.”8
7
95 S.W.3d at 859.
8
Id. at 861.
-5-
Judge
Waller did not provide improper testimony.
In the case before
us, he merely testified concerning the events and proceedings in
the underlying action between Holland and Payton and Blakely.
The trial court specifically prohibited Judge Waller from
expressing the type of opinions that the administrative law
judge gave in Marrs.
Although testimony concerning the events which
occurred during the underlying proceeding might have been
available from another source as Payton and Blakely contend, we
cannot conclude it was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion
to permit Judge Waller to provide this testimony.
Because Judge
Waller was not permitted to provide an opinion as to the
ultimate issue of what a reasonable judge or jury would have
done had Clay and Smith not been allegedly negligent in their
representation of Payton and Blakely, it was not error for the
trial court to allow his testimony in the legal malpractice
case.
Payton and Blakely next contend that the trial court
erred in permitting Clay and Smith’s expert witness, retired
Judge Michael O. McDonald, to testify regarding matters not
disclosed in Clay and Smith’s CR9 26.02 disclosure.
We review a
trial judge’s decision to admit or to exclude evidence for an
9
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-6-
abuse of discretion.10
The trial court abuses its discretion
when its decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.11
In the case before us,
we cannot conclude the trial court’s admission of Judge
McDonald’s opinions outside of those revealed in Clay and
Smith’s CR 26.02 disclosure constituted an abuse of discretion.
CR 26.02(4) provides as follows:
Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of
facts known and opinions held by experts,
otherwise discoverable under the provisions
of paragraph (1) of this rule and acquired
or developed in anticipation of litigation
or for trial, may be obtained only as
follows:
(a)(i) A party may through interrogatories
require any other party to identify each
person whom the other party expects to call
as an expert witness at trial, to state the
subject matter on which the expert is
expected to testify, and to state the
substance of the facts and opinions to which
the expert is expected to testify and a
summary of the grounds for each opinion.
Payton and Blakely propounded such an interrogatory to Clay and
Smith and, in their answer, Clay and Smith identified Judge
McDonald as an expert they intended to call to testify.
Clay and
Smith further noted that Judge McDonald had advised “that the
Plaintiffs would not be able to establish that they suffered an
adverse result in the appeal referenced in VII(d) of the
10
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000).
11
Id. at 581 (citing Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
-7-
complaint because no response was filed.”
At trial, Payton and
Blakely objected to Judge McDonald’s being permitted to express
an opinion regarding any alleged acts of negligence committed by
Clay and Smith in the Holland action other than the failure to
respond to the appeal noted in the answer to the interrogatory.
The trial court overruled Payton and Blakely’s
objection on the basis that it had already permitted their expert
witness to express opinions that had not been disclosed when the
expert was deposed by Clay and Smith.
Specifically, the trial
court permitted Payton and Blakely’s expert to testify as to how
Clay and Smith’s alleged negligence was the proximate cause of
damages to Payton and Blakely despite their counsel’s stating
during the expert’s deposition that he did not believe the expert
could offer such testimony because that was the ultimate question
for the jury to decide.
The trial court ruled that because he
had permitted Payton and Blakely’s expert to testify regarding
causation he would also permit Clay and Smith’s expert to testify
in rebuttal to that testimony.
We cannot conclude that this
decision on the part of the trial court resulted in an unfair
proceeding and, therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion to
admit the testimony of Judge McDonald.
Payton and Blakely also contend that the trial court
committed error by not instructing the jury regarding the
specific acts of negligence they alleged were committed by Clay
-8-
and Smith in the underlying action.
Additionally, they contend
that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on
punitive damages.
Payton and Blakely requested that the trial
court give the jury a negligence instruction which set forth the
general duty of Clay and Smith to exercise the degree of skill
and care of reasonably competent attorneys in undertaking
representation of Payton and Blakely and also set forth that such
duty included as specific duties the various acts of negligence
that they claimed were committed by Clay and Smith.
The trial
court rejected the instruction containing the specific duties and
instructed the jury regarding the general duty alone.
Blakely and Payton contend that the instruction did not
provide the jury with enough information to make an informed
decision.
We disagree.
Kentucky law mandates that trial courts
use “bare bones” jury instruction in all civil actions.12
As
stated by our Supreme Court,
The general rule for the content of
jury instructions on negligence is that they
should be couched in terms of duty. They
should not contain an abundance of detail,
but should provide only the bare bones of
the question for jury determination. This
skeleton may then be fleshed out by counsel
on closing argument.13
12
Olfice, Inc. v. Wilkey, 173 S.W.3d 226, 229 (Ky. 2005) (citing Lumpkins v.
City of Louisville, 157 S.W.3d 601 (Ky. 2005)).
13
Rogers v. Kasdan, 612 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Ky. 1981) (citing Cox v. Cooper, 510
S.W.2d 530, 535 (Ky. 1974)).
-9-
“The question to be considered on an appeal of an
allegedly erroneous instruction is whether the instruction
misstated the law.”14
It is not a matter of “which set of
proposed instructions best stated the law, but rather whether the
delivered instructions misstated the law.”15
In the case before
us, the instructions submitted to the jury correctly set forth
the law in regard to the duty Clay and Smith owed to Payton and
Blakely in undertaking to represent them in the Holland action.
The proposed instruction sought by Payton and Blakely, although
it correctly stated the general duty owed by Clay and Smith,
contained such an abundance of detail in the specific duties that
it gave “undue prominence to facts and issues.”16
Such an
instruction as the one tendered by Payton and Blakely created a
“rigid list of ways in which a defendant must act in order to
meet his duty.”17
The trial court did not err in rejecting the
proposed instruction.
Payton and Blakely also contend the jury should have
been given an instruction on punitive damages.
To recover
punitive damages in a legal malpractice case, it must be proven
that the attorney “acted with fraud, ill will, recklessness,
14
Olfice, 173 S.W.3d at 229 (citing Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Inc., 840
S.W.2d 814, 823 (Ky. 1992)).
15
Id. at 230 (citing Meyers, supra at 823).
16
Rogers, 612 S.W.2d at 136.
17
Id.
-10-
wantonness, oppressiveness, (or) willful disregard of the
(client’s) rights” [citation omitted].18
In their brief, Payton and Blakely assert that they
were entitled to an instruction on punitive damages on the basis
that they gave Clay money to file two separate appeals that were
never filed and that Clay used the money “to file other appellate
procedures in that action.”
We cannot conclude that such
allegations, even if true, constitute actions being carried out
with recklessness, malice, or deceit especially in light of the
fact the money was apparently used for appellate procedures on
behalf of Payton and Blakely.
As such, we cannot conclude the
trial court misapplied the law in denying Payton and Blakely’s
requested instruction on punitive damages.
Payton and Blakely further contend that the trial court
committed error by denying their motion to amend their complaint
during the trial to add “Paula and Mary, Inc.” as a plaintiff.
We disagree.
Paula and Mary, Inc. was apparently an S
corporation that Payton and Blakely had formed while running
their tax business for the purposes of reporting their business
income.
During the trial, Payton and Blakely moved the trial
court to amend their complaint to name the corporation as a
plaintiff.
18
The trial court denied the motion.
Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 400 (D.C.Cir. 1996).
-11-
The trial court has wide discretion in permitting the
amendment of pleadings.19
In this case, we cannot conclude the
trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to amend
the complaint to name the corporation as a plaintiff.
This
action had been pending for over six years when it went to trial.
Payton and Blakely were certainly aware that they had established
the corporation for the purposes of running their tax business.
Further, there does not appear to be any reason why the amendment
was necessary to the presentation of this matter to the jury.
Clay and Smith do not appear to have made an issue that the
proper party to the lawsuit was the corporation rather than
Payton and Blakely themselves.
Further, Payton and Blakely have
not alleged any harm or prejudice they sustained as a result of
the denial of their motion to amend.
Therefore, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the
motion to amend the complaint.
Finally, Payton and Blakely contend that the trial
court erred in directing a verdict in favor of Clay and Smith on
the allegation that the attorneys’ negligence resulted in Payton
and Blakely being unable to maintain a breach of contract action
against Holland.
The trial court granted the motion for directed
verdict on the basis that Payton and Blakely could still bring an
action against Holland for breach of contract because the statute
19
Givens v. Boutwell, 701 S.W.2d 146 (Ky.App. 1988).
-12-
of limitations for filing such an action had not expired at the
time of the trial of this matter.
Payton and Blakely assert that
this ruling was erroneous because such a claim must have been
brought as a counterclaim to Holland’s action against them in the
Bullitt Circuit Court and was, therefore, barred by res judicata.
We agree with Clay and Smith that Holland’s action in
the Bullitt Circuit Court seeking an injunction against Payton
and Blakely to enforce its non-competition clause does not
preclude Payton and Blakely from pursuing a breach of contract
claim against Holland.
The Bullitt Circuit Court action seeking
an injunction does not carry res judicata effect concerning any
breach of contract claim Payton and Blakely might have against
Holland arising from their business relationship.
The granting
of the injunction in favor of Holland in its action against
Payton and Blakely was interlocutory and did not constitute a
final judgment on the merits of any claim for breach of
contract20.
Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
20
Morgan v. Goode, 151 Ky. 284, 152 S.W. 584, 585 (Ky. 1912).
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
James T. Mitchell
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE THOMAS E.
CLAY:
Craig C. Dilger
W. Gregory King
W. Duncan Crosby III
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT LACEY T. SMITH:
Lacey T. Smith, Pro Se
Louisville, Kentucky
-14-
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