JOSHUA WRIGHT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 12, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000568-MR
JOSHUA WRIGHT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS M. STEPHENS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00426-002
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON AND BARBER,1 JUDGES, MILLER,2 SPECIAL JUDGE.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
Joshua Wright appeals from a March 2, 2005,
trial order and judgment of the Kenton Circuit Court finding him
guilty of first-degree assault, in violation of KRS 508.010, and
sentencing him as a youthful offender to ten years’
imprisonment.
Wright contends that the Commonwealth’s discovery
1
Judge David A. Barber dissented in this opinion and filed a separate opinion
prior to the expiration of his term of office on December 31, 2006. Release
of the opinion was delayed by administrative handling.
2
Retired Judge John Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
violation compromised his ability to put on a defense and
undermined the fairness of his trial.
We agree that the
Commonwealth’s belated, mid-trial disclosure of a statement
Wright made to the arresting officer and the use of that
statement to impeach Wright’s alibi defense was an unfair
surprise and is reasonably likely to have affected the outcome
of Wright’s trial.
Accordingly, we must reverse the trial
court’s judgment and remand for additional proceedings.
Wright and codefendant Michael Hurt were accused of
the June 8, 2004, drive-by shooting of Clifford Heard in
Covington.
The Commonwealth alleged that Hurt and one Darryl
Allen were engaged in a feud and that on the evening of June 8,
Hurt and Wright drove to Covington to confront Allen.
According
to witnesses, Hurt found Allen at the corner of Robbins and
Greenup, where he was standing with his friend Heard and several
others.
Hurt allegedly drove his car slowly around the corner,
and as he did so his passenger fired three or four shots in
Allen’s direction.
One of the shots struck Clifford Heard in
the back.
At Hurt’s and Wright’s joint trial, the Commonwealth
produced several witnesses to the shooting who identified Hurt
and his car and who testified that the passenger fired the
shots.
Although Allen and Heard both testified that Wright was
the shooter, neither of them, nor any of the other witnesses of
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the shooting, was familiar with Wright.
None of those witnesses
could identify Hurt’s passenger positively, and there was
conflicting testimony concerning the passenger’s race and
appearance.
For his defense, Hurt did positively identify Wright
as his passenger, asserted that the two had come to Covington
only to fist-fight with Allen, and claimed that when he saw how
many people were present he decided to postpone the fight.
He
was beginning to drive away, he claimed, when Wright produced a
handgun and started shooting.
He had been unaware of the
presence of the gun, he claimed, and had thus never intended its
use.
Wright presented an alibi defense premised on the fact
that he was never in Covington on the night Heard was shot.
He,
his mother, and three of his friends all testified that Wright
was near his home in Cincinnati playing basketball at the time
of the shooting.
Hurt was attempting to pin the crime on him,
Wright maintained, because he was a juvenile and so was apt to
be punished less severely than an adult.
A Cincinnati police officer, Officer Manson, arrested
Wright at his home a few hours after the shooting.
On cross-
examination, the Commonwealth asked Wright if he had not
admitted to Officer Manson that he had been in Covington that
evening.
Wright denied having said that to Officer Manson,
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whereupon the Commonwealth, outside the presence of the jury,
belatedly disclosed that Officer Manson had reported Wright’s
statement to the Commonwealth’s detective who investigated the
incident.
According to Officer Manson’s report, and then
according to his testimony at what evolved into an impromptu
suppression hearing, he had arrested Wright in Wright’s bedroom;
had advised him of his Miranda rights; and, when Wright had
denied any involvement in the shooting, had counseled him to be
truthful.
Wright then, according the Manson, said that he had
been in Covington but had not participated in the shooting.
Officer Manson verbally reported the arrest and Wright’s
statement to the Commonwealth’s detective, who made a note of
the report on his log sheet, but the substance of the report and
the statement were inadvertently omitted from the detective’s
file and from the materials produced during discovery.
Only
during trial, and possibly not until Wright’s defense was
underway, had the detective recalled Officer Manson’s report and
discussed Wright’s statement with the Commonwealth’s attorney,
who, as noted, used the alleged statement in his crossexamination of Wright without having advised either defendant of
its existence.
Arguing that Officer Manson had elicited the alleged
statement in violation of Wright’s rights, pursuant to Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694
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(1966), and that the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose the
statement was a violation of RCr 7.24, the discovery rule,
Wright moved to suppress any further reference to it.
The trial
court denied the motion, whereupon Hurt called Officer Manson as
a rebuttal witness, and the officer testified concerning
Wright’s statement.
Soon thereafter the case was submitted to the jury.
Apparently struggling with the conflicting evidence concerning
Wright, the jury submitted a question to the court asking
whether they could find Hurt guilty without convicting Wright.
The court advised them that they could, but ultimately the jury
found both defendants guilty:
Wright of first-degree assault
and Hurt of complicity to that crime.
Wright contends that the
trial court erred by refusing to suppress his statement.
We
agree.
As Wright notes and as the Commonwealth concedes, RCr
7.24(1) requires that the Commonwealth
disclose the substance, including time,
date, and place, of any oral incriminating
statement known by the attorney for the
Commonwealth to have been made by a
defendant to any witness[.]
The Commonwealth’s failure to produce Officer Manson’s report in
a timely manner during discovery violated this rule and was an
omission of such magnitude that a new trial is warranted.
While
the Commonwealth seeks to dismiss Wright’s statement that on the
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night of the shooting he “was in Covington” as “innocuous, and
clearly not incriminating”, Wright’s statement was in fact of
substantial import in a trial where there was conflicting
evidence about the race and identity of the passenger in Michael
Hurt’s car.
The statement was flatly contradictory to Wright’s
trial strategy, his own testimony and that of the four witnesses
he called to testify that he was in Cincinnati throughout the
evening of the shooting.
Moreover, the jury was clearly
struggling with conflicting testimony regarding Wright’s role,
if any, in the events as evidenced by the question which they
sent the judge during deliberations: “According to the
instructions, does the jury have to convict Joshua Wright, in
order to convict Michael Hurt?”
It is true, as the Commonwealth insists, that a
discovery violation justifies setting aside a conviction only if
there exists a reasonable probability that had the evidence been
disclosed the result would have been different.
Weaver v.
Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d 722 (Ky. 1997) (citing Wood v.
Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 116 S. Ct. 7, 133 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1995).
In Akers v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 414 (Ky. 2005), however,
our Supreme Court held that this standard was met where the
Commonwealth failed to turn over in discovery an incriminating
police report which revealed that Akers’ daughter had sustained
an injury to her leg.
Akers had intended to defend the assault,
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stalking and unlawful imprisonment charges on the grounds that
his estranged wife and daughter had simply fabricated the events
they testified to and, in support of his defense, he had
intended to emphasize that the only police report produced in
discovery revealed no injuries to either victim.
At trial, on
cross-examination, a police officer testified to a second police
report which was prepared the day of the incident and which
detailed an injury, but which, for reasons unknown, had never
been produced to Akers.
This Court and the Supreme Court held
that the mid-trial production of this document which wholly
undermined Akers’ defense required reversal.
While this Court
held that only the assault charge (which specifically required
proof of a physical injury) should be reversed, Justice
Johnstone, writing for a 6-1 majority of the Supreme Court, held
that all of Akers’ convictions should be reversed because his
ability to defend against all of the charges had been
“substantially impaired.”
Here, too, the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose
Wright’s statement misled defense counsel with respect to
critical evidence and induced Wright to rely upon a defense he
might not otherwise have asserted or asserted in the same way.
It makes no difference that Wright’s post-arrest statement was
not introduced during the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, but as
impeachment after Wright’s testimony.
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The state’s failure to
disclose impeachment evidence, like the failure to disclose
direct evidence, can so undermine the fundamental fairness of
the defendant’s trial as to warrant relief on appeal.
State v.
Allison, 11 P.3d 141 (N.M. 2000); United States v. Lewis, 511
F.2d 798 (D.C.Cir. 1975); United States v. Padrone, 406 F.2d 560
(2nd Cir. 1969).
The standard remains whether timely disclosure
is reasonably likely to have affected the result.
Allison, supra.
State v.
Much as the Supreme Court could not conclude
that Akers would have proceeded in the same way or that the jury
would have reached the same result without the second police
report, we cannot conclude that Wright would have proceeded in
the same way or that the jury would have convicted him without
the admission of Officer Manson’s belatedly produced report
regarding Wright’s alleged acknowledgment of his presence in
Covington on the night of the shooting.
Accordingly, we must
reverse Wright’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
This result largely moots Wright’s other contentions.
He contends that the trial court erroneously supplemented the
jury instructions after the jury had begun deliberating, but
because this is an alleged error not likely to recur on remand
we need not address it.
He also contends that his statement to
Officer Manson was obtained in violation of his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, supra, and should have been suppressed for
that reason as well as the discovery violation.
-8-
We decline to
address this contention, however, for, now that Wright’s
statement has been disclosed, whether, at a retrial, it should
be suppressed under Miranda is a question the trial court must
address in the first instance after the parties have had a full
opportunity to brief it.
In sum, the fairness of Wright’s trial was undermined
and its outcome thrown into reasonable doubt by the
Commonwealth’s failure to timely disclose Wright’s potentially
incriminating statement to his arresting officer.
Accordingly,
we reverse the March 2, 2005, judgment of the Kenton Circuit
Court and remand for additional proceedings.
MILLER, SPECIAL JUDGE, CONCURS.
BARBER, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
BARBER, JUDGE, DISSENTING:
I respectfully dissent.
While I agree that failure to timely disclose the statement was
an error, I don’t believe the defendant demonstrated that there
is a substantial possibility that the result would have been any
different if the error had not occurred.
See Abernathy v.
Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1969).
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Timothy E. Schneider
Ft. Thomas, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Louis F. Mathias, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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