JERRY LAYTON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 4, 2007; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002309-MR
JERRY LAYTON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BALLARD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. SHADOAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00005
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART
AND
VACATING AND REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; MOORE AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: Jerry Layton appeals from a jury verdict and judgment of the
Ballard Circuit Court that sentenced him to ten-years’ imprisonment following his
convictions for facilitation of the manufacture of methamphetamine and engaging in
organized crime. After our review, we vacate and remand the judgment for consideration
of probation and resentencing in compliance with Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
533.010(2). We affirm as to all remaining issues.
In late October or early November 2003, Amy Wilson and James Swann,
fugitives from Missouri, arrived in Kentucky. They resided at the home of Teresa Collier
on Chestnut Street in LaCenter, Kentucky. Within hours of arriving, Swann agreed to
show John Britt, Collier’s son, how to manufacture methamphetamine. Swann and Britt
asked Collier for permission to manufacture methamphetamine at her residence, and she
agreed.
The resulting “meth lab” at the Collier residence remained in operation until
it was shut down on December 9, 2003. According to testimony from Wilson and
Swann, a number of different individuals – including Layton – regularly took turns
purchasing the ingredients that were used to make methamphetamine at the residence.
These individuals kept most of the methamphetamine for their personal use; they sold the
remainder to purchase additional ingredients. According to Swann, in order to avoid
suspicion, the group later began manufacturing methamphetamine at a house on
Hazelwood Road in LaCenter. Layton was in the process of moving into the Hazelwood
Road house. Wilson and Swann obtained the key to this house from Layton, Collier, or
Britt whenever they wanted to make methamphetamine there.
On November 10, 2003, a manager at Rudy’s Farm Service called the
Ballard County Sheriff’s Office to report the purchase of a product containing iodine by
two females. The manager obtained the license plate number of the car used by the
women; the police learned that it was registered to Collier. On December 8, 2003, the
manager reported another suspicious purchase of iodine to the sheriff’s office and again
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obtained the license plate number of the car used by the buyers. Its identity revealed that
the car belonged to Wilson. On the following day – December 9, 2003 – the pharmacist
at a local drugstore contacted the sheriff’s office regarding the suspicious purchase of a
decongestant containing pseudoephedrine tablets. The pharmacist gave the police a
physical description of the woman who made the purchase along with the license plate
number of her car.
About twenty minutes later, Deputy Sheriff Jerry Jones located the car that
had been at the drugstore and pulled it over. The driver – Teresa Summers – told Jones
that she had delivered the pills to Collier’s residence. Summers permitted Jones to search
the car, and no pills were found. Jones then allowed Summers to leave, and he called the
Ballard County Sheriff for further instructions. The sheriff directed Jones to go to
Collier’s residence, to attempt to secure the premises, and to wait for the sheriff to obtain
a search warrant.
When Jones arrived at Collier’s residence, Britt, Wilson, and Swann were
present. Britt permitted Jones to enter the house. When he entered, he could hear noises
coming from the bathroom; apparently Wilson and Swann were attempting to flush the
pseudoephedrine pills down the toilet. Teresa Collier arrived a short time later and
consented to a search of her house. Police seized a number of items relating to the
manufacture of methamphetamine. Swann admitted that a group of people had been
making methamphetamine at the Collier residence and at the house on Hazelwood Road.
Consequently, a search warrant for the Hazelwood Road residence was sought and
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obtained, and police found a number of items there relating to the manufacture of
methamphetamine –including matchbooks minus their striker pads, which are used by
methamphetamine manufacturers to extract red phosphorous.
On January 16, 2004, Layton was indicted by the Ballard County Grand
Jury on two charges: (1) complicity to manufacture methamphetamine, first-degree, a
violation of KRS 502.020; and (2) acting as an accomplice in a criminal syndication, a
violation of KRS 506.120. On January 20, 2004, Layton appeared in open court with
counsel and entered a plea of not guilty to the pending charges.
On January 28, 2004, Layton filed a motion to suppress pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.78. Following a hearing, the trial court
entered an order on March 5, 2004, denying the motion. The court found that the search
of the Collier residence “was within legally recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement, i.e., exigent circumstances and consent by the lessee of the premises.” The
court further found that the stop of Summers’s vehicle was reasonable and that the search
of the Hazelwood Road residence occurred pursuant to a valid search warrant.
Following a jury trial conducted on July 19 and 20, 2004, the jury returned
a verdict finding Layton guilty of facilitation of the manufacture of methamphetamine,
first-degree, a lesser-included offense of complicity, and guilty of engaging in organized
crime. The jury recommended a one-year sentence on the facilitation charge and a tenyear sentence on the organized-crime charge. On October 1, 2004, the trial court entered
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a judgment consistent with the jury’s recommendations and ordered Layton’s sentences
to run concurrently. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Layton makes the following claims of error: (I) that he was
improperly charged and convicted of engaging in a criminal syndicate because
manufacturing methamphetamine is not a predicate offense for such a conviction; (II) that
being charged both with complicity in the manufacture of methamphetamine and with
being an accomplice in a criminal syndicate constituted a violation of double jeopardy
principles; (III) that there was insufficient evidence to convict him; (IV) that the trial
court erred in overruling his motion to suppress the search of the Chestnut Street and
Hazelwood Road residences; (V) that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to
separate witnesses; and (VI) that the trial court improperly refused to exercise its
discretion in sentencing him. A number of Layton’s claims have already been addressed
and rejected by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Britt v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-SC0956-MR, 2006 WL 141590 (Ky. Jan. 19, 2006) and Collier v. Commonwealth, No.
2004-SC-000955-MR, 2006 WL 2707445 (Ky. Sept. 21, 2006), which involved appeals
brought by Teresa Collier and John Britt, Layton’s alleged partners in the
methamphetamine operation. Thus, where appropriate, we shall adopt the Supreme
Court’s rulings on these issues as our own.
I.
Layton first argues that he was improperly charged and convicted of
engaging in a criminal syndicate because manufacturing methamphetamine is not a
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predicate offense for such a conviction. Thus, he argues that he was entitled to a directed
verdict on this charge. However, his argument has been considered and rejected by our
Supreme Court in both Collier and Britt; therefore, we adopt its ruling on the matter as
set forth in Britt:
Appellant first claims the trial court improperly denied
his motion for directed verdict on the organized crime charge.
Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to prove
Appellant was involved in trafficking in a controlled
substance, one of the statutory qualifiers of a criminal
syndicate under KRS 506.120(3). The crux of Appellant’s
complaint concerns the definition of “traffic” found in KRS
218A.010(28):1
Traffic, except as provided in KRS 218A.1431, means to
manufacture, distribute, dispense, sell, transfer, or possess
with intent to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or sell a
controlled substance.
Appellant asserts that KRS 218A.1431 provides an exception
to the general definition of “traffic” applicable only to
methamphetamine offenses, whereby “manufacture” is not
included in the definition. If this interpretation is correct,
Appellant could not be convicted of organized crime because
he was not trafficking in a controlled substance; rather, he
was aiding the manufacture of methamphetamine, which is
not an enumerated criminal syndicate statutory qualifier.
We disagree with Appellant’s argument and find it
unnecessary to conduct extensive statutory interpretation.
“On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under
the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for
a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a
directed verdict of acquittal.” Commonwealth v. Benham, 816
S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). The organized crime statute
does not require the Commonwealth to prove trafficking in a
controlled substance actually occurred. Hill v.
1
Appellant cites the former version KRS 218A.010; in 2005 the definitions were renumbered
and subsection 28 is now subsection 34.
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Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221, 233 (Ky. 2004). Illegal
trafficking is part of the definition of “criminal syndicate,”
and evidence of trafficking goes only to prove the group
qualified as a criminal syndicate under KRS 506.120(3)(e).
Id. Accordingly, Appellant violated the organized crime
statute once he “provided material aid” to maintain the
criminal syndicate, in contravention of KRS 506.120(1)(b).
As a result, the testimony and evidence presented by the
Commonwealth was sufficient to present this issue to the
jury.
Britt, 2006 WL 141590 at *1-2.
II.
Layton next argues that conviction of complicity in the manufacture of
methamphetamine and of being an accomplice in a criminal syndicate violates double
jeopardy principles. His argument fails to acknowledge that he was actually convicted of
facilitation of the manufacture of methamphetamine pursuant to KRS 506.080, which is
a lesser-included offense of complicity. Chumbler v. Commonwealth, 905 S.W.2d 488,
499 (Ky. 1995). Therefore, our consideration of Layton’s argument more properly
focuses upon his facilitation and criminal syndicate convictions.
The jury found Layton guilty of “Facilitation to Manufacturing
Methamphetamine” under “Instruction No. 4,” which provided:
[Y]ou will find Jerry Layton guilty of Facilitation to
Manufacturing Methamphetamine under this Instruction if,
and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the following:
A. That in Ballard County during the month of November
until on or about the 9th of December, 2003, and before the
finding of the Indictment herein, he intentionally facilitated
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Jamie Swann or others to Manufacture Methamphetamine by
intentionally providing his house to Jamie Swann;
AND
B. When he did so, Jerry Layton knew that Jamie Swann or
others had all of the ingredients or equipment necessary to
make Methamphetamine, and he intended to Manufacture
Methamphetamine.
The jury also found Layton guilty of “Engaging in Organized Crime” under “Instruction
No. 5,” which provided:
You, the Jury, will find the Defendant, Jerry Layton, guilty of
Engaging in Organized Crime under this Instruction if, and
only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt all of the following:
A. That in this county during the month of November, 2003
until on or about the 9th day of December, 2003 and before the
finding of the Indictment herein, he organized or participated
with, provided material to, managed, supervised or directed
any of the activities of to [sic] a group of five or more persons
collaborating to promote or engage in the manufacture of
methamphetamine;
AND
B. That when he did so, it was his intent to establish or
maintain that group, or to facilitate any activities of that group
constituting the manufacture of methamphetamine.
In Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1996), our Supreme
Court reinstated the “Blockburger rule” as set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), as “the sole basis for determining whether
multiple convictions arising out of a single course of conduct constitutes double
jeopardy.” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Ky. 1999). In addressing a
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double jeopardy claim, we must “determine whether the act or transaction complained of
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutes, and, if it does, if each statute requires proof
of a fact the other does not.” Burge, 947 S.W.2d at 811; see also KRS 505.020(2).
In Collier and Britt, the Supreme Court rejected the appellants’ arguments
involving the doctrine of double jeopardy as a bar to their convictions for criminal
complicity and organized crime. See Collier, 2006 WL 2707445 at *3; Britt, 2006 WL
141590 at *2. However, as noted above, Layton was convicted of criminal facilitation -not criminal complicity. KRS 506.080(1) provides that a person is guilty of criminal
facilitation:
when, acting with knowledge that another person is
committing or intends to commit a crime, he engages in
conduct which knowingly provides such person with means
or opportunity for the commission of the crime and which in
fact aids such person to commit the crime.
KRS 506.120(1), on the other hand, prohibits a person from engaging in a number of
activities “with the purpose to establish or maintain a criminal syndicate or to facilitate
any of its activities ….” “Criminal syndicate” is defined to mean “five (5) or more
persons collaborating to promote or engage in” a number of illegal activities “on a
continuing basis.” KRS 506.120(3).
In applying the Blockburger test, we must examine the proof necessary to
prove the statutory elements of each offense rather than the evidence presented at trial.
Mack v. Commonwealth, 136 S.W.3d 434, 438 (Ky. 2004); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S.
410, 416, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 2265, 65 L.Ed.2d 228, 235 (1980). Because KRS 506.120 is a
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multi-purpose statute containing numerous alternative grounds for conviction, we must
“construct from the alternative elements within the statute the particular formulation that
applies to the case at hand” in considering a double jeopardy claim. Mack, 136 S.W.3d at
438, quoting Pandelli v. U.S., 635 F.2d 533, 537 (6th Cir. 1980). In doing so, we must
eliminate any inapplicable elements and treat the statute as if it were several separate
statutes. Id. at 439. We then apply Blockburger to determine whether two distinct
offenses were committed or whether one offense was improperly prosecuted twice.
In reviewing the instructions as to the criminal syndicate charge, the jury
was asked to determine if Layton “organized or participated with, provided material to,
managed, supervised or directed any of the activities” of a criminal syndicate. These
elements are covered by KRS 506.120(1)(a)-(c), which prohibit a person from organizing
or participating in organizing a criminal syndicate or any of its activities; providing
material aid to a criminal syndicate or any of its activities (whether such aid is in the form
of money, other property, or credit); or managing, supervising, or directing any of the
activities of a criminal syndicate at any level of responsibility with the purpose of
establishing or maintaining a criminal syndicate or facilitating any of its activities. Other
prohibited activities contained in KRS 506.120(1) are inapplicable here.
KRS 506.120 clearly requires proof of a number of facts not required by
KRS 506.080. For example, KRS 506.120(1) requires a person to have “the purpose to
establish or maintain a criminal syndicate or to facilitate any of its activities,” a
requirement not contained within KRS 506.080. KRS 506.080 also requires proof of a
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fact which KRS 506.120 does not. According to KRS 506.080(1), if a person engages in
conduct to provide someone with the means or the opportunity to commit a crime, his
conduct must actually aid that party in committing the crime. In other words, the crime
allegedly being facilitated must actually be consummated and committed. See KRS
506.080 (LRC Commentary). No consummation requirement is contained within any of
the prohibited acts contained within KRS 506.120(1)(a)-(c). Thus, “each statute requires
proof of a fact the other does not.” Burge, 947 S.W.2d at 811.
We also note that there was sufficient evidence to convict Layton of being
an accomplice in a criminal syndicate without considering the evidence required to
convict him of criminal facilitation. See Dishman v. Commonwealth, 906 S.W.2d 335,
341 (Ky. 1995). The criminal facilitation conviction required proof that Layton had
provided his house to Swann and others in the group with the knowledge that they would
be producing methamphetamine there. However, both Wilson and Swann testified that
Layton also bought ingredients that were used by the group in the manufacturing of
methamphetamine. That conduct alone of providing materials supported a criminal
syndicate conviction. Therefore, Layton’s double jeopardy argument must fail.
III.
Layton next argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him and
that he was entitled to a directed verdict. In reviewing the propriety of a directed verdict,
we apply the rule of Benham: “the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a
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whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt ….” Benham, 816 S.W.2d
at 187. In support of his general argument, Layton raises a number of more specific
contentions.
Layton first argues that the trial court erred by permitting the
Commonwealth to amend the indictment against him. He contends that the amendment
allowed the Commonwealth to improperly introduce evidence of “other bad acts.”
The original indictment referenced only the events of December 9, 2003; the amended
indictment addressed the events of November through December 9, 2003. Once again,
our Supreme Court rejected this very argument in Collier and Britt; therefore, we are
compelled to do the same:
Appellant next claims the trial court erred by allowing
the Commonwealth to amend the date of occurrence listed on
the indictment. Appellant argues “other bad acts” evidence
was admitted because the original indictment listed only
December 9, 2003, while the amended indictment included
the month of November through December 9, 2003.
We disagree with Appellant’s assertion. The trial
court may allow amendment of the indictment if no new
offense is charged, and the defendant is not substantially
prejudiced. RCr 6.16. We do not find Appellant was
substantially prejudiced by the amendment. The
Commonwealth did not present evidence of uncharged
offenses committed during the revised time period; rather, the
evidence introduced at trial was offered to prove elements of
the charged crimes.
Furthermore, in Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 838 S.W.2d
376, 378 (Ky. 1992), we upheld the amendment of an
indictment altering the year the offense occurred. This Court
noted, “[the defendants] were not surprised or misled by the
indictment or its amendment.” Id. In this case, we are
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likewise compelled to find the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by allowing amendment of the indictment.
Britt, 2006 WL 141590 at *2-3.
Layton also argues that he was entitled to a directed verdict pursuant to
Kotila v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 226 (Ky. 2003). Kotila requires that a person must
have possessed either all of the chemicals or all of the equipment necessary to
manufacture methamphetamine and that he must have intended to manufacture
methamphetamine in order to be convicted. Accordingly, Layton contends that he should
not have been convicted of facilitation of the manufacture of methamphetamine because
insufficient evidence was introduced to establish that his cohorts possessed all of the
chemicals or all of the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine. Again,
however, our Supreme Court rejected his reliance on Kotila in Collier and Britt, and we
must do the same.
The Commonwealth introduced ample evidence for a jury to
convict Appellant of complicity to manufacture
methamphetamine. While our decision in Matheney [v.
Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 599 (Ky. 2006)] relaxed the
quantum of proof required, even if Kotila were still the law,
the Commonwealth met its burden. Therefore, the trial court
did not err by denying Appellant's motion for a directed
verdict of acquittal.
Collier, 2006 WL 2707445 at *4; see also Britt, 2006 WL 141590 at *3.
Both Wilson and Swann testified that Layton provided his house on
Hazelwood Road to the group for production of methamphetamine after the group
became concerned that local police were becoming suspicious of its activities. Therefore,
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sufficient evidence was introduced at trial from which a jury could have concluded that
Layton facilitated the manufacture of methamphetamine. Wilson and Swann also
testified that Layton purchased items used by the group in manufacturing and selling
methamphetamine. Therefore, sufficient evidence was introduced at trial from which a
jury could have concluded that Layton was an accomplice in a criminal syndicate.
Layton questions the reliability of the testimony of Wilson and Swann. However, issues
as to witness credibility are matters wholly entrusted to the purview of the jury. Pate v.
Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Ky. 2004). Thus, we cannot agree that Layton
was entitled to a directed verdict.
IV.
Layton next argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the
evidence found at the Chestnut Street and Hazelwood Road residences as it resulted from
an unconstitutional search and seizure. Our Supreme Court addressed and rejected this
very same contention in Britt. Thus, we adopt its ruling as our own:
Appellant next alleges the trial court erred by denying
Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence received from an
unconstitutional search and seizure.
Employees of Sutton’s Drugs notified the Ballard
County Sheriff’s Department regarding a suspicious woman
who purchased pseudoephedrine tablets on repeated
occasions. The employees described the woman as well as
the car she was driving. Acting on this information, Deputy
Jones initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle, driven by Teresa
Summers. After an initial denial, Summers admitted to
purchasing the pills and delivering them to the Collier
residence. Deputy Jones did not further detain Teresa
Summers. After advising his superiors of the situation, he
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drove to the Collier residence with intent to secure the
premises, concerned that Teresa Summers would “tip off” the
occupants to destroy evidence because the police were
suspicious.
Appellant responded to Deputy Jones’ knock on the
front door. Appellant moved aside and allowed Deputy Jones
to pass through the doorway into the house. At this time
Deputy Jones heard a toilet flush. The toilet was located
behind a doorway that was covered by a hanging blanket.
Deputy Jones ordered the occupants out of the bathroom.
After no response, Deputy Jones removed the blanket, finding
co-defendants Swann and Wilson flushing pseudoephedrine
pills down the toilet. Deputy Jones did not search the
dwelling further, but gathered the occupants in the front room
and phoned the county attorney to secure a search warrant.
At that time, Teresa Collier, the lessee of the house, arrived.
Collier voluntarily consented to a search of the premises and
executed a written consent form. Thereafter, additional
officers entered the home and searched for evidence of
manufacturing methamphetamine. After Swann was in
custody, he admitted to flushing the pills and made other
incriminating statements regarding manufacturing
methamphetamine at the Collier residence and at the
Hazelwood house.
It is fundamental that police cannot conduct a
warrantless search of a private home absent exigent
circumstances. Commonwealth v. McManus, 107 S.W.3d 175,
177 (Ky. 2003). On a motion to suppress, the trial court’s
findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence. RCr 9.78. In this case the trial court found the
warrantless search constitutional on grounds that Deputy
Jones entered the Collier home under exigent circumstances,
and the subsequent search of the premises was conducted
pursuant to written consent of the lessee.
We find there is substantial evidence to support the
findings of the trial court. The Collier home had been under
police surveillance for three weeks on suspicion the
occupants were operating a methamphetamine lab.
Additionally, the police had received information that Swann
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and Wilson, fugitives from Missouri, were staying at the
Collier residence. The police had also witnessed Teresa
Summers at the Collier house on numerous occasions, thereby
corroborating the information obtained during the traffic stop
conducted by Deputy Jones. Furthermore, the police knew
the occupants of the Collier home purchased high-grade
iodine (an ingredient in “red phosphorous”
methamphetamine) from a local farm supply store the day
before the traffic stop. Accordingly, as a matter of law we are
bound by the findings of the trial court because we find no
abuse of discretion or clear error.
We also note, however, it may be unnecessary to rely
on the exigent circumstances exception in this case. Deputy
Jones was allowed entry to the Collier home by Appellant,
who is Collier’s son. Therefore, it appears Deputy Jones
lawfully entered the Collier home with Appellant’s consent
and secured the premises until Teresa Collier arrived and
gave consent to a full search.
Britt, 2006 WL 141590 at *3-4. Our Supreme Court concluded that the search of the
Chestnut Street residence was constitutional at least under two exceptions to the warrant
requirement. The search of the Hazelwood Road residence was constitutional as well –
particularly since a valid search warrant was obtained after Swann admitted that
methamphetamine was being produced at that address. Therefore, this argument must
fail.
V.
Layton next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed
to grant his request to separate witnesses. Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 615
provides, in part, that “[a]t the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded
so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses and it may make the order on its
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own motion.” (Emphasis added.) The rule seeks to prevent witnesses from altering their
own testimony based on what they may hear from other witnesses. Epperson v.
Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 46, 58 (Ky. 2006). The use of the mandatory auxiliary verb
shall in KRE 615 removes the matter of witness separation from the discretion of the trial
judge “in the absence of one of the enumerated exceptions.”2 Mills v. Commonwealth, 95
S.W.3d 838, 841 (Ky. 2003). Upon making a timely request, a party has a right to
demand separation of witnesses. Id.
As Layton admits in his brief, he did not request a separation of witnesses
until after two witnesses had already testified. The first witness testified as to chain-ofcustody matters while the second testified about having performed a laboratory analysis
on some of the evidence. The trial court subsequently denied the request for separation,
correctly reasoning that demand should have been made before any of the witnesses had
testified. However, when Layton made the motion to separate before the trial
commenced on the second day, the court granted that motion to separate witnesses
Wilson and Swann and to exclude them from the courtroom.
Layton complains that Wilson was allowed to sit in the courtroom during
the first day of trial and to listen to the testimony of Steve Rudy, an assistant manager of
Rudy’s Farm Service. Rudy testified that he could not recall seeing Layton in his store
purchasing iodine. In a statement given prior to trial, Wilson said that Layton had
purchased iodine from Rudy’s store. When Wilson was asked during cross-examination
on day two about Rudy’s testimony that he had not seen Layton in his store, Wilson
2
None of these exceptions is applicable here.
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surmised that many people probably went into the store on a daily basis and Rudy could
not remember them all. According to Layton, “[h]ad Wilson not been in the courtroom
the day before, she would not have been able to weasel an excuse about the
inconsistencies between her testimony and Steve Rudy’s.”
Although KRE 615 is mandatory, the trial court’s denial of Layton’s motion
to separate must be evaluated in light of the untimeliness of the motion. See Justice v.
Commonwealth, 987 S.W.2d 306, 315 (Ky. 1998). The Commonwealth argues that even
if the judge’s denial of Layton’s motion to separate was in error, any error was harmless.
We agree. RCr 9.24 requires us to disregard errors that do not bear upon the substantial
rights of the parties. “The test for harmless error is whether there is any reasonable
possibility that, absent the error, the verdict would have been different.” Taylor, 995
S.W.2d at 361. Even assuming that the trial court erred in failing to separate Wilson as a
witness, we cannot conclude that her isolated and speculative bit of testimony upon crossexamination would have changed the result of the trial. There was additional evidence
directly linking Layton to the subject methamphetamine operation. Thus, any error
committed by the trial court in this respect was harmless and does not require reversal.
VI.
Layton last argues that the trial court failed to properly exercise its
discretion in considering the prospect of probation. Although this claim of error was not
preserved, we have been asked to review it for palpable error pursuant to RCr 10.26,
which provides:
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A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party
may be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or
by an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently
raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be
granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has
resulted from the error.
Following its deliberations, the jury recommended that Layton serve ten years for
criminal syndication and one year for facilitation. Upon receiving this verdict, the trial
judge told the jury that it was “sending a message” by its verdicts and that none of the
defendants would be probated. He further noted that he would hear the defendants’
motions for probation but that he would not consider them. The judge reiterated this
sentiment at the sentencing of Teresa Collier:
If they enter pleas, they’re asking me to exercise my
discretion. When they go through a jury trial, they’re asking
the people of Ballard County what their opinion is, and
evidently twelve people have said they think she ought to go
to the penitentiary.
Layton contends that these comments indicate an inappropriate and prejudiced refusal by
the trial court to exercise its discretion in considering probation.
KRS 533.010(2) provides that “[b]efore imposition of a sentence of
imprisonment, the court shall consider probation, probation with an alternative
sentencing plan, or conditional discharge.” (Emphasis added.) Whether or not a court
actually grants probation or conditional discharge is a matter resting within its discretion;
however, “the statute requires that probation or conditional discharge be given
consideration.” Brewer v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Ky. 1977).
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In view of this rule, the record of the proceedings leading up
to the entry of the judgment should clearly reflect the fact that
the consideration required by KRS 533.010 had been afforded
the convicted person before judgment was finally entered.
Id. at 478.
In considering the record as it stands before us, it is clear that the trial court
did not give proper consideration to the subject of probation as mandated by KRS
533.010(2). We agree that the court committed palpable error in bodaciously announcing
its clear and deliberate intention to disregard its statutory duty. Therefore, we vacate the
judgment and remand this case for consideration of probation and resentencing in
compliance with the statute. See Mishler v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 676, 681 (Ky.
1977); Patterson v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Ky.App. 1977). It is very
likely that upon remand, the trial court may reach the same result. Regardless of the
ultimate outcome on the probation issue, the court must reconsider the issue and exercise
its discretion anew as to whether to grant probation.
In summary, we vacate and remand the judgment of the Ballard Circuit
Court for consideration of probation and resentencing in compliance with KRS
533.010(2). We affirm as to all remaining issues.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Julia K. Pearson
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
James C. Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
James C. Shackelford
Frankfort, Kentucky
- 21 -
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