ELMER SMITH, JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 2, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002200-MR
ELMER SMITH, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BREATHITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE W. LARRY MILLER, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 04-CR-00013-003
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, JUDGE; ROSENBLUM,1 SENIOR JUDGE; MILLER,2 SPECIAL
JUDGE.
ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE:
Elmer Smith, Jr. appeals from his
August 2004 conviction for second degree assault by a Breathitt
Circuit Court jury.
The trial court sentenced Elmer, Jr. to
five years confinement.
Finding no error, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
2
Retired Judge John D. Miller, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
On October 12, 2003, Clark Waterson and Russell
Pelphrey, Jr. were watching Waterson’s son as he rode a fourwheeler on the family’s property.
Waterson allegedly observed
several trespassers on his property at that time, including
Elmer, Jr.’s brother, Anthony.
Waterson asked the men to leave
his property and all complied except Anthony.
Waterson and
Anthony allegedly engaged in a brief physical confrontation,
ending with Anthony’s departure toward the home of his father,
Elmer Smith, Sr.
A short while later, Anthony returned to the
area by pickup truck with his father, Elmer, Sr., and brother,
Elmer, Jr.
Elmer, Sr. was allegedly driving while Anthony and
Elmer, Jr. were on the back of the truck wielding a stick and
claw hammer, respectively.
As the truck neared, the Smith clan allegedly began
attacking Waterson.
Elmer, Sr. allegedly struck Waterson in the
back with a four-foot carpenter’s level.
Upon seeing his friend
assaulted, Pelphrey intervened and prevented Elmer, Sr. from
further striking Waterson with the level.
Elmer, Sr. allegedly
then struck Pelphrey with the level as well.
Elmer, Jr.
allegedly struck Waterson in the back of the head with the claw
hammer.
Elmer, Sr. ran to the truck and retrieved a gun.
As
Elmer, Sr. began waving the gun around, he told Anthony and
Elmer, Jr. to get in the truck.
Elmer, Sr. and sons then fled
the scene in the pickup truck.
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On February 6, 2004, a Breathitt County grand jury
indicted Elmer, Jr. with second degree assault3.
In August 2004,
a jury trial was held on the charges and Elmer, Jr. was found
guilty as charged.
On September 24, 2004, the trial court
entered its judgment of conviction and sentenced him to five
years.
This appeal followed.
Elmer, Jr. argues that there was insufficient evidence
to convict him of second degree assault because the evidence
failed to show that he used or threatened to use an instrument
in a manner capable of causing death or serious physical injury
to Waterson.
We disagree.
KRS 508.020 defines one type of second degree assault
as the intentional infliction of physical injury on another by
means of a dangerous instrument.
A dangerous instrument is
defined as any instrument which under the circumstances in which
it is used or attempted to be used or threatened to be used is
readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury.
See KRS 500.080(3); Commonwealth v. Potts, 884 S.W.2d 654, 656
(Ky. 1994).
Here, both Waterson and Pelphrey testified that Elmer,
Jr. struck Waterson with a metal claw hammer.
Regarding the
injuries received, Waterson testified that he was struck in the
3
KRS 508.020. Elmer, Jr. was originally indicted with two counts of second
degree assault, but, upon the Commonwealth’s motion, the trial court ordered
that the second count of the indictment pertained only to Elmer, Sr.
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back of the head with the hammer and suffered scarring from the
attack.
Such testimony, standing alone, is sufficient to
support a guilty verdict for second degree assault.
See
Commonwealth v. Suttles, 80 S.W.3d 424, 426 (Ky. 2002)(testimony
of single witness is sufficient to support guilty finding, even
in the face of contrary witnesses, if after considering all the
evidence, the fact finder assigns it greater weight).
Elmer, Jr. also contends that because the level was
not introduced into evidence that the jury could not properly
consider whether it was a “dangerous instrument” as contemplated
under the statute.
We disagree.
Whether an instrument or
object is a dangerous instrument is a question of fact to be
determined by the jury.
Potts, 884 S.W.2d at 656.
Sufficient
evidence was presented to the jury in order for it to make a
“dangerous instrument” determination.
Pelphrey testified that
the claw hammer had a steel handle with straight, sharp claws
and was of the type used for “hammering houses.”
Such evidence
regarding the hammer and the manner in which it was used easily
satisfies the statutory definition of a “dangerous instrument.”
The fact that the actual claw hammer was not presented to the
jury was not prejudicial.
Elmer, Jr. also argues that the Commonwealth’s
reference to the items used to attack Waterson and Pelphrey as
“weapons” constituted reversible error.
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We disagree.
At trial,
the Commonwealth referred to the stick, claw hammer and level as
weapons during its examination of witnesses and during closing
argument.
Elmer, Jr. argues that the Commonwealth’s reference
to the items as weapons amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.
An objection was made to the Commonwealth referring to the items
as weapons during the case in chief and the Commonwealth
rephrased its question, without an admonition given to the jury.
However, Elmer, Jr. did not object to the Commonwealth’s use of
the term “weapon” during its closing argument.
We note that
Elmer, Jr. did not properly preserve the issue of error in the
closing argument and is thus not subject to appellate review.4
However, even if the issue had been properly preserved, we would
still be unable to find reversible error under these facts.
To warrant reversal, prosecutorial misconduct “must be
so serious as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair.”
Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Ky. 1996).
Upon
review, we “must focus on the overall fairness of the trial, and
not the culpability of the prosecutor.”
Slaughter v.
Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 407, 411-412 (Ky. 1988).
In light of
the fact that no demonstrable prejudice to Elmer, Jr. was shown,
we are unable to say that his trial was rendered fundamentally
unfair.
4
We therefore affirm.
See RCr 9.22.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Breathitt Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Barbara Anderson
Lexington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Clint E. Watson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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