TERRY MALIN AND NANCY MALIN v. DEWAYNE JONES AND RHONDA JONES; DAVID TRAVILLIAN AND DONNA TRAVILLIAN; AND CUMBERLAND VALLEY NATIONAL BANK, DEWAYNE JONES AND RHONDA JONES, HIS WIFE HUGHES BENNETT AND ESSIE JEAN BENNETT; AND TERRY MALIN AND NANCY MALIN
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 5, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001818-MR
TERRY MALIN AND NANCY MALIN
v.
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS B. HOPPER, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 02-CI-00078 & 02-CI-00091
DEWAYNE JONES AND RHONDA JONES;
DAVID TRAVILLIAN AND DONNA TRAVILLIAN;
AND CUMBERLAND VALLEY NATIONAL BANK,
AND
APPELLANTS
APPELLEES
NO. 2004-CA-001863-MR
DEWAYNE JONES AND RHONDA JONES,
HIS WIFE
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LEWIS B. HOPPER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00078 & 02-CI-00091
HUGHES BENNETT AND
ESSIE JEAN BENNETT; AND
TERRY MALIN AND NANCY MALIN
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART
AND REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
APPELLEES
BEFORE:
BARBER,1 JUDGE; HUDDLESTON AND PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGES.2
BARBER, JUDGE:
These appeals originate from rulings of the
Laurel Circuit Court regarding a parcel of real property.
Appellants, Terry and Nancy Malin, appeal the trial court’s
dismissal of their claims against Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
Dewayne and Rhonda Jones; Appellees, David and Donna Travillian;
and Appellee, Cumberland Valley National Bank.
The Joneses
appeal the dismissal of their claims against the Bennetts.
This is the second time this matter has been before
our court.3
However, we dismissed the prior appeals as
interlocutory and remanded accordingly.
Following remand, the
trial court entered a final order in this matter.
It is from
this order and all interlocutory orders to which the parties
appeal.
We first examine the complex history behind these
appeals.
BACKGROUND
On December 19, 1995, the Joneses purchased a parcel
of property from the Bennetts to build a service station and
1
Judge David A. Barber completed this opinion prior to the expiration of his
term of office on December 31, 2006. Release of the opinion was delayed by
administrative handling.
2
Senior Judges Joseph R. Huddleston and Lewis G. Paisley, sitting as Special
Judges by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
3
The case numbers of the prior appeals are 2003-CA-002671-MR; 2004-CA-000283MR; 2004-CA-000295-MR; and 2004-CA-000384-MR.
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convenience store.4
The parties also signed an Option to
Purchase Real Property (Option) that same day.5
It is from this
document which the controversy first arose.
The Bennetts later sold a parcel of property to the
Travillians in April 1996.
The Travillians sold their property
to the Malins in March 1997.
In 2001, the Malins entered into a
written contract to sell their home to a third party.
A title
examination by the third party’s lender concluded there was a
title defect due to the Option.
In an effort to resolve the matter without litigation,
the Malins’ attorney contacted the Joneses’ attorney to request
a release of the Option for $500.00.6
The Joneses’ replied they
would release their Option for $2,500.00.7
The Malins’ then
asked the Travillians to pay them $2,500.00 in lieu of a suit
for breach of warranty.8
The Travillians declined.
The Malins’
sale fell through and they were forced to continue paying the
mortgage on a home they no longer lived in.
shortly thereafter.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
4
The deed was recorded on January 2, 1996.
5
The Option was recorded on January 31, 1996.
6
The letter was dated September 24, 2001.
7
The letter was dated September 28, 2001.
8
The letter was dated October 3, 2001.
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Litigation followed
The Bennetts were the first to file suit in this
matter on January 22, 2002, in case number 2002-CI-78.
They
sued the Joneses requesting the trial court to declare the
Option null and void.
The Joneses responded with a counterclaim
against the Bennetts claiming damages from the Bennetts’ failure
to abide by the Option before selling several other pieces of
property.
A second suit was filed by the Malins against the
Joneses, the Travillians, and the Bennetts on January 24, 2002,
in case number 2002-CI-91.
They claimed the Option was void on
its face, was a slander to their title, and constituted
interference with contract and prospective advantage.
The
Malins claimed the Travillians breached their covenant of
general warranty and failed to defend the title to the property.
As to the Joneses, the Malins claimed they were extorting them
and interfering with their contract and prospective advantage.
Lastly, the Bennetts allegedly continued to sell real estate to
third parties after exercising the Option to the Malins’
detriment.
The Travillians responded with a counterclaim
against the Malins claiming their suit was frivolous because the
Option was void on its face.
They also cross-claimed against
the Bennetts seeking indemnification.
The Joneses responded
with a crossclaim against the Bennetts for injuries resulting
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from the Bennetts’ alleged failure to abide by the Option.9
In
an effort to simplify the record, the trial court consolidated
both claims into 2002-CI-78.
Following consolidation, the Malins filed a Verified
First Amended Complaint.
The amended complaint added Cumberland
Valley National Bank as a defendant.
The Bank had given the
Malins the mortgage to purchase the property from the
Travillians in 1997.
The Malins sought to impute any negligence
on behalf of the title attorney to the Bank.
There were several orders entered throughout the
proceedings.
appeals.
Two of these orders are the primary focus of these
The first is an interlocutory summary judgment order
entered June 13, 2003.
The other is the Order Amending Amended
Judgment and Order Overruling Other Motions (Final Order)
entered August 20, 2004.
The Final Order incorporated several
prior orders, specifically the orders entered on December 3,
2003; January 12, 2004; and February 16, 2004.10
The June 13, 2003 interlocutory order granted summary
judgment to the Travillians on all claims against them.
The
reasoning of the trial court in awarding summary judgment was
9
The Joneses’ crossclaim was nearly verbatim of their counterclaim filed
against the Bennetts in 2002-CI-78.
10
The August 20, 2004 order contained a typographical error which referenced
the February 16, 2004 order as the February 7, 2004 order.
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that the Option did not apply to the parcel of property at
issue.
The December 3, 2003 order granted summary judgment to
the Bennetts and Malins declaring the Option void.
claims against the Bank were dismissed.
The Malins’
It also dismissed the
Malins’ claims against the Joneses for the reasons set forth in
the June 13, 2003 order.
The January 12, 2004 order amended the December 3,
2003 order11 by dismissing all claims against the Bennetts, i.e.
the Malins’ claims; the Joneses’ counterclaim and crossclaim;
and the Travillians’ crossclaim.
It also directed the Master
Commissioner to make a notation on the recorded Option that it
was adjudged null and void.
The February 16, 2004 order amended
the January 12, 2004 order by deleting the term “with prejudice”
from the dismissal of the Travillians’ crossclaim against the
Bennetts.12
SCOPE OF REVIEW
The standard of review on appeal when a trial court
grants a motion for summary judgment is whether the trial court
correctly found there was no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a
11
Paragraphs 1-4 of the January 12, 2004 order are restated verbatim as
paragraphs 2-6 in the Final Order.
12
The order also stated that the Travillians’ crossclaim would not be held in
abeyance.
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matter of law.
Hallahan v. The Courier-Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699,
704 (Ky.App. 2004), (citing Palmer v. International Assoc. of
Machinists, 882 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Ky. 1994)).
The movant bears
the initial burden of convincing the court by evidence of record
that no genuine issue of fact is in dispute, and then the burden
shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to present “at
least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine
issue of material fact for trial.”
Id. at 705, (citing
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d
476, 482 (Ky. 1991)).
The party opposing summary judgment
cannot rely on their own claims or arguments without significant
evidence in order to prevent summary judgment.
138 S.W.3d at 705.
Hallahan, supra,
The court must view the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant and resolve all doubts in his
favor.
Id., (citing Commonwealth v. Whitworth, 74 S.W.3d 695,
698 (Ky. 2002)).
In order for summary judgment to be proper, the movant
must show that the adverse party cannot prevail under any
circumstances.
Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Grange Mutual
Casualty Co., 149 S.W.3d 437, 439 (Ky.App. 2004), (citing
Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Ky.
1985)).
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
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that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Id., (citing CR 56.03).
The focus should be on what is of
record rather than what might be presented at trial.
Hallahan,
supra, 138 S.W.3d at 705, (citing Welch v. American Publishing
Co. of Kentucky, 3 S.W.3d 724, 730 (Ky. 1999)).
Our court need
not defer to the trial court’s decision on summary judgment and
shall review the issue de novo because only questions of law are
involved.
Id.
LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND ANALYSIS
It is well-known that the construction, as well as the
meaning and legal effect of a written instrument, however
compiled, is a matter of law for the court.
Bank One, Pikeville
v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet, 901 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Ky.App. 1995), (citing
Morganfield National Bank v. Damien Elder & Sons, 836 S.W.2d
893, 895 (Ky. 1992)).
Thus, our review of the Option shall be
de novo.
The Option reads, in pertinent part,13 as
follows:
That in consideration of the joint
promise of the parties herein, and upon
execution of this agreement, receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged, said
13
The only portions omitted were the introductory paragraph, the legal
description of the parcel purchased by the Joneses, and the signature
section.
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[Bennetts] agree to give unto the [Joneses],
the first option to purchase or lease any
property owned by the [Bennetts] on Connley
Road and Hwy. 229 being the same properties
obtained by the [Bennetts] herein, by Deed
Book 403 page 581 and Deed Book 258 page 600
both of record in the Laurel County Court
Clerks Office, London, Kentucky.
Further the [Bennetts] shall not lease
or sale [sic] to any person or entity, for
the purpose of a service station/store, nor
shall [Bennetts] operate themselves a
service station/store on any surrounding
property they own on Connley Road or on Hwy.
#229.
The [Joneses] ha[ve] heretofore
purchased from the [Bennetts] a certain
parcel or tract of land for the
consideration price of $137,500.00, and
being a portion of that certain property of
the [Bennetts] as recorded in Deed Book 258,
page 600 and [Deed Book] 403, page 581, and
the [Joneses] tract as described below:
. . . .
Should the said Option to Purchase be
exercised, the property taxes assessed for
said property shall be prorated between the
[Joneses] and [Bennetts] herein, for that
period of ownership in the tax year of
purchase.
It is hereby understood that this
contract shall be binding on the [Bennetts]
herein and their heirs and assigns.
The Joneses argue that the Option is not an option to
purchase, but a right of first refusal.
In the absence of
ambiguity, a written instrument will be enforced strictly
according to its terms.
Frear v. P.T.A. Industries, Inc., 103
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S.W.3d 99, 106 (Ky. 2003), (citing O’Bryan v. Massey-Ferguson,
Inc., 413 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Ky. 1966)).
In such cases, a court
will interpret the contract’s terms by assigning the language
its ordinary meaning and without resort to extrinsic evidence.
Id., (citing Hoheimer v. Hoheimer, 30 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Ky.
2000)).
Absent an ambiguity in the contract, the parties’
intentions must be discerned from the four corners of the
instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence.
Cantrell
Supply, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 94 S.W.3d 381, 385
(Ky.App. 2002), (citing Hoheimer v. Hoheimer, 30 S.W.3d 176, 178
(Ky. 2000)).
The fact that one party may have intended a
different result is insufficient to construe a contract at
variance with its plain and unambiguous terms.
Id., (citing
Green v. McGrath, 662 F.Supp. 337, 342 (E.D.Ky. 1986)).
The Option uses the words “option to purchase”
throughout with no mention of a right of first refusal.
construe the language used in its ordinary meaning.
supra, 103 S.W.3d at 106.
We must
Frear,
Even if the Joneses intended to
obtain a right of first refusal, their attorney drafted the
Option without using such language.
The Joneses should not
receive a benefit from their attorney’s mistake at the Bennetts’
expense.
See Bennett v. Dudley, 391 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Ky. 1965).
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Based on the foregoing, we believe the Option is, in
fact, an option to purchase granted by the Bennetts to the
Joneses.
The Malins, Travillians, and Bennetts each argue that
the Option is void in its entirety for multiple reasons,
including violation of the rule against perpetuities, lack of
consideration, and no time limits established.
The Joneses
argue the Option is valid and enforceable; therefore, their
claims against the Bennetts should not have been dismissed.
We
first examine the rule against perpetuities.
Options related to real property are subject to the
rule against perpetuities.
Three Rivers Rock Co. v. Reed
Crushed Stone Co., Inc., 530 S.W.2d 202, 208 (Ky. 1975).
The
rule against perpetuities is that no interest in real or
personal property shall be good unless it must vest, if at all,
not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the
creation of the interest.
KRS 381.215.
The Option clearly states it is applicable to the
Bennetts and their heirs and assigns.
However, the Option did
not state it applied to the Joneses’ heirs and assigns.
This
silence indicated that the signatories intended that the Option
was personal to the Joneses only.
See Central Bank & Trust Co.
v. Kincaid, 617 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Ky. 1981).
As a result, the
Option would terminate when both of the Joneses had passed away.
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Therefore, the Option does not violate the rule against
perpetuities because it would vest, if at all, within the
Joneses’ lifetimes.
We now turn to the other issues raised by
the parties related to the Option.
An option to purchase real property is a contract
giving the optionee the privilege of purchasing it if he elects
to take it within the time stated in the option.
Miller v.
Hodges, 215 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Ky. 1948), (citing Ross-Vaughan
Tobacco Co. v. Johnson, 206 S.W. 487 (Ky. 1918)).
However, not
every agreement or understanding rises to the level of a legally
enforceable contract.
Kovacs v. Freeman, 957 S.W.2d 251, 254
(Ky. 1997).
The general requirements for any contract are offer
and acceptance, full and complete terms, and consideration.
Cantrell Supply, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 94 S.W.3d
381, 384 (Ky.App. 2002).
The first requirement of an enforceable contract is
offer and acceptance.
From the face of the Option, there was an
offer and acceptance between the parties evidenced by the
Joneses’ and Bennetts’ respective signatures.
The second requirement is that the contract terms must
be full and complete.
the Option.
There are no time limits of any kind in
This goes against the very definition of an option,
i.e. a contract giving the optionee the privilege of purchasing
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it if he elects to take it within the time stated in the option.
Miller, supra, 215 S.W.2d at 100 (emphasis added).
is also incomplete on how to exercise the option.
The document
We believe
the Option lacked full and complete terms.
Consideration is the final requirement for an
enforceable contract.
Typically, where an agreement is founded
solely upon reciprocal promises, the contract is wanting in
consideration.
Pace v. Burke, 150 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Ky.App. 2004),
(citing David Roth’s Sons, Inc. v. Wright & Taylor, Inc., 343
S.W.2d 389, 390 (Ky. 1961)).
However, it is possible to have
sufficient consideration based solely upon the mutual promises
of the parties.
An offer, though without consideration, if
accepted within the time limit and before withdrawal by the
optionor, becomes obligatory upon all parties to the option
after acceptance, and it is thereafter supported by the
consideration of the mutual promises.
Ford v. McGregor, 234
S.W.2d 493, 495 (Ky. 1950), (quoting Klatch v. Simpson, 34
S.W.2d 951, 953 (Ky. 1931)).
In other words, an option is not
binding as a contract where there is no consideration, unless it
is accepted within the time limit and before the offer is
withdrawn.
Id., (quoting Combs v. Turner, 200 S.W.2d 288, 289
(Ky. 1947)).
The Joneses argue that they paid a premium price for
the lot purchased from the Bennetts in order to get the Option.
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However, the Option states that the consideration was the joint
promises of the parties, i.e. the Joneses and Bennetts.
It also
states the lot was purchased for consideration of $137,500.00
with no mention of a premium being paid to receive the Option.14
We do not believe there was any cash paid for the Option when
the Joneses purchased the parcel.
The Option states the consideration is the mutual
promises of the Bennetts and Joneses.
As stated earlier, it is
possible to have sufficient consideration with only mutual
promises.
However, that exception is not applicable in this
instance.
We believe the Bennetts’ suit against the Joneses to
declare the Option void effectively withdrew the Option prior to
acceptance by the Joneses to exercise.
Thus, there was no
consideration.
Based on the foregoing, we believe the Option is
unenforceable due to incomplete and vague terms, as well as, a
lack of consideration.
Therefore, the trial court did not err
when it dismissed the Joneses’ claims against the Bennetts.
Even assuming the Option is valid, we still do not
believe it applies to the property at issue.
The plain language
of the Option stated that it applied to all property owned by
the Bennetts on “Connley Road and Hwy. 229.”
14
All parties agree
The deed between the Joneses and the Bennetts also made no mention of this
alleged arrangement. The deed was attached as Exhibit A to the Joneses’
Answer and Counterclaim filed February 14, 2002.
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that the Malins’ property does not lie on Connely Road or
Highway 229.
In their Answer and Counterclaim15 filed February 4,
2002, the Joneses stated the following in their counterclaim
against the Bennetts:
1.
That on that same date, the [Joneses]
entered into an Option to Purchase Real
Property from the [Bennetts] in which the
[Bennetts] gave to the [Joneses] the first
option to purchase or lease any property
owned by them on Conley Road and Highway
229, a copy of said option is attached
hereto as Exhibit “B”.
. . . .
5.
That the [Bennetts] and the [Joneses]
clearly intended to protect the [Joneses]
place of business, the property upon which
had been purchased from the [Bennetts], from
any competition of property owned by the
[Bennetts] on Conley road and Highway 229.
Moreover, in the Joneses’ Objections to Motions for
Summary Judgment,16 the affidavit of Dwayne Jones was attached,
which provided, in relevant part: “It was the understanding of
the Affiant that the Bennetts would offer any property they had
to sell on Hwy. 229 or Conley Road (sic) to him prior to selling
to any third party.” (Emphasis added.)
It is difficult to conceive that the Joneses truly
believed that the Option would have been applicable to all of
15
Filed in 2002-CI-78.
16
Objections filed May 2, 2004.
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the Bennetts’ property, including property not located on
Highway 229 or Connley Road, particularly in light of the
foregoing.
Therefore, we believe the Option, even presuming its
validity, would not have been applicable to the Malins’
property.
We now examine the remaining arguments in these
appeals.
The Malins argue that the trial court erred when it
awarded summary judgment to the Travillians.
The Travillians
did not breach any of the warranties provided in their deed to
the Malins because the Option was unenforceable.
17
Even
assuming the Option’s validity, it was not applicable.
Therefore, we do not believe the court erred in granting summary
judgment to the Travillians against the Malins.
The Malins also argue that the trial court erred when
it awarded the Joneses summary judgment because the Joneses
never made a motion for summary judgment.
The Malins are
correct that the Joneses never filed a motion for summary
judgment with the trial court.
A trial judge is authorized to grant summary judgment
in favor of a party who has not requested it.
Storer
Communications of Jefferson County, Inc. v. Oldham County Board
of Education, 850 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Ky.App. 1993), (quoting
17
The Malins also argue in their appellate brief that a constructive eviction
occurred because of the Option. This claim was never made in the Malins’
Complaint or Verified First Amended Complaint. Therefore, it will not be
addressed in this opinion.
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Collins v. Duff, 283 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1955)).
This authority is
limited to those specific situations where a motion for summary
judgment has been made by some party to the action, the judge
has all of the pertinent issues before him at the time the case
is submitted and where overruling the movant’s motion for
summary judgment necessarily would require a determination that
the non-moving party was entitled to the relief asked.
Id.,
(quoting Green v. Bourbon County Joint Planning Commission, 637
S.W.2d 626, 630 (Ky. 1982) and Collins v. Duff, 283 S.W.2d 179,
183 (Ky. 1955)).
This was not the situation before the trial court.
The trial court dismissed the Malins’ claims against the Joneses
based upon the reasoning of a prior summary judgment order
granted to the Travillians.
The instant case presents a unique
situation in that a fellow defendant made a motion for summary
judgment, received it, and the trial court later granted summary
judgment sua sponte to a co-defendant who failed to file a
motion for summary judgment.
We do not believe granting summary judgment to the
Joneses would automatically be in error if a summary judgment
motion was properly made.
We believe it was improper for the
trial court to remove an important step, i.e. the filing of a
motion, from the procedural process.
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Therefore, we believe the
trial court erred when it dismissed the Malins’ claims against
the Joneses sua sponte.
The Malins lastly argue the trial court erred when it
awarded summary judgment to the Bank.
The trial court found
that the Malins did not have a valid claim against the Bank for
the alleged negligence of the title opinion attorney.
The trial
court also found that the Bank did not breach its fiduciary
duties to the Malins.
The Bank argues the Malins never made a breach of
fiduciary duty claim against them.
The Malins argue that such a
claim can be inferred from their Verified First Amended
Complaint18.
However, the Malins filed a motion to amend their
Verified First Amended Complaint to include claims for “breach
of fiduciary duties and breach of contract.”19
At motion hour,20
Malins’ counsel clearly stated that he would not know if there
was a claim for breach of fiduciary duties until he saw a title
opinion requested from the Bank.
Based on this, we do not
believe the Malins intended their Verified First Amended
18
The Bank was not a party in the original complaint.
19
Motion filed March 11, 2003.
20
Motion hour held on June 6, 2003. Originally noticed for May 2, 2003, but
pursuant to Order entered May 5, 2003, the May 2, 2003 hearing was
rescheduled for June 6, 2003.
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Complaint to include a breach of fiduciary duty claim against
the Bank.
Further, no orders were ever entered allowing the
Malins to amend their First Amended Complaint.
No second
amended complaint was filed or even tendered to the trial court.
We believe the trial court erred when it granted summary
judgment on an issue not properly before it.
Therefore, we
vacate the trial court’s dismissal of the Malins’ breach of
fiduciary duty claim against the Bank.
We now turn to the
remainder of the Bank’s summary judgment.
We note the Bank never filed a motion for summary
judgment against the Malins, but it did file a motion to dismiss
based upon the statute of limitations.21
When matters outside
the pleadings are considered in ruling on a motion to dismiss,
the motion is converted to one for summary judgment.
See Bowlin
v. Thomas, 548 S.W.2d 515, 516 (Ky.App. 1977) and Commonwealth
v. Kentucky Central Life Ins. Co., 746 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Ky.App.
1987).
In March 1997, the Malins signed a preliminary title
opinion.
The pertinent portions of the document are as follows:
7.
Search has been made for LOAN purposes only,
and not a sale, and technical title defects may
have been disregarded for loan purposes, which
would not be approved for a sale.
21
The motion was filed on April 23, 2003.
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. . . .
CONCLUSION
The undersigned attorney does not in any way or
fashion given an opinion concerning title or
certify title to the loan applicants herein or on
behalf to the loan applicants herein, but is
merely giving his opinion of title to the lender
in aiding the lender in making a credit decision
as to whether to loan the money on the collateral
(real estate) offered as security by the loan
applicants herein. It being understood that if
the loan applicants are seeking an opinion of
title concerning marketability or merchantability
of the real estate they should make arrangements
with an attorney of their own choosing for such
an opinion. . . .
Loan applicants should be aware that certain
defects in title which affect the merchantability
or marketability of the collateral (real estate)
are sometimes overlooked for lending purposes
that may not be overlooked for selling or buying
purposes. . . .
This opinion concerning title is . . . for loan
purposes only and may not be relied upon by
anyone other than said lender for any purpose
whatsoever.
(Emphasis added.)
The Malins’ signatures appear at the bottom of the same page as
the Conclusion section.
As stated earlier, we believe the Option to be
unenforceable and, even if valid, inapplicable to the Malins’
property.
This conclusion coupled with the noted sections of
the preliminary title opinion, leads us to believe summary
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judgment on behalf of the Bank was appropriate because no
genuine issue of material fact existed.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the summary judgments awarded to the Malins
and Bennetts declaring the Option void and to the Travillians
declaring the Option inapplicable to the property.
We affirm
the trial court’s dismissal of all claims against the Bennetts22
and the dismissal of the Malins’ claims against the Bank.
We
vacate that portion of summary judgment based on a breach of
fiduciary duties by the Bank to the Malins because it was not
properly before the trial court.
We vacate the trial court’s
sua sponte award of summary judgment to the Joneses against the
Malins and remand for further proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
22
The trial court dismissed the Joneses’ counterclaim and crossclaim against
the Bennetts; the Malins’ claims against the Bennetts; and the Travillians’
crossclaim against the Bennetts.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS, TERRY
AND NANCY MALIN:
Marcia A. Smith
Corbin, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES/CROSS
APPELLANTS, DEWAYNE JONES AND
RHONDA JONES:
W. PATRICK HAUSER
Barbourville, Kentucky
BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLEES
DAVID TRAVILLIAN AND DONNA
TRAVILLIAN:
Stephen W. Cessna
London, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, HUGHES
BENNETT AND ESSIE BENNETT:
Franklin A. Stivers
London, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, CUMBERLAND
VALLEY NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY
Jeffrey T. Weaver
London, Kentucky
-22-
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