JEFFERY L. CARPENTER, SR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MARCH 2, 2007; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000971-MR
JEFFERY L. CARPENTER, SR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BUTLER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00042
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ABRAMSON AND DIXON, JUDGES; HOWARD,1 SPECIAL JUDGE.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE: Appellant Jeffery L. Carpenter appeals from a January 20, 2004,
order of the Butler Circuit Court denying his RCr 11.42 motion, as well as two additional
orders overruling Carpenter's motions to vacate or amend that decision. After careful
review of the limited record before this Court, we are unable to discern whether
1
Special Judge James I. Howard concurred in this opinion prior to the expiration of his Special
Judge assignment effective February 9, 2007. Release of the opinion was delayed by
administrative handling.
Carpenter's claims are supported or contradicted therein. We therefore vacate the trial
court's orders and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
On April 17, 2003, Appellant Jeffery L. Carpenter was convicted by a jury
of one count of first-degree sexual abuse and of being a persistent felony offender in the
first degree. The Butler Circuit Court sentenced Carpenter to prison for fifteen years.
This Court subsequently affirmed Carpenter's conviction on June 10, 2005.2 Our
Supreme Court denied discretionary review of the matter on March 15, 2006.3
On August 1, 2003, approximately two and one-half months after Carpenter
appealed his conviction, he filed with the trial court a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Claiming that the Commonwealth failed to
respond to his motion, Carpenter filed a “Motion for Default Judgment” on November
13, 2003. Carpenter later filed a petition in this Court seeking a writ of mandamus
against the trial judge requiring him to rule on the motions.
On January 22, 2004, the trial court entered an order denying Carpenter's
RCr 11.42 motion. Without providing any reasoning for the decision, the court stated
simply:
The Defendant having filed a Petition For Writ of Mandamus
in the Court of Appeals alleging that the Butler Circuit Court
had not ruled upon various motions previously filed by the
Defendant.
Specifically, the Defendant alleges that he has filed a Motion
for Default Judgment, and a motion to vacate being based on
2
Case No. 2003-CA-001005.
3
Case No. 2005-SC-000598.
2
ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to RCr 11.42, and
the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised does hereby
find that said motion is not well taken and should not be
granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
the Defendant's motion to vacate sentence pursuant to RCr
11.42, and a motion for default judgment are hereby
overruled.
Following the denial of his RCr 11.42 motion, Carpenter moved twice to alter or amend
the trial court's decision. In ruling on each, the trial court entered a one-page order
denying the motion without any discussion.4 This appeal followed.
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must satisfy
a two-part test by showing: (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the
deficiency resulted in actual prejudice reasonably likely to have affected the outcome.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). An evidentiary hearing upon an RCr
11.42 motion “is required if there is a material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively
resolved, i.e., conclusively proved or disproved, by an examination of the record. The
trial judge may not simply disbelieve factual allegations in the absence of evidence in the
record refuting them.” Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452-53 (Ky. 2001).
In his RCr 11.42 motion, Carpenter appears to have raised seven grounds
supporting his assertion of ineffective assistance.5 These are: (1) failure to allow
The first order denying Carpenter's motion to alter or amend the January 20, 2004, order was
entered on February 13, 2004. The court entered its second order on March 12, 2004, denying
Carpenter's motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to CR 52.02 and 59.05.
4
These are the grounds discussed in the parties' briefs. We do not know if these are all of the
grounds alleged by Carpenter, or even if they are the correct grounds, since the RCr 11.42
motion was not included in the record on appeal.
5
3
adequate time for preparation for trial; (2) failure to call witnesses favorable to
Carpenter's case; (3) failure to defend the PFO charge; (4) failure to obtain an expert
witness; (5) failure to assert a speedy trial violation; (6) failure to preserve a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct; and (7) cumulative error. Under Kentucky law, if these claims
are refuted by the trial court's record, we should affirm the trial judge's decision to deny
Carpenter's motion. Conversely, if one or more of the allegations cannot be refuted by
reference to the record, we must reverse the trial judge's decision to deny the motion
without first holding an evidentiary hearing. However, because of the deficient record
before us in this matter, we are unable to reach either conclusion and are left with no
option but to vacate the trial court's January 22, 2004 judgment and remand for further
proceedings.
Carpenter freely admits that he filed his RCr 11.42 motion while the direct
appeal of his conviction was already pending before this Court. Apparently because the
majority of the trial court's record accompanied the direct appeal, the record that
accompanied this appeal is woefully inadequate to the task before us. The first item
found therein is Carpenter's November 13, 2003, motion seeking a default judgment
against the Commonwealth on the matters raised in his RCr 11.42 motion. This means,
of course, that the trial court's file prior to November 13, 2003, including the RCr 11.42
motion that forms the basis of this matter, is not included in the record on appeal before
us.
4
Complicating our task is the fact that the trial court chose to make no
findings when overruling Carpenter's RCr 11.42 motion other than a simple statement
that the “motion is not well taken.” We are cognizant of the fact that RCr 11.42(6)
provides in part that a “final order shall not be reversed or remanded because of the
failure of the court to make a finding of fact on an issue essential to the order unless such
failure is brought to the attention of the court by a written request for a finding on that
issue or by a motion pursuant to Civil Rule 52.02.”6 However, the lack of both a record
and any detailed findings by the trial court has rendered it impossible for us to determine
whether the trial court's decision comports with the requirements of Fraser v.
Commonwealth, supra. Under such circumstances, we simply are left with no alternative
but to vacate the trial court's January 22, 2004, judgment and remand this matter for
further proceedings so that Carpenter's motion can be reconsidered in light of a full
record and the standard set forth in Fraser.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jeffery L. Carpenter, Sr., pro se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Frankfort, Kentucky
In its March 12, 2004, order, the trial court denied Carpenter's motion “pursuant to CR 52.02
and 59.05.” Thus, it appears Carpenter may have made the requisite motion for findings but the
CR 52.02 motion, like the RCr 11.42 motion, is not in the record before us.
6
5
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.