AUTOZONE, INC. v. THOMAS R. BREWER; LLOYD R. EDENS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 20, 2002; 10:00 P.M.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY KY SUPREME COURT: JANUARY 26, 2004
(2003-SC-0046-WC)
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001311-WC
AUTOZONE, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-00-77846
THOMAS R. BREWER; LLOYD R. EDENS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; SCHRODER, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is a petition for review from a decision
of the Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”) reversing a ruling
of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) limiting the duration of
claimant’s benefits pursuant to KRS 342.730(4) and affirming the
ALJ’s finding that the employer was given timely notice of the
claimant’s injuries.
The employer argues that the claimant did
not give timely notice of certain of his injuries, and that
although the claimant was a retired federal employee and would
thus not qualify for social security benefits, the ALJ was
nevertheless correct in limiting the duration of claimant’s
benefits pursuant to KRS 342.730(4) as a matter of policy.
We
agree with the Board that under the clear unambiguous language
of KRS 342.730(4), said statute could not limit claimant’s
benefits since the claimant was not eligible for old-age social
security benefits, and that the ALJ’s finding regarding notice
was not in error.
Hence, we affirm.
Claimant Thomas Brewer was born on February 20, 1937,
and was employed by the federal government for 32 years at the
Naval Ordinance.
In 1994, he retired from his federal
employment and began working part-time for Autozone, a company
which sells auto parts.
At Autozone, Brewer worked in stocking,
as a sales representative, and on the night crew unloading
stock.
In 1998, Brewer became a full-time employee of Autozone.
On June 24, 1999, Brewer was pushing a pallet of parts onto a
truck and felt a sudden pain in his feet.
He reported the
injury to his shift supervisor and filled out an accident report
on June 24, 1999, and thereafter sought treatment from Caritas
Medical Center.
On June 4, 2000, Brewer was lifting a trash can
into a dumpster when he felt the onset of pain in his arms.
Brewer stated that he did not immediately report this injury to
his supervisor because he thought the injury was minor.
He
thereafter sought treatment on July 11, 2000, when the muscles
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in both arms began knotting up.
During his examination,
Brewer’s physician told him his injuries were work-related.
ON
that same date, Brewer reported the injury to his left
bicep/shoulder to the store manager, Eddie Stillwell.
Brewer
testified that he did not report an injury to his right shoulder
at the time because the pain in his left arm was far worse and
he thought the injury to this right arm would resolve on its
own.
When Brewer subsequently went to see his doctor about his
right shoulder pain, his doctor told him it was also workrelated.
Brewer claims that he told his supervisor about he
right shoulder injury on September 21, 2000, although Stillwell
maintains that Brewer never reported any injury to his right
shoulder.
Brewer also developed numbness and tingling in his
hands that was ultimately diagnosed as carpal tunnel syndrome.
Brewer testified that he told Stillwell about this condition in
December of 2000, when he was diagnosed with the condition.
Stillwell testified that Brewer never advised him of this
condition.
Brewer filed for workers’ compensation benefits for
the disability resulting from the injuries to his feet, left
bicep/shoulder, right shoulder, and hands.
On December 20,
2001, the ALJ issued an opinion in Brewer’s favor, determining
that:
1) all of his claimed injuries were work-related; 2)
Brewer had provided due and timely notice of his injuries and
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conditions to Autozone; and 3) Brewer was suffering from a total
functional impairment of 18%.
The ALJ then awarded benefits
based upon an 18% permanent partial disability.
However, in
light of Brewer’s age, the ALJ limited payment of periodic
benefits to age 65 or not longer than two years after the June
4, 2000, injury pursuant to KRS 342.730(4).
Brewer thereafter
appealed the ALJ’s interpretation of KRS 342.730(4), and
Autozone appealed the issues of percentage of disability and
notice.
The Board affirmed on the issues of percentage of
disability and notice, and reversed the ALJ’s determination that
Brewer’s periodic benefits were limited by KRS 342.730(4).
This
petition for review by Autozone followed.
Autozone first argues that the Board erred in
reversing the ALJ’s determination that KRS 342.730(4) would
apply in this case to limit the duration of Brewer’s benefits.
KRS 342.730(4) provides in pertinent part:
All income benefits payable pursuant to this
chapter shall terminate as of the date upon
which the employee qualifies for normal oldage Social Security retirement benefits
under the United States Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. secs. 301 to 1397f, or two (2)
years after the employee’s injury or last
exposure, whichever last occurs.
It is undisputed that as a retired federal employee,
Brewer does not qualify for old-age retirement Social Security
benefits.
Nevertheless, the ALJ applied KRS 342.730(4) for
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policy reasons, citing language in Wynn v. Ibold, Inc., Ky., 969
S.W.2d 695 (1998), which addressed the constitutionality of the
prior KRS 342.730(4) which provided for the reduction in
benefits for claimants between the ages of 65 and 70.
In
upholding the former KRS 342.730(4), the Wynn Court stated:
Keeping in mind that the purpose of workers’
compensation legislation is to maintain a
stream of income to disabled workers and
their dependents, we are persuaded that
avoiding a duplication of income benefits is
a legitimate state objective and sound
public policy. At a time when workers
become eligible for other forms of income
replacement, not only does KRS 342.730(4)
help avoid making it more profitable to be
disabled than not, it also serves to reduce
the overall cost of maintaining the workers’
compensation system, thereby improving the
economic climate for all the citizens of the
state.
Id. at 697 (citation omitted).
Unlike the Court in Wynn, we are not faced with the
constitutionality of KRS 342.730(4); rather, we are simply
interpreting whether the current version of KRS 342.730(4)
applies to a certain claimant.
When statutory language is clear
and unambiguous, it will be construed to mean what it plainly
expresses.
Commonwealth ex rel. Chandler v. Kentucky Title
Loan, Inc., Ky. App,. 16 S.W.2d 312 (1999).
“[I]t is not our
function to ‘add words and meaning to a statute that is clear on
its face.’”
Posey v. Powell, Ky. App., 965 S.W.2d 836, 838
(1998), quoting Cole v. Thomas, Ky. App., 735 S.W.2d 333, 335
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(1987).
The language of the current version of KRS 342.730(4)
is clear that it applies to those who qualify for normal old-age
Social Security retirement benefits.
We must presume that when
the legislature enacted this statute, it was aware of the fact
that federal employees were ineligible for Social Security
retirement benefits from their years of federal employment.
See
Reynolds Metal Co. v. Glass, 302 Ky. 622, 195 S.W.2d 280 (1946),
(the legislature is presumed to be aware of existing laws
pertaining to statutes it was enacting).
Yet there is no
provision for those who do not qualify for Social Security
retirement benefits but receive retirement income from other
sources, and we decline to read any such language into the
statute.
As to Autozone’s and the ALJ’s policy argument, it has
been held that “[t]he plain meaning of a law cannot be ignored
by the courts simply because another meaning might be considered
to state a better policy.”
Board of Education of Nelson County
v. Lawrence, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 830, 831 (1963).
Accordingly, we
affirm the Board’s reversal on this issue.
Autozone next argues that it was error for the ALJ to
find (and the Board to affirm) that Brewer gave timely notice of
his right shoulder and carpal tunnel injuries.
Autozone
erroneously maintains that it is undisputed that Brewer never
gave them notice of the right shoulder and carpal tunnel
injuries.
While Eddie Stillwell testified that Brewer never
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gave him notice of those injuries, Brewer testified at the
hearing that he gave definitive notice of his right shoulder
injury stemming from the June 4, 2000, incident on September 21,
2000, and that he remembered the date he gave notice because he
made a note thereof.
Brewer also testified in his deposition
that he thought he told his superior, Ronnie Spencer, and
Stillwell about the pain in both arms, his shoulders, and wrists
a couple of weeks after seeing Dr. Hockenbury on July 11.
He
stated that he told them that the right arm was now in the same
condition as the left, with a little difference, and that work
was making the condition worse.
He explained that he did not
give notice when he gave notice of the left bicep/shoulder
injury because he did not believe the injury to this right
should was as serious as the injury to his left bicep/shoulder.
As to the carpal tunnel injury, Brewer testified at the hearing
that he was “fairly certain” he told Stillwell about that injury
in December 2000, when his carpal tunnel syndrome was diagnosed.
Brewer further testified that he told Spencer he was having
problems with his fingers getting numb and that he had to wear a
wrist splint at night.
KRS 342.185 provides that in order to maintain a claim
for workers’ compensation benefits, notice of the accident must
be given to the employer “as soon as practicable after the
happening thereof.”
A reviewing court will overturn the
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decision of the Board only if the Board misconstrued the law or
erroneously assessed the evidence so flagrantly as to cause
gross injustice.
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827
S.W.2d 685 (1992).
A determination of whether notice is due and
timely is a mixed question of law and fact.
See Harry M.
Stevens Co. v. Workmen’s’ Compensation Board, Ky. App., 553
S.W.2d 852 (1977).
As to the factual portion of the
determination, we cannot say that the ALJ erred in believing
Brewer over Stillwell that he gave notice of the right shoulder
and carpal tunnel injuries.
See Brockway v. Rockwell
International, Ky. App., 907 S.W.2d 166 (1995).
As to whether
that notice was timely, even if we accept that notice was not
given until September 21, 2000, we believe the three and a halfmonth delay in giving notice of the right shoulder injury was
excusable given Brewer’s explanation that he did not believe the
injury was serious at first and thought that it would resolve on
its own.
See Marc Blackburn Brick Co. v. Yates, Ky., 424 S.W.2d
814 (1968) (sixty-six-day delay in giving notice was excusable
where employee did not know the extent of the injury or that the
injury would be disabling).
As for the carpal tunnel injury,
which is more of a gradual injury, there was evidence that
Brewer gave notice to Autozone in December of 2000, when the
injury was first diagnosed.
See Randall Co./Randall Div. of
Textron, Inc. v. Pendland, Ky. App., 770 S.W.2d 687 (1988).
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Hence, we agree with the ALJ and the Board that that notice was
timely as well.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the opinion of the
Board reversing in part and affirming in part the ALJ’s
decision.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Laurie Goetz Kemp
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, THOMAS R.
BREWER:
Scott F. Scheynost
Louisville, Kentucky
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