DALE KLEINJAN v. SPENCER COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 1, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001913-MR
DALE KLEINJAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SPENCER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES R. HICKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00111
SPENCER COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: JOHNSON AND WINE, JUDGES; MILLER,1 SPECIAL JUDGE.
MILLER, SPECIAL JUDGE:
Dale Kleinjan brings this appeal from an
order of the Spencer Circuit Court affirming a final order of
the Spencer County Board of Education (“Board”), appellees,
demoting him from his position as principal of Spencer County
Elementary School to a teaching position.
For the reasons
stated below, we affirm.
1
Retired Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
BACKGROUND
In June of 2003, Kleinjan was serving as principal of
the Spencer County Elementary School.
At that time, Kleinjan
had been serving as a principal for thirteen years.
Part of
Kleinjan’s duties required the proper reporting of school
activity accounts and submitting an annual financial report to
the school superintendent, per Board policy.
The Board required
Kleinjan to comply with the uniform financial accounting system
and activity fund accounting procedures detailed in 702 KAR2
3:130.
This regulation, which provides standards governing
internal accounting for each school, incorporates the
“Accounting Procedures for School Activity Funds” (commonly
referred to, and hereinafter, as the “Red Book”).3
In November of 2002, after a mandated audit of the
school district’s internal accounts that included Spencer County
Elementary School, auditors informed the Board that Kleinjan’s
annual financial report failed to include a school savings
account totaling in excess of $15,000.00.
Kleinjan was present
at the auditor meeting with the Board, but was unable to provide
an explanation for the discrepancy.
2
Additionally, Kleinjan
Kentucky Administrative Regulations
3
The Red Book requires a principal, i.e. Kleinjan, as the designated
administrator of a school’s activity fund, to approve or sign activity fund
documentation, and to prepare and submit annual internal accounts, budgets,
and monthly and annual financial reports to the superintendent. The Red Book
also provides that the required annual financial report signed by the
principal as administrator “shall include the amount invested and indicate
that amounts in checking and investment accounts.”
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failed to include in his annual financial reports seven
certificates of deposit, with various inception dates from 1997
to 2000, totaling in excess of $60,000.00.
At his demotion hearing, Kleinjan conceded that he did
not report those amounts in his annual financial reports to the
superintendent, nor did he include them in his monthly financial
reports to the School Based Decision Making (“SBDM”) council.
In his defense, Kleinjan testified that he did not report the
$60,000.00 because he did not know he was required to do so,
stating, “I did have a copy of the Red Book and, had I had
training or gone through it sufficiently, and you know, I have
to admit I screwed up.
I did not know.”
I did not follow it line by line. . . .
Regarding the $15,000.00, Kleinjan admitted
that “directions were given to us to report that on the reports”
and “[t]here was direction given to me to report it on the
bottom of the monthly things . . . .”
Nevertheless, it is
undisputed that the signed and approved financial reports
submitted by Kleinjan to the Board and the SBDM counsel failed
to include said amounts.
On May 1, 2003, the superintendent issued a letter to
Kleinjan demoting him from his position as principal.
On May
12, 2003, pursuant to his request and KRS4 161.765, Kleinjan was
provided with written reasons setting forth the grounds for his
4
Kentucky Revised Statutes
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demotion.
Kleinjan made a timely request and was granted a
hearing before the Board to contest his demotion.
The demotion hearing was scheduled for June 6, 2003.
Kleinjan appeared with counsel.
The Honorable Larry Bryson had
been retained to serve as counsel to the Board.
Bryson arrived
late for the hearing and was unable to confer with the Board
prior to the time it was scheduled to commence.
Bryson
explained to Kleinjan and his counsel that he needed time to
advise the Board regarding the procedural format of a demotion
hearing.
Neither Kleinjan nor his counsel made an objection
under KRS 61.846.
Hearing no objection, Bryson and the Board
proceeded into a closed session to discuss the hearing
procedures.
After the closed pre-hearing session with the
Board, the hearing commenced.
After hearing all the evidence,
the Board voted unanimously to affirm the superintendent’s
decision to demote Kleinjan.
On July 7, 2003, as authorized by KRS 61.846, Kleinjan
appealed the Board’s decision to the Spencer Circuit Court. He
argued that the decision was arbitrary and capricious.
On
August 25, 2005 the circuit court entered an opinion and order
affirming the decision of the Board.
This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review with regard to a judicial
appeal of an administrative decision is limited to determining
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whether the decision was erroneous as a matter of law.
See
Kroger Limited Partnership I v. Cabinet for Health Services,
Commonwealth of Kentucky, 174 S.W.3d 516, 518 (Ky.App. 2005).
Kleinjan’s appeal of the Board’s decision is governed by KRS
13B.150.
1994).
(Administrative Hearings; the Albert Jones Act of
Section 150 provides that “[r]eview of a final order
shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be
confined to the record . . . .” and that the reviewing court
“shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.”
Id.
Where,
as here, we review the decision of the circuit court, we stand
in that court’s shoes.
reinterpretation.
Courts are to provide review, not
See Kentucky Unemployment Insurance
Commissioner v. King, 657 S.W.2d 250 (Ky.App. 1983).
When
substantial evidence exists in the record to support an
administrative agency's factual determination, we have no
authority to overturn it.
See Kentucky State Racing Commission
v. Fuller, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 298 (1972); KRS 13B.150(2)(a).
Substantial evidence has been defined as some evidence of
substance and relevant consequence, having the fitness to induce
conviction in the minds of reasonable persons.
Smyzer v. B.F.
Goodrich Chemical Co., 474 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Ky. 1971).
In this
case, the crux of our inquiry on appeal is whether the findings
of the Board were so unreasonable under the evidence that it
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must be viewed as erroneous as a matter of law.
See e.g.,
Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986).
ANALYSIS
First, Kleinjan contends that he was denied notice of
the conduct which led to his demotion and was thus a violation
of due process.
We disagree.
Kleinjan argues that he was not given adequate notice
regarding the grounds for his demotion and consequently the
demotion hearing amounted to a “trial by ambush.”
We are
compelled to reject this contention.
KRS 161.765(2)(a) requires that a superintendent “give
written notice of the demotion to . . . . the administrator5.”
If an administrator intends to contest the demotion, as Kleinjan
did, and files notice of such intent with the superintendent,
the superintendent must then provide him with a written
statement of the grounds for demotion containing “[a] specific
and complete statement of grounds upon which the proposed
demotion is based, including, where appropriate, dates, times,
names, places, and circumstances . . . .”
KRS 161.765(2)(b)(1).
Kleinjan was provided with such written notice and the
statute required nothing more of the superintendent.
On May 12,
2003, Kleinjan acknowledged receipt of a five page letter,
5
The term “administrator” includes one employed as a principal.
161.720(8).
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See KRS
including four attached exhibits, from the superintendent
detailing not only Kleinjan’s obligations as a principal, but
also the dates, account numbers, and amounts of the erroneous
financial reports.
The letter demonstrated in minute detail the
grounds for Kleinjan’s demotion.
Consequently, we are of the
opinion that Kleinjan was provided more than enough notice of
the prohibited conduct with specificity sufficient to prepare an
adequate defense.
Similarly, Kleinjan argues that because the
superintendent never trained him regarding his accounting
obligations, Kleinjan did not have adequate notice of the
conduct that violated policy and led to his demotion.
Kleinjan
contends that this failure abridged his due process rights.
While we note that the superintendent conceded that he never
trained Kleinjan regarding compliance with the Red Book
procedures, this argument nevertheless fails.
Kleinjan admitted
on the record, during the demotion hearing, that he had access
to the Red Book.
Additionally, Kleinjan admitted that he failed
to follow the Red Book procedures “line by line.”
Moreover,
regarding his financial reporting obligations, Kleinjan
testified that he “should have been reporting [the investment
monies] according to the Red Book information . . . .” and that
he had not “gone through it sufficiently.”
Kleinjan is an
educated professional who admittedly had access to the pertinent
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information regarding his responsibilities and thus should have
known of his financial reporting obligations.
Finally, we note
that the financial reporting requirements imposed upon
principals such as Kleinjan are straightforward and simplistic.
We agree with the circuit court that substantial evidence was
presented to the Board that Kleinjan did not report funds in
accordance with the requirements of the readily available Red
Book.
Next, Kleinjan avers that his right to a fair hearing
was violated because he was denied an impartial decision-maker
pursuant to KRS 13B.040(2)(b)(3).
Again, we disagree.
Kleinjan argues that at the time of the demotion
hearing, the Board chairperson, Vickie Goodlett, had applied for
a salaried position as chief accountant with the Spencer County
Board of Education.
Consequently, Kleinjan’s superintendent
would potentially become Goodlett’s supervisor if she was
offered the position.
Kleinjan argues this constituted a
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the demotion proceeding and
thus Goodlett should have disqualified herself from serving as a
hearing officer.
This argument is without merit.
KRS 13B.040(2)(a) states that “[a] hearing officer,
agency head, or member of an agency head who is serving as a
hearing officer shall voluntarily disqualify [her]self and
withdraw from any case in which [s]he cannot afford a fair and
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impartial hearing or consideration.”
Grounds for
disqualification of a hearing officer include the hearing
officer “[h]aving a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the
proceeding.”
KRS 13B.040(2)(b)(3).
Prior to the start of the demotion hearing, Goodlett
disclosed that she had applied for a financial officer position
with Spencer County.
Goodlett also indicated that she would not
allow the potential employment to influence her decision at the
hearing.
Even after this admission, Goodlett offered to recuse
herself from the hearing if Kleinjan so desired.
presented no objection.
Kleinjan
The Kentucky Supreme Court has
recognized it is a mandatory prerequisite prior to claiming
error on appeal that it be preserved in the record.
See
Commonwealth Transportation Cabinet Bureau of Highways v. Roof,
913 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Ky. 1996).
Kleinjan not only failed to
preserve the issue, but he also affirmatively waived any
objection when, after consulting with counsel and with full
opportunity to voir dire Goodlett, agreed that she could stay on
as a hearing officer.
Moreover, Kleinjan, through counsel,
stated to Goodlett on the record that “we feel you could be able
to hear this case fairly and render a fair and impartial
decision . . . .”
Because Kleinjan did not object to Goodlett’s
participation as a hearing officer, we deem this issue waived.
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Finally, Kleinjan contends that the hearing violated
the Open Meetings Act (KRS 61.805 et seq.) and for that reason
the demotion must be set aside.
Again, we disagree.
Kleinjan asserts that because the Attorney General
concluded the Board’s pre-hearing session with Bryson violated
the Open Meetings Act6 his demotion is rendered void pursuant to
KRS 61.848(5).
This assertion fails, however, because Kleinjan
not only failed to object on the record, but also failed to
submit an individual written complaint to the presiding officer
of the Board as contemplated under KRS 61.846 and KRS 61.848(2).
While the applicable Open Meetings Act provision does not
require full exhaustion of remedies under KRS 61.846 prior to
filing suit in a circuit court, such provision does require the
submission of a written Open Meetings Act complaint to the
presiding officer of the Board as a prerequisite to judicial
relief.
See KRS 61.848(2).
Kleinjan did not submit the
required complaint to the Board, rather another person with no
affiliation to him whatsoever filed the complaint.
Kleinjan’s
attempt to “piggy-back” onto that complaint is disingenuous
where he made no complaint or objection in his own capacity.
Kleinjan’s failure to make such a complaint, in his own right,
6
It appears that one Tom Watson observed the hearing and, as a concerned
citizen, presented an Open Meetings Act complaint, pursuant to KRS 61.846, to
the chairperson of the Board on June 21, 2003. Watson appealed the Board’s
response denying the complaint to the Attorney General, which in turn issued
an opinion. Watson was not a party to the hearing, nor a representative of
Kleinjan.
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constitutes an independent procedural ground to reject his Open
Meetings claim.
Even assuming Kleinjan did make the complaint as
required by statute, his argument nevertheless fails.
We are of
the opinion his demotion should not be declared void.
The
Attorney General opinion upon which he relies dealt with the
Board’s meeting with counsel during which no action was taken.
Moreover, the Attorney General opinion did not find the
substantive decision of the Board in violation of the Open
Meetings Act.
We decline to void the Board’s decision under
these facts where Kleinjan did not object to the pre-hearing
meeting on Open Meetings Act grounds (or any grounds); was
permitted to conduct a voir dire of the panel; and, the
complained of violation was wholly an administrative matter.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Spencer
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Edward E. Dove
Lexington, Kentucky
Robert L. Chenoweth
S. Shea Luna
Frankfort, Kentucky
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