JAMES RICKETT; AND PAUL RICKETT v. DANNY RICKETT
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APRIL 14, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001035-MR
JAMES RICKETT; AND
PAUL RICKETT
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL E. BRADEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-00696
v.
DANNY RICKETT
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; JOHNSON AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
James Rickett and Paul Rickett have appealed
from the final judgment of the Whitley Circuit Court entered on
October 30, 2002, which dissolved their partnerships with Danny
Rickett and valued and divided certain property among them.
Having concluded that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, we affirm.
James, Paul, and Danny are brothers and were
involved in two partnerships that are the subject of this case.
James, Paul, and Danny were in a cattle partnership.1
Danny were in an equipment partnership.
James and
While Paul was not
involved in the equipment partnership, the trial court awarded
two pieces of equipment to James and Paul jointly and in equal
shares.
Both partnerships were oral partnerships.
The cattle partnership was formed in 1992.
Prior to
1992, James owned approximately 20 cattle in his individual
name, and Danny owned approximately 20 cattle in his individual
name.
At this time, James and Danny were also partners in an
operation which included approximately 20 cattle.
In 1992 when
Paul became a partner with James and Danny, he purchased enough
cattle2 to equal the cattle owned at that time by James and
Danny.
The cattle were held at two locations.
Some of the
cattle were on Danny’s farm, and some were located on rented
pasture land in two spots at Meadow Creek.
It is uncontested that James and Danny owned equipment
in a partnership, but specifically what equipment is in
question.3
1
Both James4 and Danny claimed to own equipment
James and Paul also owned approximately 15 to 20 head of cattle together.
2
It is unknown whether Paul purchased cattle equivalent in value or an equal
number of head.
3
Paul testified that he was not part of the equipment partnership with James
and Danny, but owned equipment individually that was used in the partnership.
In Schedule C of the complaint, James acknowledged a list of equipment that
he owned jointly with Danny including the following: 230 Massey Ferguson
tractor, three-point hitch hay rake, Massey Ferguson square hay baler, bush
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individually that was used in the partnership.
It was contested
whether the three brothers owned two pieces of equipment in
equal shares, namely a Supreme Gooseneck flatbed trailer and a
6610 Ford tractor.
James and Paul claimed that these two items
were Paul’s individual property.
James and Paul also claimed
that some of his individual equipment was used in the
partnership and was still on Danny’s property.5
In 1993 James and Paul asked Danny to dissolve the
partnership.
According to Danny, James and Paul wanted to sell
everything.
Danny, however, wanted to keep the cows that he had
originally put in the partnership.
In November 1993 the three
brothers got in a heated argument6 over the division of the
partnership cattle.
Subsequently, James and Paul filed a complaint in the
hog, two home-made corn wagons, 255 Massey Ferguson tractor, Ford corn
planter, home-made back lift boom, set of lever type harrows, and a scissortype round hay spear.
4
In Schedule A of James and Paul’s complaint, James lists as his individual
property the following: Caterpillar D-3 dozer, 540 Heston round hay baler,
set of double plows, 240 Massey Ferguson tractor, set of disc hares, bush
hog, corn sprayer, round hay feeder, three trailer axles, two tongues, two
cast iron bath tubs, four trailer tires and rims, 2x6 oak boards, electric
fence post, four 15 inch truck tires and rims, welded metal frame window
cover used to hem cattle, livestock watering faucet, 16 foot metal pipe gate,
and 8 foot metal slab gate.
5
Besides the flatbed trailer and tractor which were in dispute, Paul listed
in Schedule B of the complaint certain property located on Danny’s land that
he individually owned, including the following: several 55 gallon barrels of
hydraulic oil, several rolls of conveyor belt, and a four-foot long piece of
steel.
6
James and Paul claimed that while they were on Danny’s property to divide
the partnership cattle, Danny’s wife shot at them with a gun.
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Whitley Circuit Court on November 18, 1994, to dissolve the
partnership, to render an accounting of the partnership assets,
and to divide the assets or to distribute the proceeds of any
sale of the assets.7
They also asked to be restored to their
individual property, some of which they claimed was in Danny’s
possession.
James and Paul claimed that Danny had refused to
divide the cattle and to divide or to allow any use of the
partnership equipment.
An injunction was issued against Danny
on November 21, 1994, to prevent him from selling any of the
cattle or equipment that was considered partnership property.
Danny filed an answer and counterclaim on January 21, 1994,
requesting a dissolution of the two partnerships, an accounting
and liquidation of the partnership assets, and reimbursement for
partnership expenses.
On June 21, 1995, this matter was assigned to the
Whitley County Master Commissioner, Larry Conley, and hearings
were held before Commissioner Conley on October 25, 1995, March
13, 1996, May 30, 1996, July 11, 1996, and August 29, 1996.8
All
five hearings were transcribed and filed of record, but none of
the tendered exhibits was filed with any of the transcripts.
7
Prior to that time, 23 head of cattle had been sold.
8
During the taking of testimony, Danny’s attorney was appointed as a
Magistrate Judge for the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky. Danny hired a new attorney who was given ample time to
review the record after rebuttal was complete.
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The brothers did not keep specific records of purchases made and
cattle kept or sold.
Further, there was testimony that they
commonly conducted business in cash.
Testimony indicated that
some of the partnership cattle had calves, that some of the cows
and some of the calves were sold, and that some of the cows and
some of the calves had died, but no accurate count of increase
or decrease in cattle was ever kept.
In fact, the three
brothers could not agree on how many cattle belonged to the
partnership in November 1993 when the partnership problems
arose.9
All three brothers testified at the hearings.10
Both
James and Paul testified that the partnerships split up because
Danny did not pay his part for cattle purchased in the
partnership or for the feed for the partnership cattle.
They
also asserted that Danny used the partnership feed for cattle
and horses that he owned outside the partnership.
However, they
acknowledged that Danny had fed the partnership cattle for the
two years after the case was filed.
James testified that there
was enough hay at Danny’s farm to feed the cattle during 1993
and part of 1994.
Danny testified that he had spent $9,000.00
in feeding the partnership cattle over the two years prior to
9
James and Paul claimed there were over 100 partnership cattle at this time,
while Danny claimed there were only 55 to 60 head remaining.
10
James’s bookkeeper, Ms. Goins, also testified.
her first name in the record.
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She is not identified by
the hearing; however, he had no receipts to support this
testimony.
Paul testified that since 1993 Danny had sold
partnership cattle without their permission.
Danny testified
that he had sold one cow and two calves belonging to the
partnership prior to November 1993, in order to pay for the
pasture expenses.
He further testified that James and Paul had
refused to pay any of the expenses.
The parties agreed that
they had divided 14 of the partnership cattle that were located
on one portion of the land at Meadow Creek and that ten
partnership cattle had been sold.
Danny testified that the last time he counted the
cattle prior to the dispute was in the winter of 1992, at which
time he believed there were probably 80 to 85 cows and calves.
Paul testified that during November 1993, when the disagreement
among them occurred, the three brothers had attempted to roundup
all the partnership cattle on Danny’s property and there were
probably 60 to 70 head.
Danny testified that between November
1993 and November 21, 1994, the date of the restraining order,
he probably made four or five trips to market and sold
approximately eight cows each time.
At the time of the hearings in 1995 and 1996, Danny
testified that there were probably 40 cows and calves on his
land and six cows and seven or eight calves located at Meadow
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Creek.
He also testified that some partnership cattle had been
moved by James and Paul to an unknown location and he was
unaware of the number of head.
While Danny testified that the original number of
partnership cattle was 55 to 60 head, James testified to a much
larger number.
He claimed that the original partnership between
Danny and him started with 60 to 70 head of cattle, eight of
which Danny contributed.
He testified that Danny had agreed to
pay him for an interest in the cattle that James purchased, but
he never did.
James testified that on the date of the incident
in November 1993, there were 65 to 70 brood cows on Danny’s land
and 20 head located at Meadow Creek.
At this time, the three
brothers had already divided 14 head located at Meadow Creek.
There were also 30 calves at the two locations, for a total of
130 head.
James testified that the three brothers put hay and
corn on Danny’s farm, but Danny never paid for any of it.
James
also acknowledged that Danny had sold some cattle and that Danny
was holding proceed checks for Paul and him, but James did not
know the amounts.11
11
The highest number of partnership cattle testified to indicates that the
partnership owned over 100 cows and 30 calves. Commissioner Conley stated
his findings regarding the total number of partnership cattle as follows:
The parties attempted to divide the cattle at
one point and managed to divide 14 head. In addition
Danny had sold about 10 head out of the group the
parties had tried to divide. If the 130 head figure
is correct for the highest number of partnership
cattle then after that division there would have
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Danny testified that James had certain individual
property used by the partnership, including a 240 Massey
Ferguson tractor, disk tires, and a green bush hog.
Danny
testified that prior to filing suit, James approached him with
an agreement proposal as to the partnership equipment.
Under
the agreement, James would receive the following equipment:
120
square hay baler, 501 Ford mower, Ford corn sprayer, bush hog,
and $100.00.12
Under the agreement, Danny would receive the
following equipment:
a 230 Massey Ferguson tractor, three-point
remained 106 head of partnership cattle. In November
of 1994 the parties rounded up the partnership cattle
and had 60-70 head or over 90 head depending upon
whose testimony is accepted. If the higher figure
(90 head) is accepted then the partnership, at the
time of the roundup, would have had about the same
number of cattle as when it began with the 14 head
the parties tried to divide and the 10 head sold by
Danny representing the net increase in the herd. If
the lower number is accepted the Court notes that the
lower number (67) plus the 24 head the parties
divided or sold yields a total of 91 which is almost
exactly the number of cattle the partnership started
with. The discrepancy between the two sets of
numbers (90-58) is 32. Based upon the testimony the
Court finds that no accounting for the cattle can be
more accurate than plus or minus 16 head. Danny
Rickett admitted during his testimony on October 25th
of 1995 that he had 40 plus head of partnership
cattle on his farm plus 6 cows and 3 or 4 calves on
[M]eadow [C]reek farm for a total of 53 head of
partnership cattle. Fifty-three head of cattle
compared with the 58-67 head Danny testified to as
the number of cattle rounded up in November of 1994
yields a difference of 5 to 14 head. If the figure
of 90 head is accepted as the number of cattle
rounded up by the parties and 16 head is subtracted
from that the result is 74 head which is within 7
head of the 67 head testified to by Danny. Thus the
testimony of each side is within the 16 head margin
of error.
12
Danny testified that Paul was to pay James the $100.00 because Paul owed
Danny $100.00 as result of the cattle split.
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hitch hay rake, disc harrows, and a Ford corn planter.
Danny
testified that the equipment was exchanged, without transfer of
title or receipts.
James testified that the agreement between
Danny and him regarding the division of partnership equipment
never took place.
He acknowledged that he had in his possession
the items that Danny claimed he received, but he testified that
he took the items to prevent a confrontation and that the 501
Ford mower was his individual property, inherited from his
father.
Paul claimed that he solely owned the flatbed trailer
and the cattle trailer that are listed in the trial court’s
order as to be equally divided between James and Paul.
Danny
testified that he borrowed money from the Bank of Williamsburg
and paid one-third of the cost of both items when they were
purchased.
At the time James and Paul filed suit, Danny was in
possession of three checks issued by London Farmers Livestock
Market in the amount of $2,325.36, representing two-thirds of
the proceeds from the sale of partnership cattle that Danny had
previously sold.
On March 27, 1996, the parties entered an
agreed order stating that these checks were to be combined into
one check and reissued to the Clerk of the Whitley Circuit
Court.
The check was then placed in an interest bearing account
on April 4, 1996.
On June 7, 1996, another check from Danny’s
sale of partnership cattle, in the amount of $7,526.83, was
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placed into escrow.
On August 6, 1996, the trial court entered
an order restraining the parties from selling any additional
cattle until the entire case was settled.
On September 13,
1996, Danny was ordered to escrow his one-third of the proceeds
from the first sale of cattle.
If he did not do so, James and
Paul were entitled to receive the sum already in escrow, plus
interest.
On September 30, 1996, the clerk issued a check to
James and Paul for $2,355.70.13
On October 1, 1996, Danny filed
a motion to correct the September 30, 1996, order, stating that
James and Paul sold disputed cattle on September 24, 1996, and
that such funds were not escrowed.
James and Paul filed a
response on October 4, 1996, but the record does not indicate
that the trial court ruled on Danny’s motion.
On September 17, 1996, James and Paul filed an
affidavit stating specifically which partnership cattle they
believed were unaccounted for and listing particular cattle they
claimed to own individually.
In response to this affidavit,
Danny filed his affidavit on September 18, 1996, regarding the
disposition by him of certain cattle, the death of certain
cattle, and the location of certain cattle.
On February 6,
1997, James and Paul filed a motion for contempt stating that
certain partnership equipment that had been previously ordered
13
The order also allowed James and Paul to sell certain cattle they claimed
were their own cattle, and Danny was allowed to object at the sale, in good
faith, if he believed any head was partnership cattle.
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to be placed in plain view was missing.
On February 14, 1997,
the trial court remanded the matter back to Commissioner Conley
for a recommendation.
On March 3, 1997, Danny submitted a
memorandum to the trial court that outlined various expenses,
equipment, land, cattle, machinery, attorney’s fees, and court
costs.
Part III of the memorandum stated as follows:
As testified to at the hearings,
Gatliff Coal Company wanted two tracts of
land from the parties, one from James
Rickett and one from Danny Rickett. The
Plaintiff, James Rickett, and the Defendant,
Danny Rickett, agreed that Danny would
receive $2,000 from James in exchange for
Danny deeding his property to Gatliff and
Gatliff deeding its property solely to
James. Plaintiff has retained possession of
this property and should be ordered to pay
the Defendant, pursuant to this agreement,
the sum of $2,000.00 or convey a 1/2
interest in the property James received from
Gatliff.
Danny also claimed that James and Paul had not contributed to
the expenses of the partnership cattle, including feed, pasture
rent, and transportation of cattle for sale from 1993 to 1996.
Commissioner Conley entered his recommended findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment on April 4, 1997.
Commissioner Conley set forth items of equipment that belonged
to each party individually and recommended that, unless the
parties could agree on a division, the partnership items owned
between James and Danny should be sold by the Master
Commissioner at a public auction and the proceeds divided
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between James and Danny.
Further, he proposed that James be
awarded the D-3 bulldozer and Paul be awarded the Ford 6610
tractor as their individual property.
Commissioner Conley
further recommended that all the cattle be sold and the proceeds
divided equally among the parties.
Commissioner Conley found
that all the partnership cattle were accounted for, and that the
escrowed money, $7,526.83, should be divided equally among the
three brothers, except for $500.00 for his fee and $280.00 to be
awarded to Danny for transporting the cattle to market.
He
proposed no award to Danny for the upkeep of the partnership
cattle.
All parties filed exceptions to Commissioner Conley’s
report; however, the record is unclear as to the ruling on the
exceptions.14
On November 2, 1998, Danny filed a notice stating that
the parties could not reach an agreement as to the sale of the
property or cattle.
James and Paul filed a motion on November
18, 1998, requesting that the case be assigned to a new
14
On April 14, 1997, James and Paul filed one exception regarding the Heston
round hay baler, arguing that it was James’s individual property. Danny
filed various exceptions including the following: (1) that he should have
been awarded $18,222.42 for James’s and Paul’s share of the $25,667.62 he
paid for caring for the partnership cattle in 1993 and 1994; (2) that James
and Paul still had partnership cattle in their possession; (3) that James and
Danny had an agreement as to the division of certain partnership equipment;
(4) that certain other equipment was Danny’s property; (5) that the 501 Ford
mower, hay spear, kerosene drum and pump, Massey Ferguson spare tire and rim,
a dolly, a flat-bed trailer, and a goose-neck trailer were omitted from the
division of assets; and (6) that the Caterpillar D-3 dozer and the 6610 Ford
tractor should have been found to be partnership equipment.
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Commissioner15 and a new hearing be held.
The trial court
entered an order on December 21, 1998, assigning the case to
Domestic Relations Commissioner Cathy E. Prewitt.16
On June 18, 1999, the trial court entered an order,
following a motion dated April 8, 1999, filed by James and Paul,
requiring certain partnership equipment be sold by the Master
Commissioner, and the proceeds escrowed.17
The order stated as
follows:
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the
following equipment shall be sold by the
Master Commissioner of the Whitley Circuit
Court, after August 1, 1999, unless the
parties enter an Agreed Order to another
form of public sale,
FURTHER IT IS ORDERED that the
equipment to be sold is as follows:
230 Massey Ferguson tractor . . .
255 Massey Ferguson tractor . . .
Heston Round Hay baler . . .
Catapiller bull dozier . . .
3 point hitch Massey Ferguson Hayrake . . .
Bushhog . . .
2 row Ford Corn Planter . . .
Gooseneck cattle trailer . . .
6610 Ford Tractor . . .
15
The record is unclear as to why Commissioner Conley was no longer handling
the case at the time it was assigned to Commissioner Prewitt. The only
explanation in the record is a reference in a motion filed by James and Paul
on January 29, 1997, indicating that Commissioner Conley had “resigned”.
16
On February 8, 1999, Danny’s counsel withdrew from the case and Danny was
given ten days to employ new counsel. James and Paul filed a motion on March
4, 1999, stating that Danny had failed to hire counsel and requested the
trial court adopt Commissioner Conley’s 1997 findings, as well as their
exceptions to those findings.
17
Danny objected to the motion by response filed on April 9, 1999.
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Circle M Supreme flatbed trailer . . .
120 Massey Ferguson square hay baler . . .
3 point hitch 24 disc Massey Ferguson
hare[.]
FURTHER IT IS ORDERED that the
equipment shall be sold by the Master
Commissioner at its present locations[.]
On November 2, 1999, Danny filed a motion to vacate
the trial court’s order of sale.
On November 16, 1999, the
trial court denied Danny’s motion and made the order of sale
final and appealable.
Danny filed a second motion to alter,
amend, or vacate the order of sale on November 24, 1999, arguing
that the partnership cattle in James’s and Paul’s possession
should be sold if the partnership equipment was to be sold.
Danny argued that James and Paul had partnership cattle in their
possession worth at least $15,700.00, and had an unknown number
of calves.
Further, he argued that James and Paul had sold at
least five head of cattle for $37,500.00 before they filed the
lawsuit and one head after the order of sale, but that they had
only escrowed approximately $300.00.
He further argued that it
was improper to sell equipment prior to a determination of what
equipment was in fact partnership equipment and what equipment
was owned by him individually.
Nothing else transpired in this case until March 15,
2002, when the trial court entered a notice to dismiss for lack
of prosecution.
James and Paul filed their motion to submit on
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March 20, 2002, to which Danny did not object.
On April 8,
2002, the trial court ordered the parties to submit briefs and
at that time the case would stand submitted.
On September 27,
2002, Commissioner Prewitt filed her proposed judgment in the
case.
On October 2, 2002, James and Paul filed exceptions, and
on October 8, 2002, they supplemented their exceptions.
On
October 9, 2002, Danny filed objections to James’s and Paul’s
exceptions, but filed no exceptions of his own.
The trial court
overruled the exceptions,18 confirmed, and adopted Commissioner
Prewitt’s report, and made it a part of the order by reference.
The trial court then entered its final judgment on October 30,
2002,19 and stated as follows:
1.
Danny Rickett is awarded the 230 Massey
Ferguson tractor, three-point hitch
hayrake, disc harrow, corn planter, D-3
Caterpillar dozer and 255 Massey
Ferguson tractor, as a part of the
agreement to divide assets.
2.
James Rickett is awarded the corn
sprayer, 501 Ford mowing machine, the
18
The order overruling James’s and Paul’s exceptions indicates that the trial
court “heard arguments of counsel,” but is unclear if a hearing was held.
The court docket indicates that a hearing was set for October 14, 2002,
during the trial court’s regular motion hour; however, there is no transcript
or tape of the hearing before this Court for review.
19
Commissioner Prewitt did not propose findings on the following equipment in
question: 240 Massey Ferguson tractor, set of disc tires, bush hog, round
hay feeder, three trailer axles, two tongues, two cast iron bath tubs, four
trailer tires and rims, electric fence post, oak boards, welded metal frame,
livestock watering faucet, metal pipe gate, metal slab gate, several fiftyfive gallon barrels of hydraulic oil, several rolls of conveyor belt, fourfoot long piece of conveyor belt, and fence stretchers and accessories.
Neither commissioner made proposed findings on the trailer tires and rims and
the truck tires and rims.
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bushhog, 550 Heston round baler, and
the 120 Massey Ferguson square baler,
and the $100.00 cash, which items are
already in his possession.
3.
James and Paul Rickett are awarded in
equal shares the Supreme Gooseneck
trailer, Gooseneck cattle trailer and
6610 Ford Tractor.
4.
The total value of the cattle at the
date this case was filed was $27,026.83
and each party is entitled to one-third
of the total amount. Danny Rickett is
awarded the sum of $7,526.83 held in
escrow by the Clerk and Danny Rickett
is further awarded judgment against
James Rickett and Paul Rickett, jointly
and severally, for the sum of
$1,482.11, representing the remaining
share of the value of cattle held by
James Rickett and Paul Rickett at the
date of dissolution of the partnership.
The balance of these funds is awarded
to the plaintiffs in equal shares.
5.
The expenses of maintenance of
partnership cattle paid by Danny
Rickett for the period of 1993 to 1996
being $10,650.00, judgment is hereby
awarded to Danny Rickett against James
Rickett and Paul Rickett, jointly and
severally, for two-thirds (2/3) of this
amount, being $7,100.00.
6.
Danny Rickett is awarded judgment
against James Rickett in the sum of
$2,000.00 for proceeds from the sale of
land.
7.
All judgments awarded in favor of Danny
Rickett shall bear interest at the rate
of 8.0% per year from the date this
case was filed on November 18, 1994,
through the date of judgment and
thereafter at 12.0% per year until
paid.
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8.
Plaintiffs are not entitled to
prejudgment or post-judgment interest
because they violated the Court’s Order
by failure to sell the cattle and
escrow the proceeds.
On November 5, 2002, James and Paul filed their motion
to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court’s final judgment,
stating that the trial court adopted a decision detrimental to
them from a Commissioner who had not heard any of the evidence
or observed any witness.
James and Paul claimed that certain
evidence had been lost and the trial court’s decision was not
supported by law or fact.
Danny objected to the motion.
The
trial court overruled the motion to alter, amend, or vacate on
May 18, 2004.
This appeal followed.
Because this case was tried upon the facts without a
jury, upon review the trial court’s findings “shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous[.]”20
Findings of fact are not
clearly erroneous if supported by substantial evidence.21
Substantial evidence is “‘evidence of substance and relevant
consequence, having the fitness to induce conviction in the
minds of reasonable [people]’” [citation omitted].22
In this
case, hearings were held before a Master Commissioner, who later
20
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01.
21
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998).
22
Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 308 (Ky. 1991).
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submitted proposed findings.
The transcript of the hearings and
the record was then submitted to a Domestic Relations
Commissioner, upon request of James and Paul, who then submitted
proposed findings.
In its consideration of a Commissioner’s report, a
trial court “may adopt the report, or may modify it, or may
reject it in whole or in part, or may receive further evidence,
or may recommit it with instructions.”23
“[T]he clear language
of the rule allows the trial judge complete discretion as to the
use of a commissioner’s report.”24
In this case, the trial court
exercised its discretion by accepting Commissioner Prewitt’s
recommended order in its entirety.
Pursuant to CR 52.01, “[t]he
findings of a commissioner, to the extent that the court adopts
them, shall be considered the findings of the court.”
It is impossible in this case for this Court to
conduct an adequate review of the evidence since the record on
appeal does not include any of the exhibits from the hearings
held in this case.
While the designation of record filed by the
Whitley Circuit Court Clerk lists “a folder containing exhibits
from hearings,” these exhibits were never made part of the
record and are not attached to the transcripts of the hearings
at which they were entered.
This Court did not receive such an
23
CR 53.06(2).
24
Haley v. Haley, 573 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Ky.App. 1978).
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envelope.
In fact, all parties acknowledge in their briefs that
the exhibits are not in the record.
It was James’s and Paul’s
duty, as appellants, to ensure the exhibits were included in the
record.25
The record shows that on March 20, 2002, James and
Paul filed a motion for the trial court to enter a judgment in
the matter and acknowledged that transcripts of the hearings had
been filed and that two Commissioners had reviewed the case.
The final transcript was filed of record on August 29, 2001,
almost one year prior to this motion being filed.
Obviously
James and Paul knew before Commissioner Prewitt reviewed the
file, over one year later, that the exhibits were not attached
to the transcripts of the hearings.
When the appellate record
does not include evidence presented, we must presume that the
missing evidence supported the judgment of the trial court.26
In
this case, the evidence contained in the exhibits was the most
specific proof offered by the parties as to information
necessary to identify and to value the partnership property and
to make an equitable distribution thereof.
This Court has
devoted many hours to reviewing the pleadings and the trial
transcripts in an attempt to understand the evidence and issues
25
Burberry v. Bridges, 427 S.W.3d 583, 585 (Ky. 1968).
26
Miller v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways, 487 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Ky. 1972).
See also Caden v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Ky. 1951) (stating that
the only time this presumption does not arise is “where the omitted portions
of a record were not considered by the trial court or did not influence the
decision, and are not necessary to be regarded by us on review” [citation
omitted]).
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in this case, and based on the record before us, we conclude
that the trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and
it did not abuse its discretion in its final ruling in this
case.
Three of James’s and Paul’s arguments before this
Court concern whether the trial court abused its discretion in
its valuation and division of (1) partnership cattle, (2)
partnership equipment, and (3) partnership expenses.
First,
James and Paul argue that the trial court’s findings as to the
number of cattle in the partnership at the time the case was
filed was totally contrary to the evidence.
However, in
reviewing the transcripts of the case, there is conflicting
testimony as to who had possession of the partnership cattle at
the time of the filing of the case.
To the extent the evidence
is conflicting, a trial court’s decision must “be upheld if
correct upon any ground manifested in the record” [citations
omitted].27
James and Paul testified that Danny sold some of the
partnership cattle, but they did not know how many head.
Danny
testified that James and Paul had moved some cattle off his
land, but he did not know how many.
Thus, based on this
speculation by all parties, the trial court used its discretion
27
Cavalier Advertising Service v. Hudson, 262 Ky. 282, 90 S.W.2d 28, 33
(1936).
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to try to assign a number of cattle held by the parties within
the testimony provided.
James and Paul assert that there was no testimony
about the value of the remaining partnership cattle.
Thus, the
trial court had to determine a value of these cattle without
assistance of the parties.
However, they want this Court to
find error in the trial court’s valuation of the cattle.
“Based
on the lack of evidence, the findings of the [trial court] are
not contrary to law.
Indeed, the [trial court] appears to have
done a credible job in [its] accounting for the partnership in
view of the records presented.”28
Our review of the division of the partnership
equipment is the same.
The parties provided conflicting
testimony as to whether any of the partnership equipment had
been divided and whether certain pieces of equipment were
actually partnership property rather than owned by one of the
parties individually.
“Determination of the rights of the
parties is complicated because no formal written partnership
agreement was entered into.”29
“‘While the interest of each
partner is not established by competent testimony, in the
absence of such evidence each partner will be presumed to have
28
Pendleton v. Strange, 381 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Ky. 1964).
29
Id. at 617.
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an equal interest’” [citations omitted].30
The trial court used
its discretion in hearing the evidence presented as to the
equipment and made its decision on division based on its belief
of Danny’s testimony that a partial agreement had been reached.
Again, there is no evidence of record as to the current values
of the equipment, as acknowledged by James and Paul.
Thus, we
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in placing
values on the equipment in order to equitably divide it.
As to partnership expenses, James and Paul argue that
the trial court’s award to Danny of $7,100.00 for maintenance of
the partnership cattle31 was not supported by any competent
record of evidence.
Specifically, James and Paul argue that
there was no evidence as to what the reasonable rental value of
the pasture was, or the reasonable rental value of Danny’s
equipment.
A member of a partnership is entitled to
reimbursement from the other members,32 as partners are jointly
liable for all debts and obligations of the partnership.33
Again, without the necessary testimony, the trial court had to
30
Pendleton, 381 S.W.2d at 619.
31
In his brief to the trial court, Danny asked for reimbursement for his
payment for feed of $9,390.00, pasture rent of $1,187.00, and transportation
of cattle to sale of $280.00.
32
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 362.345(4)(a).
33
KRS 362.220(1).
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use the record before it to value the reimbursement Danny was
entitled to, and we find no abuse of discretion in doing so.
Danny was awarded $2,000.00 for one-half the value of
a piece of real estate that he deeded to Gatliff Coal Company
during the partnership, in order for James to receive other
property from Gatliff.
This issue was not raised in Danny’s
answer and counter-claim, but was raised in a brief Danny
submitted to the trial court prior to its final ruling.
There
is no evidence of record that James and Paul filed an objection
as to this allegation by Danny.
“‘Except as to a party against
whom a judgment is entered by default for want of appearance,
every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party
in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has
not demanded such relief in his pleadings.’”34
This rule of law
supports the trial court’s award.
The trial court awarded Danny 8% prejudgment interest
from November 18, 1994, until the award is paid.
James and Paul
are incorrect in their argument that this award of prejudgment
interest on an unliquidated claim is contrary to Kentucky law.
In Nucor Corp. v. General Electric Co.,35 our Supreme Court
thoroughly reviewed the issue of prejudgment interest and stated
that “[w]hen the damages are ‘liquidated,’ prejudgment interest
34
Ford v. Gilbert, 397 S.W.2d 41, 42 (Ky. 1965) (citing CR 54.03).
35
812 S.W.2d 136, 141 (Ky. 1991).
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follows as a matter of course[,]” but an award of prejudgment
interest on unliquidated damages is within the discretion of the
trial court.
A liquidated claim is defined as “‘[m]ade certain
or fixed by agreement of parties or by operation of law’”
[citations omitted].36
An unliquidated damage is one that
“exist[s] in opinion and require[s] ascertainment by a jury, and
which cannot be ascertained or fixed by calculation.”37
“Prejudgment interest is limited to the legal rate, found in KRS
360.010, of 8%.”
“The trial court may award prejudgment
interest at any rate up to 8%, or it may choose to award no
prejudgment interest at all, but it may not exceed the legal
rate of 8%” [citation omitted].38
In the case before us, the prejudgment interest was
awarded on an unliquidated claim, and thus, we must determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion39 in making an
award of prejudgment interest which “is based upon the
foundation of equity and justice.”40
“[E]quity and justice
demand that one who uses money or property of another . . .
should at least pay interest for its use in the absence of some
36
Nucor Corp., 812 S.W.2d at 141.
37
Simons v. Douglas’ Ex’r, 189 Ky. 644, 225 S.W. 721, 724 (1920).
38
Fields v. Fields, 58 S.W.3d 464, 467 (Ky. 2001).
39
Id. (citing Church & Mullins Corp. v. Bethlehem Minerals Co., 887 S.W.2d
321, 325 (Ky. 1992)).
40
Id.
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agreement to the contrary” [citation omitted].41
“This principle
applies whether or not the amount owed to another is liquidated
or unliquidated.”42
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s award of prejudgment interest on this unliquidated
claim.
Based upon the evidence of record, we conclude that
the appellants’ argument for new findings by the trial court to
be without merit; the findings of the trial court were not
clearly erroneous.
Furthermore, James and Paul failed to file a
motion for more specific findings and, thus, waived this
argument.43
For the foregoing reason, the final judgment of the
Whitley Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David O. Smith
Marcia A. Smith
Corbin, Kentucky
Frank A. Atkins
Williamsburg, Kentucky
41
Curtis v. Campbell, 336 S.W.2d 355, 361 (Ky. 1960).
42
Id. (citing Dalton v. Mullins, 293 S.W.2d 470 (Ky. 1956)).
43
Cherry v. Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982).
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