AMANDA WAUGH FELTY v. KEVIN SCOTT FELTY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 22, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000674-ME
AMANDA WAUGH FELTY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BETH LEWIS MAZE, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00796
v.
KEVIN SCOTT FELTY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, McANULTY, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE:
Appellant Amanda Waugh Felty (Amanda) brings
this appeal from an Order granting temporary sole custody of the
parties’ infant child to Appellee Kevin Scott Felty (Kevin).
We
affirm the trial court’s order and remand for further
proceedings.
Amanda and Kevin were married in December, 2001.
They
separated in July, 2003, and Amanda filed for dissolution of the
marriage shortly thereafter in August, 2003.
Amanda was then
pregnant.
She gave birth to a daughter on October 3, 2003.
On
October 21, 2003, Kevin filed a motion for temporary custody or
visitation of the child, and filed an affidavit stating that he
had not been permitted to visit the child in the hospital, and
had thereafter not been permitted to see the child for more than
a few hours at a time.
the child his surname. 1
He complained that Amanda had not given
Amanda responded that Kevin could not be
serious about wanting custody as she was still breastfeeding.
A domestic relations commissioner held a hearing at
which the parties testified.
In December, 2003, the
commissioner entered a report and recommendations.
The
commissioner found that Kevin had not been allowed to see the
child since its birth more than a few times and then only
supervised by Amanda, her parents and sometimes her grandmother.
At times, Amanda’s family videotaped his visits.
The
commissioner noted that Amanda wanted sole custody, while Kevin
was agreeable to shared custody, and that Amanda wanted Kevin
only to have supervised visitation.
The commissioner found that it was in the best
interests of the parents to have joint custody of their daughter
with each parent to have substantial parenting time.
1
Appellant gave the child her maiden name and included
middle names Christian, her former husband’s last name;
that this name had any connection to her former husband
had just always liked the name. The parties agree that
as to the child’s paternity.
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The
as one of the child’s
however, she denied
and stated that she
there is no question
commissioner recommended that Amanda be the primary residential
custodian.
The court held that the child should be given her
father’s name.
The parties were urged to work out a schedule in
which Kevin’s visitation was under no circumstances to be less
than the Boyd County Visitation Guidelines.
Finally, the
commissioner urged the parents to get along and to keep their
disagreements from affecting the child.
Amanda filed exceptions to the domestic relations
commissioner’s recommendations of joint custody and visitation
for Kevin outside her home.
Kevin responded that the
commissioner properly followed the guidelines in determining
visitation.
He stated that he was employed, of good character,
never arrested and a member of the National Guard.
He asserted
that he should be allowed the visitation any other parent would
receive – without supervision or videotaping.
He urged that the
commissioner’s recommendation be adopted.
Amanda next filed a motion for the trial judge to
recuse.
The court denied Amanda’s motion, stating that he had
no knowledge of any past dealings with her and that the motion
had no basis.
In the same order, the court granted Kevin
visitation at Amanda’s residence and stated that he should be
allowed to take any of his family members along.
Thereafter,
Kevin was to be allowed further visitation on the ensuing
Saturdays in his own home.
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Kevin soon filed a motion for contempt due to Amanda’s
failure to allow visitation, and asked the court to order an
officer to accompany Kevin when picking up the child for
visitation.
Amanda responded that she had no objection to
visits in her home, but that Kevin became agitated and she
feared for her safety and that of the child.
She also alleged
that Kevin’s family threatened to take the child and not return
her.
She alleged that the only way she could be certain of the
child’s safety was supervised visits in her home.
Amanda
renewed her motion to recuse to avoid the hint of impropriety.
A month later, Amanda noticed the court that she had
changed counsel, and complained that the domestic relations
commissioner refused her attempts to bring before the court
additional witnesses to testify as to Kevin’s character.
Amanda
argued that it would do no harm to hear additional witnesses as
nothing had been finalized regarding custody.
In March of 2004, the court entered an order denying
Amanda’s motion.
The court entered a second order establishing
a temporary visitation schedule in which Kevin would be allowed
visitation at Amanda’s residence without Amanda present,
supervised by the child’s regular babysitter.
Thereafter, Kevin
would be allowed visitation at his home supervised by the
babysitter or by his uncle.
On April 15, 2004, Amanda filed a
motion requesting that the Cabinet for Families and Children be
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allowed to supervise as the babysitter no longer felt
comfortable acting in that capacity.
In an order on April 30,
2004, following a phone conference, the court determined that
Kevin should be permitted unsupervised visitation.
The court
ordered that he be allowed visitation for the next four
Saturdays, with his family allowed to be present, and for Amanda
to transport the child at her request.
On May 3, 2004, the court entered an order stating
that although the court had found no basis for recusal,
following visits from Amanda and her mother to the court
questioning its orders, the court found it now necessary to
recuse on the basis “that any decision this Court makes in this
matter could be taken by one side or the other as being biased
based upon the visit of the Petitioner and her mother.”
A
special judge was appointed from outside the county.
In July 2004, Amanda’s counsel asked the court to hold
the case in abeyance since, while considerable issues were left
to be resolved, Kevin was known to be serving in Iraq.
No order
was entered in the record placing the case in abeyance, however.
Nothing occurred in the case until the events of this year,
which are those being appealed.
On February 22, 2005, Kevin filed a motion with the
court asking that the court affirm the recommendations of the
domestic relations commissioner, issue a decree of dissolution,
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enter a permanent child support order and allow him time sharing
with his daughter while he was on two-week leave from his
service in Iraq.
Counsel for Amanda filed a response stating
that he could not be present at the hearing due to a scheduled
trial, but that he had previously forwarded an offer of
settlement regarding visitation.
In addition, counsel argued
for benefits for Kevin’s wife and child from the military.
The trial court’s order of February 28, 2005, noted
that Amanda’s counsel had requested a continuance, but the court
found no reason to deny Kevin visitation after reviewing the
recommendations of the commissioner.
Therefore, the trial court
granted Kevin visitation for the duration of his time home from
February 25, through March 6, 2005, with the exception of one
twenty-four hour period during that time for the child to be
returned to Amanda.
The order called for exchange at Amanda’s
home with a deputy sheriff to accompany Kevin, and thereafter
exchanges at a government office.
The court warned that failure
to comply would result in the use of the court’s contempt
powers.
Not surprisingly, Amanda failed to obey the orders of
the court with regard to the visitation during Kevin’s brief
leave.
Kevin moved for Amanda to show cause why she should not
be held in contempt, and stated in an affidavit that he observed
Amanda in her trailer, but that he and the deputy sheriff were
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told that she was not there.
They were told this each day they
attempted to conduct the exchange thereafter, until ultimately
the sheriff was told by Amanda’s father that she had left the
country.
On March 8, 2005, the court entered an order awarding
temporary sole custody to Kevin pursuant to KRS 403.340(3)(c),
due to Amanda’s failure to abide by the court’s order to provide
visitation.
2005.
A show cause hearing was scheduled for March 25,
When Amanda did not appear for the hearing, the court
found her to be in contempt of court and ordered her jailed with
no bond.
Amanda immediately appealed the court’s orders of
visitation, temporary custody, and contempt to this court.
This Court is troubled, to say the least, with the
fact that it is two years now since the birth of the child and
no custody order has been able to be entered, as it should have
been possible to accomplish before Kevin ever left for Iraq.
We
observe that Amanda has engaged in obstruction of the court’s
orders and delaying tactics, including the present appeal, in
order to thwart her husband’s legal attempts to have a
relationship with his child.
Moreover, her arguments on appeal
against visitation on the basis that Kevin has had very few
visits and is “virtually . . . a stranger” to the child are not
well taken, given the fact that Amanda made any sort of visits
unworkable.
We address Amanda’s arguments on appeal simply as
follows.
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She first argues that she was not given reasonable
notice of Kevin’s motion of February 22, 2005, requesting time
with his daughter while on leave from Iraq, citing CR 6.04(1).
The notice in this case was reasonable.
Amanda had sufficient
time to file a response to the motion.
Given the fact that the
court had previously determined in its order on April 30, 2004,
that Kevin was entitled to unsupervised visitation, there was no
change in circumstance and thus no reason for an evidentiary
hearing.
Amanda has not shown prejudice from the fact that her
counsel was unable to attend the hearing on the motion.
Next, Amanda questions the court’s authority to enter
its temporary custody orders placing sole custody of the child
with Kevin, and thereafter in Kevin’s mother while he is serving
out of the country.
We conclude that exigent circumstances
required the court to properly act as it did.
We believe,
however, that the trial court mischaracterized this order as
proceeding as a modification under KRS 403.340, since at the
time of the court’s order placing temporary custody in the
father there was no custody decree in place to modify.
With no
custody order and with the necessity of entering contempt
sanctions against the appellant, the trial court had no other
opportunity than to act as it did, and the effect of the
temporary custody order is appropriate.
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We affirm the orders awarding temporary custody.
We
remand for clarification of the court’s order of contempt based
upon the circumstances as they currently exist.
We further
remand for proceedings on Appellant’s motion for entry of decree
of dissolution, and custody and visitation orders as there
appears to be no legal obstacle to entry of a decree, subject to
the requirements of KRS 403.025.
The Court further finds that this appeal was frivolous
under CR 73.02(4).
We find that the sole purpose of this appeal
was to thwart Appellee’s legal right to avail himself of the
Court’s orders.
Had Appellee filed a response to this appeal
and incurred costs in defending same, this Court would have
ordered Appellant to pay any and all costs incurred as sanctions
against Appellant.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
NO BRIEF FILED FOR APPELLEE:
Richard A. Hughes
Ashland, Kentucky
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