COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. M.R.
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 30, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000641-ME
AND
NO. 2005-CA-000643-ME
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE W. MITCHELL NANCE, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 04-J-00213-001 & 00-J-00273-003
M.R. 1
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE AND SCHRODER, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE. 2
ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE:
The Commonwealth of Kentucky
(Commonwealth) brings this appeal from an adjudication of the
Barren Circuit Court, sitting without a jury, finding J.D., a
minor; and B.R., a minor, not neglected. 3
We affirm.
1
In order to protect the privacy of the children, we will use initials to
identify the parents and the children.
2
Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 620.
As both parties accept the family court's statement of
the facts contained in the February 28, 2005, opinion and order
denying the Commonwealth's Motion to Amend, Alter or Vacate
Judgment and Motion for New Trial, we therefore adopt them as
follows:
Concerning [B.R.] (an infant {whose
date of birth is September 21, 1993} who
resides with his mother, RESPONDENT [M.R.]),
. . . on August 5, 2004, on behalf of the
Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family
Services Mrs. Connie Meadows filed a
petition alleging that RESPONDENT [M.R.] is
responsible for having neglected such child
in that on August 3, 2004,
child called 911 to report that his
mother had left the residence leaving
he and his 2 month old brother home
alone. Police responded to home and
mother was away from home for at least
30 minutes. . . .
Mrs. Meadows also filed a petition on
August 5, 2004, concerning [J.D.] (an infant
{whose date of birth is June 2, 2004} who
also resides with his mother, RESPONDENT
[M.R.]), . . . alleging that RESPONDENT
[M.R.] is responsible for having neglected
such child in that on August 3, 2004,
child was left at home alone w/ {with}
10 y.o. {year-old} brother. Parents
were arguing and fighting and both
left. . . .
The foregoing allegations aver prima
facie claims that each child is an "abused
or neglected child" as defined by KRS
600.020 as follows:
(1) "Abused or neglected child" means
a child whose health or welfare is
harmed or threatened with harm
when his parent, guardian, or
other person exercising custodial
control or supervision of the
child:
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(b)
(h)
. . . .
Creates or allows to be
created a risk of physical or
emotional injury as defined
in this section to the child
by other than accidental
means;
* * * *
Does not provide the child
with adequate care,
supervision, food, clothing,
shelter, and education or
medical care necessary for
the child's well-being.
* * * *
After a temporary removal hearing
(pursuant to KRS 620.080) in which the court
removed each child from RESPONDENT's home,
eventually the court set an adjudication
hearing for February 1, 2005. On that date
the court conducted its adjudication hearing
pursuant to the following provisions of KRS
620.100:
(3) The adjudication shall
determine the truth or
falsity of the allegations in
the complaint. The
burden of proof shall be upon
the complainant, and a
determination of dependency,
neglect, and abuse shall be
made by a preponderance of
the evidence. The Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure
shall apply.
At the adjudication hearing the court
denied RESPONDENT's motion to dismiss made
at the close of PETITIONER COMMONWEALTH's
evidence-in-chief. Thereafter RESPONDENT
put on her evidence-in-chief in which she
testified on direct examination that on
August 3, 2004, she and her paramour, [John
D.], were at RESPONDENT's home along with
their son, [J.D.], and RESPONDENT's older
son, [B.R.], along with [John D's] niece,
Portia, and someone named Jonathan, when
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RESPONDENT and her paramour, [John D.],
argued to the extent that RESPONDENT decided
to leave home for a period of time to allow
agitated emotions to subside. Specifically,
RESPONDENT testified on direct examination
as follows:
Q:
When you left, who was
present in the home?
A:
[B.R.], [J.D.], [John D.],
Jonathan, and Portia. . . .
Later, also on direct examination,
RESPONDENT testified as follows:
Q:
And what was your expectation
when you left as far as the
children being taken care of?
A:
I believed that [John D.] was
there with the children; that
I would only be gone for just
a very short time.
Q:
And how long were you gone?
A:
I'm going to guess it was
maybe 15, 20 minutes; not
long.
RESPONDENT's testimony was credible.
The court therefore could not find that
PETITIONER COMMONWEALTH had proven by a
preponderance of the evidence, in the case
of [B.R.], that RESPONDENT [M.R.] ". . . had
left the residence leaving . . . [the child]
and his 2 month old brother home alone," . .
. or in the case of [J.D.], that RESPONDENT
[M.R.] had left the "child . . . at home
alone [with ten {10} year-old brother [B.R.]
. . ."
Accordingly, following closing
arguments of counsel, in each of the above
styled (sic) actions the court made its
Adjudication Hearing Order (entered February
1, 2005) in which the court returned each
child to RESPONDENT to the home of removal,
each child ". . . having been found NOT to
be dependent, neglected or abused. . ."
Each Adjudication Hearing Order further
provided that "(t)he allegations contained
in the petition have not been proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. . . " See,
for example, KRS 620.100(3).
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Footnotes omitted.
This appeal followed.
Before us, the Commonwealth argues that the family
court's decision was inconsistent with the weight of the
evidence produced at the adjudication hearing, and that the
family court abused its discretion in considering extraneous
evidence.
We review questions of fact under the clearly
erroneous standard of Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
52.01, and legal issues de novo. Carroll v. Meredith, 59 S.W.3d
484, 489 (Ky.App. 2001).
As we conclude that the findings of
the family court are supported by substantial evidence and are
not an abuse of discretion, and that the court correctly applied
the law, we affirm.
The Commonwealth initially argues that it met its
burden of proof with regard to the issue of neglect.
While
conceding that contradictory testimony was presented on the
issue of whether M.R. left both minors B.R. and J.D. at home
alone, the Commonwealth contends that the family court erred in
believing M.R.'s testimony over the testimony of the two police
officers.
M.R. testified that John D., John D.'s thirteen-year
old niece, Portia, and a "Jonathan D.," were visiting B.R.,
J.D., and her in her home.
After an argument with John D., M.R.
left the residence as a "time-out" in order to cool off.
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When
she left, ten-year old B.R. was in his bedroom; two-month old
J.D. was in a car seat in John D.'s car; John D. was in the
residence; and Portia was in the car with J.D. with the car
running and the air conditioner on.
M.R. believed when she left
that John D. would take care of the children for the short
period of time she anticipated being gone.
She returned fifteen
to twenty minutes later.
Glasgow Police Sergeant Tony Morgan arrived first on
the scene, six minutes after B.R.'s 911 call.
B.R. answered the door.
He testified that
The baby, J.D., was in the back bedroom
lying on a twin bed propped up on a pillow with a bottle or a
toy.
B.R. and J.D. were the only ones in the residence.
M.R.
returned home approximately twenty-four minutes later, and
related two different versions of what happened after she and
John D. argued.
One version had her leaving the residence with
John D. remaining at home; a second version had John D. leaving
in a car with her following in a car.
Additionally, Glasgow
Police Officer Darrell Smith arrived after Sergeant Morgan.
His
involvement, however, was limited to speaking to Sergeant Morgan
and transferring M.R. to jail.
He indicated that all he heard
was M.R. state that she and someone had gotten in an argument
and that she had left in order to cool off.
At the conclusion of the hearing the court stated that
it did not like lying in any form, but given that M.R. either
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lied to Sergeant Morgan or to the court, the court chose to
believe that M.R. lied to Sergeant Morgan and told the truth to
the court.
Thus, the court found credible M.R.'s testimony that
M.R. left the residence for a "time out" after the argument,
leaving John D. to care for the children.
The court found that
M.R.'s version told to Sergeant Morgan, that she left after John
D., was related as to not jeopardize John D.'s chances of
getting temporary custody of J.D.
As stated in R.C.R. v. Commonwealth Cabinet for Human
Resources, 988 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Ky.App. 1998), "when the testimony
is conflicting we may not substitute our decision for the
judgment of the trial court," citing Wells v. Wells, 412 S.W.2d
568, 571 (Ky. 1967).
Further, Hunter v. Hunter, 127 S.W.3d 656,
659 (Ky.App. 2003) provides:
Under CR 52.01, in an action tried without a
jury, "[f]indings of fact shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses. . . . A factual finding is
not clearly erroneous if it is supported by
substantial evidence. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, Ky., 976
S.W.2d 409, 414 (1998); Uninsured Employers'
Fund v. Garland, Ky., 805 S.W.2d 116, 117
(1991). Substantial evidence is evidence,
when taken alone or in light of all the
evidence, which has sufficient probative
value to induce conviction in the mind of a
reasonable person. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d at
414; Sherfey v. Sherfey, Ky.App., 74 S.W.3d
777, 782 (2002).
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Giving due regard to the family court to judge the credibility
of M.R., and the substantial evidence in the form of M.R.'s
testimony that John D. and his thirteen year-old niece were
present when M.R. left the residence, the court's findings were
not clearly erroneous.
We thus decline to disturb the court's
factual finding that M.R. left B.R. and J.D. in the care of John
D.
The Commonwealth next argues that the family court
abused its discretion by considering extraneous evidence,
specifically that when considering the credibility of ten-year
old B.R.'s testimony during the adjudication hearing, the court
made reference to B.R. being "caught in the middle" because of
the court's knowledge of a "child custody case involving these
parties."
With regard to this matter, in denying the
Commonwealth's CR 59.05 motion the family court stated:
(I)t is the opinion of the court that
the authority controlling judicial notice is
KRE 201, "Judicial Notice of Adjudicative
Facts," rather than the authorities which
PETITIONER COMMONWEALTH cited (Maynard v.
Allen, 276 Ky. 485, 124 S.W.2d 765 (1939)
and Jones v. Bell, 304 Ky. 827, 202 S.W.2d
641 (1947)). ". . . (P)rior Kentucky
precedents have been rather stingy, limiting
judicial notice of court records to those in
the same court involving the same parties
and issues, or records in the current
proceedings. See, e.g. Maynard v. Allen,
124 S.W.2d 765 (Ky. 1939); Jones v. Bell,
202 S.W.2d 641 (Ky. 1947). KRE 201 should
encourage a more liberal view." R.
UNDERWOOD & G. WEISSENBERGER, KENTUCKY
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EVIDENCE COURTROOM MANUAL 43-44 (2004-2005
ed.).
Presently this court has on its docket
Civil Action Number 04-CI-00660, styled
[E.R.] v. [M.R.], being a custody action
concerning the child, [B.R.]. [footnote
omitted]. It is inevitable that what a
family court judge hears about a family in
one action will supplement what that same
family court judge hears about the family in
a related, though separate, action. Indeed,
that circumstance was encouraged in the use
of the slogan, "One Family, One Judge, One
Court," to promote the adoption of the
Family Court Constitutional Amendment in
2002.
The court emphatically did not ". . .
[decide] this matter on evidence beyond the
immediate record and on evidence beyond the
reach of the parties on this case," although
admittedly information from the custody
action certainly enhanced the court's
understanding of the situation facing this
family. Even without any information from
the custody action, however, the testimony
of RESPONDENT [M.R.] at the adjudication
hearing was sufficient to support the
court's finding and decision. The court's
decision was not arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles. There was no abuse of
discretion.
On the record at the adjudication hearing the court made it
clear that it found that the Commonwealth had failed to carry
its burden with regard to the neglect of B.R. and J.D. based on
M.R.'s testimony that she left the residence for a few minutes
in order to cool off after an argument with John D., and that
John D. was present at the residence with B.R. and J.D. when she
left.
Although the Commonwealth contends that the family court
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erroneously considered extrajudicial information from the child
custody case, we need not reach that argument because, according
to the record, the court supported its decision solely on M.R.'s
testimony and, as indicated above, said testimony provided
substantial evidence to support the findings of fact by the
court.
We decline thus to disturb the findings of the family
court.
For the foregoing reasons, the adjudication of the
Barren Family Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis Wilcutt
Glasgow, Kentucky
Betty Reece Herbert
Brian K. Pack
Glasgow, Kentucky
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