ACUITY v. GREAT WEST CASUALTY COMPANY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 22, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000027-MR
ACUITY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENISE CLAYTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-001450
v.
GREAT WEST CASUALTY COMPANY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, MINTON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Acuity brings this appeal from a December 3,
2004, summary judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing
its claim as barred by the statute of limitations.
We affirm.
Acuity filed a complaint against Great West Casualty
Company (Great West) to recover $10,000.00 in Basic Reparation
Benefits (BRB) it paid to its insured as a result of an
automobile accident which occurred on March 21, 2000, in
Jefferson County.
The driver of the other vehicle involved in
the accident was insured by Great West.
It appears that a
representative of Acuity, Jay Machcinski, and a representative
of Great West, Alan Druckemiller, corresponded concerning Great
West reimbursing Acuity the $10,000.00 paid in BRB.
However,
Great West never paid Acuity, and Acuity instituted the instant
action to recover same on February 19, 2003.
Great West moved for summary judgment based upon the
statute of limitations set out in Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 304.39-230.
Great West pointed out that Acuity made the
last payment of BRB on July 21, 2000, and Acuity commenced the
instant action on February 19, 2003.
Pursuant to KRS 304.39-
230(6), Great West argued that an action to recover BRB should
have been instituted by Acuity within two years from the last
payment of BRB.
Thus, Great West contended that Acuity’s action
was time-barred.
Great West responded that Acuity should be estopped
from relying upon the statute of limitations defense because of
its misrepresentations.
Moreover, Acuity argued that there
existed an implied contract between it and Great West.
Specifically, Acuity contended that Great West representative,
Druckemiller promised its representative Machcinski, that
payment of the $10,000.00 in BRB would be forthcoming.
Acuity
believes that this promise created an “implied contract” which
was breached when Great West failed to pay the BRB.
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On December 3, 2004, the circuit court granted Great
West’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action.
This appeal follows.
Acuity contends the circuit court committed error by
entering summary judgment dismissing its action against Great
West.
Summary judgment is proper where there exists no material
issue of fact and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
Ky. R. Civ. P. 56.03.
Movant must demonstrate that the
opposing party could not prevail under any circumstance.
Pearson ex rel. Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Sys., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46
(Ky. 2002).
Acuity specifically asserts there existed material
issues of fact upon whether Great West was equitably estopped
from relying upon the statute of limitations defense.
Again,
Acuity’s claim centers around the allegation that a false
representation was made by Druckemiller promising to pay the
$10,000.00 in BRB and that Acuity relied upon such
misrepresentation to its detriment by failing to timely file a
claim within the statutory deadline.
To create a material issue of fact, Acuity relies upon
what it calls the “Acuity Claim Diary” (Diary).
The Diary was
found in the appendix to Acuity’s response to Great West’s
motion for summary judgment.
We observe that the record is
devoid of an affidavit concerning the validity or veracity of
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the Diary’s contents.
are terse.
Nevertheless, the entries in the Diary
The Diary indicates that on May 10, 2002, Machcinski
presumably contacted Druckemiller and was told by Druckemiller
that Acuity would receive a check by May 13, 2002.
On May 24,
2002, and June 3, 2002, the Diary reflects that Machcinski
attempted to call Druckemiller to determine why a check was
never received by Acuity.
Another entry on June 18, 2002,
reflects that Machcinski sent a letter to Great West advising it
to either reimburse Acuity or legal action would be pursued.
To prevail upon a claim of equitable estoppal, a party
must demonstrate:
(1) [L]ack of knowledge and of the means of
knowledge of the truth as to the facts in
question; (2) reliance, in good faith, upon
the conduct or statements of the party to be
estopped; and (3) action or inaction based
thereon of such a character as to change the
position or status of the party claiming the
estoppel, to his injury, detriment, or
prejudice.
Rivermont Inn, Inc. v. Bass Hotels Resorts, Inc., 113 S.W.3d
636, 643 (Ky.App. 2003).
It is well-established that the
reliance necessary to establish a claim of equitable estoppal
must be reasonable.
Gailor v. Alsabi, 990 S.W.2d 597 (Ky.
1999).
In the case at hand, the Diary indicates that Acuity’s
representative Machcinski was aware by June 18, 2002, that legal
action was probable as Druckemiller failed to forward the
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reimbursement check by May 13, 2002.
The last payment of BRB
was on July 21, 2000; thus, the statute of limitations had yet
to expire.
From these facts, we cannot say that Acuity’s
failure to file the complaint within the two-year statute of
limitation was due to a reasonable reliance upon the
misrepresentation of Great West representative Druckemiller.
As
such, we are of the opinion the circuit court properly entered
summary judgment upon the claim of equitable estoppel.
Acuity also argues the circuit court committed error
by entering summary judgment upon its claim of breach of an
implied contract between the parties.
To create a material
issue of fact, Acuity once again relies upon the Diary.
In
particular, it calls this Court’s attention to the entry on May
10, 2002, which states as follows:
CALLED ALAN AT GREAT WEST CAS, HE SAID HE
HAD TO REOPEN THE FILE AND FORGOT TO TO
[Sic] IT. HE WILL GET THE CHECK OUT BY 513. REDIARY.
We, however, believe that the Diary’s entry without more is
insufficient to support Acuity’s claim of breach of an implied
contract.
To create an implied-in-fact contract, the evidence
must demonstrate:
[A]n actual agreement or meeting of the
minds although not expressed and such is
implied or presumed from the acts or
circumstances which according to the
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ordinary course of dealing and the common
understanding of men shows a mutual intent
to contract.
Rider v. Combs, 256 S.W.2d 749, 749 (Ky. 1953).
The Diary entry
does not establish evidence of a “mutual intent” to enter into a
contract.
Rather, the entry merely shows that a check was to be
issued by May 13.
Thus, we are of the opinion that Acuity
failed to demonstrate sufficient facts to create a material
issue of fact upon whether an implied-in-fact contract existed.
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Wayne J. Carroll
Keri E. Hieneman
MacKENZIE & PEDEN, P.S.C.
Louisville, Kentucky
Stockard R. Hickey,III
David M. Schuler, Jr.
FROST BROWN TODD, LLC
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Wayne J. Carroll
MacKENZIE & PEDEN, P.S.C.
Louisville, Kentucky
David M. Schuler, Jr.
FROST BROWN TODD, LLC
Louisville, Kentucky
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