DOYLE W. FOISTER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 9, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002409-MR
DOYLE W. FOISTER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES L. BOWLING, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00046
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, McANULTY AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
Doyle W. Foister appeals from a judgment of
the Bell Circuit Court reflecting a jury verdict finding Foister
guilty of one count of possession of a handgun by a convicted
felon.
Foister argues on appeal that the trial judge erred in
denying Foister’s motion for a directed verdict.
He also
contends that palpable error resulted when the trial judge and
the prosecutor referred to other charges and unrelated past
convictions.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm the
judgment on appeal.
On March 11, 2004, the Bell County grand jury indicted
Foister on four misdemeanor traffic offenses and one count of
possession of a handgun by a convicted felon.
The charges arose
from an incident occurring on October 12, 2003, wherein Foister
borrowed his mother’s car to visit a girlfriend.
At
approximately 1:30 a.m. on that date, Officer James Shackleford
observed Foister committing various traffic violations,
including driving with a broken headlight.
Shackleford pulled Foister over and discovered that
Foister had two outstanding arrest warrants.
arrested.
Foister was
Pursuant to the arrest, Officers Shackleford and
Goodwin conducted a search of Foister’s vehicle and found a .25
caliber handgun.
The handgun was wedged between the vehicle’s
seat and console.
The matter proceeded to trial on September 16, 2004,
whereupon the Commonwealth moved to dismiss all counts of the
indictment except the charge of possession of a handgun.
After
hearing the proof, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the
sole remaining charge, and Foister was sentenced to six years in
prison.
A judgment reflecting the verdict and sentence was
rendered on November 10, 2004, and this appeal followed.
Foister first argues that the trial court committed
reversible error when it failed to sustain his motion at trial
for a directed verdict.
He maintains that the Commonwealth
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failed to prove an essential element of the crime, to wit, that
Foister knew the gun was present in the car.
Foister’s defense
on this issue at trial was that he was unaware of the gun’s
presence, and that he had no opportunity to see it because he
borrowed the car in the early morning hours when it was dark.
He contends that the Commonwealth presented no proof on this
issue, and that as such he was entitled to a directed verdict.
We find no error on this issue.
While the language of
KRS 527.040 does not expressly establish intent as an element of
the offense, 1 we agree with Foister that it may properly be
described as a “general intent” statute.
KRS 501.040 states
that,
Although no culpable mental state is
expressly designated in a statute defining
an offense, a culpable mental state may
nevertheless be required for the commission
of such offense, or with respect to some or
all of the material elements thereof, if the
proscribed conduct necessarily involves such
culpable mental state.
Furthermore,
As Professors Lawson and Fortune note,
strict liability crimes are commonplace but
"largely limited to offenses with minor
penalties--traffic crimes, building, fire,
health code violations, etc." Nonetheless,
imposition of punishment in the absence of
fault (i.e., "mens rea," "intent," "guilty
mind," or "scienter") is generally regarded
1
KRS 527.040 states at section (1) that, “[A] person is guilty of possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon when he possesses, manufactures, or
transports a firearm when he has been convicted of a felony . . . .”
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as the exception rather than the rule in our
jurisprudence, especially for crimes with
substantial penalties. 2
In the matter at bar, KRS 527.040 proscribes a
“substantial penalty”, and the conduct required to commit the
offense necessarily involves a culpable mental state.
As such,
the burden was on the Commonwealth to offer some proof from
which the jury could reasonably conclude that Foister knew the
gun was present in the vehicle.
The record indicates that such proof was presented at
trial.
The Commonwealth offered evidence that the handgun was
located in the interior of the vehicle and was not concealed.
Because some evidence was offered that the gun was not
concealed, the jury had a reasonable basis for concluding that
Foister was aware of its presence.
When this proof is
considered in light of Commonwealth v. Benham, 3 which requires
the trial court to draw all fair and reasonable inferences from
it in favor of the Commonwealth, we must conclude that
sufficient proof was offered to overcome Foister’s motion for a
directed verdict.
Foister also argues that palpable error resulted when
the trial judge and the prosecutor referred to the severed
charges and to unrelated past convictions during the guilt phase
2
Walker v. Commonwealth, 127 S.W.3d 596 (Ky. 2004), citing Robert G. Lawson &
William H. Fortune, Kentucky Criminal Law § 2-1(b)(1).
3
816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991).
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of the trial.
Specifically, Foister notes that the venire heard
the trial judge reference the four severed misdemeanor charges,
then later the prosecutor again referenced the four charges
during the opening statement.
Shortly thereafter, a witness
mentioned prior burglary and alcohol-related charges.
Foister
contends that these events had an inflammatory effect and
prejudiced the jury against him.
As such, he argues that he is
entitled to have the conviction reversed.
KRE 103(e) and RCr 10.26 state that,
A palpable error in applying the Kentucky
Rules of Evidence which affects the
substantial rights of a party may be
considered by a trial court on motion for a
new trial or by an appellate court on
appeal, even though insufficiently raised or
preserved for review, and appropriate relief
may be granted upon a determination that
manifest injustice has resulted from the
error.
Thus, in order to prevail on his claim of palpable
error, Foister must show that his substantial rights were
adversely affected and that manifest injustice resulted.
Stated
differently, Foister must show that but for the alleged error
the outcome of the trial would have been different. 4
Having examined the totality of the record, including
the alleged wrongful remarks by the trial judge, the prosecutor,
and the witness, we cannot conclude that but for the remarks at
4
Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 157 S.W.3d 194 (Ky. 2005).
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issue Foister would have been found not guilty on the charge of
possession of a handgun by a convicted felon.
First, it is
worth noting that the trial judge admonished the venire to
disregard the initial comments relating to the severed offenses.
While Foister argues that this let “the cat out of the bag”, we
have no basis for concluding that the venire disregarded the
judge’s admonition.
Second, the severed charges were mere
misdemeanors, including operating a motor vehicle with a broken
headlight.
While not completely inconsequential, the severed
charges pale in comparison to, for example, an armed robbery
conviction – the improper introduction of which the Kentucky
Supreme Court recently ruled did not rise to palpable error. 5
And finally, Foister himself made reference to his incarceration
for evading the police and the fact that he eluded apprehension
for a period of some two years.
More important, however, is the fact that sufficient
evidence exists in the record upon which the jury could have
reasonably based its conclusion that Foister was a felon in
possession of a handgun.
Evidence was tendered showing that
Foister was a felon, and that he was aware of the gun’s presence
by virtue of the fact that it was visible in the vehicle’s
interior.
5
In sum, Foister’s claim does not rise to the level of
Cochran v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 837 (Ky. 2003).
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palpable error and does not represent a basis for reversing the
judgment on appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Bell Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Lisa Bridges Clare
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, KY
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Wm. Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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