STEVEN BOYD AND GERI BOYD v. MOHAMED MAHMOUD
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Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002378-ME
STEVEN BOYD AND
GERI BOYD
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAM H. MONARCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 91-CI-00244
v.
MOHAMED MAHMOUD
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, DYCHE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE:
Steven and Geri Boyd appeal from an order of
the Meade Circuit Court denying their motion for leave to
intervene in a custody dispute between Susan Boyd Mahmoud and
Mohamed Mahmoud, natural parents of Sarah Mahmoud.
We conclude
that the court properly denied the Boyds’ motion, and we thus
affirm.
Susan and Mohamed met while Mohamed was assigned to
Ft. Knox, Kentucky, for training as an Egyptian army officer.
They were married in Cairo, Egypt, on June 25, 1983.
After
their marriage, Susan and Mohamed returned to the United States.
Mohamed renounced his Egyptian citizenship and became a United
States citizen in August 1989.
After completing graduate work
in engineering, Mohamed obtained a job at the Toyota plant in
Georgetown, Kentucky.
The couple’s only child, Sarah, was born on April 4,
1990.
Thereafter, the couple began experiencing marital
difficulties, and they separated in November 1991.
Susan
returned to Meade County, and Mohamed remained in Georgetown
(Scott County).
In December 1991 Susan filed a petition for
dissolution of marriage in the Meade Circuit Court.
In addition to the normal issues raised in a divorce
case, Susan expressed grave concerns that Mohamed would take
their child and return to Egypt.
Because of these concerns, the
court ordered that Mohamed’s visitation with Sarah be supervised
at the home of Susan’s parents during the pendency of the case.
On June 3, 1993, the court entered a divorce decree
wherein Susan was granted full custody of the child and Mohamed
was granted unsupervised visitation.
Mohamed exercised
unsupervised visitation with Sarah from that time until April
1994.
His visitation was modified at that time to supervised
visits of one-half hour a week.
This change was made because of
allegations brought by Susan alleging that Mohamed had sexually
abused the child.
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It subsequently became known that the allegations made
in April 1994 were not the first allegations of that kind to be
made by Susan.
In December 1993 she took Sarah to see Dr.
Jacquelyn Sugarman at Child First in Louisville.
Although Susan
reported allegations of abuse, Dr. Sugarman was unable to
confirm them when she questioned Sarah alone.
Further, a full
pelvic exam did not reveal any evidence of abuse.
Neither Dr.
Sugarman nor Susan made any report of these allegations to the
authorities in December 1993.
In April 1994 Susan returned to Dr. Sugarman’s office
again alleging that Mohamed had sexually abused Sarah.
As with
the previous occasion, a full pelvic exam produced no evidence
of abuse.
However, on this occasion Sarah told Dr. Sugarman
that her daddy had done things to her.
Sarah was then referred
to a licensed clinical psychologist, Dr. Patricia Abbott.
Word
of the allegations reached the circuit court, and it entered an
order sua sponte referring the case to a domestic relations
commissioner (DRC) for proof.
The DRC modified Mohamed’s
visitation to supervised visits of one-half hour a week at the
Meade County Office of the Cabinet for Families and Children.
In June 1994 the Cabinet employee responsible for
supervising visitation provided an affidavit, which was filed
with the court, indicating that supervised visits did not appear
to be necessary.
Further, the Cabinet worker indicated her
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belief that continued restrictions would be detrimental to
Sarah.
In July 1994 a Georgetown police detective provided an
affidavit indicating that the police had investigated the
allegations and found no evidence of sexual abuse.
The
Georgetown police thus closed their investigation into the
incident.
On March 29, 1996, the DRC filed his report
recommending that Susan’s motion to modify custody by
restricting Mohamed’s visitation be denied.
Prior to a hearing
by the court on exceptions filed by Susan to the DRC’s report,
the court sought input from the guardian ad litem (GAL).
The
GAL filed a brief on behalf of Sarah, noting that Sarah had
given conflicting statements at the time the April 1994
allegations first came up.
The GAL also raised concerns over
the behavior of Susan and her parents.
In particular, she found
them to be defensive and combative at the hearing before the
DRC, and she found that the grandparents acted in ways intended
to make the supervised visitation uncomfortable for all
involved.
The GAL also pointed out that Cabinet employees had
found Sarah’s behavior toward her father during the supervised
visits to be inconsistent with the allegations made against him.
As to supervised visitation, the GAL agreed with Cabinet
employees that continued supervision of the visitation could be
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harmful.
Finally, the GAL warned that Susan should be watched,
as she appeared fully capable of taking Sarah and running.
On November 19, 1996, the court entered an order
agreeing with the DRC that Susan’s motion to modify custody by
restricting Mohamed’s visitation should be denied.
The court
concluded its order by accepting the recommendation of the
Cabinet that unsupervised visitation be reinstated in stages.
Susan appealed the court’s order, and in July 1998 a panel of
this court rendered an opinion vacating and remanding the case
after determining that certain of Sarah’s statements made to Dr.
Sugarman and Dr. Abbott should not have been excluded as
evidence.
Following the remanding of the case to the circuit
court, Susan continued to seek reinstatement of supervised
visitation.
On December 9, 1998, the court again denied Susan’s
motion to restrict Mohamed’s visitation.
In late May 2000,
Susan told Mohamed that she would no longer allow unsupervised
visitation.
When he arrived to pick up Sarah for a weekend
visit, she refused to allow him to see her.
Further, Susan
informed Mohamed that she would not allow his summer visitation.
As a result of Susan’s actions, Mohamed filed a motion
in the circuit court seeking to hold Susan in contempt.
Susan
failed to appear with Sarah at the hearing, and she again failed
to appear the following day per order of the court.
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Her
whereabouts and the whereabouts of Sarah would remain unknown to
the court from June 2000 until July 2004.
As a result of Susan’s actions, the court awarded
temporary custody of Sarah to Mohamed.
Acting through her
attorney, Susan sought a writ of prohibition and emergency
relief from this court.
Her motions were denied.
Furthermore,
a Meade County grand jury returned a criminal indictment against
Susan for the felony offense of custodial interference.
In
connection with the grand jury investigation, Susan’s father
refused to testify and was held in contempt.
As a result, he
was held in custody from September 2000 until February 2001.
The DRC filed his report on September 28, 2000, after
considering the issues on remand.
Once again, the DRC
recommended that Susan’s motion to restrict Mohamed’s visitation
be denied.
In an order entered on November 22, 2000, the court
rejected exceptions to the report filed by Susan and adopted the
DRC’s finding.
The court agreed that there was no credible
evidence upon which to deny Mohamed unsupervised visitation or
custody.
Further, the court agreed that there was no credible
evidence establishing the allegations of sexual abuse.
The
court found the issue of custody to be moot in light of the fact
that Susan had defied court orders and absconded with Sarah.
This court rejected Susan’s appeal.
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Susan and Sarah were discovered in Paoli, Indiana, in
July 2004.
Apparently, they had been living in a single motel
room during the four-year period.
Sarah had not been permitted
to attend a regular school, and she had little or no contact
with any person other than Susan.
Susan was arrested on the
felony warrant for custodial interference, and Sarah was placed
in the care of the Indiana Office for Families and Children.
Both were subsequently returned to the custody and jurisdiction
of Kentucky authorities in Meade County.
The circuit court was
advised that Sarah was developmentally delayed and appeared to
be “brainwashed.”
Further, the court was advised that the child
exhibited an intense hatred for her father and possessed the
desire to do him harm by stabbing him with a knife.
The court placed the emergency custody of Sarah with
the Cabinet “only for the duration necessary to refamiliarize
[sic] the child with her father and; thus, enable the return of
the child to his care.”
The Cabinet, which was joined as a
party to this case on August 23, 2004, placed Sarah in foster
care while it attempted to get her the care necessary to reunite
her with her father.
At this point in the divorce and custody battle,
Steven and Geri Boyd sought to intervene for the purpose of
obtaining temporary and permanent custody of Sarah.
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Steven is
Susan’s brother, and Geri is married to Steven.
Thus, they are
Sarah’s maternal uncle and aunt.
On October 15, 2004, the circuit court entered an
order denying the Boyds’ motion to intervene on the ground that
they lacked standing.
The court noted the uncontested facts
that the Boyds neither qualified as de facto custodians under
KRS1 403.270, nor had they ever had actual possession of Sarah.
The Boyds then filed this appeal.
Arguing that they have a right to intervene in the
case pursuant to CR2 24.01, the Boyds contend that the circuit
court erred as a matter of law in denying their motion to
intervene.
The rule provides in applicable part as follows:
Upon timely application anyone shall be
permitted to intervene in an action (a) when
a statute confers an unconditional right to
intervene, or (b) when the applicant claims
an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the
action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the applicant’s
ability to protect that interest, unless
that interest is adequately represented by
existing parties.
CR 24.01(1).
The Boyds contend that their right to intervene is
based on subsection (b) to CR 24.01(1).
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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As the Boyds noted in their brief, there must be a
“present substantial interest in the subject matter of the
lawsuit” in order that a party claiming an interest in the
matter be allowed to intervene.
See Baker v. Webb, 127 S.W.3d
622, 624 (Ky. 2004), quoting Gayner v. Packaging Serv. Corp. of
Ky., 636 S.W.2d 658, 659 (Ky.App. 1982).
The Boyds argue that
“[a]s relatives concerned with the care and custody of Sarah,
[they] have a fundamental interest in protecting and nurturing
Sarah in a safe and loving environment that will allow Sarah to
develop into an intelligent, resourceful, content adult.”
We
disagree with the Boyds that their interest is such that they
have a right to intervene under CR 24.01(1).
In Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 358 (Ky. 2003),
the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that “Kentucky’s appellate
courts have recognized not only that ‘parents of a child have a
statutorily granted superior right to its care and custody,’ but
also ‘that parents have fundamental, basic and constitutionally
protected rights to raise their own children.’”
Likewise, in
Vinson v. Sorrell, 136 S.W.3d 465, 468 (Ky. 2004), our supreme
court recognized that “[p]arents of a child have a fundamental,
basic and constitutional right to raise, care for, and control
their own children.”
This right is also recognized in KRS
405.020(1).
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In the Vinson case our supreme court, referring to its
decision in Moore v. Asente, described how a non-parent may
pursue the custody of a child.
The court stated:
When a non-parent does not meet the
statutory standard of de facto custodian,
the non-parent pursuing custody must prove
either of the following two exceptions to a
parent’s superior right or entitlement to
custody: (1) that the parent is shown by
clear and convincing evidence to be an unfit
custodian, or (2) that the parent has waived
his or her superior right to custody by
clear and convincing evidence.
Vinson, 136 S.W.3d at 468.
Therefore, since the Boyds were not
de facto custodians of Sarah and since Mohamed had not waived
his superior right to custody, the Boyds were left to show by
clear and convincing evidence that Mohamed was an unfit
custodian.
The Boyds argue there is ample evidence Mohamed is
currently unfit, if not based on his actions raised in the
original abuse allegations, then based on Sarah’s perception of
him.
The first part of this argument ignores the court’s
November 22, 2000, order which found both that there was no
credible evidence of abuse and that Mohamed was suitable to care
for Sarah without restrictions.
As these findings were never
appealed, they are now final and are foreclosed from further
attack by the Boyds.
The second part of the Boyds’ argument,
that Mohamed is unfit based on Sarah’s perception of him, is
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also insufficient.
In Moore the court noted that a showing of
unfitness requires that the parent must have “engaged in conduct
similar to activity that could result in the termination of
parental rights by the state.”
110 S.W.3d at 360.
Thus, the
Boyds cannot simply point to Sarah’s perceptions, nor can they
attribute the results of Susan’s actions to Mohamed in order to
show unfitness.
Therefore, we conclude they had no right to
intervene pursuant to CR 24.01(1) and challenge Mohamed for
custody of Sarah.
The Boyds also claim a right to intervene based on the
recent case of Baker, 127 S.W.3d at 622.
Therein, the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that biological relatives of a child sought
to be adopted by foster parents had “a sufficient, cognizable
legal interest in the adoption proceeding” so as to grant them a
right to intervene in the proceeding pursuant to CR 24.01(1).
Id. at 625.
In support of its decision, the supreme court
referred to KRS 620.090(2), which requires the Cabinet to give
preference to available and qualified relatives of a child when
placing a child given to its temporary custody.
127 S.W.3d at
625.
We conclude that the holding in the Baker case does
not give the Boyds the right to intervene in this case.
The
Baker case was a dependency, neglect, or abuse case that arose
under KRS Chapter 620 of the Unified Juvenile Code.
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The goal of
the Cabinet, which had received temporary custody when the
allegations of abuse arose, became placement for adoption once
the father committed suicide and the parental rights of the
mother had been terminated.
Pursuant to the statute and the
Cabinet’s administrative regulations, relative placement was to
be given preference.
Therefore, the court held that the
biological relatives had a right to intervene in the adoption
proceeding.
Id. at 626.
This case is different from the Baker case in that the
child has been placed in the temporary custody of the Cabinet
“only for the duration necessary to refamiliarize [sic] the
child with her father and; thus enable the return of the child
to his care.”
This is not a case where the temporary custody of
the child has been given to the Cabinet as a part of a
dependency, neglect, or abuse action pursuant to KRS 620.090 or
an adoption proceeding.
Contrary to their arguments, KRS
620.090 does not provide a basis for the Boyds’ standing to
request custody of Sarah.
Because the circuit court correctly determined that
the Boyds had no right to intervene in the custody dispute
between Susan and Mohamed, we affirm the court’s order denying
the Boyds’ motion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Eugene L. Mosley
Louisville, Kentucky
Chris J. Gohman
Radcliff, Kentucky
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