FLAGET FUELS, INC. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC PROTECTION CABINET
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 14, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 2004-CA-002364-MR
FLAGET FUELS, INC.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-0587
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC
PROTECTION CABINET
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, KNOPF, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Flaget Fuels, Inc. appeals from an order of the
Franklin Circuit Court affirming an order by the Secretary of
the Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet (the Cabinet)
finding that Flaget Fuels violated KRS 151.250(2), KRS 151.310,
and 401 KAR 4:060, and imposing a civil penalty of $43,200.00.
Flaget Fuels argues that the Cabinet acted in excess of its
statutory authority, that the Cabinet’s finding of a violation
was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the civil
penalty imposed by the Cabinet was arbitrary and excessive.
We
agree with the circuit court that the Cabinet used substantial
evidence and a correct application of the law to ascertain
Flaget Fuels’s violations and penalty.
Hence, we affirm.
Flaget Fuels holds a surface mining operations and
reclamation permit for mining in the Brown’s Fork Creek area of
Perry County, Kentucky.
Prior to the events at issue, in 1991
and 1995, respectively, Flaget Fuel’s activities had caused
spoil material from its permitted area to slide into Brown’s
Fork Creek adjacent to property owned by Joe and Nadine Roberts.
These previous slides were the subject of a prior administrative
action by the Cabinet’s Department of Surface Mining Reclamation
and Enforcement (DSMRE). 1
DSMRE directed Flaget Fuels to remove
the material from the stream, to return the material to the
permitted area and to spread the material out to dry.
Instead,
Flaget Fuels took the material from the creek and stacked it
back against the toe of the slide.
On July 8, 1998, DSMRE was informed that material had
slid from the face of the slide, obstructing the Brown’s Fork
1
The previous slides were addressed in a prior decision by this
Court, Flaget Fuels, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Natural Resources &
Environmental Protection Cabinet, No. 1998-CA-001106-MR (Not-tobe-published opinion rendered June 4, 1999).
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Creek and causing water from the creek to flow into the
Robertses’ yard up to their residence, through the yard and back
into the stream channel.
DSMRE contacted the Division of Water
(DOW), which sent an environmental response team to assess the
situation.
DOW did not immediately issue a notice of violation
to Flaget Fuels because Flaget Fuels and DSMRE had reached an
agreement that the slide material was to be removed from the
creek and hauled back into the permitted area.
The Robertses’ property was unflooded within twentyfour hours.
However, the creek remained partially blocked
throughout July and August, and was totally blocked several
times during August.
DOW became dissatisfied with the slow
progress of Flaget Fuel’s work to remove the material from the
creek.
In addition, DOW complained that Flaget Fuels was
depositing the slide material on the banks of the creek, rather
than returning it to the permitted area.
Consequently, DOW issued a notice of violation to
Flaget Fuels on August 28, 1998.
DOW cited Flaget Fuels for
“unpermitted relocation of slide material in and along the
Brown’s Fork Creek channel.”
DOW directed Flaget Fuels to
immediately cease placing the material along the stream channel,
to remove the slide material from the floodplain and stream
channel, to take the material to another, appropriate location,
and to stabilize the slide to avoid further encroachment into
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Brown’s Fork Creek.
By September 3, Flaget had removed all
slide material from the creek channel, and by September 9,
Flaget completed restoration of the creek channel.
However,
Flaget Fuels left the slide material in the floodplain, and did
not complete all required reclamation work until February 8,
1999.
On September 28, 1998, Flaget Fuels filed a petition
contesting the notice of violation.
A date was set for an
expedited hearing, and DOW reached an interim agreement with
Flaget Fuels regarding the remedial measures which Flaget Fuels
needed to take to prevent the probability of flooding due to the
placement of material in the floodplain.
Following the hearing,
the hearing officer issued a report on March 13, 2001.
The
hearing officer found that Flaget Fuels had violated the
provisions of KRS 151.250, KRS 151.310, and 401 KAR 4:060 due to
its unpermitted depositing of slide material into the channel
and floodway of Brown’s Fork Creek.
The hearing officer also
recommended that Flaget Fuels be assessed a penalty of
$43,200.00.
The Cabinet Secretary adopted the hearing officer’s
report in an order entered on April 16, 2001.
Thereupon, Flaget Fuels filed a timely appeal from
this order to the Franklin Circuit Court. 2
2
After considering
See KRS 224.10-470 and KRS 151.186. The former statute
requires an appeal from a final order of the Cabinet to be taken
-4-
briefs and arguments of counsel, the circuit court affirmed the
Cabinet’s order and penalty.
The circuit court concluded that
the Cabinet’s findings were supported by substantial evidence,
that the Cabinet’s order was not clearly erroneous or in excess
of its statutory authority, and that the Cabinet applied the
appropriate factors to determine the amount of the penalty.
Flaget Fuels now appeals to this Court. 3
In Bowling v. Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet, 4 this Court set out our standard of review as
follows:
"Judicial review of an administrative
agency's action is concerned with the
question of arbitrariness." Commonwealth
Transportation Cabinet v. Cornell, Ky.App.,
796 S.W.2d 591, 594 (1990), citing American
Beauty Homes Corporation v. Louisville and
Jefferson County Planning and Zoning
Commission, Ky., 379 S.W.2d 450, 456 (1964).
to the circuit court of the county where the structure or
activity which is the subject of the complaint is located, while
the latter statute requires an appeal from a final order of the
Cabinet to be taken to the Franklin Circuit Court. In Shewmaker
v. Commonwealth, 30 S.W.3d 807 (Ky.App. 2000), this Court held
that the context of these statutes implies that KRS 224.10-470
applies to violations under Chapter 224, while KRS 151.186
applies to violations under Chapter 151. Although the Cabinet
charged Flaget Fuels with violations under Chapter 151, its
administrative process against Flaget Fuels was initiated
pursuant to KRS 224.10-420(2). Consequently, the Franklin
Circuit Court determined that it had jurisdiction over the
appeal. Neither party appeals from this conclusion.
3
4
KRS 224.10-470(2).
891 S.W.2d 406 (Ky.App. 1994).
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Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution
prohibits the exercise of arbitrary power by
an administrative agency.
Id.
In determining whether an agency's
action was arbitrary, the
reviewing court should look at
three primary factors. The court
should first determine whether the
agency acted within the
constraints of its statutory
powers or whether it exceeded
them. (citation omitted).
Second, the court should examine
the agency's procedures to see if
a party to be affected by an
administrative order was afforded
his procedural due process. The
individual must have been given an
opportunity to be heard. Finally,
the reviewing court must determine
whether the agency's action is
supported by substantial evidence.
(citation omitted). If any of
these three tests are failed, the
reviewing court may find that the
agency's action was arbitrary.
Com. Transp. Cabinet v. Cornell, 796 S.W.2d
at 594.
See also KRS 18A.100(5). Because
no arguments were addressed to the first two
factors and because we nevertheless find
them satisfied by the evidence in the
record, we focus only upon whether the
Board's final decision is supported by
substantial evidence.
"On factual issues[ ], a circuit court
in reviewing the agency's decision is
confined to the record of proceedings held
before the administrative body and is bound
by the administrative decision if it is
supported by substantial evidence." Id. at
594. "If there is any substantial evidence
to support the action of the administrative
agency, it cannot be found to be arbitrary
and will be sustained." Taylor v. Coblin,
Ky., 461 S.W.2d 78, 80 (1970). Substantial
evidence has been conclusively defined by
Kentucky courts as that which, when taken
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alone or in light of all the evidence, has
sufficient probative value to induce
conviction in the mind of a reasonable
person. Kentucky State Racing Commission v.
Fuller, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 298, 308 (1972),
citing Blankenship v. Lloyd Blankenship Coal
Company, Inc., Ky., 463 S.W.2d 62 (1970).
In weighing the substantiality of the
evidence supporting an agency's decision, a
reviewing court must hold fast to the
guiding principle that the trier of facts is
afforded great latitude in its evaluation of
the evidence heard and the credibility of
witnesses appearing before it. Kentucky
State Racing Commission v. Fuller, supra, at
308.
The former Court of Appeals in its
discussion of the substantial evidence
standard in Kentucky State Racing Commission
v. Fuller addressed at length the notion
that although a reviewing court may arrive
at a different conclusion than the trier of
fact in its consideration of the evidence in
the record, this does not necessarily
deprive the agency's decision of support by
substantial evidence. Citing Chesapeake and
Ohio Railway Company v. United States, 298
F.Supp. 734 (D.C.1969), the Court observed:
Substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion; it is
something less than the weight of
the evidence, and the possibility
of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does
not prevent an administrative
agency's finding from being
supported by substantial evidence.
Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller,
supra, at 307.
The Court underscored this
point by further stating:
Regardless of the fact that this
Court might have reached a
contrary result if it were hearing
this case de novo, it is required
on the basis of its posture as a
reviewing body to affirm the
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administrative determination. For
it must be borne in mind that it
is the exclusive province of the
administrative trier of fact to
pass upon the credibility of
witnesses, and the weight of the
evidence.
Id. at 308, citing Wheatley v. Shields, 292
F.Supp. 608 (D.C.1968). To put it simply,
"the trier of facts in an administrative
agency may consider all of the evidence and
choose the evidence that he believes." Com.
Transp. Cabinet v. Cornell, supra, at 594. 5
On the other hand, this Court is authorized to review
issues of law on a de novo basis. 6
While we will give some
deference to an agency interpretation of the regulations and the
law underlying them, the courts have the ultimate responsibility
in matters of statutory construction. 7
With this standard of review in mind, we will first
address Flaget Fuel’s argument that DOW lacks jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the violations.
Flaget Fuels points to
KRS 350.425, which provides in pertinent part:
The Kentucky Department of Surface Mining
through this chapter shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over Chapter 151 concerning the
regulation of dams, levees, embankments,
dikes, bridges, fills, or other obstructions
across or along any stream or in the
5
Id. at 409-410.
6
Aubrey v. Office of Attorney General, 994 S.W.2d 516, 519
(Ky.App. 1998).
7
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Com., Revenue Cabinet, 689 S.W.2d 14,
20 (Ky. 1985).
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floodway of any stream, which structures or
obstructions are permitted under this
chapter.
However, the preceding text in the statute relates to
regulation of coal waste piles used as dams or embankments.
KRS
350.425 specifically gives the DSMRE exclusive jurisdiction over
such structures only if the material or obstruction to the
waterway is within a permitted area.
Neither the creek channel
nor the banks of Brown’s Fork Creek are within Flaget Fuel’s
permitted area.
Furthermore, the Cabinet has the authority to
assign its duties and responsibilities to its departments except
where designated by statute. 8
Consequently we conclude that KRS
350.425 does not prohibit DOW from exercising jurisdiction over
the violation.
Flaget Fuels next argues that the Cabinet failed to
prove the charged violations.
In addition to challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence, Flaget Fuels contends that the
Cabinet failed to adequately identify the floodway of Brown’s
Fork Creek.
Since no floodway had ever been properly
determined, Flaget Fuel asserts that the hearing officer’s
finding that it improperly redeposited slide material in the
floodway was arbitrary and clearly erroneous as a matter of law.
KRS 151.250(2) provides that
8
KRS 224.10-050.
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No person, . . . shall commence the filling
of any area with earth, debris or any other
material, or raise the level of any area in
any manner, or place a building, barrier, or
obstruction of any sort on any area located
adjacent to a river or stream or in the
floodway of the stream so that such filling,
raising or obstruction will in any way
affect the flow of water in the channel or
in the floodway of the stream unless plans
and specifications for such work have been
submitted to and approved by the cabinet and
a permit issued.
Likewise, KRS 151.310 prohibits any person from
“deposit[ing] or caus[ing] to deposit any matter that will in
any way restrict or disturb the flow of water in the channel or
in the floodway of any stream” except where permitted by the
Cabinet. 9
Flaget Fuels correctly notes that DOW did not charge
it for the initial deposit of the slide material in Brown’s Fork
Creek, but for the actions it took (or failed to take) while
remediating the slide.
DOW’s notice of violation involved two
aspects of Flaget Fuel’s remediation efforts: (1) the slow
progress of those efforts (resulting in the obstruction of the
creek channel after August 28); and (2) Flaget Fuel’s actions in
depositing the material removed from the channel onto the banks
of the creek.
Flaget Fuels focuses on the second aspect of the
charged violation.
Although KRS 151.250(2) and 151.310 prohibit
9
401 KAR 4:060, also cited as a basis for the violation, sets
out stream construction criteria, including definition of the
regulatory floodway, and regulations relating to construction
and placement of materials within the floodway and floodplain.
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the unauthorized placement of material in a “floodway”, DOW’s
notice of violation charges Flaget Fuels with the authorized
placement of slide material in the creek’s “floodplain”.
KRS
151.100(6) & (7) define the terms “floodway” and “floodplain” as
follows:
(6)
The word “floodway” shall mean that area of
a stream or watercourse necessary to carry off
flood water as determined by the secretary;
(7)
The word “floodplain” shall mean the area in
a watershed that is subject to inundation.
Flaget Fuels contends that DOW used the terms
“floodway” and floodplain” interchangeably, even though they
have separate and distinct statutory definitions.
Flaget Fuels
also asserts that KRS 151.100(6) reserves the designation of a
“floodway” to the Cabinet Secretary.
Flaget Fuels argues that
it could not be charged with improperly placing slide material
within a floodway because the Secretary never designated a
floodway for Brown’s Fork Creek.
We find none of these arguments convincing.
First,
Flaget Fuel’s argument does not address the finding that it
failed to take timely action to remove the slide material from
the creek channel.
(We shall address the sufficiency of this
finding later in the opinion).
Second, the statutory
definitions of the terms “floodway” and “floodplain” support the
Cabinet’s position that the floodway is part of the floodplain,
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rather than an entirely different area as claimed by Flaget
Fuels.
Moreover, we agree with the hearing officer’s finding
that the floodway of Brown’s Fork Creek was adequately defined.
Although the notice of violation and the hearing officer’s
report refer to material left in the “floodplain” and the
“floodway”, Flaget Fuels repeatedly pointed out this discrepancy
to the hearing officer.
The hearing officer’s report focuses on
the relocation of slide material to the floodway.
Furthermore,
we agree with the following portion of the hearing officer’s
analysis:
While KRS 151.100(6) makes reference to a
determination being made by the Secretary, I
would construe this to be a determination by
representatives of the Secretary, who are
qualified by their training and expertise to
make such a determination, such as
[floodplain inspector Orville] Darvin Messer
and [DOW engineer] Art Clay. In addition,
floodway is not defined solely in KRS
151.100(6). It is defined in 401 KAR 4:060
Section 1, Subsection (20), as the stream
channel and that portion of adjacent land
area that is required to pass flood flows
without raising the base flood crest
elevation by more than one (1) foot.
The testimony from the expert witnesses established
that the floodway and floodplain of a stream cannot be defined
by a blanket rule, but can only be determined by applying the
statutory and regulatory definitions to the particular stream.
401 KAR 4:060 § 5 sets forth the criteria for determining the
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regulatory floodway boundaries.
The engineering analysis,
performed by Cabinet engineer Art Clay with information supplied
by Flaget Fuel’s engineer Myron McCoy, concluded that at least a
portion of the material relocated to the bank of Brown’s Fork
Creek was within the floodway.
In addition, Darvin Messer
testified that the slide material which Flaget Fuels placed on
the bank significantly raised the elevation on the slide side of
Brown’s Fork Creek by several feet.
Consequently, there was
substantial evidence to support the hearing officer’s conclusion
that Flaget Fuels redeposited slide material within the floodway
of Brown’s Fork Creek.
Likewise, there was substantial evidence to support
the hearing officer’s finding that Flaget Fuels blocked or
obstructed the channel of Brown’s Fork Creek.
As previously
noted, DOW did not charge Flaget Fuels with the initial slide on
July 8, 1998. 10
But following that slide, DOW and Flaget Fuels
entered into a specific reclamation plan.
Flaget Fuels points
out that its efforts to remove the slide material were hampered
because the Robertses refused to allow it access to the creek
through their property.
Nevertheless, the Cabinet inspectors
repeatedly complained throughout July and August that the
equipment which Flaget Fuels was using was too small and
10
Apparently, that slide was the subject of a separate action
before the DMSRE.
- 13 -
inefficient for the work.
When DOW issued its notice of
violation on August 28, the creek channel had been obstructed or
blocked for over eight weeks, and Flaget Fuels did not
completely clear the channel until six days later.
Furthermore,
as noted above, Flaget Fuels failed to comply with DOW’s
instructions to return the slide material to its permitted area,
but instead deposited most of the material within the floodway.
In short, there was substantial evidence to support the hearing
officer’s finding that Flaget Fuels had violated KRS 151.250(2),
KRS 151.310, and 401 KAR 4:060.
Finally, Flaget Fuels argues that the DOW’s imposition
of a civil penalty in this case was arbitrary and unsupported by
the record.
Flaget Fuels contends that it cooperated with DOW’s
remediation instructions and that it acted promptly to restore
the creek channel.
Flaget Fuels also states that it spent
$27,000.00 for removal of slide material between August 25,
1998, and February 8, 1999.
The hearing officer found
otherwise, and we are bound by that finding as it is supported
by substantial evidence. 11
KRS 151.990(1) provides that any person who violates
KRS 151.100 to 151.460 shall be liable for a civil penalty of
11
The hearing officer noted Flaget Fuel’s claimed expenditures
to remediate the slide, but also found that Flaget Fuels had
failed to present competent evidence to support those claimed
expenses.
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not more than $1,000.00 and in addition may be enjoined from
continuing said violation.
Each day upon which such violation
occurs or continues shall constitute a separate offense.
The
Cabinet has not adopted regulations setting standards for
determining the amount of such penalties.
However, in the case
of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet v.
Wendall Maggard, 12 the Secretary of the Cabinet adjudged that
penalties must be determined by considering the following
factors:
1. the seriousness of the violation, taking into account such
factors as:
a) the susceptibility of the site to environmental harm
of the type concerned in the case,
b) the physical, geographic and chronological extent of
the violation,
c) the inherent danger to the environment or human health
and safety posed by a violation of the type concerned
in the case,
d) the substantive nature of the violation, e.g.; whether
it is a reporting violation or a violation of a
substantive standard of the law or regulations, and
e) whether the violation is correctable and if so, the
type and extent of remedial efforts required to
correct the violation, taking into account any
secondary harm to the environment which may be caused
thereby;
2. the economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation;
3. the economic impact of the penalty on the violator,
including the cost of remediation;
4. the history of other violations on the site by this
violator;
5. the culpability of the violator;
6. the good faith actions of the violator to remedy the
violation, comply with the law or obey an order of the
Cabinet;
12
File No. DWM-19198-038 (June 2, 1994).
- 15 -
7. such other matters as imposition of a just penalty would
require; and
8. the number of days the Cabinet shows the violator to have
violated the law.
Flaget Fuels does not argue that any of these factors
are arbitrary or inappropriate.
The hearing officer made
detailed findings applying each of these factors.
Again, these
findings are supported by substantial evidence and will not be
disturbed on appeal.
Nonetheless, Flaget Fuels contends that DOW’s
calculation of the amount of its penalty was arbitrary and that
the amount of the penalty is excessive.
Much of Flaget Fuel’s
argument in this regard is devoted to irrelevant comparisons of
its penalty to those imposed in entirely unrelated cases.
Flaget Fuels also suggests that KRS 13A.100(1)
requires the Cabinet to promulgate regulations relating to the
penalty calculations.
That statute requires that administrative
bodies empowered to promulgate regulations
shall, by administrative regulation
prescribe, consistent with applicable
statutes: (1) Each statement of general
applicability, policy, procedure,
memorandum, or other form of action that
implements; interprets; prescribes law or
policy; describes the organization,
procedure, or practice requirements of any
administrative body; or affects private
rights or procedures available to the
public; . . .
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Flaget Fuels points out that the DSMRE has
promulgated regulations relating to its calculation of civil
penalties, 13 but DOW has not.
However, the DSMRE’s adoption of a
formula for calculating penalties does not suggest that all
agencies are required to do so.
Moreover, Flaget Fuels submits
no authority for its assertion that DOW’s failure to promulgate
a regulation adopting the Maggard factors renders its use of
those factors void.
To the contrary, 401 KAR 100.010 §3(5)(b) grants the
hearing officer discretion to calculate the amount of the
penalty, provided that the hearing officer states the reasons
for the amount of the penalty with particularity.
Indeed, the
hearing officer’s report sets out the basis for his calculation
of the penalty in detail, as follows:
In consideration of the above factors, it is
my determination that a penalty of $43,200
is warranted. I concluded that the maximum
penalty of $1,000 should be imposed from the
date the NOV [notice of violation] was
issued until the emergency was alleviated.
Hence, the $1,000 penalty should run for six
days from August 28 until September 3, for a
total of $6,000. From September 4 until
February 8, there were 158 additional days
during which the NOV was not abated. While
the emergency had been abated earlier, the
entire reclamation could have been
accomplished in much less than 158
additional days. Each month the violation
continued unabated meant that the Cabinet
expended additional man-hours monitoring the
13
See 405 KAR 7:095.
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situation. Despite repeated admonitions
from the Cabinet that the equipment on site
was not adequate, Flaget [Fuels] refused to
bring in an excavator, or demonstate that it
had attempted to secure more appropriate
equipment, until forced to by the Interim
Agreed Order. Hence, I recommend that the
per day penalty begin with a minimum penalty
of $100 per day and increase by $100 for
each month the violation remained unabated.
For the remaining days in September, I
recommend a penalty of $100 per day (27 days
x 100 = $2,700); the days in October at $200
per day (31 days x $200 = $6,200); in
November at $300 per day (30 days x $300 =
$9,000); and in December at $400 per day (31
days x $400 = $12,400). For January 1-11, I
recommend $500 a day (11 days x $500 =
$5,500). From January 12 through February
8, when the Cabinet acknowledged that Flaget
acted within the time deadlines given in the
Interim Agreed Order, I propose a minimum of
$50 per day ($50 x 28 = $1,400). The total
penalty being recommended is $43,200.
Contrary to Flaget Fuels’s argument, the hearing
officer fully justified this calculation of the penalty.
Furthermore, the amount of the penalty was well within the
amounts allowed by KRS 151.990(1).
We find nothing else in the
record to indicate that the penalty was arbitrary or
unreasonable under the circumstances.
In conclusion, therefore, we find that DOW was within
its statutory authority to issue the notice of violation and to
impose a penalty upon finding the violation.
Furthermore, the
hearing officer’s finding that Flaget Fuels had violated KRS
151.250(2) and KRS 151.310 was based upon a proper application
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of law and was supported by substantial evidence.
Likewise, the
penalty imposed by the Cabinet was supported by substantial
evidence and was not clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, the order of the Franklin Circuit Court
affirming the April 16, 2001, order by the Secretary imposing
penalties upon Flaget Fuels is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Donald Duff
Frankfort, Kentucky
Mary Stephens
Office of Legal Services
Environmental and Public
Protection Cabinet
Frankfort, Kentucky
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