WILLIE G. MAFFETT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 22, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002249-MR
WILLIE G. MAFFETT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN A. HAYDEN, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 04-CR-00286
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND HENRY, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE:
On June 17, 2004, Mickea Goatee’s 1994 Buick
LeSabre automobile was stolen from outside her apartment in
Vandenberg County, Indiana.
An officer came to the scene and
took a statement, but apparently no report was made at that
time.
A few days later, Goatee spotted her Buick out on the
roadway and again called the police, who filed a formal theft
report.
On June 28, 2004, the Buick was pulled over by police
in Henderson, Kentucky, following the report of a theft at Walmart.
Appellant, Willie Maffett, was driving the car with two
associates as passengers.
Maffett was taken into custody
because of a suspended driver’s license and an outstanding
warrant for his arrest.
He was later charged with receiving
stolen property valued over $300 and operating a motor vehicle
on a suspended license.
Maffett was convicted of both charges
as well as being a first-degree persistent felony offender by a
jury in Henderson Circuit Court.
years’ imprisonment.
He was sentenced to fifteen
This appeal follows.
First, Maffett argues that he was entitled to a
directed verdict on the receiving stolen property charge because
the Commonwealth failed to prove the value of the car and failed
to prove that he knew or had reason to know the car was stolen.
The standard for a directed verdict is well settled.
In Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991), the
Kentucky Supreme Court held that a trial court “must draw all
fair and reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth.”
A
directed verdict is inappropriate if there is sufficient
evidence to convince a reasonable juror of the defendant’s
guilt.
Id.
The trial court is required to assume the veracity
of the Commonwealth’s evidence while reserving questions of
weight and credibility to the jury.
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Id.
Upon appellate review,
the defendant must show that it was clearly unreasonable for the
jury to find guilt based on the evidence as a whole.
Id.
We find that the proof of value issue has been waived
because of Maffett’s acquiescence to the jury instructions,
which did not give the jury an option to find that the vehicle
was valued at less than three hundred dollars.
Embry v.
Commonwealth, 492 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Ky. 1973).
As to the
knowledge issue, we find ample evidence in the record sufficient
to convince a reasonable juror of guilt.
Accordingly, there was
no error.
Next, Maffett argues that the trial court erred by
allowing him to proceed as co-counsel in this case without
conducting a hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806 (1975).
In Kentucky, a trial court is under an affirmative
duty to hold a Faretta hearing when an accused attempts to make
an absolute or limited waiver of the right to counsel.
Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221, 226 (Ky. 2004).
has three Faretta duties.
Id.
Hill v.
The trial court
First, the trial court must
conduct a hearing in which the defendant testifies as to whether
the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
Id.
Second,
the trial court must warn the defendant in the hearing of the
benefits relinquished and the perils arising from the waiver of
counsel.
Id.
Finally, the trial court must make a finding on
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the record that the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent.
Id.
The failure to comply with these requirements
constitutes “structural” error to which harmless error analysis
is inapplicable.
Id. at 228.
Maffett invoked his right to self-representation at
arraignment.
The trial court appointed standby counsel to
assist him with the subpoenaing of out of state witnesses.
At
one pretrial conference, Maffett accepted the appointment of
counsel to represent him; however, counsel was permitted to
withdraw one week later.
Thereafter another public defender was
appointed to assist Maffett as co-counsel.
Maffett presented an
opening statement to the jury at trial and his counsel made
objections and examined the witnesses.
Although the trial court demonstrated an abundance of
patience and solicitude for the preservation of Maffett’s
rights, the mandates of Hill, supra, were not satisfied.
There
was no Faretta hearing and no finding on the record that
Maffett’s waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
Although we are reluctant to reward Maffet’s calculated, erratic
antics, we are constrained by precedent to remand this case for
a new trial despite the fact that Maffett’s words and behavior
in the proceedings below clearly evinced his voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent waiver.
Finally, Maffett argues that the trial court erred by
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allowing into evidence letters he had written to Mickea Goatee
and his cousin, Chuck Ray.
Maffett argues that the letters
should have been excluded because of inadequate proof of chain
of custody and that the letter to Chuck was unduly prejudicial.
Maffett does not dispute the authenticity of the
letters.
In fact, he admitted under oath at a motion in limine
to writing the letters.
Nor has Maffett made any allegation of
tampering or alteration at any time.
Items of physical evidence which are clearly
identifiable and distinguishable do not require proof of chain
of custody under KRE 901(a).
S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998).
Rabovsky v. Commonwealth, 973
Further, a perfect chain of custody
need not be established so long as there is evidence that there
is a reasonable probability that the evidence in question has
not been tampered with or altered.
Id.
There was no error in
the introduction of either letter because of chain of custody.
Finally, Maffett argues that the introduction of his
letter to Ray was error because its probative value was
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
In the letter to Ray,
Maffett encouraged him to persuade Goatee not to press charges
against Maffett and to convince her of Maffett’s version of
events.
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We find that this was competent evidence of an attempt
to induce a witness to swear falsely and tended to show guilt.
Foley v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 876, 887 (Ky. 1996).
The judgment of the Henderson Circuit Court is
reversed and remanded for a new trial.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Astrida L. Lemkins
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, KY
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
James Havey
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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