JAMES RAY JOHNSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 2, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001960-MR
JAMES RAY JOHNSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OHIO CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00069
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HENRY AND VANMETER, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
VANMETER, JUDGE:
James Ray Johnson appeals from the Ohio
Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to vacate its judgment of
conviction and sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42 and his motion for
the trial judge’s recusal.
For the following reasons, we
affirm.
Pursuant to a search warrant, the Ohio County
Sheriff’s Department searched Johnson’s home.
Based upon
several items seized during the search, Johnson was indicted on
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
August 10, 2000 of the following counts:
possession of drug
paraphernalia, possession of marijuana, trafficking in a
controlled substance (methamphetamine), possession of a handgun
by a convicted felon, and trafficking in marijuana within 1000
yards of a school.
A trial commenced on June 26, 2001, and at
the close of all of the proof, the court dismissed the count of
trafficking in marijuana within 1000 yards of a school.
Ultimately, the jury found Johnson not guilty of trafficking in
methamphetamine but guilty of the lesser-included offense of
possession of methamphetamine, as well as the remaining indicted
counts.
The court accepted the jury’s recommended sentence and
sentenced Johnson to serve five years for possession of
marijuana, five years for possession of drug paraphernalia, and
ten years for possession of methamphetamine, to run
consecutively, for a total of twenty years. 2
Johnson appealed to
the Kentucky Supreme Court, which affirmed after reviewing the
following issues:
(1) failing to instruct the jury on the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard with
respect to the firearm enhancement issue;
(2) failing to dismiss the enhancement issue
because of insufficiency of the evidence to
prove his possession of a firearm; (3)
allowing the Commonwealth to play a
videotape of the execution of the search
warrant and his arrest; (4) failing to
sufficiently cure the Commonwealth's
2
All three of these counts were enhanced by the gun possession count;
further, Johnson was given the maximum sentence for each count.
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reference to his prior guilty plea in
another case; (5) failing to properly
instruct the jury on the drug paraphernalia
charge; and (6) allowing the Commonwealth to
amend the indictment with respect to the
charge of trafficking in methamphetamine. 3
On August 18, 2004, Johnson filed pro se motions to
vacate the court’s judgment of conviction and sentence pursuant
to RCr 11.42, and to recuse the trial judge, the Honorable
Ronnie C. Dortch.
The trial court overruled Johnson’s RCr 11.42
motion, stating that his “allegations were or should have been
raised in his direct appeal and that the allegations relating to
an ineffective assistance of counsel are without substance.”
The trial court further overruled Johnson’s motion for recusal.
This appeal followed.
I.
Denial of RCr 11.42 Relief
Johnson contends that the trial court erred when it
denied his RCr 11.42 motion without holding an evidentiary
hearing.
We disagree.
An evidentiary hearing is not required
to consider issues refuted by the trial court record. 4
Because
the trial court denied Johnson’s RCr 11.42 motion without a
hearing, “our review at this time is confined to ‘whether the
[RCr 11.42] motion on its face states grounds that are not
3
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Ky. 2003).
4
Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Ky. 2001); Bowling v.
Commonwealth, 981 S.W.2d 545 (Ky. 1998); see also Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59
S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001) (court holding that the motion may be summarily
dismissed if it fails to specify grounds and supporting facts which justify
relief).
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conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true, would
invalidate the conviction.’” 5
Accordingly, we must first
determine whether the alleged errors entitle Johnson to relief
under RCr 11.42. 6
The purpose of RCr 11.42 is to provide defendants with
a means to obtain relief for errors that “rise to the level of a
constitutional deprivation of due process.” 7
It is not a
“substitute for appeal nor does it permit a review of all of the
alleged trial errors.” 8
Further, we will not disturb the trial
court’s decision unless it is clearly erroneous. 9
Johnson
alleges many instances of ineffective assistance of counsel in
support of his claim that the trial court improperly denied his
RCr 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing.
In analyzing
these alleged errors, we are compelled to follow “[t]he
two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel . . . (1)
whether counsel made errors so serious that he was not
functioning as ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and
5
Baze v. Commonwealth, 23 S.W.3d 619, 622 (Ky. 2000) (citing Lewis v.
Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1967)).
6
Hodge v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 338, 342 (Ky. 2001).
7
Commonwealth v. Basnight, 770 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Ky.App. 1989).
8
Harris v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 143, 144 (Ky. 1969).
9
Robbins v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Ky.App. 1986), overruled on
other grounds by Norton v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 175 (Ky. 2001).
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(2) whether the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” 10
In essence, “[c]ounsel is constitutionally ineffective only if
performance below professional standards caused the defendant to
lose what he otherwise would probably have won.” 11
Johnson’s first allegation is that his attorney, Jason
Pfeil, did not properly investigate the matter.
In support
thereof, Johnson asserts that Pfeil did not interview several
potential witnesses, including David Stewart, who Johnson
contends brought into his home the gun that the police found. 12
The record, however, discloses that Johnson’s daughter testified
that the gun did not belong to Johnson, but that it instead was
brought into the residence by Stewart, who took the gun out of
his boot and stashed it under the chair where the police found
it.
Thus, the testimony that Johnson complains was omitted was,
in fact, presented to the jury.
The failure to call Stewart did
not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. 13
10
Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 456-57 (Ky. 2001) (citing, inter
alia, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).
11
Foley v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 878, 884 (Ky. 2000) (quoting United States
v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992).
12
Less notably, Johnson wanted Pfeil to interview Tony and Brenda Stevens and
Ray “Bam Bam” Whitler for the proposition that the Ohio County Sheriff’s
Department had a practice of “setting people up.”
13
See Foley, 17 S.W.3d at 885 (court noting that “[d]ecisions relating to
witness selection are normally left to counsel’s judgment and this judgment
will not be second-guessed by hindsight”)(citation omitted).
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Johnson also contends that Pfeil failed to investigate
and challenge the search warrant, which he claims was
insufficient because it was based upon an unreliable, anonymous
informant’s information.
The standard for determining whether
an informant’s tip provides probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant is based upon the “totality of the circumstances”
set forth in the police affidavit. 14
In Lovett v. Commonwealth, 15
the Kentucky Supreme Court noted that
[u]nder this test, the issuing magistrate
need only “make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit
before him . . . there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of
a crime will be found in a particular
place.” [462 U.S.] at 238, 103 S.Ct. at
2332. While an informant's veracity,
reliability, and basis of knowledge are all
“relevant considerations in the totality of
the circumstances analysis,” they are not
conclusive and “a deficiency in one may be
compensated for, in determining the overall
reliability of a tip, by a strong showing
as to the other, or by some other indicia
of reliability.” Id. at 233, 103 S.Ct. at
2329. . . .
Gates also explained that a
magistrate's determination of probable cause
is entitled to “great deference” and should
be upheld so long as the magistrate,
considering the totality of the
circumstances, had a “substantial basis for
concluding that a search would uncover
evidence of wrongdoing.” Id. at 236, 103
14
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L.Ed.2d
527 (1983); Lovett v. Commonwealth, 103 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Ky. 2003).
15
Supra, note 14.
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S.Ct. at 2331 (internal quotation omitted);
Beemer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 665 S.W.2d 912,
914 (1984); see also Massachusetts v. Upton,
466 U.S. 727, 732-33, 104 S.Ct. 2085, 2087,
80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984) (reemphasizing Gates).
It is within this rubric that we evaluate
the decision of the trial court.
Typically, a bare and uncorroborated
tip received from a confidential informant,
without more, would be insufficient to
establish probable cause for a search
warrant. E.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S.
266, 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 1378, 146 L.Ed.2d
254 (2000). This is not such a case. As
stated supra, the totality of the
circumstances test requires a balancing of
the relative indicia of reliability
accompanying an informant's tip. Gates,
supra, at 234, 103 S.Ct. at 2330. Thus,
while a court may question an informant's
motives, an "explicit and detailed
description of alleged wrongdoing, along
with a statement that the event was observed
first-hand, entitles [the informant's] tip
to greater weight than might otherwise be
the case." Id.; United States v. Sonagere,
30 F.3d 51, 53 (6th Cir.1994). 16
In Lovett, the court upheld a search warrant based on
detailed, first-hand observations.
Similarly, in this case the
affidavit, signed by Deputy Sheriff Norman Payton, demonstrated
that the basis of the informant’s knowledge was his first-hand
presence and observations at Johnson’s house within a week
prior to the issuance of the search warrant, including his
observation of “a quantity of methamphetamine ‘crank’ at the
residence” and several sales made by Johnson at the residence.
16
103 S.W.3d at 77-78.
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Deputy Payton’s affidavit further stated that the confidential
informant was known to Payton, that the informant had
previously provided reliable information which resulted in
drug-related arrests, and that the Ohio County Sheriff’s
department had received 3 to 4 months’ worth of complaints from
neighbors about people coming and going at the residence at all
hours.
This affidavit clearly showed that the informant had
personal knowledge of facts constituting probable cause.
The
affidavit also sufficiently allowed the magistrate to judge the
informant’s credibility.
Thus, counsel's decision not to
challenge the search warrant was reasonable under the
circumstances. 17
Next, Johnson contends that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel because Pfeil did not file the
appropriate pretrial motions, including a motion for Dortch’s
recusal.
As the basis for this motion, Johnson asserts both
that Dortch previously prosecuted him on unrelated charges, and
that Dortch “chewed out” Johnson when he ended a live-in
17
The video record supports a conclusion that Pfeil did, in fact, investigate
the circumstances of the informant. At his initial appearance on behalf of
Johnson on March 22, 2001, Pfeil advised the trial court that a discovery
issue had arisen concerning the informant. In addition, Florida v. J.L., 529
U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000), cited by Johnson, does not
compel a different result. Factually, J.L. involved a tip from an anonymous
caller from an unknown location. The facts in the instant case, by contrast,
involve a confidential informant. See Collins v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d
113, 121 (Ky. 2004) (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
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relationship with one of Dortch’s neighbors and close friends. 18
“A motion for recusal should be made immediately upon discovery
of the facts upon which the disqualification rests.
it will be waived.” 19
Otherwise,
Here, the record indicates that Dortch was
the circuit judge who originally arraigned Johnson in August
2000.
Pfeil did not enter his appearance in the case until
March 2001.
As Johnson clearly was aware that Dortch was
assigned to the case nearly seven months before Pfeil entered
his appearance, Pfeil’s failure to move for recusal did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
Johnson’s next contention is that Pfeil was
ineffective because he did not file a motion for a speedy trial.
A defendant who does not demand a speedy trial does not waive
his right; rather, a defendant's failure to assert this right is
merely a factor “to be considered in an inquiry into the
deprivation of the right.” 20
The threshold question when
analyzing the possible denial of a speedy trial is whether there
was a presumptively prejudicial delay. 21
18
In its order denying Johnson’s pro se motion for recusal, which Johnson
filed after the Kentucky Supreme Court’s affirmance on appeal, the trial
judge acknowledged Johnson’s former assertion but denied the latter.
19
Bussell v. Commonwealth, 882 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Ky. 1994) (internal citations
omitted).
20
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 528, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2191, 33 L.Ed.2d 101
(1972).
21
Gabow v. Commonwealth, 34 S.W.3d 63, 70 (Ky. 2000).
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Here, Johnson’s right to a speedy trial attached when
formal proceedings were brought against him, 22 i.e., the August
10, 2000 indictment.
We do not believe, and Johnson has alleged
nothing to persuade us, that the delay between the indictment
and the June 26, 2001, trial was presumptively prejudicial,
especially in light of the facts that Pfeil first entered his
appearance on Johnson’s behalf on March 5, 2001, and the trial
court’s order setting the trial date was entered on April 17.
No ineffective assistance of counsel resulted from any failure
to move for a speedy trial.
Johnson’s next contention is that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel because Pfeil neither prepared
alternative jury instructions nor objected to the instructions
ultimately given to the jury.
Unquestionably, the Kentucky
Supreme Court was critical of the jury instructions in this
matter.
The Court held that the jury instructions failed to
require a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson
possessed a handgun, and failed to require a nexus between the
crime committed and the possession of the handgun. 23
Even so,
the court nevertheless found no palpable error or “manifest
injustice” since the jury instructions did contain a general
instruction that the “reasonable doubt” standard applied to the
22
Reed v. Commonwealth, 738 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Ky. 1987).
23
Johnson, 105 S.W.3d at 435-36.
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whole case. 24
In addition, the Court found that the evidence
supported the finding of a nexus between the pistol and
Johnson’s drug possession. 25
In applying these holdings to Johnson’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, we note that a palpable error is
one which upon consideration of the whole case the reviewing
court concludes that a substantial possibility exists that the
result would have been different absent the error. 26
Although
stated differently, the substantial possibility of a different
result is substantially the same as the prejudice prong of the
Strickland analysis.
We also note that the purpose of an RCr
11.42 motion is to provide means to attack a judgment which were
not available on direct appeal. 27
As Johnson’s RCr 11.42
complaints concerning the jury instructions were already
addressed on direct appeal, they are not properly the subject of
post-judgment proceedings.
The trial court did not err in
failing to grant relief.
The record also refutes Johnson’s allegation that he
was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel because Pfeil
failed to advise him of his right to testify.
Johnson testified
24
Id.
25
Id. at 436-38.
26
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d 511, 514 (Ky.App. 1986).
27
Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983).
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during penalty phase of his trial.
After expressing displeasure
at not getting to testify during the guilt phase, the following
exchange occurred between Pfeil and Johnson:
Pfeil:
Mr. Johnson, prior to your trial
getting started, I explained to you the pros
and cons of your testifying. Correct?
Johnson:
Yes sir.
Pfeil:
I also asked you if you wanted to
testify given those risks, did I not?
Johnson: You said it would be best for me
not to testify so this wouldn’t be brought
out. But he brought it out in this court
anyway.
Pfeil:
Correct?
But I did give you the choice.
Johnson:
Yes sir.
Thus, the record demonstrates that Johnson was aware of his
right to testify, 28 but voluntarily waived it.
Given Johnson’s
extensive criminal record and the fact that his two children
testified on his behalf concerning the family, the search, and
items found at the home, such as the surveillance cameras and
the police scanner, we cannot say that Pfeil’s advice to Johnson
was unreasonable.
Johnson’s next complaint, that Pfeil failed to enforce
separation of the witnesses, is also refuted by the record.
Under KRE 615(2), the Commonwealth is permitted one officer or
28
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3312, 77 L.Ed.2d 987
(1983).
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employee to be designated as its representative to sit at
counsel table. 29
In this case, Detective Phillip Ballard served
in that capacity, as demonstrated by the video record and as
conceded by Johnson.
The Commonwealth, in order, called four
witnesses: Norman Payton, David Wayne Hack, Gregory Clark, and
Ballard.
At the time Payton testified no other Commonwealth
witness was in the courtroom, other than Ballard as permitted.
Payton remained in the courtroom after testifying, but he was
not recalled to the stand.
The second witness for the
Commonwealth, David Wayne Hack from the Kentucky State Police
Crime Laboratory, entered the courtroom from outside upon being
called, and he apparently left after his testimony.
Although
the next witness, Clark, remained in the courtroom for the
testimony of Ballard, the final witness, Clark was not recalled
to the stand.
The requirement of separation of witnesses is not
violated if a witness, having testified and not being recalled,
remains in the courtroom to hear the balance of the case.
Finally, Johnson alleges Pfeil failed (1) to inquire
as to whether any jurors were tainted by a list posted in the
courthouse which stated that Johnson was charged of being a
convicted felon in possession of a handgun, despite the fact
that this charge was severed from his drug charges, (2) to
consult with Johnson in developing trial strategy and regarding
29
See Dillingham v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 377, 381 (Ky. 1999).
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jury selection, and (3) to adequately prepare for the penalty
phase of the trial.
With respect to the list of charges outside
the courtroom, the trial judge in fact inquired of the jurors
whether anyone knew Johnson, or heard or talked about the case.
Further, Johnson makes no credible allegation that any juror was
tainted by seeing this list.
An RCr 11.42 motion is not a
proper means for attempting discovery. 30
With regard to the
strategy issue, the record refutes the claim that Pfeil failed
to consult with Johnson or to develop trial strategy.
Johnson’s
own pleadings indicate that Pfeil consulted with Johnson, even
if in hindsight Johnson now thinks the amount was insufficient.
The testimony of both Johnson and his daughter, Elizabeth,
established that Pfeil consulted with Johnson and the witnesses
on a number of occasions in an attempt to develop strategy and
prepare testimony.
The record also shows that Pfeil was
actively engaged in questioning the Commonwealth’s witnesses and
presenting a defense on Johnson’s behalf.
As to the penalty
phase, Johnson argues that his work to obtain his GED in 1994,
his efforts to support his children after their mother abandoned
the family, and his caretaking of his granddaughter should have
been addressed.
The record addresses the family relationships
but contains no mention of Johnson’s 1994 GED.
However,
considering the totality of the trial, as well as Johnson’s
30
Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Ky. 2001).
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extensive criminal record, we do not believe this omission was
determinative in the sentence recommended by the jury. 31
In order for individual allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel to have a cumulative effect, the
individual allegations must have merit. 32
“Repeated and
collective reviewing of alleged errors does not increase their
validity.” 33
Johnson has failed to demonstrate any basis for his
claims that counsel's performance was deficient.
He received a
fundamentally fair trial.
Having concluded that the issues raised by Johnson are
all refuted by the record, it follows that he was not entitled
to an evidentiary hearing. 34
II.
Motion to Recuse
In addition to citing the failure to file a motion to
recuse as an example of Pfeil’s ineffective assistance as
counsel, Johnson maintains on appeal that the trial court erred
in denying his postjudgment pro se motion for Dortch’s recusal.
We disagree.
31
Id. at 441-42 (court noting that “the reviewing court must focus on the
totality of the evidence before the judge or jury and assess the overall
performance of counsel throughout the case in order to determine whether the
identified acts or omissions overcome the presumption that counsel rendered
reasonable professional assistance.”).
32
McQueen v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694, 701 (Ky. 1986).
33
Parrish v. Commonwealth, 121 S.W.3d 198, 207 (Ky. 2003).
34
Baze v. Commonwealth, 23 S.W.3d at 628.
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“A motion for recusal should be made immediately upon
discovery of the facts upon which the disqualification rests.
Otherwise, it will be waived.” 35
The record indicates that
Dortch was the circuit judge originally assigned to the case in
August 2000.
Pfeil did not enter his appearance in the case
until March 2001, and the trial began on June 26, 2001.
Johnson
claims he expressed to Pfeil his belief that Dortch should be
recused prior to the trial in the matter, but no motion for
recusal was filed until more than three years after the trial.
While authority exists that issues relating to the recusal and
appointment of a judge may be reviewed under the palpable error
rule, 36 even palpable errors may be waived. 37
Thus, the trial
court did not err in overruling Johnson’s motion, because
Johnson waived any objection to Dortch presiding over the trial
by filing an extremely untimely motion.
The Ohio Circuit Court’s order is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
35
Bussell v. Commonwealth, 882 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Ky. 1994) (internal citations
omitted).
36
Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Ky.App. 1997).
37
West v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Ky. 1989).
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James Ray Johnson
Central City, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Dennis W. Shepherd
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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