LUCIO LUNA CLEMENTE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 4, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001903-MR
LUCIO LUNA CLEMENTE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HENRY M. GRIFFIN, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00523
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE. 1
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; McANULTY, JUDGE; PAISLEY, SENIOR
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
On April 20, 2004, the appellant, Lucio
Luna Clemente, entered a plea of guilty to the crime of assault
in the first degree.
He appeals from the final judgment and
twelve-year sentence of imprisonment imposed by the Daviess
Circuit Court on August 27, 2004.
1
He also appeals from the
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by Assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
court’s order of August 19, 2004, which denied his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
Clemente, who is of Hispanic descent and speaks very
little English, claims that his interpreter failed to explain
adequately the rights he was waiving and that his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance.
As a combined result of both
problems, he argues that his plea was not voluntary, knowing, or
intelligent.
After our review of the record, we are not
persuaded by Clemente’s arguments.
Thus, we affirm.
Clemente was arrested on October 11, 2003, after
attacking Francisco Espinoza, an acquaintance, outside a bar in
Owensboro.
He stabbed Espinoza numerous times with a knife,
causing nearly fatal injuries to the victim.
He was indicted on
a charge of assault in the first degree on November 4, 2003.
At his arraignment, Clemente received appointed
counsel, Attorney Cher Eaves; he also received the service of an
interpreter, Greta Payne, designated as a competent court
interpreter by the Administrative Office of the Courts (the
AOC).
Between his arraignment and the entry of his plea of
guilty, attorney Eaves, who speaks Spanish, met with Clemente on
seven or eight separate occasions.
During at least three of her
visits with Clemente, Eaves was accompanied by Payne.
On
another occasion, Payne brought along a second interpreter -–
one skilled in translating medical terminology -– to assist her
-2-
and Eaves in communicating to Clemente the contents of the
medical records pertaining to the injuries that Espinoza
sustained in the assault.
During the Boykin 2 colloquy, the trial court, assisted
by the interpreter, took considerable time and care to determine
whether Clemente understood the rights that he was waiving and
the terms of the plea agreement that he had negotiated with the
Commonwealth.
After Clemente acknowledged that the contents of
the written agreement had been read to him, he executed the
document before the court.
The court asked several questions of Clemente relating
to the representation afforded by Eaves and the interpreting
services provided by Payne.
Without hesitation, Clemente
expressed satisfaction with both his lawyer and his interpreter.
When asked to describe the assault, Clemente
acknowledged that he had stabbed Espinoza.
He claimed that he
was drunk at the time and that he had obtained the knife from
the victim himself.
At that juncture, the trial court directly
inquired whether Clemente understood that he was giving up any
claim of self-defense.
Clemente indicated that he understood.
A few days before his scheduled sentencing hearing,
Clemente filed a motion pursuant to RCr 3 8.10 to withdraw his
guilty plea, contending that he did not understand the
2
3
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-3-
implications of his plea.
He alleged that Payne left him with a
“limited understanding of the contents of the discovery in the
case” and that she failed to “interpret correctly” during the
Boykin colloquy.
He cited Payne’s lack of certification as
proof of her “inadequacy to interpret.”
Clemente also charged
that a twelve-year sentence was unfair and that there was
insufficient evidence to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Since it was becoming apparent that Clemente was also
dissatisfied with his trial counsel, the court continued his
case to allow Clemente time to obtain new counsel.
A new
interpreter was also obtained, and an evidentiary hearing was
conducted on Clemente’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea on
August 5, 2004.
At the hearing, the trial court allowed
Clemente to amend his motion to include a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.
Clemente testified that Eaves and Payne did not read
the entire discovery materials to him.
He also claimed that
prior to his plea of guilty to the assault charge, Eaves had not
advised him of the possibility of defenses of self-defense or
extreme emotional disturbance.
He testified that if he had
known about the availability of those defenses, he would have
insisted on going to trial.
According to Clemente, Eaves told
him that the victim and the four or five persons who witnessed
-4-
the assault were prepared to testify that he instigated the
fight with the victim.
In light of the state of the evidence
against him, Eaves advised Clemente to accept the Commonwealth’s
offer of twelve years in prison.
Clemente claimed that he had a hard time understanding
Eaves and blamed her for not asking more questions of him.
He
also told the court that he did not know what questions to ask
of her.
However, he acknowledged that his dissatisfaction with
Eaves did not arise until he came into contact with other
Hispanic inmates who told him that “it wasn’t good” that he had
entered a guilty plea.
As to Payne, his translator, Clemente alleged that she
instructed him how to answer the court’s questions during the
Boykin colloquy.
As a result of her directions, he testified
that he told the court that he understood many things when in
fact he did not.
Clemente called Eaves as a witness.
She testified
that she had no trouble understanding Clemente and that she had
no reason to believe that he failed to understand any matter she
discussed with him.
She related to the court that she spoke
Spanish fluently and that she had taken Payne to their meetings
on several occasions as a “safety net” and as a facilitator due
to Payne’s ability to speak and translate faster than she could
herself.
Eaves did not preserve notes of her meetings with
-5-
Clemente; nor did she remember all the matters she discussed
with him.
However, she remembered advising Clemente that
recourse to a claim of self-defense was not viable in light of
the anticipated testimony of the victim and that of the eyewitnesses to the stabbing.
She also testified that she advised
Clemente that he should not rely on his belief that Espinoza
would not appear in court.
Eaves testified that Payne spoke excellent Spanish,
citing her nine-year tenure as a court interpreter.
She
believed that Clemente had understood the discussions that he
had with her alone as well as those in which Payne acted as an
interpreter.
She wholly denied that Clemente had been coached
by Payne during his Boykin colloquy with the court.
She
testified that prior to entering his plea of guilty, Clemente
had never raised any complaint concerning her Spanish-speaking
skills or the competency of the interpreter.
Payne testified that Eaves spoke a broken Spanish and
needed assistance in communicating technical terms.
However,
she stated that Eaves’s Spanish language skills were good enough
to enable her in her capacity as a lawyer to communicate with
her clients most of the time without the aid of an interpreter.
Payne did not remember the substance of most of the discussions
between Eaves and Clemente in which she had acted as an
interpreter.
However, she did remember Clemente’s suggestion
-6-
that the victim might not appear at trial, refuted by Eaves’s
response that the victim and several witnesses would appear and
would accuse him of starting the fight.
She also remembered
discussions concerning the possible penalties, the offers made
by the Commonwealth, and the terms of the plea agreement.
Following the presentation of evidence, Clemente’s new
interpreter viewed the videotaped recording of the Boykin
colloquy and testified that she failed to see any instance in
which Payne erred either in her interpretation of the questions
posed by the court to Clemente or in her interpretation of
Clemente’s responses.
The new interpreter also saw no
indication that Payne prompted or suggested to Clemente the
responses that he should give to the court’s questions.
In its order denying the motion to withdraw the guilty
plea, the court found as follows:
The record of the original Court colloquy
and the evidence presented in the subsequent
hearing completely refutes [sic]
[Clemente’s] claims that he did not
understand the Commonwealth’s offer and the
negotiated plea entered into in the case and
that he did not enter his plea of guilty
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.
The Court specifically asked [Clemente]
whether he waived his right to assert self
defense. He intelligently waived that
defense on the record. While no mention was
made of extreme emotional disturbance, under
the circumstances any disturbance would be
related to self protection. [Clemente] has
made no proffer in support of any other
cause of extreme emotional disturbance. The
-7-
Court further notes evidence that [Clemente]
is motivated by a desire to take advantage
of the perspective [sic] unavailability of
certain witnesses.
As he did before the trial court, Clemente argues that
his plea was not entered voluntarily, knowingly, or
intelligently.
He contends that the dialects spoken by Eaves
and Payne were unfamiliar to him, thus failing to communicate to
him the legal concepts necessary to render his plea valid.
He
also asserts that his lawyer failed to discuss any defenses with
him and that he was not provided with a “written translation of
[his] waiver and of the plea agreement.”
p. 11.)
(Appellant’s brief at
He charges that his attorney erred in failing to bring
an interpreter to all of her meetings with him and she did not
properly appreciate the potential for a defense of extreme
emotional disturbance.
Finally, he argues that his trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate the
circumstances surrounding his assault of Espinoza.
Rigdon v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 283, 287-289
(Ky.App. 2004), governs the procedure to be used by the trial
court in ruling upon a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under
RCr 8.10 as well as our appellate review of that decision:
When a criminal defendant pleads
guilty, Rule 8.10 of the Kentucky Rules of
Criminal Procedure (RCr) requires the trial
court receiving the guilty plea to determine
on the record whether the defendant is
-8-
voluntarily pleading guilty. Whether a
guilty plea is voluntarily given is to be
determined from the totality of the
circumstances surrounding it. The trial
court is in the best position to determine
the totality of the circumstances
surrounding a guilty plea. Once a criminal
defendant has pleaded guilty, he may move
the trial court to withdraw the guilty plea,
pursuant to RCr 8.10. If the plea was
involuntary, the motion to withdraw it must
be granted. However, if it was voluntary,
the trial court may, within its discretion,
either grant or deny the motion. Whether to
deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
based on a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel first requires “a factual inquiry
into the circumstances surrounding the plea,
primarily to ascertain whether it was
voluntarily entered.” The trial court’s
determination on whether the plea was
voluntarily entered is reviewed under the
clearly erroneous standard. A decision
which is supported by substantial evidence
is not clearly erroneous. If, however, the
trial court determines that the guilty plea
was entered voluntarily, then it may grant
or deny the motion to withdraw the plea at
its discretion. This decision is reviewed
under the abuse of discretion standard. A
trial court abuses its discretion when it
renders a decision which is arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by
legal principles. [Citations omitted;
emphasis original.]
Clemente contends that he did not enter a plea
knowingly and intelligently because the dialects of Spanish
spoken by Eaves (Cuban) and Payne (Argentinean) were
significantly different from his native Mexican patois.
Nonetheless, the evidence at the hearing to withdraw the plea
revealed that Clemente had no difficulty whatsoever in
-9-
understanding either his lawyer or his interpreter.
That
evidence includes the testimony of both Eaves and Payne -- as
well as that of the probation officer who interviewed Clemente
(with the help of Payne) in preparing the pre-sentence
investigation report.
Clemente did not raise any complaint with
Payne’s skills as an interpreter at any time prior to his guilty
plea; nor did he identify any specific portion of the Boykin
colloquy where the dialect utilized impeded his understanding of
the proceedings.
Most significantly, the testimony of his
second and subsequent interpreter completely undermined his
testimony that he was coached by Payne as well as his claim that
Payne misinterpreted portions of the plea proceeding.
With respect to the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, Clemente argues that Eaves failed to interview him
adequately enough to determine the actual events surrounding his
attack of Espinoza.
He contends that:
[a]s Clemente’s record stands, there is a
looming question as to whether Ms. Eves
[sic] investigated his defenses and
mitigating factors at all. There is no
indication that Ms. Eves [sic] knew that the
knife had been drawn on Clemente, not the
other way around. There is no indication in
her testimony that she took notice of any
inebriation of witnesses at the bar. There
is no indication that, despite her faith in
her ability to translate, that she even
inquired as to Mr. Clemente’s home, native
dialect, length of time in the United States
and other factors affecting his ability to
understand her. . . Clemente’s record is
-10-
silent as to whether Ms. Eves [sic] ever
inquired as to whether he was legally
registered as an alien. (Appellant’s brief
at pp. 21-22.)
Clemente also claims that Eaves failed to discuss with him the
mitigating factor of extreme emotional distress and that she
failed to communicate to him that a jury might acquit him if it
were informed that the eye-witnesses were friends with Espinoza
or related to him.
Clemente bore the burden of satisfying the two-pronged
Strickland standard as to the investigation undertaken by Eaves
and/or the matters she discussed with him during the seven or
eight encounters that they had prior to his guilty plea.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Contrary to Clemente’s contentions, the record does
not establish that he did not receive advice as to his potential
defense of self-defense.
On the contrary, there is both direct
and circumstantial evidence that Eaves fully informed him as to
the option of self-defense.
Clemente presented no evidence at the hearing that
Eaves might have uncovered exculpatory evidence if she had
engaged in a more extensive investigation of his case.
Clemente
has not alleged the existence of any witness who might have
testified that Espinoza threatened him with the knife used in
-11-
the assault.
Thus, he has failed to establish that additional
investigation would have discovered evidence to support a theory
of self-defense.
Additionally, he has not shown any prejudice
or any indication that he would have not pled guilty regardless
in order to receive the benefit of his plea agreement.
Finally, Clemente testified that at the time of the
stabbing, he was unaware that his wife and Espinoza were
involved in a relationship.
In light of his admitted ignorance
of this fact, his trial counsel cannot be blamed for failing to
advise him of a potential defense of extreme emotional
disturbance based on the extra-marital relationship.
The trial
court found that Clemente failed to meet his burden of showing
that Eaves rendered constitutionally defective representation -much less that he would have insisted on going to trial but for
her alleged errors.
See, Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-59,
106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).
We conclude that it did
not err in so finding.
Having reviewed the Boykin colloquy, we are convinced
that the trial judge fully comprehended Clemente’s reliance on
and relationship with his interpreter.
The judge took care to
speak slowly and to afford the interpreter all the time needed
to communicate every concept to Clemente and to insure that he
understood the gravity and the consequences of his plea.
The
court gave Clemente several opportunities to ask questions and
-12-
to express any concerns about his attorney, the interpreter, his
plea, and its implications.
Nothing indicated -- either in his
answers or in his demeanor -- that Clemente was confused or that
he lacked an understanding of the rights that he was waiving.
The voluntariness of Clemente’s guilty plea can be
ascertained only from the totality of the circumstances
surrounding it.
Rigdon, supra; Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 87
S.W.3d 8, 10 (Ky. 2002).
The records of both the Boykin
colloquy and of the evidentiary hearing persuade us that
Clemente entered his plea voluntarily.
In light of the evidence
against him, we conclude that Clemente obtained a very favorable
plea bargain with the Commonwealth:
twelve years in prison as
distinguished from a possible sentence of twenty years.
Accordingly, we have found no abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea.
We affirm the judgment of the Daviess Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Lisa Bridges Clare
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Dennis W. Shepherd
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
-13-
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
-14-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.