WILLIAM TODD BURNS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 4, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001857-MR
WILLIAM TODD BURNS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BILL CUNNINGHAM, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 90-CR-00001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE:
William Todd Burns appeals from orders of
the Muhlenberg Circuit Court denying his motions pursuant to CR 1
60.02, CR 59.05, and CR 52.02.
Burns is a prison inmate, and he
is seeking relief from criminal convictions and a life sentence.
We conclude that the circuit court properly denied Burns’s
motions, and we thus affirm.
On November 27, 1989, Jack Nelson was stabbed to
death.
1
Burns was charged in a grand jury indictment with
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
capital murder and first-degree robbery in connection with the
incident.
Following the indictment, the circuit court ordered
that Burns be evaluated and treated by the Kentucky Correctional
Psychiatric Center (KCPC) “as to any mental disease or defect
that may relate to his competency and criminal responsibility.”
A psychological evaluation report in the court record concludes
that Burns was both competent to stand trial and responsible for
his behavior at the time the allegations took place.
On October 3, 1990, Burns, who was represented by
counsel, signed a plea agreement with the Commonwealth.
On the
same day, Burns entered an Alford plea of guilty to murder and
first-degree robbery.
Pursuant to the agreement, the court
sentenced Burns to life in prison for murder and 20 years in
prison for first-degree robbery.
Also in accordance with the
agreement, the court ordered the sentences to be served
consecutively.
The final judgment was entered on November 9,
1990. 2
On July 22, 1994, Burns filed a motion to correct
and/or amend his sentence.
Therein, he moved the court to order
that his sentences run concurrently with each other rather than
2
Judge Dan Cornette was the circuit judge who sentenced Burns and signed the
final judgment. Judge Cornette was also the judge who signed other
postjudgment orders referred to in this opinion. Special Judge Cunningham
signed the order that is subject to this appeal.
-2-
consecutively.
The motion was granted, and the court ordered
Burns’s sentences to run concurrently.
On October 31, 1994, Burns filed a motion to vacate or
set aside the judgment pursuant to RCr 3 11.42.
The grounds
alleged in support of the motion included that his guilty plea
was not knowingly and intelligently entered and that the court
had failed to order a competency hearing despite ordering that
he be evaluated at KCPC.
In an order entered on December 8,
1994, the court denied Burns’s motion.
Burns appealed to this
court, but we later dismissed his appeal pursuant to his motion.
On June 29, 1998, Burns moved the court to vacate the
judgment pursuant to CR 60.02.
Therein, he alleged that the
court had erroneously failed to hold a competency hearing prior
to accepting his guilty plea.
That motion was denied by the
court in an order entered on July 29, 1998.
On appeal, this
court affirmed the denial.
On April 24, 2000, Burns filed another CR 60.02
motion.
The circuit court denied the motion in an order entered
on May 2, 2000.
Burns again appealed, and this court affirmed
the circuit court’s denial of the motion.
On January 11, 2001, Burns filed another motion to
vacate the judgment pursuant to CR 60.02.
The court denied the
motion in an order entered on January 26, 2001.
3
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-3-
Burns appealed,
and this court dismissed the appeal pursuant to a joint motion
to dismiss.
On January 26, 2004, Burns filed yet another CR 60.02
motion.
Therein, he alleges that his conviction and sentence
“violates due process of law since reasonable grounds existed
for the trial judge to belief [sic] that the defendant may not
have been competent at the time the court accepted the
defendant’s Alford plea.”
The circuit court denied Burns’s
motion in an order dated May 24, 2004.
On June 8, 2004, Burns filed a motion to alter, amend,
or vacate pursuant to CR 59.05 and a motion for additional
findings pursuant to CR 52.02.
The court denied those motions
in an order entered on July 1, 2004.
Burns apparently did not
receive a copy of the order since he thereafter filed a motion
for the court to rule on his earlier motions.
In an order
entered on August 30, 2004, the court again denied the motions.
This appeal by Burns followed.
KRS 504.100(3) states that “[a]fter the filing of a
report (or reports), the court shall hold a hearing to determine
whether or not the defendant is competent to stand trial.”
Although the psychological evaluation report was filed in this
case, the court did not hold such a hearing.
The requirements
of KRS 504.100(3) are mandatory, and the defendant cannot waive
them.
See Mills v. Commonwealth, 996 S.W.2d 473, 486 (Ky.
-4-
1999).
Burns argues that his conviction should be vacated and
that his case should be remanded to the circuit court for a
retrospective competency hearing.
See Thompson v. Commonwealth,
56 S.W.3d 406 (Ky. 2001).
The circuit court denied Burns’s motion on the grounds
that the issue raised was one that Burns could or should have
raised in his RCr 11.42 motion in 1994.
The court cited McQueen
v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1997), wherein the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that “Civil Rule 60.02 is not intended merely
as an additional opportunity to relitigate the same issues which
could ‘reasonably have been presented’ by direct appeal or RCr
11.42 proceedings.”
Id. at 416.
See also Gross v.
Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1983).
Having examined the record, we agree with the circuit
court’s denial of Burns’s motion.
In Burns’s RCr 11.42 motion
in 1994, he raised the issue of the court’s failure to hold a
competency hearing prior to accepting his guilty plea.
As we
have noted, the court denied his motion and Burns dropped his
appeal.
Under these circumstances, he may not now raise the
issue again.
Burns also argues that the court abused its discretion
by failing to comply with CR 59.05 and CR 52.02.
error in this regard.
-5-
We find no
The orders of the Muhlenberg Circuit Court are
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William Todd Burns, Pro Se
LaGrange Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew D. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-6-
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