DANNY LEE BATCHELOR v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 28, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2004-CA-001706-MR
DANNY LEE BATCHELOR
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BARRY WILLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-003001
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
KNOPF AND TACKETT, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
TACKETT, JUDGE:
Danny Batchelor appeals from the judgment of
the Jefferson Circuit Court finding him guilty of third-degree
rape and sentencing him to two years, six months’ imprisonment.
He entered a conditional guilty plea after the trial court
denied his motion to admit evidence of the victim’s alleged
sexual relationship with another man and his motion challenging
the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
1
For reasons
Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
which will be discussed below, we agree with the trial court’s
decision declining to find such evidence admissible under the
rape shield rule.
Further, Batchelor’s motion challenging the
trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction fails because the
indictment specifies a range of dates after his eighteenth
birthday.
Thus, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
The twelve year-old victim, J.E., was admitted to
Kosair Children’s Hospital in Louisville on July 20, 2003.
After she was found to be suffering from a severe outbreak of
genital herpes and trichomonas, the police were called to
informally interview her.
On August 7, 2003, J.E. spoke with a
detective from the Crimes Against Children Unit and described
being raped by Batchelor in the downstairs bathroom of her old
house.
She was referred to Children First where she gave a full
account of the incident to a forensic interviewer.
Batchelor was a friend of D.O. who was dating the
victim’s sister at the time of the assault.
He would accompany
D.O. to the victim’s home when D.O. visited his girlfriend, but
had little interaction with J.E. prior to the assault.
Sometime
between April 18 and May 31, Batchelor was at J.E.’s home and
her older sister, M.W., temporarily left the two of them alone
while she went upstairs to wash some clothes.
While they were
alone, Batchelor dragged J.E. into the bathroom, locked the door
and raped her.
J.E. stated that she had no prior sexual contact
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and had not engaged in sexual activity since the assault.
During the rape, J.E. observed that Batchelor’s penis was
covered in bumps.
She said that he stopped what he was doing
and pulled her pants up when he heard her sister coming back
downstairs.
Batchelor.
M.W. found J.E. locked in the bathroom with
J.E., who was clothed at the time, ran upstairs and
did not tell her sister what had happened.
M.W. noticed that
Batchelor was holding his pants and ordered him to leave their
house.
Some time later, J.E. noticed bumps around her vaginal
area and told her mother who took her to the hospital.
Officers investigating the case tried to set up an
interview with Batchelor, but he failed to show up twice.
The
case was presented to the grand jury which returned an
indictment charging Batchelor with second-degree rape.
After
his arrest, Batchelor waived his right against selfincrimination and gave a statement to the investigating
officers.
He denied having sex with J.E. and told police that
the actual perpetrator was his friend, D.O.
According to
Batchelor, J.E.’s home was a crack house, D.O. lived there with
the victim’s sister, but also had sexual relations with J.E.
with both D.O and J.E. bragging about their sexual encounters.
Batchelor said J.E. wanted him to have sex with her, but he
refused because she was dirty and a minor.
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The investigating officers followed up by interviewing
D.O.
He denied any sexual contact with the victim, and said
that he occasionally stayed the night at the house during the
three to four months when he was dating her sister, M.W.
D.O.
also told police that, according to M.W., she had caught the
victim in the bathroom with Batchelor engaging in some type of
sexual activity.
Batchelor filed a pretrial motion requesting that he
be allowed to present evidence that the victim had engaged in a
sexual relationship with D.O.
He argued that this evidence was
admissible under the rape shield rule because it would account
for the fact that a twelve year-old girl had contracted two
sexually-transmitted diseases.
motion.
The trial court denied the
Batchelor also unsuccessfully challenged the trial
court’s subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that some of the
discovery materials indicated that he was still a minor when the
sexual contact with J.E. allegedly occurred.
After both motions
were denied, Batchelor pled guilty to the amended charge of
third-degree rape, but reserved the right to appeal from the
trial court’s pretrial rulings.
This appeal followed.
Batchelor contends that evidence of an alleged sexual
relationship between D.O. and J.E. was improperly excluded in
light of the victim’s young age.
Although evidence of a rape
victim’s prior sexual conduct is generally inadmissible,
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Kentucky Rule of Evidence 412(b)(1)(B) allows such evidence if
it is “offered to prove that a person other than the accused was
the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence[.]”
During a hearing on his motion, Batchelor attempted to establish
that D.O. was the source of J.E.’s sexually-transmitted
diseases.
According to Batchelor, D.O. bragged about his sexual
relationship with J.E. to the extent that it was common
knowledge in the neighborhood.
However, D.O. and J.E. both
denied engaging in sexual activity with each other, and the only
hearsay evidence Batchelor proposed to offer was the testimony
of his niece, also twelve years old, that J.E. had talked about
having sex with D.O.
With regard to the sexually-transmitted diseases, J.E.
was diagnosed with a severe case of genital herpes and
trichomonas.
Both the victim’s sister and the appellant’s
sister had been sexually involved with D.O.
sister also had trichomonas.
The appellant’s
According to the appellant, this
proves that D.O. was the source of J.E.’s trichomonas.
evidence is deficient for several reasons.
This
First of all,
appellant’s sister did not have herpes as the victim did.
Second, D.O. spoke with police investigators and, without being
informed what diseases the victim had, he admitted that he had
gonorrhea, rather than herpes or trichomonas.
In fact, the
victim’s sister, who was dating D.O. at the time of the assault,
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also had gonorrhea, but not herpes or trichomonas.
Batchelor’s
status could not be confirmed since he refused, as a matter of
defense strategy, to be tested for STDs, and there were no
medical records showing that D.O. tested positive for herpes or
trichomonas.
The trial judge disagreed with Batchelor’s
argument that his sister provided the missing link needed to
establish that D.O. had infected J.E. with trichomonas.
Batchelor has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused
its discretion in refusing to allow evidence of an alleged
sexual relationship between J.E. and D.O.
Batchelor next argues that the trial court denied him
the right to present a defense since he could not argue that
D.O. had infected J.E. with sexually-transmitted diseases.
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.09 allows a defendant to
enter a conditional guilty plea reserving the right to appeal
from “the adverse determination of any specified trial or
pretrial motion.”
At the time of his guilty plea, Batchelor
specified that he was appealing from the trial court’s rulings
on two matters.
The first was the determination that any
evidence of an alleged sexual relationship between D.O. and J.E.
was inadmissible under the rape shield rule.
The second was the
trial court’s denial of his motion challenging subject matter
jurisdiction.
The motion to enter a conditional guilty plea
failed to specify that the trial court’s ruling regarding J.E.’s
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alleged prior sexual conduct amounted to a denial of his
constitutional right to present a defense.
Therefore, we
decline to further consider the issue.
Finally, Batchelor argues that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over him because some of the
discovery materials could be interpreted to allege that the
assault happened before his eighteenth birthday in March 2003.
We would first point out that the indictment charges Batchelor
with engaging in sexual relations with J.E. between April 18 and
May 31, 2003.
In order to preside over a case, a trial court
must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person
charged.
Malone v. Commonwealth, 30 S.W.3d 180 (Ky. 2000).
The
indictment charged the crime of second-degree rape, allegedly
committed by a person over the age of eighteen.
Circuit courts
in the Commonwealth have jurisdiction over felony cases
involving adult defendants.
Although he challenged the trial court’s subject
matter jurisdiction, Batchelor is actually arguing that the
court lacked personal jurisdiction over him since he may have
been only seventeen at the time of the charged conduct.
Thus,
he contends that the matter should have been properly handled by
the juvenile court.
He bases this claim on comments by the
victim and her mother who both stated uncertainty as to whether
he was seventeen or eighteen at the time of the offense.
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In
addition, because no one was certain of the exact date of the
offense, he argues that the discovery materials could be
interpreted to allege that J.E. was raped in mid-March, before
Batchelor’s eighteenth birthday.
March 24, 1985.
Batchelor’s date of birth is
The indictment charges Batchelor with engaging
in sexual relations with J.E. between April 18, 2003 and May 31,
2003.
Thus, even if Batchelor had properly phrased his motion
as a challenge to the trial court’s personal jurisdiction over
him, his argument would fail.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN RESULT:
While I agree with
much of the reasoning and the result of the majority opinion, I
disagree with the position taken by the Commonwealth and adopted
by the majority characterizing Batchelor’s third argument as a
challenge to the circuit court’s personal jurisdiction over him
rather than an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.
KRS
610.010(1) vests the district court with exclusive jurisdiction
“in proceedings concerning any child living or found within the
county who has not reached his or her eighteenth birthday or any
person who at the time of committing a public offense was under
the age of eighteen (18) years, who allegedly (a) [h]as committed
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a public offense prior to his or her eighteenth birthday . . . .”
The circuit court may be vested with jurisdiction over youthful
offenders only following the transfer proceedings set forth in
KRS 635.020 and KRS 640.010.
See also Humphrey v. Commonwealth,
153 S.W.3d 854 (Ky.App. 2004).
Nevertheless, the point is moot because it would not
make any difference in this case.
First, as the majority
correctly points out, the indictment charged Batchelor with
offenses allegedly committed after his eighteenth birthday on
March 24, 2003.
Therefore, the indictment is sufficient on its
face to vest jurisdiction in the circuit court.
Moreover, since
jurisdiction was properly lodged in the circuit court over the
charges against Batchelor as an adult, the circuit court could
properly exercise jurisdiction over charges arising out of the
same course of conduct.
238-39 (Ky. 2001).
Osborne v. Commonwealth, 43 S.W.3d 234,
Consequently, the circuit court could
properly exercise jurisdiction over Batchelor even if the jury
had found that he committed the offenses prior to his eighteenth
birthday.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Jason Anthony Dattilo
Louisville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew R. Krygiel
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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